













This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 





Chronometers and Chronometry on 





Emily Jane Akkermans 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of  






The University of Edinburgh 








I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that no part of this thesis has 

















First and foremost, I am extremely grateful to my supervisors, Charlie Withers, Richard Dunn 
and Megan Barford for their invaluable advice, continuous support and patience during my 
doctoral studies. I could not have wished for better supervision during the writing of my 
thesis. Each have provided superb academic support and subject specific knowledge. In 
particular, I have to thank Charlie and his red pen, which I hope has made me a better writer; 
Richard for his patience and support when I felt lost in the literature and Megan for her 
practical advice and encouragement when I felt swamped by the burden of writing.  
I also wish to thank Royal Museums Greenwich (RMG) for supporting me throughout 
this project. Special thanks in particular to Louise Devoy, for her support and encouragement 
throughout, particularly when combining the research with my work commitments proved 
more challenging than I had anticipated. Thanks also to Stuart Bligh and the research team 
in general for their understanding and allowance to continue this project alongside my work 
commitments. Thanks to Sally Archer, for her great work in the coordination of the 
Collaborative Doctoral Partnership (CDP) programme. Thanks also to Megan and Erika Jones, 
for being great team members and supportive colleagues.  
I am also very grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for the 
funding which enabled me to pursue this degree. These thanks are extended to the British 
Society for the History of Science for providing funding to travel to the Mystic Seaport, in the 
United States to attend a course in nineteenth-century celestial navigation. Thanks also to 
Frank Reed, the course instructor, who helped me interpret the navigational notebooks of 
the nineteenth century. The astronomy team at Mystic Seaport were particularly kind when 
I arrived at the museum. Thanks also to Rory McEvoy for aiding me in setting up a 
iv 
 
chronometer rating experiment, Lucas ‘Clocks’ Marijnissen for giving me the opportunity to 
restore a nineteenth century chronometer, and Niko van Keep for introducing us. 
Thanks to the library and archive staff at The National Archives, the Caird Library, The 
United Kingdom Hydrographic Archive, the Scott Polar Research Institute, the Royal Society 
and the Plymouth and West Devon Record Office. In particular, thanks to Penny Allen, Stawell 
Heard, and Martin Salmon at RMG for wonderful chats in times when archival research was 
quite isolating and to Ann-Marie Fitzsimmons, Ian Killick, Sian Padgett and Adrian Webb for 
the warm welcome and good company I always received during my visits to Taunton. In 
addition, Mike Dryland, Dorothy Mellor and Sarah Wood, as RMG horology volunteers, for 
their chronometric assistance.  
Finally, a big thanks to my fellow PhD colleagues, Cha Young Wha, Sarah Heaton, 
Jennifer Thomson, Shafrina Wan Mohd Jaafar, who helped share the burden. I also could not 
have done this without my friends and family, both at home and abroad. Last but not least, 






This thesis demonstrates how a historical geography of the chronometer can inform our 
understanding of the production and circulation of scientific knowledge at sea. The history 
and development of the marine chronometer has been a topic of considerable research.  Yet 
few studies have focused on their actual use at sea, particularly during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. This thesis aims to understand how officers, charged with the use and 
care of chronometers at sea, took up the use of these instruments and developed practices 
for the purpose of determining longitude at sea that would later become widespread. The 
thesis draws upon work in the history and historical geography of science and the history of 
technology and of navigational instruments to provide the context to its detailed empirical 
content. The thesis examines the use of chronometers on Royal Navy vessels by considering 
four detailed case studies of voyages and navigational practice between 1819 and 1836. 
These are William Edward Parry’s three attempts to find a North-West Passage; William 
Owen’s survey of the east coast of Africa, Henry Foster’s scientific expedition in the Atlantic 
and Robert Fitzroy’s survey of South America and circumnavigation. The research presents a 
detailed analysis of a broad range of archival material, including navigational notebooks, 
chronometric data books, journals, correspondence, published travel narratives and 
navigational manuals.  
The thesis pays attention to the social and institutional networks in which the users of 
these instruments operated, including a consideration of the role of the State, the Royal 
Society and the Admiralty. It considers how reforms within the Royal Navy during this period 
shaped the role of naval officers, who turned to scientific pursuits to further their naval 
careers and to their close associations with scientific societies. The thesis argues that we 
should not consider ‘longitude by chronometer’ as a single instrumental measurement easily 
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achieved, but, rather as a complex interaction of instruments and methods whose 
manipulation invoked questions of credibility and tolerance, in the instruments and in their 
users. By learning and adopting observatory techniques, officers integrated chronometers 
and astronomical techniques into established practices of navigation. This was not achieved 
through straightforward textbook instruction: these skills were learnt at sea, with the help of 
skilled astronomers. This thesis shows that techniques of data management were 
transported from the observatory to the ship between ship and shore. The Royal Observatory 
at Greenwich aided the emergence of standardised systems of numerical reduction that were 
required when using large numbers of chronometers and in order to ‘test’ one device against 
the another.  
The thesis contributes to the history of the chronometer, the history of navigation and 
the history of exploration by considering how this particular instrument was used on 
particular voyages and how its use was shaped by the navigational practices of naval men, 
the aims and ambitions of astronomers, and by the limitations of the instruments 
themselves. The methodology pursued through the detailed examination of observational 
records and data workbooks affords significant new insights in the practice of science at sea 
in the early nineteenth century and shows how navigational knowledge derived from 







This thesis examines the use of chronometers in the early nineteenth century. Chronometers, 
or marine timekeepers, were specifically designed to provide accurate timekeeping at sea to 
assist in the determination of longitude. Scholars have examined these instruments at the 
point of their invention and their technical development, and have examined the first 
voyages that were charged with testing these instruments on board ship. Little is known, 
however, about how chronometers were used in the Royal Navy in the early nineteenth 
century, specifically between 1820 and 1850, a period in which chronometers were 
considered to have become widespread in use.  
This research examines the practices that were adopted by Royal Navy officers in the 
use and management of chronometers at sea. It does so by considering four scientific 
expeditions that took place between 1819 and 1836. Due to their complicated and delicate 
mechanisms, chronometers were inherently temperamental and unreliable devices and they 
responded in different ways to the unstable environment of the ship. Despite this, officers 
were required to use them to take and record reliable navigational and longitude 
measurements at sea. Part of their use thus involved the management of the instruments on 
board ship, the training of officers in the astronomical and mathematical concepts and 
procedures that underlined their use, and instructions in how to record and manage the data 
that chronometers produced. The thesis shows that these practices differed as some officers, 
who were offered command of prestigious voyages, were issued with what were considered 
the best chronometers, ones that had been quality tested by the Astronomer Royal at the 
Royal Observatory in Greenwich. Other officers had to make do with what were considered 
‘less’ good instruments and, because of this, paid more attention to their management and 
use. In addition, some officers were better versed in astronomy and mathematics, and 
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therefore trusted to receive and make use of these instruments while other officers were 
not.  
This thesis shows that the use of chronometers remained difficult even when multiple 
chronometers were used to measure longitude. As a result, chronometers were used 
alongside astronomical methods of finding longitude, notably astronomical observations 
made on shore. The Admiralty Hydrographer would then evaluate the longitudes determined 
by these officers and select those considered more accurate in order to compile the list of 
latitudes and longitudes of ports around the globe. These important lists in turn helped 
officers using chronometers to check if their devices were working properly, as the longitude 
of the port listed could confirm the longitude measured by the chronometer. The use of 
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Chronometers and Chronometry on British Voyages of Exploration, 1819-1836 
 
The chief desideratum unquestionably is, that many ships in his majesty’s service 
should be supplied with at least one good chronometer.1  
 
Introduction 
This statement, by Royal Navy Captain Basil Hall (1788-1844), captures the state of nautical 
chronometry in 1820. In a 10-page memorandum entitled, ‘On the most effectual mode of 
supplying the navy with Chronometers’, Hall urged the Admiralty to support the supply of 
chronometers to HM vessels, to establish depots at British ports, and to cultivate more 
scientific habits among officers navigating ships. By this time, the Admiralty had increased its 
stock of chronometers for use by the Royal Navy, but they were only issued to a few ships. 
Basil Hall, like others, considered chronometers beneficial to navigation and worked to 
promote their more widespread use at sea. His statement also alludes to the central concerns 
of this thesis. Why were all ships not issued with what was considered an important tool in 
navigation? What defined a ‘good chronometer’? How did officers judge whether or not they 
had a good chronometer and what did they do if they did not? Why was this particular captain 
advocating their use?  
This thesis aims to contribute to the history of the chronometer and of chronometry 
by examining its deployment as a situated practice, something used by particular people for 
specific aims. The research is informed by a number of fields of study as well as by the 
examination in detail of various archival holdings and ships records. It draws on work in 
 
1 Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956. My Emphasis 
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historical geography on the ‘production, circulation, embodiment and governance of 
science’.2 It is also situated within the history of science and of technology, in the latter case 
relating to the provision and use of instruments of navigation. The central theme I take from 
these disciplines in what follows is a focus on the place of science: where science was 
performed and how this affected how it was conducted.3 Chronometers were used on ships, 
in observatories and on shore: these form the places of science which this thesis explores. 
Yet, science is also informed by its political and institutional context. Alongside this, my focus 
is on use. I take up David Edgerton’s suggestion that ‘invention, “technological change” and 
the “shaping of technology”’ should not be the central questions for the history of 
technology, but rather, what happens as technologies are adopted. Here, the user, rather 
than the inventor or developer, plays the central role.4 It is with issues of use – of 
chronometers at sea, on shore, in the hands of the experienced and the more novice sailor – 
that this thesis is concerned.  
 
The principal research aims 
Chronometers went to sea during the late-eighteenth century to aid in the determination of 
longitude at sea. In time, they would become a standard navigational tool until their 
replacement by the widespread adoption of satellite navigation systems such as GPS in the 
1990s.5 Several scholars have examined the early conception and development of 
 
2 Felix Driver, ‘Research in Historical Geography and in the History and Philosophy of Geography in the 
UK, 2001-2011: An Overview’, Journal of Historical Geography, 42, (2013), p. 204 
3 Adi Ophir and Steven Shapin, ‘The Place of Knowledge: A Methodological Survey’, Science in Context, 
4, (1991), pp. 3-21; Thomas Gieryn, ‘Three truth-spots’, Journal of the History of the Behavioural 
Sciences, 38, (2002), p. 113 
4 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old, Technology and Global History Since 1900’, (London: Profile 
Books Ltd, 2008), p. 211 
5 Jonathan Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, A Catalogue of Marine Chronometers at the 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 66-72 
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chronometers from the late-eighteenth century.6 For Jonathan Betts, ‘[by] the early 1820s, 
the marine chronometer had effectively come of age; even the Board of Longitude and the 
Royal Navy were now finally beginning to accept that it was the wholly practicable solution 
they had been looking for. The instrument had become standard issue to all Royal Navy 
vessels sent on voyages of exploration, but there was also now more regular demand for 
good chronometers, not just for scientific expeditions’.7 ‘By the middle of the [nineteenth] 
century’, Betts continued, ‘the use of chronometers on board ocean-going vessels was almost 
universal’.8 The period between 1820 and 1850 is commonly identified as the one in which 
chronometers went from being a scientific instrument on board voyages of exploration to a 
standard tool in navigation.9 However, while this can be claimed as an important period in 
the history of the chronometer, it seems odd that their use at sea in this period has not been 
the subject of detailed study.  
This thesis examines how specific practices on Royal Navy expeditions between 1819 
and 1836 played a significant role in the development of chronometric practices at sea. The 
principal aim of this thesis is to investigate how chronometers were used on board Royal 
Navy vessels by examining the chronometric shipboard practices through four detailed case 
studies. These are, first, William Edward Parry’s three expeditions in search of a North-West 
Passage, on board HMS Hecla and HMS Griper 1819-1820, HMS Fury and HMS Hecla 1821-
1823, and HMS Hecla and HMS Fury 1824-1825; second, William Fitzwilliam Owen’s survey 
of the East African coast in command of HMS Leven and HMS Barracouta 1821-1826; third, 
 
6 Rupert T. Gould, The Marine Chronometer: Its History and Development, (Woodbridge: The Antique 
Collectors’ Club, 2013); Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, pp. 3-72; Alan Davies, ‘The Life and 
Death of a Scientific Instrument: The Marine Chronometer, 1770-1920’, Annals of Science, 35, (1978), 
pp. 509-525 
7 Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, p. 59 
8 Ibid, p. 59 
9 William E. May, A History of Marine Navigation, (Henley-on-Thames: G. T. Foulis & Co Ltd), 1973; Jim 
Bennett, Navigation, a Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 88-89; 
Gould, The Marine Chronometer: Its History and Development, p. 131    
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Henry Foster’s British Naval Expedition to the South Atlantic on HMS Chanticleer 1828-1831; 
and, lastly, Robert Fitzroy’s survey of South America and circumnavigation on HMS Beagle 
1831-1836. The choice of case studies was in an important sense guided by the existence of 
the chronometers from these voyages within the collections of Royal Museums Greenwich 
(RMG). The RMG collection consists of over 200 marine timekeepers, for, the majority of 
which the service history of the instrument is unknown. Of the roughly 68 chronometers that 
were known with certainty to be employed in the period 1820-1850, only about 30 can be 
traced back to the captains of the ships to whom they were issued. Even when this service 
history is known, this does not mean that the documents associated with the captain or ship 
have survived, and even if they do, that the records necessarily relate to matters of 
chronometry at sea. The case studies here were selected because of the ‘thickness’ of the 
archival sources; that is, the existence of both the chronometer and of substantial 
documentation relating to its use in the collections of RMG and other repositories. This 
research therefore contributes to the material culture of science and technology by using it 
‘as both subject and source’ of the thesis.10  
The early nineteenth century was a period of naval reform. The Navy that emerged 
from the end of the Napoleonic Wars after 1815 had to adapt to a period of severe 
retrenchment and a new economy. Between 1806 and 1816, many of the Navy Boards were 
dissolved and the Navy and Victualling Boards were abolished in 1832.11 With the cessation 
of war-time activities, John Barrow, Second Secretary to the Admiralty and Council member 
of the Royal Society, advocated a series of state-sponsored scientific expeditions.12 As Don 
 
10 Richard Dunn, ‘Material Culture in the History of Science: Case Studies from the National Maritime 
Museum’, British Society for the History of Science, 42, (2009), pp. 31-33 
11 Don Leggett and James Davey, ‘Introduction: Expertise and Authority in the Royal Navy, 1800-1945’, 
Journal for Maritime Research, 16, (2014), p. 3 
12 John Gascoigne, Science and the State: From the Scientific Revolution to World War, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 84-92 
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Leggett described it, the ‘period from 1800 to 1945 saw the emergence of new forms of 
expertise, a growth in the power of many types of specialist and a large number of 
bureaucratic reforms dealing with how the Admiralty functioned’.13 The research is thus 
situated in this period of naval reform, following the chronometers on board these state-
sponsored expeditions. Scientific societies were also undergoing change. The Royal Society 
was long the dominant scientific institution for British science but new, specialist societies 
were beginning to emerge. These included the Geological Society (1807), the Astronomical 
Society (1820), the Geographical Society (1830) and the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (1831). The Board of Longitude, which grew out of the Longitude 
Act of 1714, was disbanded in 1828 and its ‘duties continued by the Resident Committee that 
replaced it’.14 By doing so, ‘the Admiralty retained [power] in the patronage of scientific 
work’.15 As I show here, it is important to consider Admiralty patronage in relation to the 
testing and issuing of chronometers on these voyages since the early development of the 
chronometer owed greatly to the work of the Board of Longitude, which, alongside the Royal 
Society, also supplied training and instruction.  
It is important to state that this research into the use of chronometers does not take 
their use for granted. I hope, rather, to consider how users were trained to ‘manipulate 
technology’ and to ask questions about the ‘rise of method in science’ and how this 
depended on instructive guides.16 One of the key themes examined is thus how officers were 
trained to use these instruments and what instructive literature was available to them. I do 
not assume that such textual guides were either necessarily definitive or unchanging. Rather 
 
13 Leggett and Davey, ‘Introduction’, p. 3 
14 Sophie Waring, Thomas Young, the Board of Longitude and the Age of Reform, Unpublished PhD, 
University of Cambridge, (2014), p. 182  
15 Waring, Thomas Young, the Board of Longitude and the Age of Reform, p. 215 
16 Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, ‘Introduction: Geography, Technology and Instruments 
of Exploration’, in: Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and 
Charles W. J. Withers, eds. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), quotes on p. 9 and p. 7 respectively 
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than assuming that officers followed such instructions to the letter, I ask how they may have 
engaged with, learned from, and even influenced the relevant guides.  
The status of an instrument is equally important, by which I mean its manufacturer 
and its association with certain qualities in its making and use. In this context, part of the 
research involves knowing whether users trusted the instruments used to generate 
navigational data, and what happened if they did not. This involves understanding the 
instrument’s status: was it considered reliable? If not, how did users deal with uncertainty? 
How did users work with chronometers that may not have functioned as they should? How 
and where were they installed on the ship? Who was allowed access to them? What skills 
were required to use them? How much knowledge did one require of the astronomical 
concepts underpinning the various methods then current in establishing longitude at sea? 
What happened when an instrument was suspected of performing poorly, or even failing? 
And how was ‘failure’ judged? These questions bring into focus the epistemological standing 
of the instruments and the data they produced and they point to questions of credibility and 
authority in their users.  
Chronometers did not work in isolation. Recent work has shown how old and new 
navigational techniques were used in conjunction with each other.17 New methods were 
trialled and developed at sea where the ‘possibilities and requirements of accuracy were 
always contingent’.18 This thesis examines how chronometers were used alongside other 
navigational techniques, old and new. In this period, navigational science increasingly 
involved astronomical and mathematical techniques which produced large quantities of data 
that required comparison and calibration. Even as it is essential to the use of chronometers, 
 
17 Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, ‘Introduction’, in: Navigational Enterprises in Europe and its 
Empires, 1730-1850, Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
p. 4 




the role of mathematics and of mathematical calculation in particular is often overlooked in 
chronometric histories. By drawing attention in what follows ‘to techniques for managing 
numbers’, I hope to shed light on how mathematical observational techniques were 
developed alongside and became embedded within navigational shipboard practices.19 I 
hope to show how this data was collected and organised by participants and how it related 
to other data collected at sea and at other sites.  
 
A note on the primary source material 
Research in historical geography and in much history of science relies on primary source 
material for its ‘ethical and epistemological credibility’.20 Archival research in a sense is the 
‘fieldwork’ of historical scholarship. While we have a range of records on the presence of 
chronometers at sea and upon the validity of the resultant data, there is, in general, a lack of 
primary sources relating to their actual use at sea. Nockolds noted this limitation in the 1960s, 
emphasising the scarcity of extant records which provide evidence of chronometric practices 
and how this absence had limited research into the ‘general adoption of the method’.21 It is 
possible, however, to determine the nature of chronometers’ use at sea by working from the 
artefact itself in association with materials held within various national and international 
repositories.   
My research focuses on documents that were initially produced by and for the State 
and its institutions, such as the Admiralty, the Board of Longitude, the Royal Society and the 
Hydrographic Office. What remains of relevant navigational documents is spread over a 
 
19 David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg and H. Otto Sibum, ‘Introduction: Observatory Techniques in 
Nineteenth-Century Science and Society’, in: The Heavens on Earth, Observatories and Astronomy in 
Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010), p. 13 
20 Thomas Osborne, ‘The Ordinariness of the Archive’, History of the Human Sciences, 12, (1999), p. 51 
21 G. W. Nockolds, ‘Early Timekeepers at Sea: The Story of the General Adoption of the Chronometer 
between 1770 and 1820’, Antiquarian Horology, 4, (1963), p. 110  
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number of repositories. For example, Cambridge University Archives hold the Royal 
Greenwich Observatory Archives containing historical records dating from 1675 to c.1980. 
The main documents relevant to the thesis are among the Papers of Astronomer Royal John 
Pond (1811-1835) and the papers of the Board of Longitude (1737-1828), and the papers of 
Astronomers Royal Nevil Maskelyne (1765-1811) and George Airy (1835-1881). The National 
Archives holds Admiralty correspondence and administrative records of the Royal Navy such 
as logbooks, journals, muster lists, charts and coastal views. The correspondence and papers 
of Sir Edward Sabine (1788-1883) includes documents relating to his use of chronometers 
during his appointment as astronomer on two Arctic expeditions between 1818 and 1820. 
Additional material produced by Sabine is held by the Royal Society (a chronometer diary 
kept on board HMS Hecla, 1819-1820) and by the Plymouth and West Devon Record Office 
(Sabine Journal and letters kept on board HMS Isabella, 1818). The astronomical and 
magnetic observations of George Fisher, astronomer on Parry’s second expedition (1821-
1823), were collected and preserved by his relatives and now form part of the archival 
holdings of RMG. His journals detail the astronomical and mathematical calculations for 
longitude and were a valuable resource for this thesis. In addition, the collection of John Lort 
Stokes (1811-1885), who served as an officer on HMS Beagle, is held within the RMG archive. 
His navigational and surveying notes composed on HMS Beagle, although relatively limited 
in their scope, comprise one of the few surviving documentary sources relating to the 
navigational practices on that vessel. Additional manuscripts relating to the Beagle were 
consulted in the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO) archive in Taunton. These 
included the Beagle’s chronometer rate book and chronometer comparison book. In total, 
this is all that remains of the chronometric practices of HMS Beagle. In sharp contrast, the 
collection of documents relating to Henry Foster’s (1797-1831) chronometrical practices, also 
at UKHO, is quite extensive and its analysis forms a significant part of this thesis. This 
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collection, comprising astronomical data books, note books and correspondence with the 
Hydrographic Office provided a comprehensive overview of day-to-day shipboard practice 
on instrumental use. These sources have hitherto not been studied by historians of science 
as they consist primarily of tabulated numerical data which can only be understood in 
relation to other source material. For students of the routine practice of navigation in 
general, or of chronometers in particular, this thesis shows how such documents can be a 
significant and valuable resource.  
In addition to the manuscript documents described above, that is, those surviving 
records which were produced at sea as a direct result of chronometric practices, I make use 
of journals, the published narratives of expeditions, correspondence, newspapers and 
literary journals, navigation manuals, printed chronometric instructions and committee 
meetings and minutes of the Admiralty, of the Board of Longitude and of the Royal Society. 
Where the shipboard documents produced by naval officers may tell us how chronometry 
was practised at sea, these sources may help us understand why these choices were made.   
 
The structure of the thesis  
Chapter 2 examines the literature on the history of the chronometer in three main areas; its 
technological history, its history in relation to navigation and its history in relation to 
maritime exploration. I then examine the disciplinary framework that has informed my 
research with particular reference to work in historical geography on the geographies of 
science, to the ‘spatial turn’ in the history of science and to matters of importance in the 
history of technology. This chapter shows how insights from recent work in these fields can 
inform a new approach to the study of navigational practices, specifically chronometry.  
Chapter 3 considers the political and cultural networks in which the officers issued with 
chronometers operated. From this point, the thesis takes, if you will, a ‘voyage-like’ structure, 
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working from the port, to departure, to sea-based practices, to land again. I start this voyage, 
on land, in order to examine the context in which officers were awarded not only the 
command of a vessel, but also the responsibility for the instruments they were commissioned 
to use. I examine the role that the Board of Longitude, the Hydrographic Office, and the 
Admiralty played in overseeing the stock, supply and testing of instruments prior to their 
purchase for Admiralty use and how they issued them to specific vessels and crews. I 
introduce the scientific expeditions that form the case studies which are my focus and 
examine the context and particular aims of each voyage, which, as I shall show, were 
commonly determined in collaboration with the Royal Society. The chapter also describes 
the inherent unreliability of the chronometers and how the notions of reliability and, thus, 
of accuracy, were both shaped internally (in the mechanical hardware of the instruments) 
and externally (in relation to the rules and regulations established for their use) and how 
these issues were managed by individuals on land and at sea.  
Chapter 4 examines the training and instruction that was given in relation to 
chronometric practices. Chronometric instructions were both surprisingly few and limited in 
their content until the early nineteenth century. Even then, as I shall show, they were often 
limited to a few rules that officers should follow. I consider where and how an officer received 
his education and training and how this training had an impact on the practices undertaken 
on their expeditions. In this context, I examine what ‘tacit knowledge’ was required for the 
chronometer to work at sea, and how this was learned if not communicated by descriptions 
and rules in manuals or textbooks. The chapter argues that there was no standardised 
method or training for officers using chronometers during this period.   
Chapter 5 investigates how the chronometer was managed at sea. Drawing on 
research which identifies problems that are inherent when travelling with instruments and 
trying to operate them ‘on the move’, I examine the structures and practices which officers 
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put in place to ensure their instruments would perform adequately. I examine the different 
approaches that were used and how users adapted their working practices based on 
experience as well as upon more ‘formal’ training. I consider how users themselves were 
trained and disciplined when using chronometers, and examine the embodied skills that 
were required in the operation of chronometers.  
Chapters 6 and 7 are similar in terms of the material examined yet different in their 
focus. Both chapters consider the importance and difficulties of keeping records and 
accounts of practice. In chapter 6, building on research emphasising the importance of the 
‘circulation of things’, I examine not only how record keeping was essential for keeping track 
of the ship from a navigational perspective, but also how such record keeping was embedded 
within a complex network of instruments, observations, observers and measurements, on 
board and on land. In short, the practice of chronometry produced volumes of data that 
required continuous monitoring. I consider why particular determinations of longitude were 
considered accurate and others not and how users determined whether their instruments 
were working correctly. The focus in this chapter is particularist and localist, in placing and 
understanding specific onboard practices. 
In chapter 7 the emphasis rests on the analysis and processing of this data. The chapter 
examines the output of the chronometer and how this data was incorporated into global 
cultures of navigation. In this chapter, the ship has returned to Britain and, once on shore, 
the accumulated data was analysed and processed, perhaps to be incorporated into revised 
versions of textual instruction. My analysis is informed by the idea of negotiation and 
agreement in science and through cycles of knowledge. Chronometers were used alongside 
other methods for determining longitude, whether ship- or land-based practices. The chapter 
takes into account other places of knowledge crucial for chronometry, and so draws 
12 
 
‘attention to place and to the connections between places’.22 In this final empirical chapter, 
I consider how a ‘cycle of navigational accumulation’ has been completed. Data has been 
collected on board ship, where an initial weeding took place. Through further mathematical 
work, the data was organised and reduced to become manageable. Finally, the data was 
processed at the Hydrographic Office where, again, it was once more collected, organised 
and reduced. Once it was assessed in relation to other data and placed in the context of the 
instructions and purpose of a subsequent voyage, the data was stabilised and could be sent 
out on voyage again. 
 
22 Charles W. J. Withers, ‘Place and the “Spatial Turn” in Geography and in History’, Journal of the 





Chronometry at Sea: The Research Context 
 
When lunar observations & chronometers were first introduced in order to determine 
the longitudes at sea, & even for many years afterwards, it was the practice of seamen 
to hold these methods in contempt; but this unworthy feeling gradually gave way to a 
more enlightened spirit, & in the present day we see officers of all ranks, taking a pride 
and satisfaction not only in availing themselves of the methods alluded to, but in 
following up a number of other liberal & scientific pursuits; connected more or less 
directly with their profession. This generous ardour to attain nautical & philosophical 
knowledge, has of late taken deep root in the navy, & seems now to want only a little 




The words above are once more from Basil Hall’s 1820 memorandum to the Admiralty. Hall 
had by this point already spent two decades at sea in the Royal Navy. Alongside his naval 
career, Hall was in several ways a man of science: an author, a member of the Royal 
Astronomical Society. He was involved in global pendulum experiments to measure the figure 
of the earth and, was an advocate for ‘voyages devoted to the “express purpose of 
research”’.2 Hall’s extract neatly describes the context in which I examine chronometry at sea 
in the early nineteenth century, amongst officers with an ‘enlightened spirit’ and following 
‘scientific pursuits’, men who have been termed ‘scientific servicemen’ by historian David 
Phillip Miller and who contributed to the growing professionalisation of science in this 
period.3 
 
1 Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956  
2 Sophie Waring, Thomas Young, the Board of Longitude and the Age of Reform, Unpublished PhD, 
University of Cambridge, (2014), p. 121 
3 David Phillip Miller, ‘The Revival of the Physical Sciences in Britain, 1815-1840’, Osiris, 2, (1986), pp. 
107-134; Randolph Cock, ‘Scientific Servicemen in the Royal Navy and the Professionalisation of 
Science 1816-1855’, in Science and Beliefs: From Natural Philosophy to Natural Science 1700-1900, 
David M. Knight, and Matthew D. Eddy, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), pp. 95–112 
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In this chapter, I start by examining how the history of the chronometer is currently 
reflected within different disciplines. The first section examines how technological, 
navigational and expeditionary histories situate and explore the chronometer and its 
development. I then turn to the literature that informs the thesis and detail how my work is 
placed within, and relates to, the themes discussed. Historical geographies of science study 
the ‘production, circulation, embodiment and governance of science’.4 I therefore examine 
these themes by turning, first, to how place shapes and defines scientific practices. Second, 
I examine how authority, credibility and trust is generated in scientific pursuits. Third, I 
consider how knowledge circulates, which relates closely to the fourth section on 
instrumentation, replication and standardisation in scientific practices. This disciplinary 
framework requires a different set of questions to be asked concerning chronometers and 
chronometric histories and puts their use, in the hands of naval officers, in focus.   
 
Chronometers and chronometry explained 
Technical Interpretations 
Considerable research has been done to describe the technological development of the 
chronometer.5 These histories discuss how the chronometer developed alongside other 
methods that were considered by the Board of Longitude as a means to accurately determine 
 
4 Felix Driver, ‘Research in Historical Geography and in the History and Philosophy of Geography in the 
UK, 2001-2011: an Overview’, Journal of Historical Geography, 42, (2013), p. 204; Thomas Gieryn, 
‘Three truth-spots’, Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, 38, (2002), p. 113; Adi Ophir 
and Steven Shapin, ‘The Place of Knowledge: A Methodological Survey’, Science in Context, 4, (1991), 
pp. 3-21 
5 Rupert T. Gould, The Marine Chronometer, Its History and Development, (Woodbridge: The Antique 
Collectors’ Club, 2013); Eric Gray Forbes, ‘The Origin and Development of the Marine Chronometer’, 
Annals of Science, 22, (1966), pp. 1-25; William J. H. Andrewes, ed. The Quest for Longitude, (Harvard 
University: Collection of Historical Scientific Instruments, 1996); Jonathan Betts, Marine Chronometers 
at Greenwich, A Catalogue of Marine Chronometers at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Alun Davies, ‘The Life and Death of a Scientific Instrument: 
The Marine Chronometer, 1770-1920’, Annals of Science, 35, (1978), pp. 509-525  
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longitude at sea and how they developed in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Gould concluded that chronometers were a ‘satisfactory solution’, Betts that the 
chronometer was ‘established as the practical means of finding longitude at sea’ by the 
1820s.6 These narratives are embedded within a land-based approach from which we learn 
in detail about the technological development of the chronometer, the personalities of the 
instrument makers, the difficulties of trials and testing and issuing rewards, and the disputes 
that accompanied them. From these histories, we learn that the chronometer came into 
general use sometime between 1825 and 1850, and consider ‘general use’ in the sense of a 
being issued to ships and used in practice.7 Quite why, and how, this occurred and with what 
variation within this period is not addressed. Nor does this literature discuss the experience 
of the navigator learning to operate these instruments. 
Popular histories of the ‘longitude problem’ commonly focus upon the technological 
development of the chronometer as the solution to ‘the longitude problem’. From this 
perspective, the chronometer went to sea because it straightforwardly allowed its users to 
determine longitude. Let us consider the terms on which success is judged in these 
‘chronometer-centric’ histories: chronometers were successful because they were reliable 
and easy to use. All navigators required was the rate and error of the chronometer, which 
was readily found by taking Equal Altitudes of the Sun. Once error and rate were determined, 
they were deducted or added to the time shown on the dial and longitude was found. 
According to these histories, this mechanical solution was superior to complex astronomical 
solutions due to its simplicity.8  
 
6 Gould, The Marine Chronometer, p. 117; Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, p. 60 
7 David S. Landes, Revolution in Time, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 155-202; 
Nicolas A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815, (London: 
Penguin Books Ltd, 2004), pp. 382-383 
8 Dava Sobel, Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of 
his Time, (London: Fourth Estate, 1996); Neil MacGregor, ‘91. Ship’s Chronometer from HMS Beagle’, 




Within work in the history of navigation we learn of the art and practice of navigation, or ‘the 
art of conducting a ship successfully from one place on the earth’s surface to another’.9 
Chronometers are introduced and examined in the context of finding longitude at sea. The 
conclusion is similar to that in popular histories: ‘the “mechanicks” had solved the problem 
which had defeated the scientists of generations’, that is, the operation of the chronometer 
in the hands of its users found longitude.10 Traditional histories of navigation focus 
predominantly on the development of those methods, maps and technologies that helped 
sailors navigate the oceans as a process of linear and sequential development.11 If such works 
help illustrate the field of navigation as diverse, they do little to help understand the 
implementation of these new technologies from the users’ or operators’ points of view. The 
challenges of using chronometers may be noted, but how responses to those challenges 
developed in practice are not examined in any depth.12 In brief, many of these works discuss 
the technological development of instruments of navigation, and tend to see the 
development of ‘modern’ devices such as the chronometers designed by Arnold and 
Earnshaw as the basis to their discussion of the many nineteenth-century examples. In such 
narratives, not only is the development of chronometry seen as ‘simply’ chronological and 
without reference to the conditioning social context, but the early nineteenth century is 
generally glossed over, treated as a period in which such chronometers as were at work were 
too expensive and too few in number to allow for general use.  
 
9 William E. May, A History of Marine Navigation, (Henley-on-Thames: G T Foulis & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 
xiii 
10 J. E. D. Williams, From Sails to Satellites: The Origin and Development of Navigational Science, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 107 
11 May, A History of Marine Navigation; Williams, From Sails to Satellites: The Origin and Development 
of Navigational Science; Charles H. Cotter, A History of Nautical Astronomy, (London: Hollis & Carter 
Ltd, 1968) 
12 May, A History of Marine Navigation, pp. 155-175 
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Other work goes into more detail about the extensive practical details involved in 
managing chronometers at sea. For Cotter, the questions of temperature variation, the 
management of the instruments, the routine of winding and the difficulties of establishing 
the rate and error were all aspects that required attention in a fuller history of 
chronometry.13 Cotter has described the astronomical observations and procedures that 
were necessary for longitude to be reckoned by chronometer. Observers were required to 
find the local time, by solving what is known as the astronomical or PZX triangle, to which 
the rules of spherical trigonometry applied. There were a variety of mathematical formulae 
to choose from and the choice was often dependent on the particular nautical tables that 
the operator used. Navigators would often stick to a method they learned by rote.14 Again, 
while the practice of chronometry at sea is recognised and the problems of chronometers’ 
use noted, the solutions that were considered and implemented in practice are not 
examined. Jim Bennett has acknowledged this and points out that although the new methods 
for finding longitude were taken up at sea, their application proved problematic in practice: 
the ‘observational and calculational techniques required for lunars had to be learnt and 
mastered’ and in this context, rather than being a straightforwardly ‘useful’ technology, 
‘chronometers had to earn the seaman’s trust and even then were very expensive’.15  
Although several studies have examined the use of chronometers at sea, the focus has 
been on the late eighteenth century and upon their use in the voyages of exploration 
commanded by James Cook (1728-1779), John Phipps (1744-1792), George Vancouver (1757-
1798), William Bligh (1754-1817), and Matthew Flinders (1774-1814), on which 
chronometers were trialled.16 These voyages tested and trialled the use of the first marine 
 
13 Cotter, A History of Nautical Astronomy, pp. 52-56 
14 Ibid, pp. 243-254 
15 Jim Bennett, Navigation, a Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 89 
16 Derek Howse, ‘Captain Cook’s Marine Timekeepers, Part I: The Kendall Watches’, Antiquarian 
Horology, 6:4, (1969), pp. 190-199; Derek Howse, ‘Captain Cook’s Marine Timekeepers, Part II: The 
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timekeepers by Larcum Kendall (1719-1790), John Arnold (1736-1799) and Thomas Earnshaw 
(1749-1829). The success of these early trials was the result of several elements in 
combination. The Board of Longitude played an important role in the introduction of 
chronometers to shipboard practices, appointed astronomers to these expeditions, and 
provided them with instructions.17 Expeditionary astronomers used a wide range of 
astronomical techniques, both at sea and on land, to determine the error and rate of the 
chronometers. Davies stressed the importance of the ‘tent observatory and the pendulum 
regulator’ for making these observations on land.18 The astronomers worked alongside 
experienced navigators who were skilled in traditional methods that remained essential in 
navigation.19 Andrew David has shown how George Vancouver’s surveys built upon a wide 
range of skills, resources, instruments and techniques.20 Here, chronometers, lunar distances 
and dead reckoning were all techniques employed to measure distances. These methods 
were based on various instructions issued by the Board of Longitude and the Admiralty and 
evident in different navigation and surveying manuals. From the early use of chronometers, 
we learn that they could be a valuable instrument, provided that their rate remained stable 
and they did not stop. These were, however, exactly the problems that users commonly 
experienced. In general, these voyages tested and trialled these early chronometers and 
 
Arnold Chronometers’, Antiquarian Horology, 6:5, (1969), pp. 276-280; Ann Savours, ‘”A Very 
Interesting Point in Geography”: The 1773 Phipps Expedition towards the North Pole’, Arctic, 37, 
(1984), pp. 402-428; John Bendall, Kendall’s Longitude, (London: Austin Macauley Publishers Ltd, 
2019) 
17 Richard Dunn and Eóin Phillips, ‘Of Clocks and Cats’, Antiquarian Horology, 34, (2013), pp. 88-93 
18 Alun C. Davies, ‘Horology and Navigation: The Chronometers on Vancouver’s Expedition, 1791-95’, 
Antiquarian Horology, 21, (1994), p. 252  
19 Jim Bennett, ‘Mathematicians on Board: Introducing Lunar Distances to Life at Sea’, British Journal 
for the History of Science, 52, (2019), pp. 65-83 
20 Andrew David, ‘Vancouver’s Survey Methods and Surveys’, in: From Maps to Metaphors: The Pacific 
World of George Vancouver, Robin Fisher, ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), pp. 51-69 
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attempted to identify which problems occurred and why.21 In addition, successful use of a 
chronometer on such a prestigious voyage could provide good publicity for the makers.  
Some studies have focused on the distribution of chronometers employed at sea.22 
May examined the early use of chronometers on East India Company (EIC) and Royal Navy 
vessels and also studied regulations concerning the issuing, testing and stocks of 
chronometers which took place on shore, as well as the regulations regarding which 
personnel were responsible for the instruments once on board the ship. Webb has 
additionally shed light on the role that the Royal Observatory and the Hydrographic Office 
played in regulating the testing, stock, supply and issuing of chronometers.23 While valuable, 




Histories of exploration tend to mention chronometers only in passing. The same conclusion 
can be found: ‘accurate navigation also depended upon the accurate measurement of time, 
which was possible thanks to Harrison’s invention of the marine chronometer; longitude at 
sea could now be determined accurately. Local time, generally noon, was determined 
astronomically by observing when the Sun was at its meridian, and this time could be 
 
21 Alun C. Davies, ‘Vancouver’s Chronometers’, in: From Maps to Metaphors: The Pacific World of 
George Vancouver, Robin Fisher and Hugh J. M. Johnston, eds. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), pp. 70-
84 
22  William E. May, ‘How the Chronometer Went to Sea’, Antiquarian Horology, 9, (1976), pp. 638-663; 
Simon C. Davidson, ‘The Use of Chronometers to Determine Longitude on East India Company 
Voyages’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 102:3, (2016), pp. 344-348; Simon C. Davidson, ‘Marine 
Chronometers: The Rapid Adoption of New Technology by East India Captains in the period 1770-1792 
on over 580 Voyages’, Antiquarian Horology, 40, (2019), pp. 76-91;  
23 Adrian Webb, The Expansion of British Naval Hydrographic Administration, 1808-1829, Unpublished 
PhD, University of Exeter, (2010); Yuto Ishibashi, ‘A Place for Managing Government Chronometers: 




compared by the chronometer with a time at a standard location, generally Greenwich’.24 
Studies of the imperial, commercial and colonial aims of oceanic exploration commonly 
consider the voyages of James Cook, William Bligh, George Vancouver, Matthew Flinders and 
Robert Fitzroy.25 Such work tends to concentrate on the context in which chronometers and 
other scientific measuring devices were used, but they do not examine those devices or their 
use in detail. In general, they focus on a region, a voyage, or an individual. The voyage of HMS 
Beagle is a good example, which generated considerable research largely in relation to 
Fitzroy’s gentleman companion, Charles Darwin (1809-1882). Under the command of Robert 
Fitzroy (1805-1865), the Beagle was provisioned with twenty-two chronometers, the largest 
number of chronometers carried by the Royal Navy on any one vessel during this period. 
Despite this, the chronometric history of this voyage has been rather overlooked and the 
aims and implications of completing a global chain of meridian distances rather glossed over. 
Rather than considering the complexities of managing twenty-two chronometers, they are 
heralded as accurate instruments where the result of the meridian distances, established 
during the five years at sea, ‘showed a discrepancy of only 33 seconds from the expected 
time’.26  
Histories of exploration and expeditionary voyages thus often reference the invention 
of the chronometer and the new ways in which longitude could be measured by the 
nineteenth century, but because they do not address the practical implementation of these 
methods, they miss the difficulties faced by their users and the complexities of practice at 
sea.  
 
24 Trevor H. Levere, Science and the Canadian Arctic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
pp. 53-54 
25 Nigel Rigby, Pieter van der Merwe, Glyn Williams, Pacific Exploration, Voyages of Discovery from 
Captain Cook’s Endeavour to the Beagle, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2018) 
26 James Taylor, The Voyage of the Beagle, Darwin’s Extraordinary Adventure Aboard FitzRoy’s Famous 





Recent work within the history of science has challenged these dominant narratives and 
shown that we should look beyond technological determinism as a solution to the longitude 
problem and that not one method can be said to have solved the problem overall.27 Thus, for 
Miller ‘we need to understand the longitude problem, and its solution, in a broader sense’ as 
the longitude ‘solution may be universalized in theory but individual determinations of 
longitude at sea were contingent acts reliant on ... ships, instruments, methods and 
procedures’.28 Put this way, we need to understand the chronometer from a different 
perspective, namely its use within the wider context of its history in maritime navigation. 
Studies on the use of chronometry at sea suggested the value of asking questions 
about their practical use. Nockolds’ 1964 paper was pioneering in this respect, although only 
recently has research addressed the issues she raised. Nockolds queried ‘who [which officers] 
were equipped with timekeepers, cared for them, rated and checked them and [what] use 
they made of them?’29 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, those who had experience 
of chronometry at sea were providing written advice based on their practice. This advice 
included where to store them, whether or not to move them, how to wind them with care, 
and how to rate them. It is interesting in this regard to find that the advice from an East India 
Company Captain differed to that from a Royal Navy Captain, perhaps because of the 
different purposes of these voyages. Stuart Jennings examined this particular aspect of 
 
27 Jim Bennett, ‘Travels and Trials of Harrison’s Timekeeper’, in: Instruments, Travel and Science: 
Itineraries of Precision from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, 
Christian Licoppe, and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 75-95; Richard Dunn and 
Rebekah Higgitt, Finding Longitude: How Ships, Clocks and Stars Helped Solve the Longitude Problem, 
(Glasgow: Collins, 2014); Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds. Navigational Enterprises in Europe 
and its Empires, 1730-1850, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 
28 David Phillip Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea: The East India Company and Longitude 
Measurements ‘in the Wild’, 1770-1840’, in: Navigational Enterprises in Europe and its Empires, 1730-
1850, Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds. (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
p. 224 
29 G. W. Nockolds, ‘Early Timekeepers at Sea’, Antiquarian Horology, 4:5, (1963), p. 149 
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experienced officers compiling instructions for the benefit of others.30 His study of Captain 
William Fitzwilliam Owen (1774-1857) showed how Owen experimented with chronometers 
during his deployment on various surveying voyages and how he communicated his 
recommendations to the Admiralty and to the Board of Longitude. William Owen had been 
commissioned to survey the east coast of Africa between 1821 and 1827, following which he 
published a list of latitudes and longitudes prefaced by an essay on the management and use 
of chronometers.31 The essay was written by a lieutenant on the voyage, Richard Owen, as a 
result of what he saw as the lack of regulation and instruction in chronometric methods, and 
an over reliance on chronometers by officers not taking proper precautions in their use.32  
Jennings explored ‘the methods, processes and hierarchies that formed around 
chronometers on an extended and challenging voyage at a time before any standard practice 
had been set for surveying voyages’.33  
Miller has examined chronometric practices within broader networks and he 
emphasised the importance of other instruments (sextants, octants, artificial horizons) in 
longitude determinations. Timekeepers were used to assist other methods such as double 
altitude observations and lunar distances. Miller showed how judgements were made ‘on 
the spot’ whilst navigating ‘in the wild’, depending on ‘the condition of the chronometers 
themselves, the success (or otherwise) with which they had been cared for at sea, the 
 
30 Stuart Jennings, ‘Chronometers on the 1821-26 Royal Navy African Survey’, Antiquarian Horology, 
40, (2019), pp. 200-214 
31 Richard Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, in: Tables of Latitude, and 
Longitudes by Chronometer, William Fitzwilliam Owen, (London; Duckworth and Ireland, 1827), pp. 3-
35 
32 The relationship between William Fitzwilliam Owen and Richard Owen is unclear. Dawson states in 
Memoirs of Hydrography that Richard was William Owen’s nephew. The entry for Richard Owen in A 
Naval Biographical Dictionary simply lists Richard Owen as the son of a clergyman from county 
Wexford, Ireland. Neither Burrows or Brown confirm this family link, which makes it more likely that 
there is none. Llewellyn S. Dawson, Memoirs of Hydrography, Part I, (Eastbourne: Henry W. Keay, 
1885), p. 126; William R. O'Byrne, A Naval Biographical Dictionary, (London: John Murray, 1849), p. 
846 
33 Jennings, ‘Chronometers on the 1821-26 Royal Navy African Survey’, pp. 206-207 
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constancy of their rates, the reliability of other longitude measures, determinations of local 
time and, crucially, how much time and effort it was worth investing in potentially 
superfluous precision’.34 Miller examined the role of the observatory, particularly Madras 
and Bombay Observatories, and even considered the ship as one of the instruments used in 
the method of dead reckoning, thus building on Richard Sorrenson’s work which described 
the ‘ship’s track [as] a representation of the probing course of the instrument through the 
sea’.35 Miller’s study also reveals the importance and role of logbooks, textbooks, The 
Nautical Almanac, maps, charts; and the institutions that supported them together with the 
skills and training navigators required to (successfully) employ these new methods at sea. 
Miller thus concluded that practices by East India Company captains were a ‘situated activity 
dependent on complex networks’.36 Instructions formed an important part in the training of 
East India Company officers. However, in spite of the instructions given regarding lunar 
observations or chronometric measurements, officers were constrained by what was 
possible in practice in a particular place and at a particular time: judgements were made ‘on 
the spot’. Miller concluded that ‘[what] techniques to employ, and how to employ them 
were, in short, practical choices ‘in the wild’.37 Similarly, Simon Werrett has demonstrated 
that navigation was a varied practice, where successful navigation was achieved through a 
‘complex process of adjudicating between methods, instruments, measurements and 
personnel.38 Werrett has shown how Russian navigators adopted British navigational 
 
34 Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea’, p. 226   
35 Richard Sorrenson, ‘The Ship as a Scientific Instrument in the Eighteenth Century’, Osiris, 11, (1996), 
p. 229 quoted in Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea’, p. 227 
36 Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea’, p. 240 
37 Ibid, p. 241 
38 Simon Werrett, ‘’Perfectly Correct’: Russian Navigators and the Royal Navy’, in: Navigational 
Enterprises in Europe and its Empires, 1730-1850, Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds. (Basingstoke 
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 126 
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practices, and equally important, British navigators benefited from Russian ‘theoretical and 
practical resources and patronage’.39 
What most of these studies have in common is a focus on the shipboard routines 
established by different users. What we learn from this is that each particular voyage used 
their chronometers in different ways. They all experienced problems using the instruments 
and dealt with these issues in their own way. How this was done depended on the perceived 
reliability of the instruments, the training and instructions received and ‘the selective pursuit 
of precision’.40 Following these lines I examine not only how chronometers were managed at 
sea, but also why certain practices were implemented. This requires me to examine the 
particular aims of each voyage, the training and educational history of the officers involved, 
and their views on the reliability of chronometers. To help in doing so, I draw on research 
from the histories and historical geographies of science. These approaches allow me to place 
the chronometer within its wider context and appreciate a more nuanced version of the 
history of the development of its use at sea, as: ‘A widely acknowledged ‘spatial turn’ across 
arts and sciences corresponds to post-structuralist agnosticism about both naturalistic and 
universal explanations and about single-voiced historical narratives, and to the concomitant 
recognition that position and context are centrally and inescapably implicated in all 
constructions of knowledge’.41 
 
Historical geographies of science 
Science has traditionally been considered placeless and universal. In this view, science 
transcended its settings to achieve an aura of truth and validity. Today, it is more common 
 
39 Werrett, ‘’Perfectly Correct’: Russian Navigators and the Royal Navy’, p. 126 
40 Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea’, p. 238, original emphasis 
41 Denis Cosgrove, ‘Introduction’, in: Mappings, Denis Cosgrove, ed. (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), 
quoted in Warf and Arias, ‘Introduction: The Reinsertion of Space into the Social Sciences and 
Humanities’, p. 1  
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to think of science as having both a history and a geography and that its placed nature can 
help explain the nature of the science in question. Historical geographers of science pay 
attention to ‘science as a cultural formation, embedded in wider networks of social relations 
and political power, and shaped by the local environments in which its practitioners carry out 
their tasks’.42 Rather than viewing science as a disembodied, universal truth awaiting 
discovery, historians of science now argue that scientific knowledge is shaped, judged and 
constructed through local values and practices.43 Empiricist interpretations of science hold 
the view that theoretical representations of the world can be tested and validated through 
observation. From this account, the ‘world is independent of how we represent it, and our 
representations may depict the world inaccurately’.44 Joseph Rouse, however, argued that 
‘science is a means . . . for constructing and improving representations of the world’.45 There 
is no independent world to represent, as the representations themselves are shaped by the 
observations that are meant to represent them. Science is consequently a situated, local, and 
social practice: ‘science has a geography [and] scientific knowledge bears the marks of 
particular locations’.46 The phrase ‘finding longitude’ neatly encapsulates an empiricist view 
of science which predominates in the historical literature concerning chronometers and 
navigation. A historical geographical approach allows the researcher to consider the sites of 
science’s making and application and the social spaces in which it was made and received 
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and so show how longitude was constructed locally and embedded globally. I thus consider 
the history of the chronometer within its spatial settings on board a ship sailing in different 
geographical locations and consider the local practices that occurred within these locations.   
 
Places of knowledge  
By acknowledging the situatedness of scientific practice, where science is ‘produced’, 
historians of science and historical geographers have illuminated how place shapes and 
defines scientific activities and how these activities in turn redefine and shape place. For 
instance, Shapin argued that we need to ‘take a close look at the culturally demarcated 
physical sites from which scientific knowledge has historically emerged’ and consider who 
had access and why, how their behaviour was guided within these spaces, what purposes 
they may have pursued and how knowledge circulated between specific sites.47 Knowledge 
is produced locally, in a specific location, but since science has to travel it need not necessarily 
remain in any one location. Science travels from place to place, from the context of its 
discovery to perhaps different contexts of justification, and it is important to investigate the 
mechanisms by which this happens to understand how local practices of knowledge become 
accepted global structures.48 Historians of science have identified that questions of authority, 
credibility and trust are similarly crucial for the circulation of knowledge and that 
instrumentation, replication of experiment and questions of precision likewise played a key 
role.  
Place can be considered as a ‘location or a site in space where an activity or object is 
located and which relates to other sites or locations because of interaction, movement and 
 
47 Stevin Shapin, Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was Produced by People with Bodies, 
Situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority, (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), p. 57 
48 Stevin Shapin, ‘Placing the View from Nowhere: Historical and Geographical Problems in the 
Location of Science’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 23, (1998), pp. 5-12 
27 
 
diffusion between them’.49 Museums, libraries, observatories are all specific sites of scientific 
activity which shape the activities that take place within and beyond their walls. The places 
where science could be practised (laboratories, observatories, museums, etc.) enhanced the 
status of the practitioner and the scientific knowledge they generated, but they may also 
have determined who was allowed to participate. With reference to botany, for the working 
classes and for women, for example, Anne Secord has shown how by the mid-nineteenth 
century, many scientific practices operated on a basis of social exclusion.50 Access to given 
sites was key: not all participants could take part in the select venues in which some sciences 
were undertaken.  
Place may also be considered a ‘series of locales or settings where everyday-life 
activities take place’, shaping the behaviour of its inhabitants and structuring their social 
interaction.51 The ship is a good example of this and has been seen as a heterotopic ‘floating 
laboratory,’ or an ‘itinerant observatory,’ in direct contact with the field site in which 
scientific activities were conducted.52 The spatial dimensions of the ship determined varying 
degrees of social and epistemic visibility, controlled access to objects and instruments of 
research, controlled the movement between workplaces and the interactions between 
people. Only gentlemen officers could walk the quarterdeck, engage in scientific pursuits at 
sea, access instruments, consult textbooks and take part in shipboard training, which often 
required admission to the captain’s cabin.  
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Place can also be understood as a particular and singular entity; ‘a unique community, 
landscape, and moral order’.53 Places are more than ‘isolated entities’; they are located in 
series of extensive economic, political, and cultural networks with varying geographical 
scope’. The venues for science may, thus, be ‘a range of sites where scientific knowledge 
might be constructed at a distance’; for example, societies, lectures tours, exhibitions, and 
publications.54 In the late eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, scientific practitioners 
operated within and across political and cultural networks. Levere described science as more 
than its context: ‘it has its inner dynamics, directed through its institutions and applied 
through instruments and concepts to an uncompromising natural world’.55 As Levere has 
shown, science played a key role in Arctic exploration and the majority of officers who 
commanded these British voyages to the region were elected Fellows of the Royal Society. 
John Barrow (1764-1848) was a fervent promotor of Arctic exploration: it held ‘the key to 
national honour, individual fame and navigational success in high latitudes’.56 In his study of 
the social organisation of science in the Arctic, Bravo argued that following the Napoleonic 
Wars (after 1815) the Royal Navy collaborated with the Royal Society in pursuing scientific 
activities within Regency Britain. Naval officers and Royal Society observers worked together, 
often using the same scientific instruments, although with different purposes in mind.57 
Bravo described this as a complex arrangement where ‘two different fields of enquiry’ were 
pursued.58 Despite having different aims, both groups used the same instruments to conduct 
similar measurements. Different experimental practices were ‘central to achieving the goals 
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of the expeditions, both in terms of geographical discovery and regulatory science’.59 The 
cooperation between Royal Society observers and Naval officers led to relationships in which 
naval officers were trained to become observers. While this is true, it is also the case that 
navigational science is generally left aside in these accounts, with the focus more often upon 
astronomy, terrestrial magnetism, hydrography, geography, natural history, geology and 
zoology.60  
Place should, therefore, be a central concern in an account of the history of 
chronometric practices. Geography is ‘a necessary prerequisite for science to even take 
place’.61 Local accomplishments are important, because they, and not universal constants, 
produce ‘evidential warrant and experimental procedure’.62 The world itself is ‘spatialized by 
science’, as it ‘creates spaces and places for its own activities’, thereby making geographies 
of science.63 The specific location in which science is made is more than just a geographical 
coordinate; it is an ‘active ingredient in social and cultural life’.64 All activities, conceptions, 
constructions and judgements relating to epistemology are informed by the social and the 
local.65 However, a focus on place is only part of the construction of knowledge as the ‘wide 
distribution of scientific knowledge flows from the success of certain cultures in creating and 
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Authority, credibility and trust in science  
A central question in the spatial history or historical geography of science is ‘how and why 
does knowledge circulate?’.67 To be considered universal truths, scientific or knowledge 
claims must somehow transcend their locality and their relation to place in order to achieve 
a ‘placeless’ validity. A field scientist, for example, must ‘create a place, situate inquiry there, 
fashion it into a truth-spot from which abstract, universal, and transcendental claims might 
soar, give beliefs a provenance’.68 This means that for the field scientist, ‘being there’ lends 
credibility to the knowledge produced in that particular location. In a laboratory, this is not 
the case. Here, the social and local aspects where the claim is produced can be seen to taint, 
and thus discredit, the claim as a universal truth. Laboratory science requires 
instrumentation, standardisation, replication, and above all, objectivity, to become ‘a place 
denied’.69 The practices should be replicated anywhere, and yield the same results, what 
Thomas Gieryn calls a ‘paradox of place and truth’. The paradox is that it is the place that 
allows the claim to transcend; it being achieved through ‘the geographic, architectural and 
rhetorical construction of a “truth-spot”’.70 The place where facts are produced lays down 
the rules by which the claim is validated. What Gieryn is urging us to do is to understand how 
knowledge claims are produced in a particular location, and then to investigate how 
mechanisms were employed for those claims to be accepted on a global scale.   
Shapin argued that a fundamental requisite in knowledge circulation is that of trust: in 
the scientist, in her or his words, and in the claims to evidence that are at any time advanced 
or written in support of an argument. This means we must look at themes relating to 
authority and credibility – at how science is practised and against what forms of judgement 
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as to its accuracy or precision – to understand how knowledge is generated in science.71 
Science at sea was a collaboration between the state, particular institutions such as the 
Admiralty and social groups operating at sea. Nineteenth-century scientific practices at sea 
operated through collaboration and with the support of scientific societies, but it was the 
Royal Navy that facilitated these opportunities in practice and particular ships’ crews that 
instantiated them.72 One element of understanding the making of science at sea and trust in 
sea-borne science is to examine the structure, influence and aims of the communities and 
individuals involved and how they operated.  
‘Disciplinarity’ is a constructivist analysis that examines how scientific disciplines are 
embedded in larger networks of power. In these terms, ‘discipline formation requires the 
consolidation of a community that shares a particular model of practice, which in turn implies 
modes of regulating behavior’.73 Golinski stressed that this ‘discipline’ simultaneously 
operated ‘as both a form of instruction to which one submits and to a means of controlling 
behaviour’.74 Knowledge production in this view is mutually constitutive: knowledge is 
constructed through the disciplining of the individual by training and instruction in a 
particular method or practice, and, at the same time, the individual is constrained and judged 
by their ability to produce the required results according to the norms of the emergent 
discipline. The institution in which an individual works, or to which an individual is affiliated, 
characterises the nature of the scientific pursuit, or the ‘particularities of practice that 
characterise it’.75 At the same time, the institution is itself shaped and consolidated by the 
pursuits of the individuals operating within its constraints. ‘Institutions are social 
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constructions in that their definitions, relationships, values and goals are negotiated by 
ordinary people in ordinary settings . . . The institution is available for multiple and not always 
consistent descriptions and explanations’.76  
Miller has shown how this applied to the navigational practices of the East India 
Company. Navigational practices on board East India Company ships were a result of their 
‘elaborate system of qualification for officers [which] ensured a fairly rigorous training’. This 
training ‘was provided through a complex network of teachers and examiners, and through 
training aboard ship, rather than a single institution’.77 It is clear from Miller’s research that 
although the institution is important in shaping the general pursuit of navigation in the East 
India Company, the specific and particular place, or even range of places, where officers were 
trained was equally, if not more, important. The training of officers to use scientific 
instruments at sea is, thus, an important aspect in the development of navigational practices 
and the credibility of the individuals involved; however, when it came to actual shipboard 
practice, ‘the navigator employed techniques that were practicable and that sufficed rather 
than those that were ideal from a theoretical, hydrographic or administrative viewpoint’.78 
Place informs not just ‘where things happen’ but also ‘how and why they happen’.79 Thus, to 
understand these practices we need to understand the practitioners, and the context in 
which they operated as this determined how they used chronometers to negotiate authority 
and expertise.  
The early nineteenth century was in many ways a transformational period in terms of 
the emergence of scientific practice at sea. Joseph Banks’ presidency of the Royal Society 
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(1778-1820) ‘marked a transition from a State which could still use the services of an outside 
gentleman expert to one which increasingly relied on professional civil servants’.80 Eóin 
Phillips has demonstrated the importance of ‘trust, visibility and discipline’ for ships’ 
captains.81 Astronomers accompanying voyages of exploration were trusted by the Board of 
Longitude to perform astronomical duties and to train others to do so to. Others were not. 
Scientific knowledge became embodied in ‘skilled people, in scientific instruments, or in the 
transactions between people and knowledge-making devices’.82 To implement the new 
technologies and methods of finding longitude more broadly across the Royal Navy required 
a transformation in how naval officers were trained so that the knowledge they produced 
and documented could be established and standardised so that both the personnel and the 
knowledge claims could be trusted.83  
The end of the Napoleonic Wars saw an increasing role for the Royal Navy in British 
science. John Barrow, Second Secretary to the Admiralty, pursued ‘the advancement of 
geography, navigation and commerce’ after 1815.84 The role of state institutions, such as the 
Admiralty, the Board of Longitude, and the Hydrographic Office, was to identify and support 
‘select individuals and relatively informal groups as trusted advisors’.85 Naval officers 
increasingly pursued scientific careers in surveying and exploration. Within the Royal Navy of 
the 1820s, they operated within the strict hierarchies of the Admiralty, although the scientific 
and navigational aims they pursued were set by bodies such as the Royal Society, the Board 
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of Longitude, and the Pendulum Committee. For Waring, the Board of Longitude was ‘a 
location of interaction for authority and expertise’.86 During this period, and certainly after 
the dissolution of the Board of Longitude in 1828, the Hydrographic Office played an 
increasingly large role in establishing these pursuits. This is not to deny that individual 
pursuits also shaped navigational science. William Edward Parry (1790-1855) attempted to 
improve surveying although it was Francis Beaufort who became a pivotal figure in co-
ordinating scientific activity within the Royal Navy.87 Basil Hall was instrumental in bringing 
about the first naval expedition solely devoted to the pursuit of the physical sciences under 
Captain Foster in 1828. Henry Kater (1777-1835), like the above a Fellow of the Royal Society, 
was instrumental in establishing guides and training for individuals.88 Thomas Young (1773-
1829), Secretary to the Board of Longitude and Superintendent of the Nautical Almanac, and 
Davies Gilbert (1767-1839), President of the Royal Society (1827-1830), likewise ‘believed 
almost exclusively in the model of scientific individualism and this shaped their management 
of state-science interaction’.89  
Waring has cautioned scholars not to consider these and other individuals a ‘well-
institutionalised or consensual scientific community in Britain’.90 Miller has linked the pursuit 
of the physical sciences in Britain between 1815 and 1840 to the ‘skills and ambitions of three 
groups – mathematical practitioners, the Cambridge network, and scientific servicemen’.91 
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The mathematical practitioners were linked to the Royal Military Academy, and the Royal 
Military College where they taught mathematics, astronomy and surveying. Banks’ influence 
at the Royal Society meant that natural philosophy was favoured over the physical sciences, 
a fact which led to a push for reform by the mathematical practitioners. The Cambridge 
Network ‘promoted institutional reforms and innovations at Cambridge University, in the 
Royal, Astronomical, and Geological societies and in the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science’.92 The scientific servicemen were members of the armed services 
employed in surveys and voyages of exploration. In the early-nineteenth century, this was ‘a 
core of naval officers . . . associated with the Admiralty Hydrographic Office [who] took an 
increasing pride in their scientific acquirements and sought recognition in the scientific 
community of the metropolis’.93   
The context in which technologies were implemented had a direct effect on how they 
were used and on their subsequent development.94 ‘Science was not one thing’, Shapin 
argued; but ‘a variety of practices whose conceptual identities were the outcomes of local 
patterns of training and socialization’.95 Similarly, for Waring, ‘while the actions of the 
military-fiscal state may have helped to construct and consolidate a scientific community 
around commissioned activities and tasks, this process of construction used highly informal 
patterns of sociability, networking, and patronage’.96 Simon Naylor examined ‘science 
through its spaces of activity and its networks of geographies’. This methodology revealed 
the invisible practitioners who helped establish methods for a tradition of science.97 Although 
Naylor’s research explored less known naturalists, chemists and astronomers as invisible 
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practitioners, rather than the ‘well-known researchers’ in a ‘traditional hagiographic 
approach to the history of science’,  I wish to draw from this approach to consider the actions 
of the ‘invisible practitioners’ of chronometry, i.e. the naval servicemen who, ‘played a very 
significant, if largely unsung, role in British science’ and remain largely invisible within the 
history of the chronometer.98  
 
Circulation of knowledge  
‘The spatial turn stressed that ideas and theories should be understood as always being 
embodied in material objects, from human bodies to books, papers, instruments, and other 
“immutable mobiles” as sociologist Bruno Latour called them’.99 Thus, science is ‘an 
embodied practice involving primarily the manipulation of things’.100 These things include 
instruments, humans, textbooks, paper, graphs, maps, and even ships: together, ‘a concrete 
collective practice of producing, assessing, and circulating material objects designated as 
carriers of natural knowledge’.101 Knowledge is thus an outcome of stabilised processes and 
the manipulation of ‘things’ in a network: ‘knowledge production displays a complex 
geography as it is both situated within particular locations and linked to other places through 
mostly circulatory movements’.102 By passing through these other places, or centres, 
geographical knowledge of other places emerges. The processes that take place at such a 
centre of calculation include ‘the mobilisation of resources, the stabilisation of new 
knowledge claims and the extension of knowledge networks of the validation, dissemination 
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and preservation of knowledge and its products’.103 The resources used to produce 
knowledge are varied; these can be books, documents, instruments, methods, observations, 
data, maps, charts and drawings. Latour considers three aspects that these resources require 
to ‘act at a distance’; that the resources are mobile, that they are stable, and that they can 
be combined to allow for accumulation and aggregation.104 Instruments, observations, 
methods, data, documents, books, maps and drawings, become ‘immutable and combinable 
mobiles’.105 Through this process, distant places are made familiar, and potentially, 
controllable.106  
Work within the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) has examined the 
mundaneness of science, ‘displaying the contingency, informality, and situatedness of 
scientific knowledge-making’.107 Science in this light, is not produced by humans with 
exceptional abilities, but by and through ‘ordinary human cognitive capacities and ordinary 
forms of social interaction’.108 By studying scientists in their daily activities, Latour examined 
how scientists used different rhetorical and epistemological devices to convince others of the 
validity of their scientific activity and to secure it as fact.109 This ‘rhetorical turn’ examines 
‘the textual and informal means by which scientists labor [sic] to persuade others, to extend 
experience from private to public domains, to assure others of their disinterestedness, to 
assert the significance of their claims, to argue that their body of knowledge is indeed 
“scientific”’.110 For those working in the field in the nineteenth century, ‘credibility was a 
matter of demonstrating in appropriate ways the epistemological and moral warrant that, if 
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properly wrought, would facilitate the circulation of their testimony and secure their 
reputational status as tellers of truth’.111 
In his Actor-Network Theory (ANT), Bruno Latour proposes that ‘instead of starting 
from universal laws – social or natural – and to take local contingencies as so many queer 
particularities that should be either eliminated or protected’, ANT encourages us to start 
locally and trace these ‘irreducible, incommensurable, unconnected localities’ and examine 
how they end up forming ‘commensurable connections’.112 ANT describes activities relating 
to the building of knowledge and has proven controversial. Critics of ANT state that it is 
‘culturally flat’, as is does not recognise that technoscience operates within the context of 
culture and practice and that trust is a central feature in science. ANT attributes not just equal 
agency to humans and non-humans, but also equal intentionality. Finally, ANT often focuses 
on heroics or failures, failing to recognise the mundane and the structures that marginalise 
others.113 According to Edwin Sayes, ANT can be seen as a tool to ‘better attend to the minute 
displacements, translations, practices, riots, processes, protests, arguments, expeditions, 
struggles and swap-meets – no matter what the actors involved may look like’, realising that 
even without intention, a non-human can and does have influence within scientific 
networks.114 This approach encourages a focus on what it was that connected determinations 
of longitudes which were conducted by different people, using different instruments, 
following different instructions, all at different locations. I have, therefore sought out 
additional materials that were used and produced within navigational and scientific 
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networks, specifically ones that have been overlooked before now, and examine how they 
interacted within these networks in bringing together these disparate elements.  
From the late eighteenth century, precision instruments were increasingly relied upon 
to bridge distances between the sites of science’s making, perhaps commonly between the 
periphery and the centre. ‘Precision’, Bourguet wrote, ‘is importantly involved in the 
commensurability of work at separated sites’.115 Authority became associated with, even 
embodied in figures, tables and graphs.116 The manpower of the Royal Navy allowed this data 
collection to be pursued on a large scale. Naval surveying, Randolph Cock pointed out, was 
‘an organised network of observers spreading precise, disciplined measurement and 
accurate maps across the globe’.117 Chronometric methods were developed within these 
practices, and as a result, were shaped by these developments as, in turn, they helped shape 
the practices with which they were associated. MacDonald and Withers conclude that ‘by the 
late eighteenth century, questions of method in an increasingly disciplined natural 
philosophy – what from the 1830s would become Science and the sciences – were predicated 
not only upon the regulation of observations and of inscription, but also upon the epistemic 
authority of numbers and of measurement’.118 The accumulated data formed both an input 
and an output. The data was ‘systemized, classified, transformed, tied together and re-
represented in order to build a strong web of associations that makes up a new knowledge 
claim’.119  
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In the context of chronometric practices at sea, exploring these avenues will provide a 
broader understanding of how data was produced at sea (by instruments that were 
considered inherently unreliable) and how it was manipulated and reconstructed to inform 
and discipline subsequent practices. 
 
Instruments, replication and precision  
Contemporary ethnographic approaches to science have studied the ways in which scientists 
perform within the laboratory and how the results they produce are exported to other 
locations through standardised instrumental practices.120 These approaches have been 
applied to historical developments of technology and science in order to explore the past 
from different perspectives. Such a social constructivist approach does not separate science 
from technology but instead focuses on how technology helped constitute science. Such an 
approach challenges the view of technology as subordinate to science, and has, as a result, 
produced the ‘technological turn’ which places both science and technology on equal footing 
and does so through a focus on instrumentation and ‘instrument epistemology’.121 Davis 
Baird argued that we need to acknowledge that instruments themselves are 
‘epistemologically important’.122 Baird considered instruments ‘on par with theory’, and, as 
such, they ‘bear knowledge. Instruments are not in the intellectual basement; they occupy 
the same floor as our greatest theoretical contributions to understanding the world’.123 
Rather, scientific instruments are ‘material products of science and technology that 
constitute our knowledge’.124 Under Baird’s terms, when thinking about ‘thing knowledge’, a 
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chronometer would fall into the category of ‘measuring instruments’. This is because of what 
they do: ‘measuring presupposes representation, for measuring something locates it in an 
ordered space of possible measurement outcomes. A representation – or model – of this 
ordered space has to be built into a measuring instrument’.125 The knowledge produced by a 
chronometer was ‘encapsulated knowledge’: the instrumental measurement was a result of 
‘effective action and accurate representation’.126  
The replication of experimental practices using these instruments to produce the 
desired results is equally important in the construction of navigational knowledge. The 
credibility of one voyage could be confirmed, adjusted or even refuted by another voyage 
replicating the same observations or measurements. Collins argues that ‘confirmatory power 
. . . seems to increase as the differences between a confirming experiment and the initial 
experiment increases’.127 Two different experiments, say an astronomical observation and a 
mechanical measurement, producing the same results, would therefore enhance the 
experiments’ confirmatory power, especially if they were performed by persons deemed 
credible to make the experiments. This is again a matter of trust. Replicating an experiment 
requires more than a device and a manual. Only certain individuals had the access to the 
training, skill and tacit knowledge that were prerequisites to performing these experiments. 
Human skill, not laws of nature, produce ‘experimental regularity’.128 Accuracy is in that sense 
an ‘administrative achievement’.129 Wynne suggested that we explore ‘what kinds of rule-
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following behaviour are involved in technologies, and how reproducible, generalizable, or 
controllable are they?’130   
Bourguet pointed out that ‘to enforce modes of commensurability between distant 
places, objects or phenomena, instruments have first to be calibrated and made comparable 
under a common standard’.131 This can be achieved through disciplinary practice. In the first 
instance this requires disciplining the makers to produce instruments according to 
standardised designs and methods. John Harrison’s marine timekeepers are a good example 
of this. For his timekeepers to work at sea, they had to ‘become commodities that could 
travel everywhere and be read by anybody’. The problem with Harrison’s timekeeper was 
that it ‘lacked a method which would allow it to become a replicable commodity’ and it was 
therefore ‘bound to the unique craftsmanship of its maker’. For Bourguet, only when the 
‘watch mechanism could be explicated and produced according to a general principle [could 
Harrison] be construed as a discoverer of an accurate and certain method’.132 The 
technological history of the chronometer testifies as to how challenging that proved to be. 
After chronometer makers Arnold and Earnshaw had achieved this, astronomers were 
required to teach the necessary skills to seamen, because they were trusted to keep accurate 
records ‘based on their mathematical and astronomical skill’.133 Precision, and the moral 
values associated with it, is a ‘cultural achievement, one rooted in the pursuit of unity’.134  
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Exploration and surveying voyages not only applied new technologies but sought to 
test the instruments themselves, in varying geographies and circumstances.135 Several 
studies have shown how experimental practices with instruments involved a continuous 
circulation of the instrument’s status: from object of investigation, to a tool for making 
measurements, almost always falling back to being an object of investigation (servicing and 
repair, rating, calibration for specific climates) before reverting to a tool again.136 Adequate 
functioning of an instrument relied on ‘outcomes that are the same or can be understood to 
be the same given an analysis of error’.137 A further problem with replication is the ability to 
determine if the experiment has been successful since the success of an experiment can only 
be determined if the experiment yields the correct results. The difficulty lies in cases where 
the result is unknown: when the existing scientific knowledge does not help to decide 
whether an experimental result is reliable, the attempt to prove scientific claims lead into an 
infinite regress: whether the experiment is implemented in a competent way or not can only 
be determined by the accuracy of the results. Yet the decision about the results depends on 
the experiment and whether it is competently conducted.138 Collins termed this 
experimenters’ regress; Meyer and Schulz-Schaeffer described it as a regress of truth.139 
From a sociologist’s point of view, the correct result, or overall truth, is not the point: the 
point is what is commonly accepted as the truth in a particular field. The ‘closure’ of a 
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controversy is a social negotiation.140 In this way, ‘precision is the result, rather than the 
cause, of consensus among scientific practitioners’.141  
Precision and accurate recordkeeping were embedded in early nineteenth-century 
science: quantification became increasingly synonymous with authority. This authority could 
be achieved through various procedures. Theodore Porter termed one of these ‘disciplinary 
objectivity’: this required consensus, evidence of expertise and appropriate conduct.142 
‘Mechanical objectivity’, in contrast, was achieved by individuals following standardised rules 
and procedures to make decisions. Practitioners would follow rules leading to ‘rigorous 
method, enforced by disciplinary peers, cancelling the biases of the knower and leading 
ineluctably to valid conclusions.’143 The values produced are therefore not objective 
knowledge, but a direct consequence of those imposing the rules and procedures that are 
followed. Through this imposition, they remake the world according to these values. 
Standardisation was critical as users became disciplined by these numbers; to achieve 
uniformity, they had to act uniformly. This reinforced administrative power: ‘if expertise 
means the authority to exercise discretion, grounded on a presumption of superior 
judgement informed by special knowledge, then trust in numbers reflects suspicion and not 
merely faith in experts’.144 Initially, numbers will require interpretations and decisions 
regarding their accuracy will need to be made. Increased quantification will eventually lead 
to official stabilised values that appear natural or evident. Quantitative objectivity requires 
us to understand ‘the intellectual formation of experts’ and ‘the social basis of authority’.145 
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What is hidden from view here is ‘the values of the people who have pursued precision, which 
people, and to what ends’.146 
With these ideas in mind, I want to argue that it is important to think of a historical 
geography of chronometry, in which we consider where it took place, how it was put to work 
and under what social and material operating conditions.  
 
A historical geography of the chronometer 
A historical geography of the chronometer that builds on the perspectives and approaches 
outlined above means examining the ‘specific circumstances of scientific practices and the 
ways in which the travel of scientists, resources, and ideas shape the production and 
circulation of scientific knowledge’.147  As noted, a central theme in the history of science is 
that of the circulation of scientific knowledge. The thematic approach of the thesis reflects 
this. Although the focus of the thesis is to examine actual ship-board practices, this approach 
allows me to consider these practices in relation to the broader context of science, naval 
training and navigational instructions in the early nineteenth century. An argument based on 
technological determinism would propose that the introduction of chronometers ‘forced 
social adaptions’ through their use at sea.148 But by applying a Social Constructivist of 
Technology (SCOT) analysis, I hope to illuminate the role of the users in the history of 
chronometry since ‘the success of an artifact depends upon the strength and size of the group 
that takes it up and promotes it’.149 The history of the chronometer will therefore become a 
more global one, as we visit distant places where they were put to use, and a more timeless 
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one, as we consider how old and new technologies existed and were used alongside one 
another.150  
What follows is thus a historiography and a historical geography of the chronometer 
that examines the ‘chronometer in action’. Drawing on the work from Bruno Latour, I shall 
follow the chronometer from Greenwich, to sea, and back again.151 By taking this approach I 
wish to draw attention to more than just the instruments and those using them, and to take 
into account the ‘background assumptions, methodologies, techniques, social rules and 
institutions, routines, experiments, measurements, and the appropriate instruments as well 
as scientific texts’.152
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Testing and Trialling: The Royal Observatory and the Authority of Astronomers 
 
The first object of this establishment would be, to procure a certain number of good 
chronometers; which would be done by the officer in charge, in conjunction with the 
Board of Longitude. These chronometers would be instantly exposed to severe & 
deliberate scrutiny, & would not be sent on board ship till their merits were fully 
ascertained. All chronometers at present belonging to the Admiralty would be sent to 
the depot, & whenever a ship came to anchor her chronometer should be sent there 
also; and officers ought to be allowed the advantage of sending any which belonged 
to themselves, if they chose to do so.1 
 
Introduction  
Basil Hall’s concern regarding the regulation of chronometers was not uncommon in this 
period; the Admiralty did not do enough to support chronometer use at sea. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, the efforts of Arnold and Earnshaw in particular, with financial 
support from the Board of Longitude, had led to an increase in the number of chronometers 
produced. Specifically, Arnold’s technical improvements combined with Earnshaw’s large-
scale production method allowed larger production numbers that could be sold at a lower 
cost. By the first two decades of the nineteenth century, however, production numbers were 
still low and demand continued to outweigh supply. Despite what some contemporary 
writers perceived as a lack of support from the Admiralty, financial support from the Board 
of Longitude and the Admiralty had been crucial to chronometer makers in these early years.2 
By 1842, this had changed: ‘it [the chronometer] is no longer dependent upon government 
patronage: the universal conviction of its importance and utility has so increased the demand 
 
1 Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956 
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48 
 
as to secure vigorous competition on the part of the artist, and render it an article of 
commerce’.3 This was not a natural progression as patronage remained a central issue for 
the success of chronometers during the 1820s. This lack of support did not relate only to 
chronometers, as the Admiralty did not do enough to implement standards and procedures 
that would improve navigation overall. In 1808, commanding officers of vessels, or those 
officers in charge of navigating the ship, were expected to buy their own instruments 
including sextants, octants, quadrants and chart. These were in general only available on the 
private market until the establishment of the Hydrographic Office, although the Navy Board 
and the Board of Longitude did lend some instruments.4  
This chapter explores how developments both internal and external were shaped by 
astronomers, mathematicians, navigators, captains, and surveyors. I argue that we should 
consider additional factors that led to widespread chronometer use at sea, rather than just 
considering this as a matter of supply and demand. Chronometers had been introduced and 
used on Royal Navy vessels during the last decades of the eighteenth century. Although they 
were perceived as beneficial to navigation, problems concerning their use remained. 
Practical experience of chronometers helped officers evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of these instruments and transformed how chronometers were tested on land and used at 
sea. 
The relationship between clockmakers and the Board of Longitude in the late 
eighteenth century was characterised by tension. Phillips described how in the eighteenth 
century these tensions were caused by the transition from ‘a reliance on the authority of 
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master in the [clockmakers’] trade to assess their own skill and the skill of the trade, the new 
standard set to solve the problem of longitude now seemed to want to move such control 
from the trade, to institutions and personnel associated with the state’.5 The new standards 
were astronomical ones; control lay solely in the hands of astronomers, predominantly 
Greenwich ones. The problem was that chronometers remained inherently unreliable, and 
thus difficult to use. 
The Greenwich Premium trials, instigated in 1822, were established to encourage 
chronometer makers to improve their instruments. The best performing instruments were 
guaranteed purchase by the Admiralty at premium prices. The Admiralty’s plan was to 
establish a performance-based testing system, allowing them to select the best performing 
instruments for the growing number of scientific expeditions being increasingly carried out 
by Royal Navy officers. Supplied with a larger number of these quality-controlled 
instruments, expeditions were charged with measuring meridian distances only, an emerging 
chronometric practice intended to benefit hydrographic surveying.  
To assume that higher production numbers and the subsequent reduction in price was 
the only reason the chronometer went to sea implies a degree of closure, in the instrument 
and in its use. Technological closure or stabilisation, according to a constructivist view of 
technological systems, implies that ‘a consensus [has emerged] that a problem [arisen] 
during the development of technology has been closed’.6 In relation to chronometers, this 
would imply that the problem of variations in rate, or at least the cause, had been solved. 
This chapter will show that for chronometers this was not the case. A more nuanced view 
can be gained by examining the chronometer from the perspective of different user groups 
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50 
 
over time, since, ‘closure and stabilisation . . . are not isolated events’.7 This theme runs 
throughout the thesis, as there are many aspects to examine to understand the role users 
played in the stabilising the technology. This chapter specifically examines the problems 
users faced.  
Section one examines the issues that naval officers and astronomers encountered in 
their use of chronometers at sea. Because of the complicated mechanism of the instruments, 
it was not always clear what was the cause of reported problems and solutions. Accordingly, 
solutions varied: users did not always agree on how to mitigate the problems experienced at 
sea. The problem in general was one of trust, or more often, a lack of trust: in the instrument 
itself, in the operator and in the method of use. Tensions occurred at sea (and on distant 
shores), where astronomers introduced these new techniques that required additional skill 
and knowledge that did not always work well with practices already established in traditional 
navigation and the aims of these practices did not always align. Although this section focuses 
on the period prior to the case studies examined in this thesis, it gives a clear picture of the 
issues that users faced using their chronometers during the early nineteenth century and 
how they considered dealing with them. 
Section two considers the role played by the state, institutions and societies in 
promoting and supporting chronometry at sea. I examine the role of astronomers, 
mathematicians and the Premium Trials in stimulating improvements in the mechanism of 
chronometers. This is to show how the technological development of chronometers 
continued to be influenced not only by clockmakers but also by their users, the Royal 
Observatory and the Hydrographic Office and how this led to the chronometer trials at the 
Royal Observatory. As a result, questions concerning the reliability and thus the trust, placed 
in an instrument, transferred from the clockmakers to the astronomers at Greenwich.    
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Sections three, four and five together consider the implications of the above to the 
individuals operating within these structures as they were issued with chronometers for 
different expeditions. A consequence of the Premium Trials was a stock of chronometers with 
a clear hierarchy: chronometers that won the annual premium were considered better than 
others. This had several implications. These chronometers were reserved for those voyages, 
and officers, with a high standing. The social status of these officers thus granted them access 
to resources that were denied to others. Being supplied with what were considered ‘good’ 
instruments had a direct effect on how trustworthy officers considered their instruments to 
be, the more so if the device in question had proven reliable on a previous voyage. Questions 
of trust, authority, hierarchies of instruments and methods are considered throughout these 
sections. Section three examines the aims of William Edward Parry’s Arctic expeditions and 
the continuing role of astronomers who continued to shape on board practices and how the 
reliability of the chronometers was evaluated. Section four considers a new approach at sea 
where meridian distances where measured by larger numbers of chronometers. These 
expeditions show the relationship between astronomical and chronometrical 
measurements. I also show how these methods were perceived by both the Admiralty and 
the Board of Longitude as they discussed the best scheme to measure the longitude of 
Funchal in Madeira. Like chronometers, not all methods were considered equal. Section five 
considers William Fitzwilliam Owen’s survey of the East African Coast, which reveals 
uncertainty and confusion surrounding the issuing of chronometers. Owen was not able to 
access the same resources as those commanding voyages of a more scientific nature and thus 





Instruments under investigation: trials and tribulations 
The new navigational techniques for determining longitude at sea were tested on voyages of 
exploration following their introduction in the 1760s. Naval captains and astronomers 
worked together, testing and trialling these technologies and methods, although this did not 
occur without challenges.8 The new techniques and instruments required integration within 
established navigational practices. Tensions were ‘caused by the attempts of naval officers 
to hold on to traditional forms of understanding their skill and status against the ambitions 
of astronomy and practical mathematics to transform and regulate those traditions’.9 In their 
attempts to establish these practices, the Board of Longitude appointed astronomers to 
instruct and discipline the crew on naval expeditions. Each astronomer received a set of 
written instructions compiled by Astronomer Royal Nevil Maskelyne.10 Particularly in the 
voyages of the late 1760s and early 1770s, astronomers’ work was more suited to 
astronomical observation on distant shores, rather than assisting in navigational practices 
that the crew could perform without them. Astronomers like William Wales, (appointed by 
Maskelyne and the Board of Longitude to Cook’s second voyage of exploration on board HMS 
Resolution) thus had to promote themselves by emphasising the importance of accuracy 
within navigation. More significantly, they had to show that astronomers themselves had the 
authority required to evaluate this.11 This requirement for accuracy was not shared by all, 
and even James Cook thought that inaccuracies in the longitude would not ‘much effect 
either Navigation or Geography’.12 But by the nineteenth century, this view was changing; 
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instrumental precision and accuracy transferred from the domain of astronomers and 
observatories to the emerging group of scientific naval officers.13 The early Admiralty 
Hydrographers, Alexander Dalrymple (1737-1808) and Thomas Hurd (1747-1823), saw the 
potential benefit that chronometers could bring to Admiralty charts.14 Combined with 
astronomical observations, accurate chronometer data could be accumulated at the 
Hydrographic Office, to improve the points of longitude on which accurate charts depended.  
These early decades of chronometer use at sea thus proved two things: first, 
chronometers were a beneficial addition to navigation; second, they could never be 
completely relied upon. During the late eighteenth century, neither the competence of users, 
nor the reliability of the instruments, could be guaranteed. Although most early users praised 
their timekeepers, they were also very aware of the ease with which an instrument could 
malfunction or slip into a ‘state of disrepair’.15 Chronometers can be said to ‘keep’ longitude 
as opposed to ‘finding’ it. In this sense, astronomical observations such as lunar distances or 
Jupiter’s Satellites would ‘find’ or establish the longitude of a place. A chronometer could not 
do this. Rather, it kept an account of the time progressed since departure. If it malfunctioned 
or stopped, the longitude was lost. Reliability was fundamental, but problematic. Variations 
in temperature were a known cause of disruption, so temperature compensation was a 
crucial part of the instrument’s design. It was very difficult however, to determine the effect 
of temperature variations, specifically as there was no way of judging if the internal, delicate 
mechanism was compensating correctly. Keeping an account of the daily comparison of the 
chronometers, assuming that more than one had been issued, and noting any potential 
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causes of disruption (temperature, barometric pressure, unfavourable passages) contributed 
to the growing understanding of how these instruments fared at sea. But this was not always 
done, or if done, done systematically. As a result, by the early 1800s there was no consensus 
as to what exactly caused a chronometer to malfunction, and thus no guidelines on how to 
prevent this from happening. Human error was inevitable, and many problems could be 
down to mismanagement of the instruments. One captain, when asked ‘by what violence’ 
his chronometer was damaged, admitted that he accidentally dropped it whilst winding, 
‘though not [through] carelessness or inattention’.16 He was cautioned to report it in future 
and to be more careful. In another case, a lieutenant was charged for a chronometer repair 
previously under his care.17 Other, less harmful, problems arose when the user forgot to wind 
the instruments and they stopped, an oversight that was surprisingly common. 
Human error was only one cause of malfunction, and at least it was one that was 
relatively easy to notice. But how was one to know the instrument was performing correctly? 
Sudden changes in rate could indicate internal problems, but if these changes were gradual, 
they were harder to detect and could result from a number of causes. Early users were aware 
of these problems and guidelines appeared in publications like the Naval Chronicle. In 1799, 
for example, Joseph Whidbey, a captain who gained early chronometer experience with 
Captain George Vancouver on board Sans Pareil, advised readers that ‘when a timekeeper is 
received on board a ship, the greatest care should be taken to have it immediately secured 
in some convenient place in the cabin: where it may be the least liable to be moved during 
the voyage; it should never be touched but at the time of winding up, which ought to be at 
noon, and then with the greatest care, particularly avoiding circular motion’. This advice, he 
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wrote, was considered unnecessary by the makers, but as a user, he found ‘the above 
precautions necessary’.18  
That not everyone agreed is evident from a pamphlet of 1807 published by John 
Warren (a captain in the East India Company and temporary astronomer at the Madras 
Observatory). Warren stated that carrying the instruments from the ship to the observatory 
had no effect on the rates of chronometers, and, more importantly, that observations taken 
on shipboard with a sextant could never match the superior observations of the observatory. 
As a result, he argued, a more accurate rate could be achieved only on shore, at the 
observatory. These findings were based on an experiment he made with three chronometers 
(two box-chronometers and one pocket chronometer), where he conveniently blamed any 
alteration of rate on ‘bad watches’ or concluded that motion was not the cause.19 Even as 
late as 1834, the firm Parkinson and Frodsham communicated on the subject, claiming that 
transporting chronometers should not alter their rates, and the idea that they did would ‘lead 
persons unacquainted with the subject to form very erroneous notions as to the degree of 
perfection which the art of chronometer-making has reached’.20 James Frodsham further 
argued that ‘our Chronometers are not subject to the change of sea and land rates (which 
would render them useless for navigation) as stated to exist in the Chronometers of Messrs. 
Arnold & Dent’.21 This should be seen for what it was: a prolonged marketing campaign 
started by the firm in 1819. Considering that the rates of chronometers were problematic, 
and remained so, the comment that they would be useless for navigation is interesting. It is 
all the more remarkable because despite this ‘uselessness’, chronometers came into 
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widespread use. And it was precisely because of this fact and from the difficulty of 
ascertaining a rate on board a ship that Robert Wauchope (1788-1862), a naval officer who 
is credited with the invention of the time-ball, corresponded with Barrow in 1824 on the 
subject of time signals. Wauchope’s plan was to simplify the method of chronometric 
longitude by providing the observer on board with a visual time signal from shore. This would 
achieve two things. The first was that the chronometer need not be removed from the shore 
to the ship: thus, a shipboard rate would be acquired. Secondly, this would reduce the time 
required to establish a rate through celestial observations. Without judging the rights and 
wrongs of contemporary debates over whether or not the rates differed between ship and 
shore, two things are clear: a significant number of users found establishing a rate 
problematic, and the relationship between the ship and the shore (or observatory) could not 
be broken.  
If a faulty mechanism was not to blame for inaccurate readings, what was? What was 
under discussion was the effect to which variations in temperature, the movement of 
chronometers, their incorrect handling and their improper storage could have on them. 
While some of these problems could be addressed through regulations and guidelines, others 
could not. One of the biggest debates was over the question of magnetism, and whether or 
not it affected chronometers. Brooks’ examination of the publications and experiments 
conducted between 1798 and 1834 on this subject allowed him to compare contemporary 
debates to determine what effect, if any, local or terrestrial magnetism was thought to have 
on chronometers.22 Brooks looked at contributions from several individuals. Samuel Varley, 
a watch and instrument maker, initiated the discussion in 1798 after experimenting with steel 
and gold balances in various positions in the vicinity of a magnet. He concluded that 
 
22 Randall C. Brooks, ‘Magnetic Influence on Chronometers, 1798–1834: A Case Study’, Annals of 
Science, 44:3, (1987), pp. 245-264  
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magnetism altered the rate of a chronometer depending on its position. George Fisher (1794-
1873), the astronomer appointed to Parry’s second voyage, produced a paper detailing the 
effects of magnetism on chronometers in 1820. Fisher’s paper was based on his experiences 
as astronomer on board HMS Dorothea in 1818 where he was in charge of rating the 
chronometers. He found that the rates increased whilst sailing in comparison to the rates 
determined on shore. Fisher blamed the alteration of the rates entirely on the effects of 
magnetism, rather than the motion of the vessel, as others argued. Peter Barlow, a 
mathematician and physicist, continued Fisher’s experiments in 1822 at the observatory of 
the Reverend Lewis Evans, situated on Woolwich Common. Like Varley, he used a magnet to 
determine the influence on a number of chronometers and concluded, just as Varley and 
Fisher did, that magnetism affected chronometers. Brooks concluded that the research 
methods applied by these individuals were questionable at best.  
 
Figure 3.1: Mechanism of Arnold 326. George Fisher believed that magnetism would have a 




Figure 3.2: One-day chronometer by John Arnold & Son, no 326. This chronometer was the property 
of George Fisher. He used it whilst serving as astronomer on HMS Hecla, 1821-23. (NMM ZAA0067). 
Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, pp. 268-270. © National Maritime Museum. 
My point here is to emphasise that such debates were taking place and to note the 
effect that had on how users perceived or used chronometers, rather than to evaluate the 
efficiency of their research methods. The above-mentioned experiments were all based on 
the assumption that the ship itself was the source of error, due to the iron on board. William 
Scoresby, Arctic observer and whaler, determined that it was not local magnetism, but 
terrestrial magnetism that was to blame for the variations found between land and sea rates. 
59 
 
His paper to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1823 detailed not only his conviction of this 
effect, but also provided three potential remedies: two lay in the hands of instrument makers 
as they relied on using non-ferrous or non-magnetic materials for balances (as Dent had 
experimented with glass balance springs) or by eliminating magnetism within the steel 
balance. The third solution was to mount a pocket chronometer on a compass card in a box, 
suspended in gimbals, which would keep the instrument aligned to the magnetic meridian.23 
Although Scoresby tested this method himself, there is no evidence that others did.  
Others disagreed over the effect of magnetism. William C. Bond, chronometer maker 
and first Director of the Harvard College Observatory, recorded the land rates and sea rates 
of 133 chronometers between 1821 and 1829. He concluded that removing chronometers 
from the ship did not lead to a gain in their rates, and although it did produce some variation, 
this was ‘so minute, as to be within the limits of error to which Chronometers, in their present 
state, are liable on shore’.24 The conclusion Brooks draws, on examining Bond’s paper, is that 
‘Bond was counting “apples and oranges” in making such computations’ and that all he 
proved was that ‘given a large number of chronometers, there is no systematic difference, 
either gaining or losing in the sea – land rates’.25 This was exactly the point Ezekiel Walker 
had made to the Board of Longitude in 1783. Ezekiel Walker (1741-1834) from King’s Lynn 
(best known for his reflector designs for lighthouses) corresponded with the Board and with 
Maskelyne on this issue. Since the chronometer was unreliable on long voyages, he 
suggested using five or six chronometers from which a mean longitude would be deduced. 
This would give greater accuracy to the result even after three or four months. This had the 
additional advantage that the other chronometers could be used if one stopped to restart it 
or to detect irregularity in any of the instruments, allowing users to reject its rate in the mean. 
 
23 Brooks, ‘Magnetic Influence on Chronometers’, pp. 253-254 
24 William Bond quoted in Brooks, ‘Magnetic Influence on Chronometers’, p. 256 
25 Brooks, ‘Magnetic Influence on Chronometers’, p. 256 
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Walker provided examples of the comparison of three Arnold chronometers (Nos. 36, 51, and 
59) over a thirty-day period and between one Arnold (No. 86) and two Mudge timekeeper’s 
(‘green’ and ‘blue’) over a three-month period: ‘From these examples we may see . . . how 
regularity rises out of irregularity; the error of one time-keeper correcting that of another . . 
. and as the number of time-keepers increases, the error will decrease, until it be almost 
annihilated’.26 As with other contributors to the debate, cost was seen as the only objection, 
although Walker argued, as did others, that the cost of acquiring the chronometers was of 
‘no proportion’ to the security it enabled.27 The Board did not approve his recommendation, 
but not because it was a bad idea. Maskelyne commented that Walker’s proposal was 
‘certainly very judicious, being founded upon the same principles as the advantage arising 
from taking a mean of a number of observations in practical astronomy’.28 Unfortunately for 
Walker, who was writing in the hopes of claiming some reward for the idea, Maskelyne 
continued that ‘it is at the same time so very obvious that it cannot be considered as new, or 
containing any great degree of merit; indeed I have myself heard it often suggested by 
different persons in conversation upon the use of time-keepers’.29 Maskelyne also pointed 
out that this method would only remove larger errors, not smaller ones.  
By the 1820s, chronometers were increasingly used at sea: on surveying voyages, 
voyages of exploration, commercial merchant exchanges and for routine navigation. 
Attention to detail in the use of the instruments was wholly dependent on the purpose of 
the voyage. Commercial voyages, looking to shorten their voyage by relying on the 
chronometers, could disregard gradual changes in rate as soon as they reached their 
destination or a port along the way. There, a new rate would be established for the next part 
 
26 Anonymous, A Journal of The Natural Philosophy, Chemistry and The Arts, Vol. 8, 1804, pp. 65-70 
27 Ibid, pp. 65-70 
28 Report by the Astronomer Royal, 17 December, 1783. CUL, RGO 14/10, f. 215v 
29 Ibid, f. 215v 
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of the voyage. Thus, for many users, the chronometer fulfilled the purpose that it was put to, 
mainly helping them get to their destination more quickly and in safety. Despite this, a 
growing number of users saw benefit could be gained from the instruments if they could be 
made more reliable and the standardisation of practices could lead to the accumulation of 
data.  
 
Astronomers, mathematicians and the Greenwich Trials 
The chronometers that went to sea in the early nineteenth century were of a basic design 
that remained almost the same for the next 125 years.30 Despite this apparently successful 
technological achievement, trialling and testing the instruments remained an essential 
requirement. Not many people would dispute that a chronometer was valuable in navigation, 
but they still had the potential for considerable inaccuracy. As to the cause of inaccuracy, 
which was generally put down to an unpredictable acceleration or retardation of rate, this 
remained unsettled. In 1804 William Nicholson, chemist and inventor, published a letter in 
the Journal of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry and the Arts, which he also edited. The writer 
of the letter was John Haley (probably the son of clockmaker Charles Haley, one of the 
experts appointed to report on the marine timekeepers made by Thomas Mudge in 1793). 
The letter concerned the matter of irregularities in chronometers. Haley’s opinion was that 
chronometer makers too easily blamed external factors for affecting the rate of their 
instruments, rather than any ‘mechanical cause’: this, he pointed out, did not encourage 
mechanical improvements of the instrument.31 Arnold and Earnshaw dominated the market 
 
30 Rupert Gould, The Marine Chronometer: Its History and Development, (Woodbridge: Antique 
Collecters’ Club, 2013), p. 133; Jonathan Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, A Catalogue of 
Marine Chronometers at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2017), p. 66 
31 John Haley, ‘Experiments on Chronometers’, Journal of Natural Philosophy, Chemistry and the Arts, 
8, (1804), pp. 46-57  
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during this time and their chronometers were those tested upon the exploration voyages in 
the late eighteenth century. These chronometers did not always perform well and so the 
Admiralty needed to find a means of valuing individual instruments rather than remaining 
dependent on the makers’ reputation. There was no point in buying up a stock of 
chronometers if the instruments proved unreliable. But the Royal Navy would prove a viable 
market, one which the junior Mudge attempted to tap into by requesting ‘permission to 
become Chronometer-Maker to the Royal Navy’.32 As his chronometers were no better than 
those of Arnold and Earnshaw, and costed twice as much, the Board refused his request. 
Although there was a willingness from the Royal Navy to buy chronometers and chronometer 
makers had succeeded in lowering the price to between sixty-five and eighty guineas, the 
process of setting up a valuation scheme that favoured performance over reputation still 
took two decades to accomplish.   
In 1805, William Marsden (1754-1836), First Secretary to the Admiralty, outlined a plan 
in which chronometers would be tested, both on land and at sea, before they were purchased 
by the Admiralty, at prices determined by their performance. The plan was comprehensive. 
Chronometers would be trialled for three months by the ‘land Tryer’ on shore, who would 
keep ‘a regular account of the going of each watch in different positions and of the effects of 
heat & cold on each’.33 This land trial had two underlying purposes: it would determine which 
chronometers should be selected for a further trial at sea and, in the case of further trial, it 
determined what the rate should be. The plan further detailed exactly how the chronometers 
should be transported; that the ship should be sufficiently outfitted to receive the 
instruments (and if not, that ‘objections’ and ‘remedies’ should be reported); when and how 
the watches should be wound and compared; and, finally, how astronomical observations 
 
32 May, How the Chronometer went to Sea, p. 644 
33 William Marsden to George Gilpin, 7 March, 1805. CUL, RGO 14/23, ff. 6r-10v, quotes on f. 7r and f. 
6v respectively.  
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should support the trial. The level of accuracy achieved by each chronometer on the sea trial 
would determine the value, and thus the purchase price, of each instrument. Marsden listed 
these as follows: 
- 100 guineas: if during the shore trial the monthly mean did not exceed 1.45 seconds 
and at sea the error did not exceed more than four minutes in time or one degree of 
longitude.  
- 80 guineas: if during the shore trial the monthly mean did not exceed 2 seconds and 
at sea the error did not exceed more than six minutes in time or one-and-a-half 
degrees of longitude. 
- 60 guineas: if during the shore trial the monthly mean did not exceed 2.15 seconds 
and at sea the error did not exceed more than eight minutes in time or two degrees 
of longitude.34 
 
Despite this detailed plan, one crucial element was missing. Marsden left blanks in the 
document regarding where the journals and records relating to the trial should be deposited 
and who should oversee the trial. This indicates that this was an element requiring further 
thought and suggests that Marsden may have expected the Board of Longitude to decide this 
(figure 3.3).  
  
 







Figure 3.3: Marsden’s black sections relating to chronometer trials. CUL, RGO 14/23.  
If any one reason should be underlined as to why the testing and issuing of 
chronometers was unregulated at the start of the nineteenth century then evidence suggests 
that we should point to a lack of administrative oversight on the Admiralty’s part. Masters of 
Royal Navy ships were responsible for the purchase of their own mathematical instruments 
and charts. Some specialist equipment could be issued by the Navy Board or the local 
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dockyard official, a category to which the chronometer belonged. But these were not 
standard issues and stocks were low.35 Alexander Dalrymple wrote to the Admiralty in 1807 
proposing that officers also be issued with ‘chronometers, nautical almanacs, a protractor 
and a ‘graduated Semi circle of transparent Horn’’.36 Before Hall picked up the call for a 
systematic method of trialling chronometers at sea (see the epigraph which begins this 
chapter), an anonymous captain wrote in 1812 to the Naval Chronicle, adding his voice to 
calls to the Admiralty to supply officers with instruments. He claimed that shipwrecks and 
losses at sea could be avoided if the officers had the means to determine the longitude. He 
argued that the cost of supplying chronometers, sextants and barometers for a period of ten 
years would amount to no more than £95,000 for the whole navy (0.05% of the total 
expenditure of £190 million over a ten-year period). It is worth emphasising that the author 
requested not just two chronometers per ship, but also three sextants and two barometers.37  
Thomas Hurd was instrumental in establishing a more central and organised 
distribution depot, although this did not appear overnight. In regards to the chronometer, 
the Navy Board had established a stock of chronometers at the Naval College in Portsmouth, 
under the charge of James Inman (1776-1859), astronomer and Professor of Nautical 
Mathematics at the College. Chronometer stocks were low, and many requests were 
refused.38 These duties were transferred to Hurd in 1818, when he was officially appointed 
superintendent of the chronometers, although he had been involved in these duties since 
 
35 Webb, The Expansion of British Naval Hydrographic Administration, p. 295 
36 Alexander Dalrymple to Pole, 10 October 1807. TNA, ADM1/3523, quoted in Webb, The Expansion 
of British Naval Hydrographic Administration, p. 295 
37 John Malham, Navigation Made Easy and Familiar, (London: S. Crowder and B. C. Collins, 1790), 
p.263; Naval Chronicle, Vol. 27, (1812), pp. 121-122 
38 Inman had sailed with Matthew Flinders on board HMS Investigator, replacing the astronomer who 
had suffered from seasickness. He published Navigation and Nautical Astronomy for Seamen in 1821. 




1809.39 His duties, described by himself as ‘a subject of serious consideration’, and by virtue 
of being ‘their public accountant’, included keeping records of all associated costs (purchase 
and repair) and registering the movements between stores, ports, makers and ships.40 The 
instruments (mostly Arnolds’) were in short supply. As soon as a chronometer was purchased 
or returned from repair, it was issued to a ship from the Royal Naval College in Portsmouth. 
Rates and errors of the timekeepers were provided either by the respective maker or by 
James Inman at the Royal Naval College. Stocks at the Naval Yard in Plymouth were 
problematic, but it was again thanks to Hurd’s efforts that an agent was set up there: Mr. Cox 
held a small stock of Arnold chronometers, kept an account of their rates and notified Hurd 
when an instrument was issued to a ship. Despite these efforts, between 1815 and 1820, 
many requests for chronometers were still being refused.41 Gradually, as stocks increased, 
more applications for chronometers were accepted. When the superintendence of the 
instruments was transferred to the Astronomer Royal, John Pond, in 1821, the number of 
chronometers had increased from thirty to 130.42  
It is important to understand why these duties were transferred to the Royal 
Observatory as a site, under the care of the Astronomer Royal as an authority, especially 
since Hurd was opposed to the move. Hurd’s main objection concerned the additional 
transfer that chronometers would be subject to. Hurd argued that this was ‘likely to prove 
 
39 Various sources list different dates for the transfer of the chronometer duties to the Hydrographer. 
Ishibashi, Nockolds and May both claim it was around 1810, but list no sources. Webb lists the date as 
1809. The issue may be resolved if the duties were transferred to the Hydrographic Office around 
1810, but a superintendent not appointed until 1818. Webb, The Expansion of British Naval 
Hydrographic Administration, p. 295. The Admiralty Digest also states 1818 (TNA, ADM 12/193, tab 
57a Board of Longitude) 
40 Letter from Thomas Hurd to John Pond, Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, 3 September, 1821. CUL, 
RGO 5/229, f. 4r 
41 Admiralty Digest Books: TNA, ADM 12/174, ADM 12/180, ADM 12/185, ADM 12/189, ADM 12/194 
see tab 98.4 ‘Mathematical Instruments’.  
42 For a more detailed account of the period under Hurd’s supervision, and the management of the 
chronometers under Pond at Greenwich, see Webb, The Expansion of British Naval Hydrographic 
Administration, and Ishibashi, ‘A Place for Managing Government Chronometers’.   
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more injurious than beneficial to the service’ as well as causing ‘many inconveniences to the 
Board’.43 One reason for the transfer was the change in supervision of the Royal Observatory 
itself, which since its establishment in 1675 had been in the hands of the Board of Ordnance. 
Due to a lack of decent funding from this body, the Astronomers Royal often had to depend 
on additional funding from the Admiralty and Treasury. In 1816, the Board of Visitors (mostly 
comprised of council members of the Royal Society) recommended the transfer of 
supervision to the Admiralty with a view ‘to improve administrative procedures, 
astronomical efficiency, and navigational science’.44 This also allowed the Admiralty to set up 
a land-based trialling system for the instruments, as Marsden had first suggested in 1805.  
Before the Greenwich trials, the Admiralty and Board of Longitude were wholly 
dependent on the authority of chronometer makers when it came to judging the merits of a 
timekeeper.45 Although chronometer makers could rely on their status and authority to sell 
chronometers through the private market, a state-funded stock of instruments required 
independent quality control. Hurd may have provided good administration, but he could not 
perform this latter aspect. Prior to becoming the official testing centre for chronometers, the 
Royal Observatory and the Royal Society had been performing chronometer tests for those 
timekeepers sent on board early voyages of exploration. Maskelyne had conducted trials 
between 1770 and 1790 for the Board of Longitude to test the accuracy and reliability of the 
chronometers. This had sometimes caused tension between the Astronomer Royal and 
makers such as Harrison, Arnold, and Mudge. The Royal Observatory was not necessarily the 
obvious place for trialling and issuing chronometers. Hurd was very keen to fulfil the latter 
function, and Inman at the Royal Naval College was also capable of managing a depot at one 
of the biggest dockyards in the country. In addition, Henry Browne’s house at Portland Place 
 
43 Hurd quoted in Webb, The Expansion of British Naval Hydrographic Administration, p. 304 
44 Ishibashi, ‘A Place for Managing Government Chronometers’, pp. 54-55 
45 Phillips, Making Time Fit, pp. 62-69 
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in London was used to test the chronometers issued to the polar voyages in 1818 and 1819, 
under the expertise and authority of Captain Henry Kater.46  
In 1821, the responsibility did become that of the Royal Observatory, and did so as a 
result of Maskelyne’s management of the site between 1765 and 1811. Within this period, 
he transformed the Royal Observatory into a ‘truth-spot’, a place Gieryn describes as a 
‘delimited geographical location that lends credibility to claims’.47 The Observatory’s 
credibility lay not in the bricks and mortar, nor the instruments and observers, nor even the 
Royal title; but rather in Maskelyne’s strict regime of discipline and regulation.48 If the 
Admiralty in 1820 was looking for a location from which to test and issue chronometers, then 
Maskelyne had ensured that this place should be Greenwich. Numerous observatories were 
established in eighteenth-century Britain, many equipped with superior instruments and 
better astronomical practices. But what Maskelyne emphasised was ‘the need to 
demonstrate at all times the effective management and maintenance of clocks and other 
instruments’.49 Maskelyne ‘described, lobbied for and then implemented a set of managerial, 
publishing, and epistolary practices that would secure his vision of British state-sponsored 
astronomy co-ordinated from Greenwich’.50 By this time, the Royal Observatory was also 
funded by the Admiralty.  
Transferring the duty to the Astronomer Royal John Pond in 1821 thus finally 
implemented Marsden’s plan to properly test chronometers when securing them for the 
Admiralty, and helped further establish the Royal Observatory at the centre of state-
 
46 List of government chronometers, UKHO, MLP 82; Sophie Waring, Thomas Young, the Board of 
Longitude and the Age of Reform, Unpublished PhD, University of Cambridge, (2014), pp. 97-100 
47 Thomas F. Gieryn, ‘City as Truth-Spot: Laboratories and Field-Sites in Urban Studies’, Social Studies 
of Science, 36:1, (2006), p. 29  
48 Nicky Reeves, ‘Maskelyne the Manager’, in: Maskelyne, Astronomer Royal, ed Rebekah Higgitt, 
(London: National Maritime Museum, 2014), pp. 97-123  
49 Reeves, ‘Maskelyne the Manager’, p. 104 
50 Ibid, p. 97  
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sponsored nautical science. The trials went further than this, as they also realised John 
Haley’s point that to improve the chronometers makers would need an additional incentive, 
as can be seen in the official announcement in the London Gazette in June 1821: 
The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, being desirous of increasing the 
number of  chronometers for the use of his Majesty’s Navy, and of encouraging the 
improved manufacture of that important article, do hereby give notice, that a depot 
for the reception of chronometers is opened at the Royal Observatory of Greenwich, 
where the makers will be permitted to deposit their chronometers, in order to their 
being tried, and ultimately purchased for the use of the navy, or of being disposed of 
by the proprietors to private purchasers. And, for further encouragement, their 
Lordships will purchase, at the end of each year, the chronometer which shall have 
kept the best time, at the price of 300£, and the second best at the price of 200£, 
provided that there have been above ten chronometers in the competition . . . The 
other chronometers their Lordships may purchase, as they may think proper, at such 
sums as may be agreed upon with the makers, and their Lordships have reason to 
expect, that their annual rate of purchase, for some years to come, will be not less 
than ten chronometers in each year.51 
 
After its announcement, the first trial ran from February 1822 until January 1823. The 
Astronomer Royal and the Board of Longitude were tasked with overseeing the trials. John 
Wilson Croker (1780-1857), First Secretary to the Admiralty from 1809 to 1827, announced 
in the London Gazette the purchase of Barraud 957 for £300 and Pennington 154 for £200. 
The announcement included a paragraph on how the rates would be computed and the limits 
within which they should fall. For the trail commencing in 1823, these limits were set at under 
six seconds for the first prize and at under ten seconds for the second prize.52  
Following the first-year trial, the initial method of determining how the rate should be 
calculated and within which limits they should fall was judged by a committee of the Board 
of Longitude (John Pond, William Hyde Wollaston, Captain Kater, Thomas Colby, John 
Herschel, Thomas Young). Based on the results achieved by this trial, they immediately 
narrowed the limits for the first and second prizes. The limit was based on the greatest 
 
51 London Gazette, 26 June, 1821.  
52 John Wilson Croker, Admiralty Office, London Gazette, 28 April, (1823) p. 707 
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variation found within one month of chronometer rating, which for the purposes of the trial 
was doubled. Barraud’s chronometers achieved a result of 11.29/10.40, the smallest that 
year, and Pennington, 12.87.53 For the next year’s trials, the commissions ‘[begged] leave to 
suggest that for rewards to be adjudged in future, it be a condition without which the first 
reward cannot be claimed, that the sum of the mean monthly variations added to twice the 
variation of the mean monthly rates, shall not exceed eight six seconds and that for the 
second prize, it shall not exceed twelve ten seconds’.54 Young sent the report to astronomers 
and mathematicians in Cambridge and Oxford requesting their opinions on the proposed 
method.55 Amongst the recipients was Thomas Turton, then Senior Wrangler and Lucasian 
Professor of Mathematics at St. Catherine’s College, Cambridge. Turton approved of the 
proposal, but suggested that ‘to guard, in some measure, against sudden changes, could any 
limit be fixed to the variations of the rate, in two or three successive days?’56 Three weeks 
later, Turton added another excluding clause over variations between mean daily rates 
exceeding a specified amount. Stephen Peter Rigaud, Savilian Professor of Astronomy, and 
Abraham Robertson, Scottish mathematician and astronomer, both approved of the scheme 
although they had ‘some difficulty in forming an opinion’ regarding the limits for the prizes.57 
William Lax, Lowndean Professor of Astronomy and Geometry at Cambridge, approved of 
the plan, although his colleague Robert Woodhouse pointed out potential errors. 
Woodhouse, Plumian Professor of Astronomy at Cambridge, formulated a different 
 
53 The calculation for example Pennington was as follows: greatest variation in one month (+5,08) + 
least variation in one month (-0.05) = difference (5.13). This difference was doubled (10.26) and the 
mean of the variations added (2.61) resulting in a trial number of 12.87.    
54 J. Pond, Wm Wollaston, Henry Kater, Tho. Colby, J. F. W. Herschel, Thomas Young, Report of a 
Committee of the Board of Longitude respecting the Mode of Trail to be adopted for Chronometers, 
Admiralty, 25 February, 1823. CUL, RGO 14/23, f. 70v: The scorings through are the original emphasis 
in the manuscript.  
55 Turton, Professor of Mathematics at Catherine’s Hall; A. Robertson and S. P. Rigaud, Professors of 
Astronomy and Geometry respectively at Oxford; W. Lax, Professor of Astronomy at Cambridge; R. 
Woodhouse, Plumian Professor of Astronomy at Cambridge. 
56 Thomas Turton to Thomas Young, Catherine Hall, Cambridge, 19 April, 1823. CUL, RGO 14/23, f. 73r  
57 A. Robertson and S. P. Rigaud, Oxford, 22 April, 1823. CUL, RGO 14/23, f. 74r 
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calculation that would detect irregularities in the daily rates that would otherwise go 
unnoticed.58  
The importance of mathematics and of mathematical reasoning in relation to 
chronometry must not be underestimated. As described earlier, Maskelyne had pointed out 
that Walker’s plan (of using multiple chronometers to average out errors) was not novel and 
that it was already applied to practical astronomy. The problem with chronometers was that 
their rates were liable to an irregularity that was unpredictable. In the case of the 
chronometer trials, mathematics might provide a solution to this problem by defining a way 
in which all types of irregularity could be identified; be they daily, monthly, regular or 
irregular fluctuations. But even mathematics cannot ‘magic’ regularity out of irregularity. The 
trials suggested by the Board required the advice of the most prominent mathematicians and 
astronomers. Thus, it is clear that even on land, astronomers and mathematicians struggled 
to determine the most effective method of establishing the reliability of chronometers.   
Not all credible authorities were supportive of the proposed method. In an 1822 
article, James South, astronomer and joint founder of the Astronomical Society, made his 
view clear. This was apparent from the title ‘Observations on the Chronometrical 
Arrangements now carried on at the Royal Observatory, under the authority of the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty, tending to shew their Inadequacy to the purpose for which 
they were designed’. 59 His motive for writing was ‘that the acts of public bodies, which have 
for their object public benefit . . . become fair subjects for private as well as public inquiry’.60 
A good chronometer, according to South, had a uniform rate and would not be affected by 
 
58 Corrections to a report on chronometers, Robert Woodhouse, not dated. CUL, RGO 14/23, f. 77r 
59 James South, ‘Observations on the Chronometrical Arrangements now carried on at the Royal 
Observatory, under the authority of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, tending to shew their 
Inadequacy to the purpose for which they were designed’, Quarterly Journal of Science, Literature, and 
the Arts, Volume XIII, (1822), p. 211  
60 South, ‘Observations on the Chronometrical Arrangements now carried on at the Royal 
Observatory’, p. 211 
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temperature or by the position of the instrument. South’s criticism was that the trials did not 
test how the chronometers fared in a variety of circumstances. He pointed out that a 
chronometer ‘may go well whilst horizontal, and ill whilst vertical; and vice versa, or it may 
go well whilst in a state of quiescence and ill when put in motion; it may go well when placed 
in an atmosphere which is temperate, and ill when exposed to extremes of heat or cold’.61 
Although South was known for his critical writing (he was critical of the Nautical Almanac and 
laid ‘Thirty-six Charges against the President and Council of the Royal Society’), he had a 
point.62 A paper by an unknown author contained in the same volume as the correspondence 
concerning the chronometer trials raised the same concern: ‘no chronometer, however 
excellent it may have proved, on any number of previous occasions, can, or ought to be 
implicitly relied on … the principle of the instrument implores this necessity, & as it cannot 
be removed, other means must be resorted to, to counter act the errors into which it must 
necessarily lead’.63   
That the trials to improve the accuracy of the instruments had been successful by 1831 
can be seen in attempts by the increasingly narrow limits placed on the rewards: the ‘trial 
number is to be three seconds and a half for the first premium, four seconds and a half for 
the second and six seconds for the third premium’.64 After the dissolution of the Board of 
Longitude in 1828, the oversight of the trials fell under the joint supervision of the Admiralty, 
the Hydrographer and the Astronomer Royal.65 The trials were terminated in 1835 as their 
lordships were ‘now satisfied that the instruction with which the system of annual trials of 
 
61 South, ‘Observations on the Chronometrical Arrangements now carried on at the Royal 
Observatory’, p. 215 
62 A. M. Clarke, revised by Michael Hoskin, South, Sir James (1784-1867), Oxford Dictionary of National 
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chronometers and procuring premiums has had its full effect’.66 Rewards were still offered 
to encourage improvement in the instruments, specifically ones that reduced the cost of 
manufacture or those ‘by which a greater uniformity of rate can be measured within more 
certainty under all variations of positions, motion & climate’.67 One effect that was perhaps 
not expected was expressed by John Pond (1767-1836) in a letter to Croker. The improved 
rates of chronometers led to ‘fastidious’ captains feeling ‘extremely mortified if we cannot 
indulge them with one of superior class’. Pond was thus left with a surplus of ‘indifferent 
ones’ useless for any service. He suggested purchasing an additional supply of chronometers 
because the number of chronometers required at any point in time could not be predicted.68 
During the 1830s, problems arose in the allocations of the premium rewards between the 
Admiralty, Pond and the chronometer makers, leading Pond to suggest a suspension of the 
trials.69 Although the trials were terminated in 1835, a new and similar system was adopted 
by George Airy in 1840. Airy abandoned the premium reward system but retained the aim: 
improving the construction of chronometers and the means for judging their merits. Airy 
‘introduced new methods of rating, the publications of the results and arrangements for trial 
in heat and cold’ and in later reports ‘attributed the general improvement in the 
chronometer to the work done at Greenwich’.70 
Pond’s duties as superintendent of chronometers were not limited to overseeing the 
chronometer trials. He continued with the duties listed by Hurd: issuing chronometers, 
keeping an account of their rates and errors, organising repairs when needed, overseeing 
and regulating supply and stocks at additional depots. The increase in stock at Greenwich led 
to a heavy burden on the Astronomer Royal. Pond had already commented on the burden 
 
66 John Barrow to John Pond, Admiralty Office, 9 January, 1835. CUL, RGO 5/231, f. 265r 
67 Ibid, f. 265v 
68 John Pond to John Croker, Royal Observatory, 15 August, 1829. CUL, RGO 5/233, f. 49v 
69 See Ishibashi ‘A Place for Managing Government Chronometers’  
70 Jim Bennett, ‘George Biddell Airy and Horology’, Annals of Science, 37, (1980), p. 277 
74 
 
that the trials placed on him, requesting that makers be restricted to sending only one 
chronometer per year and that Pond should be allowed to select forty of the best instruments 
after the first month to continue with the trial. Pond complained to Croker that ‘the number 
of Chronometers deposited here on the Annual Trials, have so much increased of late Years, 
that they very materially interfere with the business of the Royal Observatory’.71 Inman 
echoed this, stating that the timekeepers interfered with the duties of his assistants at 
Portsmouth, adding that the ‘Astronomer Royal was made superintendent of timekeepers 
(which office I do not envy him by any means)’.72 Edward Walter Maunder would later 
comment that during this period, the ‘excessive development of chronometer business 
[was], so as practically to swamp the real work of the Observatory, whilst the prices paid for 
the chronometers at this time were often much larger than would have been the case under 
a more business-like administration’.73 Pond had often been absent from the Royal 
Observatory, particularly in the 1830s, in stark contrast to his predecessor Maskelyne’s 
approach of ‘careful managerial attention’ and ‘constant attendance’.74 By 1829, the 
Admiralty again turned to the then Hydrographer (Francis Beaufort) to oversee the 
management of chronometers issued to ships, although their rating and testing still took 
place at the Royal Observatory. When George Biddell Airy (1801-1892) became Astronomer 
Royal in 1835, he noted that a third of the staff’s time was taken up in rating chronometers.75  
Transferring the duties regarding chronometers to the Royal Observatory and 
establishing the Premium Trials had a significant impact on the development and use of 
chronometers at sea. The trials encouraged some improvement in the instruments, as can be 
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seen by the narrowing of the limits within which first premiums were rewarded. The trials 
also put the Royal Observatory at the centre of chronometer use at sea. The Longitude Act 
of 1818 had reorganised the Board of Longitude, transforming it into ‘a scientific department 
for the Admiralty’.76 Maskelyne had already been instrumental in testing the new technology 
for the Board of Longitude. With both the Board and the Royal Observatory now firmly under 
Admiralty authority, and the transfer of superintendence to the Astronomer Royal, these 
duties became Admiralty business. This included the issuing of chronometers to captains of 
Royal Navy vessels. But although Pond was in charge of issuing chronometers, he was only 
able to fulfil the instructions he was given by the Admiralty. For a captain to be assigned a 
chronometer he had to apply to the Admiralty, the First and Second Secretaries (Croker and 
Barrow) then deliberated and if they agreed, Pond would be notified and directed to issue 
one. The trials had also ended the dominance of Arnold and Earnshaw on the chronometer 
market. When the trials started in 1821, nine makers made up the total of 130 government 
chronometers. By 1835, fifty different makers were responsible for the 356 government-
owned chronometers.77  
The establishment of an official depot and testing ground for chronometers had a 
profound effect on how they were used at sea. Acknowledging both the drawbacks but also 
the potential of the instruments led to practices that would improve the use of 
chronometers. The trialling on land gradually led to better instruments. Their use at sea 
gradually led to standardised methods of use (issues explored in chapters 5-7). As part of this, 
certain voyages were issued with what were considered the best instruments, which in 
general meant those with small amounts of variations and a regular rate.  
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Parry’s three expeditions to find a North-West Passage 
The Greenwich Trials are of particular interest for scientific expeditions as the chronometers 
receiving the premium rewards were often reserved for these expeditions. Parry’s three 
voyages of discovery for a North-West Passage set out before, during and after these changes 
had taken place and therefore present an interesting case study through which to consider 
the implication for users.  
Parry’s voyages were modelled on the preceding expedition of 1818 led by John Ross 
(1777-1856), on which Parry served as commanding lieutenant on HMS Alexander, and 
Edward Sabine served as appointed astronomer (and thus in charge of the chronometers) on 
board HMS Isabella. The Isabella carried seven chronometers, only three of which were 
government property. Two chronometers were loaned to the expedition by Henry Browne, 
one was owned by Ross, and the final one was on loan from chronometer makers Parkinson 
and Frodsham. Parkinson and Frodsham, who, in their own words, ‘had devoted a 
considerable portion of their time and great attention to the improvement of Chronometers, 
and had spared neither expense nor exertions in their endeavours to attain perfection, 
considered this an opportunity of having one of their principle practically tried’.78 Parkinson 
and Frodsham chronometers were adapted specifically for the cold conditions of the Arctic, 
and, as a result, they became Parry’s preferred instruments. This was important as the 
chronometer was tested in the environment it was adjusted for, thus eliminating one of 
South’s criticisms of the method employed at the Royal Observatory for testing 
chronometers; namely, that a chronometer might perform well in certain circumstances, but 
poorly in others. This marketing strategy proved successful, and the firm lent instruments to 
all subsequent Arctic expeditions and incentivised other makers to loan instruments for 
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testing too. Although chronometer P&F 228 was sent by the makers specifically to test the 
principles on which it had been adjusted, this was not the case for the chronometers supplied 
by the Admiralty.  
In addition to Ross’s expedition, another expedition set out in 1818. Fisher was 
appointed astronomer on HMS Dorothea, under the command of Captain David Buchan 
(1780-1838). The purpose of the voyage was to reach the North Pole via the polar sea. As 
astronomical observations were increasingly difficult in high latitudes, Fisher was instructed 
to be ‘particularly attentive to ascertain the rate of your chronometers, as should you reach 
the Pole, your future course must mainly depend upon the accuracy with which you may be 
able to carry with you the time at Greenwich’.79 Testing how the chronometers fared was not 
part of the instruction, although Fisher’s experience with chronometers on this voyage led to 
his publication stating the detrimental effects of magnetism on chronometers. 
Unfortunately, an account of the chronometers was either not kept, or did not survive. In his 
report, Fisher references his observations made at Spitzbergen, where they compared the 
clock with nine chronometers (two Earnshaw’s, four Arnolds, one Barraud, Baird and 
Pennington).80 It is thus unclear exactly which chronometers were supplied to each voyage. 
Hurd’s list of chronometers issued stated that in 1818 eight chronometers had been issued 
to Henry Browne’s house; two to Captain Ross of HMS Isabella, and two to Captain Buchan 
of HMS Dorothea.  
The issuing of chronometers and how they should be used was thus characterised by 
confusion and lack of regulations. As Waring put it, Sabine ‘was unsure for whom exactly he 
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was working’ in publishing his experimental results related to his pendulum research.81 This 
lack of a ‘formal system of employment’ and bureaucracy led individuals to turn to ‘personal 
socio-economic networks’.82 Such was the case of Henry Browne, not only a fervent 
supporter of science, but also very wealthy. Browne had made his fortune in the merchant 
navy and pursued astronomy in his retirement.83 The basement of his house became the site 
in which naval officers were trained by Henry Kater in swinging the seconds pendulum, a 
crucial skill to determine length of the seconds pendulum at different latitudes and thus 
deduce the figure of the earth. Sabine, following a brief but successful military career, turned 
to astronomy, magnetism and ornithology in 1816, aided through his family connection to 
Browne (his brother-in-law). It was during this period that Sabine was introduced to Henry 
Kater, and in 1818, elected Fellow of the Royal Society. Immersed in this network of scientific 
gentlemen, Sabine was appointed to the Ross expedition as astronomer. Fisher, who 
conducted experiments at Spitzbergen to determine the length of the seconds pendulum, 
was also supplied with a pendulum that had been tested at Browne’s basement. It was here 
that the Admiralty sent eight of the twelve government-owned chronometers that would 
accompany the 1818 Arctic expeditions. Browne’s house boasted a transit circle and 
‘excellent time-pieces’ (an Arnold pendulum clock and a ‘time-piece by Cumming . . . 
considered by Mr. Browne to be the best in his possession’). The location was ‘not liable to 
much disturbance from the passing of carriages’ and had a stable temperature that could be 
raised if necessary.84 Basil Hall was also part of this network. Hall commanded HMS Conway 
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between 1820 and 1823 and he conducted pendulum experiments in the Pacific and Atlantic, 
supported by Henry Foster. For this purpose, he also received training from Kater at Browne’s 
place.85  
The chronometers supplied to Parry were treated in the same way. With no official 
testing grounds, they were again sent to Browne’s house in preparation for the expedition of 
1819. Here, Sabine was able to determine a rate for each instrument over a period of five 
weeks. Most of the chronometers issued were made by Arnold and Earnshaw. Following a 
successful trial on the Ross expedition, the Admiralty purchased P&F 228 and issued it to the 
expedition. In addition to the seven government chronometers and two chronometers 
loaned by Browne, Parkinson and Frodsham loaned three instruments and the firm Finer & 
Nowland requested permission to send an instrument on board, requests accepted by the 
Admiralty. One of the chronometer’s loaned by Parkinson and Frodsham, P&F 259, 
performed so well, that on return, Parry’s officer bought the instrument for him (figure 3.4). 
By the time Parry set out on his third voyage, in 1824, the situation had changed. Pond 
was now in charge of overseeing the chronometers and the Royal Observatory enabled the 
instruments to be rated by an astronomer before being sent out to sea. Parry initially wrote 
to Pond in January 1824: ‘It being determined that another Polar Expedition should be 
undertaken, and it being of consequence that Chronometers which have already been tried 
in the Northern Regions should again be selected for that purpose, may I request you will 
allow the watches of Messrs. Parkinson & Frodsham in particular, which were returned from 
the Fury to be retained for our future use’.86 
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Figure 3.4: One-day box chronometer by Parkinson and Frodsham, no. 259. This chronometer was 
purchased for William Parry by his officers. (NMM ZAA0033). Betts, Marine Chronometers at 
Greenwich, pp. 280-281. © National Maritime Museum. 
In January, Pond was ‘indisposed’ and his assistant Thomas Taylor dealt with the 
chronometer requests. This possibly explains why the correspondence concerning the 
expedition chronometers did not resume until March. Parry then wrote to Croker requesting 
instruments; four box chronometers and two pocket chronometers for the Hecla, the latter 
‘being found indispensable in making observations in a cold climate, which prevents the 
exposure of the other instruments’.87 The next day, Barrow transmitted a copy of Parry’s 
letter to Pond, requesting him to supply the ten chronometers to the expedition.88 A list of 
the chronometers supplied to the Hecla and the Fury can be found in the archives of the 
Hydrographic Office (figure 3.5). 
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Parry received two chronometers from the maker Lancaster, two by Arnold, one by Murray, 
one by Smith and four from Parkinson & Frodsham. Pond supplied Parry with the same 
number of Parkinson & Frodsham chronometers as the previous voyage, although only two 
of those had been on that expedition. One of the Arnolds had also been supplied previously. 
These instruments had proved their reliability at sea, and were thus verified and valued by 
their users. As with previous voyages, the total number of chronometers exceeded those 
issued by the Admiralty. Parry and John Land Wynn (a lieutenant on board the Hecla) both 
carried their own private instruments and the firms Murray, Frodsham and Arnold each 
offered one chronometer for testing.  
 
Foster and Fitzroy: chronometers for the measurement of meridian distances  
Appointed to command the Chanticleer in 1828, Foster set out on ‘an enterprise destined 
solely and simply for the promotion of scientific research, and the extension of the bounds 
of human knowledge’.89 The voyage was a continuation of the pendulum experiments to 
‘establish the true figure of the earth and the law of the variation of gravity in different points 
of its surface’.90 Foster had previously accompanied Basil Hall to South America in 1820 to 
assist in pendulum measurements and received the Copley Medal in 1827 for his pendulum 
experiments on Parry’s third voyage. Foster was described by a midshipman on the Fury, as 
‘a distinguished navigator; he was an excellent officer, the best nautical scholar I ever knew, 
and a good astronomer’.91 He was also a ‘most intimate friend’ of Captain Francis Beaufort 
(1774-1857) and enjoyed the support of Thomas Young, Secretary to the Board of 
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Longitude.92 In collaboration with hydrographers from the Navy and the East India Company, 
the Royal Society selected fourteen pendulum stations that were critical for the expedition, 
but also beneficial for hydrography and navigation in general.93 The Royal Society committee 
considered all other objects of the expedition secondary to the pendulum experiments. The 
chronometric objective of the expedition was varied. It was adopted primarily to connect 
points of longitudes determined astronomically at each of the pendulum stations to 
determine differences of longitude. By employing many chronometers, and by determining 
the time at principal ports and commercial stations, the committee hoped to judge the 
efficacy of the method and to approximately measure ‘a great number of smaller intervals of 
high importance to navigation’ without interfering with the primary aim.94 For these 
determinations, the Admiralty ordered Pond to supply Foster with twelve of the best 
chronometers available.95 Foster, like Parry, had a strong institutional network to rely upon.  
Foster’s chronometric orders were modelled on a previous voyage to Madeira 
orchestrated by the Board of Longitude and the Admiralty. Madeira was considered an 
important stop for sailors. In 1818, by orders of the Admiralty, Captain Bartholomew had 
received notice to ‘ascertain that point, and that, generally, all HMS proceeding in the 
direction of Madeira, with time keepers on board, will have directions to attend to the same 
subject’.96  By 1822, however, there was still no agreement on the matter, and Pond had 
determined that the longitude of Funchal was 5’ in error. Following this, that same year, John 
Lewis Tiarks (1789-1837) was appointed as astronomer to a voyage in order solely to 
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determine the meridian distance between Falmouth and Madeira. In a letter to Young, 
Croker asserted that ‘their Lordships . . . perfectly agree with the Board of longitude as to the 
expediency of ascertaining with the greatest possible accuracy the longitude of Funchal’. To 
facilitate the matter, they would ‘furnish a proper vessel for this purpose’ while the Board 
should ‘point out the time, and have prepared the instruments & the instructions for the 
observers’.97 This one-sided correspondence, from Croker to Young, reveals many of the 
uncertainties surrounding the issuing of chronometers, Pond’s authority as superintendent, 
the relationship between the Board and the Admiralty and the accuracy of the methods to 
be employed.  
Let me review the above three points. It is clear from the correspondence between 
Croker and Young that there was some confusion and disagreement over who should appoint 
a suitable astronomer, who should oversee the chronometers and how the expedition should 
proceed. Croker felt that ‘the Board of Admiralty cannot give any opinion as to the person 
who may be fit to make the observations at Madeira. It will be the duty of the Board of 
Longitude to select a proper person for that purpose & to notify the same to the Admiralty’ 
and that the ‘Resident Committee should prepare the instructions for the person & should 
determine as to the number of chronometers &tc to be taken out & the mode of 
superintending them’.98 Ten days later, Croker again wrote to Young asking him to act 
immediately, as ‘the season [was] proper’ and if he saw ‘no prospect of getting a competent 
observer to undertake the observations a shore, not a moment should be lost in selecting 
ten or a dozen of the best going of the chronometers in order to their being immediately 
embarked in a frigate who should be directed to convey them to Madeira & back, departing 
from & returning to Falmouth’.99 This appears to have resulted in a miscommunication 
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between the two, as Croker wrote again three days later asking ‘when will the doctor & his 
instruments be ready to embark? I presume that you mean, tho’ it is not clearly expressed, 
that the frigate & the chronometers should run out to Madeira, land the Doctor and return 
immediately to Falmouth & thence sail back to fetch the Doctor & the instruments. To save 
time I have written to the astronomer royal to select 6 8 or 10 of the best chronometers and 
to give their makers notice of the intended trial’.100  
The Admiralty trusted the Resident Committee and the Astronomer Royal to select the 
appropriate observers for the celestial observations and for the care of the instruments. The 
Admiralty were able to organise the endeavour and select a suitable vessel. However, the 
letters reveal that Young believed chronometric measurement alone would be sufficient, 
whilst it was the Admiralty’s intention that the method should be tested against astronomical 
observations in order to test the efficiency of chronometric differences. Croker made this 
very clear the following day, when he again corresponded with Young:  
Of course we must be satisfied with what shall be thought satisfactory by the Board of 
Longitude, but it occurs to us that the observations on shore should be made with 
great care, nicety, & deliberation & although it may be expected that the 
chronometers will give a nearer approximation to the truth, than the observations, this 
must be mere expectation & one advantage of the experiment will be the bringing 
careful observations to bear upon the best chronometrical calculations. It seems 
therefore that the observations by Dr Tiarks should be made in the most compete & 
scientific manner, else, they had better, for all our sakes, not be made at all.101 
 
The Admiralty wanted two determinations of longitude, one on shore by observations, the 
other by ‘chronometers afloat’.102 Tiarks was to be the on-shore observer, and a second 
person, selected by Pond and the Resident Committee, was to have care of the 
chronometers. Croker had made clear in conversation with Young that he wished ‘to keep 
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the result of the chronometer time a secret from the observer’.103 In addition, Young believed 
that one trip to Funchal should be sufficient, whilst Croker wanted the chronometers to take 
two trips. Young also proposed that ‘little stress is to be laid on the observations & a great 
deal on the chronometers’, leading Croker to reply that this would ‘diminish the chronometer 
experiment by one half without at all improving the other’.104 Croker then requested Young 
and Tiarks to call on him to discuss the matter. Judging by the manner in which the voyage 
preceded, it seemed that Young was able to convince the Admiralty that the method of 
chronometric distances would be sufficient for the purpose. Tiarks subsequently sailed to 
Madeira and back between the 24 July and 29 August 1822, with his chronometers. At 
Falmouth and Madeira, he determined the rates of the chronometers by Equal Altitudes of 
the Sun. No other astronomical observations were made.  
Pond meanwhile was ordered to ‘select a sufficient number of the best going 
chronometers’.105 Even though he was trusted with selecting these instruments, Pond was 
seen to overstep his authority by authorising an additional four instruments (likely 
instruments leant for trial by their makers) to the total of twelve issued by Admiralty order. 
Their Lordships disapproved of the other instruments and ordered ‘Captain Spencer & Dr 
Tiarks not to take any account of their rates of going’.106 Pond convinced the Admiralty of his 
reasons for supplying these additional instruments, who then permitted ‘all the 
chronometers to proceed, tho’ there are some points which they do not yet perfectly 
understand & could have wished that the Private Watches had not been sent’.107 Considering 
that with chronometric differences, in general it was perceived that a greater number of 
instruments was better, it is surprising that the Admiralty were so opposed to the addition 
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of these instruments. As the trials were intended for public benefit, they may have feared 
this would lead to a loss of trust in the trials. What is clear is that the Admiralty had to approve 
each chronometer added to the voyage. 
Pond reported back to the Admiralty on the return of the voyage. He found that the 
‘discordances [were] not greater than I expected from previous experiments and I have little 
doubt but that the difference of longitude of these two places is now as correctly known as 
that of Greenwich and the principal observatories in Europe’. He added that even if ‘future 
revision may improve this result a very small quantity’ the ‘performance of the chronometers 
will remain exactly the same’. ‘Upon the whole’, Pond was ‘persuaded the experiment has 
been as successful as it was important’.108 Tiarks’ voyage convinced Pond of the success of 
chronometric distances, and Pond in his turn convinced the Admiralty, yet caution in the 
method and its results remained evident throughout the following decades. Consequently, 
the Admiralty ordered similar experiments to be performed upon a variety of Royal Navy 
expeditions, notably including the voyages of HMS Adventure, under command of Captain 
King (1826-1830); HMS Chanticleer, under Captain Foster (1828-1831); and HMS Beagle, 
under Captain Fitzroy (1831-1836). All three expeditions sailed with a large number of 
chronometers in order to measure meridian distances in the same manner as Tiarks had done 
before them.  
Issuing chronometers to Foster and Fitzroy was far more straightforward. After six 
years of chronometer trials at Greenwich, Pond had a greater number of instruments to 
choose from (though he still had to purchase additional instruments to make up the 
numbers). The use of a large number of ‘the best’ chronometers to measure meridian 
distances became accepted as a method, although astronomical observations were still seen 
as the only method to truly establish a longitude. A meeting of the committee was held on 
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28 January 1828 to determine the aims of Foster’s voyage. Present were Davies Gilbert 
(President to the Royal Society), Francis Beaufort (at this point still a captain in the Royal 
Navy), William Henry Fitton (President of the Geological Society), John Herschel (President 
of the Astronomical Society), Captain Kater, Peter Mark Roget (Secretary of the Royal Society) 
and Captain Sabine. Parry (then Hydrographer to the Navy), Foster and James Horsburgh 
(Hydrographer to the East India Company) attended by invitation.109 The point of the 
chronometric measurements was solely to connect the longitudes determined 
astronomically at the pendulum stations and extended the experiment initiated with Tiarks 
in 1822, as the following extract underlines:  
The committee are far from considering that great intervals of longitude thus obtained 
even by the mean of a great number of chronometers can be compared in point of 
accuracy with those resulting from direct independent determinations from 
astronomical observations such as eclipses, occultation’s and the lunar methods. But 
they conceive that by the employment of 12, 18 or any greater number of their 
instruments of good and ascertained character which can be placed at Captain Foster’s 
disposal not only may be satisfactory estimate be found of the actual efficacy of the 
method of chronometers, by checking their results in trips of various lengths with 
those already well known, or determined by better means in the course of the 
expedition but also that a great number of smaller intervals of high importance to 
navigation may thus be ascertained with a great degree of approximation, which the 
other objects of the expedition would not allow of being determined independently.110 
 
Although issuing chronometers was delegated to Pond, the Admiralty remained in control. 
In December 1828, Foster requested a list of instruments he required for the voyage from 
Young. The list covered two pages, specifying thirty-seven different instruments; most of 
these were for astronomical purposes, but they also included instruments for magnetic, 
meteorological and observational research. Written in the margin in pencil, either by Young 
or an unknown Admiralty hand, is specified who owned the instruments required, in most 
cases this was the Admiralty or the Board of Longitude. At the top of the list, Foster requested 
 




thirty chronometers. The chronometers were listed as Admiralty property, and in pencil the 
amount was adjusted to ‘12’ with the additional remark ‘or as many as possible’ (figure 
3.6).111 
 
Figure 3.6: List of instruments requested for HMS Chanticleer. CUL, RGO 14/49, f. 60r  
Before the Chanticleer departed, Foster requested that the chronometers (‘not less than 
eighteen’) should ‘for a considerable time previous to their embarkation, be in the hands of 
the Astronomer Royal, for the purpose of determining their rates’.112 Pond was then directed 
by Barrow to have ‘twelve chronometers of the best qualities prepared’.113 Ultimately, the 
Chanticleer sailed with fifteen chronometers: two on loan from the makers, one belonged to 
Foster, all others were government-owned (figure 3.7).  
 
111 Henry Foster to Thomas Young, December, 1828. CUL, RGO 14/49, f. 60r 
112 Henry Foster to John Wilson Croker, Athenaum, 15 January, 1828. TNA, ADM1/1816  




Figure 3.7: List of Chronometers supplied to HMS Chanticleer. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7  
Fitzroy was aided by Beaufort and a ‘kind uncle’ for his expedition on HMS Beagle.114 
Fitzroy, having served on the first voyage of the Beagle (he took over her command after 
Captain Pringle Stokes committed suicide), had been under the impression that another 
voyage would be ordered to continue the survey. The Admiralty initially opposed this but 
 
114 Robert Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty’s Ships Adventure and Beagle 
between the years 1826 and 1836, Volume II, (London: Henry Colburn, 1839), p. 13 
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Fitzroy’s uncle intervened; he ‘went to the Admiralty, and soon afterwards told me that I 
should be appointed to the command of the Chanticleer, to go to Tierra de Fuego’.115 Fitzroy 
did not identify which uncle, and he had many: his family was an old aristocratic one with 
influential connections. His father, Lord Charles Fitzroy, was an army officer and politician, 
and his grandfather, Augustus Henry Fitzroy, was the third Duke of Grafton and Prime 
Minister between 1768 and 1770. Beaufort was also supportive of the endeavour and was 
instrumental in setting-up the instructions for the voyage. It was Beaufort who requested 
specific chronometers from Pond: Earnshaw 705, Frodsham 1, Arnold 465 and Parkinson 
1048.116 The Admiralty offered Frodsham £100 for Frodsham no. 2 after it performed well at 
trial. They accepted the offer and requested the Admiralty to also consider purchasing no. 1, 
although it had performed less well. According to Frodsham, this was down to the 
temperature adjustment, which they had improved. Beaufort, rather than Pond, 
recommended purchasing the instrument, as it was ‘good’ for 70 guineas, based on its trial 
number and the pay scale adopted.117 The chronometers selected for these voyages 
remained out of bounds to other users. The Beagle did not leave Devonport until 27 
December 1831. In July 1831, a captain requested the use of a chronometer reserved for the 
Beagle, as he was to set out immediately. The request was refused.118 Access to these 
instruments, then, considered to be the best by the Observatory standards, was dependent 
on the social and institutional networks in which one operated.  
 
 
115 Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages, Volume II, p. 13.  
116 Francis Beaufort to John Pond, Admiralty Office, 8 July, 1831. CUL, RGO5/231, f. 43r 
117 Francis Beaufort, 20 January, 1831. TNA, ADM 1/4609 
118 Admiralty Digest, Mathematical Instruments, 1831. TNA, ADM12/278 
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Owen: hydrographic surveying on the East African Coast  
Scientific or exploration voyages were thus held in high esteem, and were issued with the 
best chronometers that Pond had on offer. In 1829, Pond even discouraged the purchase of 
the chronometers on trial, as ‘should no particular scientific expedition be in contemplation 
by their lordships, I do not on my part see any urgency for their purchase’.119 Surveyors 
enjoyed no such standing. Croker saw the Hydrographic Office ‘as a wasteful expense and 
surveying as unnecessary diversion’.120 Entrance to the service had even been described as 
‘an act of “self-immolation”’ in terms of an officer’s opportunities for promotion and career 
prospects.121 Surveyors could not necessarily draw on the same resources as naval officers 
such as Parry, Foster and Fitzroy did. As with Fitzroy, where they could, it was because of the 
social standing they had, rather than from their employment as surveyors. Admiralty-
sponsored expeditions were still clearly a higher priority. Even so, and to judge from the 
chronometers issued during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, surveyors were still 
important figures and their standing increased with the expansion of the Hydrographic Office 
under Thomas Hurd, William Parry and Francis Beaufort.122  
The captains of HMS Leven and HMS Barracouta, William Fitzwilliam Owen and William 
Cutfield respectively, wrote to the Admiralty requesting chronometers. Croker forwarded the 
application to Pond on their behalf. For the two vessels, nine chronometers in total were 
issued from the Observatory in 1821: five to HMS Leven, four to HMS Barracouta. Owen 
requested that he ‘be supplied with two of the condemned chronometers now in store, in 
 
119 John Pond to John Wilson Croker, Royal Observatory, 25 August, 1829. TNA, ADM1/3470 
120 Megan Barford, Naval Hydrography, Charismatic Bureaucracy, and the British Military State, c. 
1825-1855, Unpublished PhD, University of Cambridge, (2016), p. 3 
121 Barford, Naval Hydrography, Charismatic Bureaucracy, and the British Military State, p. 3 
122 Megan Barford, ‘D.176: Sextants, numbers, and the Hydrographic Office of the Admiralty’, History 
of Science, 55, (2017), pp. 431-456; Webb, ‘More than just Charts: Hydrographic Expertise within the 




addition to the Chronometers now on charge, to enable him to carry time from place to place 
in the Boats or otherwise, without disturbing the latter from their places’.123 From these 
requests, it is clear that Owen was of the opinion that moving chronometers around would 
be detrimental to their use. Like the polar voyages, the chronometers issued by the Admiralty 
were not the only ones used during the five years of surveying. Unfortunately, despite the 
comprehensive ‘Essay on Chronometers’ written by Lieutenant Richard Owen of HMS Leven, 
Owen did not specify which particular instruments were used. This could be because his 
‘Essay’ was intended as a general instruction, on how to manage chronometers, but it could 
also indicate that Owen viewed the instruments as (almost) interchangeable. Figure 3.8 
shows the chronometers that were used on board HMS Leven and HMS Barracouta during 
the survey.124  
  
 
123 John Barrow to John Pond, 11 October, 1821. CUL, RGO 5/229, f. 11r 
124 The Table is comprised based on the following sources: Richard Owen, Essay on Chronometers, 
(London: Printed by Duckworth and Ireland, for the Hydrographical Office, 1827); ‘List of government 
chronometers’. UKHO, MLP 82; Barrow to Pond: ‘List of instruments on board HMS Leven belonging 
to His Majesty. Originally supplied from the Hydrographical department of the Admiralty Office’. CUL, 




Maker & no. Type Issued Owner 
Arnold 498 8-day box 1821 London Government 
Arnold 503 Box 1821 London Government 
Arnold 1970 Pocket 1821 London Government 
Young 6303 Hack watch 1821 London Government 
Margetts 97 Hack watch 1821 London Government 
Arnold 1870 Pocket  1822 Cape of Good Hope Purchased by Owen, lost in Zambezi  
Barraud 618 Box 1823 Bombay Purchased by Owen, reimbursed on 
return  
Arnold 323 Box 1825 London  Government  
Arnold 1891 Box 1822 Cape of Good Hope Purchased by Owen, reimbursed on 
return  




?  Owen 
HMS Barracouta 
Margetts 223 ? 1821 London Government 
Margetts 163 ? 1821 London Government 
Barraud 10 Box 1821 London Government 
Barraud 517 ? 1821 London Government 
French 1640 Box Unclear Government  
Massey ?  Owen 
Figure 3.8: Table containing the chronometers used by the Leven and Barracouta during the East 
African Survey.  
Due to this lack of specification, it is unclear exactly how many chronometers were 
used on the voyage. Parry had requested particular instruments because of his experience 
with them in particular conditions. William Fitzwilliam Owen’s faith lay more in the method, 
which indicates that the status of the instrument was less important, as the method would 
justify the results, not the status of the instrument. As Owen did not have access to several 
‘good’ instruments, he relied on strict methods of use to guarantee their reliability.  Owen 
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employed a stricter hierarchy of instruments than the other users considered in this thesis. 
Of the five chronometers issued to the Leven, two were considered hack watches (the 
condemned chronometers cited above), which Owen used to compare time between 
instruments. A pocket chronometer was issued, but Owen did not specify what this particular 
instrument was used for. The remaining two box chronometers, considered the best, were 
used as the standards (Arnold 498 and Arnold 503). Owen did not have much success with 
his chronometers. By 1823, ‘all our chronometers had failed, except one; that had also 
fluctuated in rate, so we could not depend on the meridian distance shewn by any of 
them’.125  
Owen’s problems with the instruments reveal the complications that chronometer 
users still needed to overcome. To deal with them, Owen purchased additional instruments 
at his own expense. These included two pocket watches at the Cape of Good Hope in 
September, 1823 and one box chronometer in Bombay, in December 1823. On return to 
England, Owen was reimbursed for the costs and the chronometers became government 
property. One pocket chronometer was bought by Owen in 1822 (an Arnold 1870) but this 
was lost during the survey of the Zambezi, along with Lieutenant Browne and his men.126 
Whilst Owen purchased chronometers abroad, to replace those that malfunctioned, he only 
replaced the pocket and hack chronometers. When it came to the chronometers that Owen 
kept below decks, those used as standards, Owen applied to the Admiralty to supply these 
from England.  
 
125 Owen, ‘Tables of Latitude and Longitude’, p. 13 
126 Stuart Jennings, ‘Chronometers on the 1821-26 Royal Navy African Survey’, Antiquarian Horology, 




Figure 3.9: One-day box chronometer by John Roger Arnold, no. 323. Issued to William Owen from the 
Royal Observatory, 1825. (NMM ZAA0117). Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, pp. 261-263. 
© National Maritime Museum. 
There was, in other words, a clear hierarchy here; chronometers to be used as the 
standard required the authority of appropriate individuals such as Pond to determine their 
status. In 1825, Owen received Arnold 323 (figure 3.9) as a replacement chronometer for 
Arnold 503, which he had sent back to England for repair.127 In addition to these instruments 
issued, purchased and exchanged. Owen also carried his own chronometers. On requesting 
 
127 Jennings, ‘Chronometers on the 1821-26 Royal Navy African Survey’, p. 209 
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that the Admiralty pay the bill for the repair of his own chronometer Brockbanks and Atkins 
3454 (which they refused), Owen mentioned that he ‘embarked several chronometers 
belonging to myself to aid me in the observations required’.128 A final chronometer listed by 
Jennings is French 1640, but it is unclear where this instrument was purchased and by whom. 




Pond wrote in 1829 that the ‘chronometers in question are much superior to those of former 
years, indeed the rates of improvement in the last few years may be I think fairly stated as at 
least two to one’.129 The Premium Trials had at least succeeded in their aim of improving the 
performance of chronometers on shore. While the rating of chronometers remained under 
the supervision of the Observatory, Pond’s management of chronometer issue was short-
lived. Hurd would have been pleased that the responsibility returned to the Hydrographer in 
1829, under the supervision of Beaufort. A growing stock of chronometers at Greenwich 
meant that increasing numbers of Royal Navy ships could be issued with them. The addition 
of the marine chronometer to the navigational equipment meant that ships could potentially 
sail more quickly and with increased certainty. Until the 1820s, chronometers had not yet 
had a great effect on the practices of navigation; traditional methods were still adhered to 
by the captain or master navigating the ship. Transforming practice at sea required more 
than just the addition of another piece of hardware, especially one that was liable to 
uncertainty and error. Yet specific groups of users saw the benefit that could be achieved if 
 
128 William Fitzwilliam Owen to John Wilson Croker, HMS Eden, Woolwich 26 May, 1827. TNA, ADM 
1/2272 
129 Copy of a letter to John Wilson Croker, Royal Observatory, August, 1829. CUL, RGO 5/233, f. 49r 
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standardised practices were adhered to. The Hydrographic Office in particular was keen to 
promote this and played a central role in chronometric matters.  
On land, the business of chronometry had changed. The market had opened up to 
chronometer makers. Official trials were initiated on which the merits of individual 
instruments could be judged. The Admiralty, with assistance from the Hydrographer and the 
Astronomer Royal, took control of government stock and supply and, more importantly, had 
the authority to judge the merits of individual chronometers. As a result, ‘the systems of the 
state, not the trade . . . gave their timekeepers value’.130 Thus at Greenwich, the Astronomer 
Royal became an authority on chronometers.  
This chapter has also shown that what had proved possible on land required replicating 
at sea. Observatory Staff, with the help of the university-based mathematicians, were now 
trained in the use of observing instruments and regulators, and they selected the instruments 
that performed best in the (relatively) stable environment of terrestrial sites. At sea, most 
users found that the rates of the instruments altered, although they did not agree upon the 
cause. How an individual evaluated the reliability depended entirely on what they believed 
caused irregularities in their chronometers. Parry and Sabine considered their chronometers, 
which had been specifically adjusted for the cold climate of the Arctic, reliable. Fisher on the 
other hand, was suspicious of their performance as he believed magnetism would have a 
detrimental effect on their rates.  
Astronomical observations went hand in hand with chronometric measurements. By 
the 1820s, the Admiralty was still not convinced of the accuracy of chronometers and wished 
to test them against astronomical observations made on shore. As is clear from the 
correspondence concerning the method for best determining the longitude of Funchal in 
Madeira, opinions varied as to what the most accurate method might be. Owen had to make 
 
130 Phillips, Making Time Fit, p. 65 
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similar judgements, although rather than between methods, Owen determined strict 
hierarchies between his instruments. He clearly considered chronometers unstable, and 
cautioned others not to become too reliant on them. To counter this inherent problem, Owen 
advised strict procedures for their use. From these examples it is clear that one’s social 
network had a direct outcome on chronometric practice. Parry, Foster and Fitzroy, all well-
connected gentlemen charged with the command of prestigious expeditions were allocated 
the best resources on offer. The Arctic voyages in particular had the support of John Barrow. 
William Fitzwilliam Owen, as only a surveyor, lacked the standing of his fellow naval officers 
employed on these scientific expeditions and had to make do with ‘lesser’ instruments.131  
Determining the rate of the instrument was the most important but also the most 
challenging aspect of practice. Because an observatory regulated clock was not available at 
sea, navigators turned to traditional celestial observations to determine the changes taking 
place in their instruments. Introducing new technologies required guidance and instructions 
on how best to implement them. Instructions for chronometers came from a variety of 
sources: textual instruction, on-board learning, and experimental experience. Hurd, and later 
Parry and Beaufort, each promoted hydrography and collected significant amounts of data 
at the Hydrographic Office. They saw the potential, through disciplined instruction, that the 
collection of chronometric data had for increasing the reliability of Admiralty charts. The next 
chapter examines how users were instructed in the use of the instruments and what this 
meant for the practices they implemented.   
 
131 Webb, ‘More than just Charts: Hydrographic Expertise within the Admiralty, 1795-1829’, p. 46; 





Naval Education and Chronometric Instruction 
 
But this can never be strictly true unless she be not only provided with a chronometer, 
but with officers familiarised to the use of this instrument. Let an officer’s theoretical 
knowledge be what it may, he will perform his voyage, whether short or long – in a 
manner much inferior to that of another officer who, without his zeal, knowledge, or 
talents, had by some accident rendered himself practically master of this important 
branch of his duty.1 
 
Introduction 
When the chronometer was introduced at sea in the 1770s, instructions about how to use 
them in navigational manuals were limited to a short description of this ‘mechanical 
solution’, which was considered too expensive and too unreliable for general use at sea.2 This 
scant description did not change until the early nineteenth century and even then, remained 
limited. Not until the 1820s and 1830s did more in-depth instructions become available, 
either as instructions distributed to Royal Navy captains, as a section in a navigation manual, 
or as a separate publication. In 1855, Captain Charles Shadwell (1814-1886) published a 158-
page instruction manual on the management and use of chronometers.3 Much had changed 
concerning chronometer use at sea in the intervening years: it is also clear, as this chapter 
shows, that most of these developments had occurred as experimental practices on board 
ship. 
 
1 Basil Hall to Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956. 
2 John Robertson, The Elements of Navigation; Containing the Theory and Practice, Volume II, (London: 
Printed for J. Nourse, 1772), Book IX, p. 341  
3 Charles F. A. Shadwell, Notes on the Management of Chronometers and the Measurement of 
Meridian Distances, (London: J. D. Potter, 1855) 
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Understanding these early experimental practices is challenging given the scarcity of 
records. Research into the uptake and early use of these methods has focused predominantly 
on two sources: logbooks and navigational manuals. Interpretations of the logbooks indicate 
that the Royal Navy was slow to take up chronometers, particularly in comparison with the 
East India Company which, in 1791, introduced an additional column into their logbooks for 
the longitude by chronometer.4 May has shown that most of the chronometers in circulation 
were used either privately, by captains of the East India Company, or on Royal Navy 
exploration or surveying expeditions.5 Most of these instruments were supplied by a few 
makers, the majority from Arnold, as noted in the previous chapter. May’s research indicated 
a lack of chronometric instruction and Wess has similarly noted the sparsity of lunar 
instruction in navigational manuals from the late eighteenth century.6 Wess also noted a lack 
of ‘longitude by lunar’ in late eighteenth-century East India Company logbooks. From the 
examination of logbooks and navigation manuals, Wess concluded that within the East India 
Company, the lunar distance method was only used on exploration voyages and ‘just as likely 
a chronometer would be preferred, or neither’.7  
Study of the logbooks of the East India Company has revealed a different picture. 
Davidson examined 587 East India Company logbooks for the period 1770-1792. In total, 45% 
of these voyages used lunar distances and 22% used chronometers. Within this period, 
chronometer use increased towards the end of the century whilst records of the lunar 
distance method started to decline. The method of dead reckoning was also taken into 
 
4 William E. May, ‘How the Chronometer Went to Sea’, Antiquarian Horology, 9, (1976), pp. 638-663; 
Simon C. Davidson, Marine Chronometers: The Rapid Adoption of New Technology by East India 
Captains in the Period 1772-1792 on over 580 Voyages’, Antiquarian Horology, Vol. 40, (2019), pp. 76-
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5 May, ‘How the Chronometer went to Sea’, pp. 638-663 
6 May, ‘How the Chronometer went to Sea’; Jane Wess, ‘Navigation and Mathematics: A Match Made 
in the Heavens?’, in: Navigational Enterprises in Europe and its Empires, 1730-1850, Richard Dunn and 
Rebekah Higgitt, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2016), p. 208 
7 Wess, ‘Navigation and Mathematics’, p. 215 
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account in this study, but only when it was used as the sole method for determining 
longitude.8 This study showed that by the 1790s, dead reckoning was always supported by 
either chronometers or lunar observations. But it must not be forgotten that dead reckoning 
underpinned all navigation, and without it, a ship simply could not sail.  
These studies show that different pictures emerge depending on the nature of the 
source material examined. Lack of lunar instruction in navigational manuals does not 
necessarily preclude chronometers’ use at sea. The use of lunars on both Royal Navy and East 
India Company ships reveals that not all users were reliant on these manuals to learn new 
methods. This raises the question of who was the intended audience for these manuals and 
if the early users of these methods were part of that audience. The same trend can be seen 
in chronometry. Davidson’s study showed that chronometer use in the East India Company 
increased from only 4% in the 1770s, to 82% by 1791-92, based on the evidence from the 
logbooks studied.9 At that time, however, published chronometric instruction in navigational 
manuals was still almost non-existent, as May has pointed out and as this study also supports. 
These source materials are thus problematic and interpretations from them should be made 
with caution; but this does not mean they are without merit. Secord challenges us to think 
about ‘every text, image, action, and object as the trace of an act of communication, with 
receivers, producers, and modes and conventions of transmission’.10 We can see from these 
studies by May, Wess, and Davidson that textual instruction in navigation manuals did not 
reflect actual use at sea, and that practice at sea developed more rapidly than the instruction 
in books. Studying the interaction of both instruction in print and practice in the field can give 
a richer view of the development of practice, to see ‘knowledge not just as abstract doctrine 
 
8 Davidson ‘Marine chronometers: The Rapid Adoption of New Technology by East India Captains’, pp. 
638-663 
9 The percentages are based on the number of voyages carrying chronometers in a particular year.  
10 James A. Secord, ‘Knowledge in Transit’, Isis, 95, (2004), p. 661 
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but as communicative practice in a range of well-integrated and closely understood 
settings’.11 
The fact that users had to turn to other sources to learn the technologies suggests that 
in these early stages, users are key to understanding how these manuals related to practice 
at sea. Context is also important. Given that navigation was an established practice, and 
manuals had been in circulation since the sixteenth century, the question why instruction in 
these new methods remained relatively absent is a crucial one. For methods so desperately 
needed, the lack of instruction contrasts sharply with the research and rewards being 
devoted to these so-called longitude solutions.12 Yet, two publications circulating in the late 
eighteenth century deserve specific attention: the first is Alexander Dalrymple’s Notes on 
Chronometers, published in various forms between 1786 and 1788. The second is William 
Wales’ Method for Finding the Longitude at Sea, published in 1794. Both works deserve our 
attention for two reasons: they highlight the basic skills and knowledge necessary for the use 
of chronometers, and they demonstrate that because the aims of various users differed, so 
did the emphasis as to what was the subject of instruction. Therefore, if we compare how 
the chronometers were used in the various case studies, we also see differences in what was 
expected of the instrument. Although the case studies studied below were using 
chronometers between 1819 and 1836, most of the captains were introduced to navigational 
practices during the end of the eighteenth century and in the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first examines chronometric 
instruction in general navigation manuals between 1770 and 1820, and the context in which 
they were used. This cut-off point reflects the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the effect this 
 
11 Secord, ‘Knowledge in Transit’, p. 671  
12 May, ‘How the Chronometer went to Sea’; Wess, ‘Navigation and Mathematics: A Match Made in 
the Heavens?’  
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had on naval education and on the careers and status of naval officers, and, more directly, 
because most of the officers within these case studies went to sea within this period. This 
section also examines the role that shore-based education played in the training of a naval 
officer. The question of different schooling is, I argue, key to understanding how we interpret 
these textual instructions which must be placed within the broader context of a naval 
education. The two works by Dalrymple and Wales identified above are examined in relation 
to the users they were intended for and for what they reveal about the authors’ perceptions 
of problems that would be encountered in the use of chronometers.    
The second section examines the change in naval culture following the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars and the emergence of what has been termed ‘the scientific naval officer’.13 
New cultures within the Admiralty influenced the careers of officers after 1815 and the aims 
of the Navy changed significantly in the transition from war to peace. Peace time operations 
increasingly focused on scientific pursuits at sea. These are reflected in Parry’s Arctic voyages, 
Owen’s survey, Foster’s scientific expedition and Fitzroy’s chronometric expedition. 
Following the points made in the preceding chapter, I examine these voyages in terms of 
their captains, to evaluate their naval training and education in the context of this ‘navy in 
transition’ and their social standing and connections within the Admiralty and the scientific 
societies.   
 
On shore: naval education and textual instruction 
As chronometers were developed to assist navigators in determining their longitude at sea, 
one might expect that the explanation of their use would be disseminated through the 
navigational manuals that were prolific in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
 
13 Randolph Cock, ‘Scientific Servicemen in the Royal Navy and the Professionalisation of Science, 
1816-55’, Science and Beliefs: From Natural Philosophy to Natural Science, 1700-1900, Matthew D. 
Eddy, ed. (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 95–112 
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These manuals built on a tradition dating back to the sixteenth century but had, over time, 
developed into hefty volumes, often written from a theoretical perspective by authors who 
did not practice navigation at sea. The manuals would instruct seamen on plane- and great 
circle sailing, navigational instruments (cross-staff, compass, astrolabe, sea charts), the 
motions of the Moon and tides and the rules for meridian altitudes for finding latitude. As 
practices developed throughout the seventeenth century, new instruments, methods and 
data were added. Developments increasingly involved mathematics, introducing Napier’s 
logarithms and the Gunter scale and logarithmic trigonometrical functions. As a result, 
‘arithmetic navigation’ advanced and the use of the common log for measuring speed 
became standard.14 Mathematical and astronomical theories concerning navigation 
flourished in the seventeenth century, but it was not until the eighteenth century that these 
practices were applied by sailors to improve navigational practices.15 By then, over fifty 
different authors had contributed to the stock of manuals, predominantly in English, Spanish, 
Portuguese, French and Dutch. These were often copied from older manuals and featured 
obscure explanations which sailors often did not understand, reducing the tacit skills of 
sailors to ‘automatic adherence to rules of thumb’.16 
Later eighteenth and early nineteenth century editions were often divided into two 
main sections. The former focused on basic mathematical principles (arithmetic, logarithms, 
sine, tangents, degrees, minutes, trigonometry); geography and astronomy; different sailing 
techniques (plane, Mercator, middle latitude, traverse); the construction and use of 
Mercator’s chart; winds, tides, tables of finding the time of high water at any place; 
description and use of nautical instruments (log-line and half-minute glass, Hadley’s 
 
14 Charles H. Cotter, 'A Brief Historical Survey of British Navigation Manuals', Journal of Navigation, 36, 
(1983), p. 242 
15 Commander J. B. Hewson, A History of the Practice of Navigation, (Glasgow: Brown, Son & Ferguson, 
1951), pp. 101-103 
16 Hewson, A History of the Practice of Navigation, p.102 
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quadrant, sextant) and how to observe distances; parallax, refraction, semi-diameter; 
compass variation, true amplitude, true azimuth; the method of keeping a ship’s reckoning; 
rules for correcting dead reckoning; and a journal example. The latter explained the various 
astronomical methods for determining latitude and longitude. Navigators looking to improve 
their accuracy in navigation by applying mathematical and astronomical rules could turn to 
subject specific publications. These related to specific instruments (quadrant, reflecting 
circle, compass, chronometer, Gunter scale); methods for determining latitude and longitude 
(Equal Altitudes, lunars, chronometers, position line); astronomical observations (finding 
azimuths, ex-meridian observations, hour angles) and specific data required for solving 
nautical problems (refraction, parallax, spherical trigonometry, simplified or new methods of 
calculation). 
These developments not only transformed how navigation was practised at sea; they 
also led to the formation of the Royal Mathematical School, Christ’s Hospital (RMS) in 
London. Established by Charles II in 1673, the RMS was the first school to teach boys, aged 
between twelve and sixteen years, mathematics and navigation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
many of the individuals associated with the RMS had close links with the Royal Society and 
the Royal Observatory. Samuel Pepys, Jonas Moore, Robert Hooke, Isaac Newton, 
Christopher Wren, John Flamsteed and Edmond Halley all contributed to its establishment. 
Hooke, Newton, Wren, Flamsteed and Halley were all involved with the content and 
structure of the curriculum.17 This is significant as it underlines how important these 
individuals felt that mathematics and astronomy were for navigation, in particular for 
longitude determinations. Margaret Schotte argues that the RMS was ‘shaped by an elite 
 
17 Nerida F. Ellerton and M. A. Clements, Samuel Pepys, Isaac Newton, James Hodgson, and the 
Beginnings of Secondary School Mathematics: A History of the Royal Mathematical School Within 
Christ’s Hospital, London 1673-1868, (New York: Springer, 2017), pp. 13-20   
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group of naval administrators and governors who stressed math and science’, who preferred 
intellectual education above practical training.18  
James Hodgson (assistant to Flamsteed at the Royal Observatory between 1696 and 
1702), John Robertson and William Wales were influential Masters during the eighteenth 
century.19 It was for the curriculum of this school that John Robertson wrote his first edition 
of Elements of Navigation in 1754.20 Students learned according to the cyphering tradition; 
extant cyphering books examined by Ellerton and Clements showed that they were largely 
copies of Robertson’s Elements.21 After passing their exams at Trinity House based on 
Robertson’s Elements, the boys would proceed to a seven-year apprenticeship on a merchant 
or naval vessel. These boys would thus enter the Navy as a King’s Boy, or ‘Volunteer per 
Order’. As an Admiralty nominee, captains could not refuse such an appointment. Young men 
who entered the Navy via this pathway were often poor or the sons of deceased captains; 
their prospects were that of a warrant officer, the master charged with navigating the ship.22  
Another shore-based education institution, established in 1733, was the Royal Naval 
Academy (RNA) in Portsmouth. Dickinson has traced the motive for establishing the Academy 
to the somewhat failed scheme of the naval schoolmaster, introduced in 1702 with the 
intention of teaching future officers on board ship by midshipmen who would receive 
additional pay for taking on this duty. To remedy this, the Admiralty proposed that the 
Academy teach ‘the sons of noblemen and gentlemen aged between 13 and 16 year on 
admission’.23 These students were to receive a ‘broad spectrum of the academic and the 
 
18 Margaret E. Schotte, Sailing School: Navigating Science and Skill, 1550-1800, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2019), p. 102  
19 Ellerton and Clements, A History of the Royal Mathematical School, p. 25 
20 John Robertson, The Elements of Navigation Containing the Theory and Practice, (London: Printed 
for J. Nourse, 1754) 
21 Ellerton and Clements, A History of the Royal Mathematical School, p. 111 
22 Ibid, pp. 121-141  




practical [which stood in] marked contrast, not only to the narrow classical curriculum of the 
eighteenth-century public school, but also to the meagre diet provided by the naval 
schoolmaster afloat’.24 The practical aspect of the curriculum took place in the dockyard. 
After spending two years at the Academy, the student progressed to sea, where although he 
might access the quarterdeck, he would be paid as an able-seaman and would only be 
awarded a midshipman’s rank after two years of service. Via the Royal Naval Academy, the 
Admiralty attempted not only to combine theoretical and practical training, but to ensure 
ongoing training beyond the Academy. To promote this route, academy graduates could 
qualify for the lieutenant’s exam after only four years of service at sea, rather than six years 
as was the general custom. But this was not their only aim; it was also an attempt at the 
centralisation and control of naval education, a struggle the Admiralty would continue well 
into the nineteenth century.    
 
Figure 4.1: Royal Naval Academy, Portsmouth: panoramic view with an anchor. Aquatint by Hall, 1806, 
after I.T. Lee. Credit: Wellcome Collection. (Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)) 
 
 
24 Dickinson, ‘The Portsmouth Naval Academy, 1733-1806’, p. 19 
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Like the Royal Mathematical School, the Royal Naval Academy had close ties to the 
Royal Society, Trinity House, the Board of Longitude and the Royal Observatory. These links 
can again be found in the Masters of the academy. John Robertson held the position between 
1755 and 1766, using his Elements of Navigation as part of the curriculum. Robertson’s 
assistant at the Academy, Robert Waddington, had served as an observer with Nevil 
Maskelyne on the 1761 transit of Venus expedition and on his return promoted the lunar 
distance method through publications and private instruction.25 George Witchell, master 
between 1766 and 1785, was a Fellow of the Royal Society, had received £300 from the Board 
of Longitude, and had ‘assisted Cook with calculations and chronometer calibrations’ after 
his second voyage.26 Witchell’s assistant, John Bradley, nephew to the Astronomer Royal, 
also had experience at sea trialling lunar distances under Captain John Campbell on HMS 
Chatham. In 1784, William Bayly, former assistant to the Astronomer Royal, was appointed 
as astronomer by the Royal Society to observe the transit of Venus at the North Cape in 1769 
and served alongside Wales on Cook’s second voyage of discovery. Bayly was Master during 
the final decades of the Royal Naval Academy (1785-1807), before it was reconstituted under 
James Inman as the Royal Naval College. For other young hopefuls, private academies also 
provided education and training for boys looking to enter the Navy. One such establishment 
was Dr Burney’s Naval Academy, situated at Gosport in Portsmouth, which enjoyed royal 
patronage and also received students from wealthy families.27 Despite its name (and Burney’s 
claim that he trained ‘a greater number of young officers for the sea service than any other 
individual’), boys at the academy were taught a wide range of subjects and although many 
did enter the navy, former pupils also joined the Marines or the Army. George Francis Lyon, 
 
25 Jim Bennett, ‘Mathematicians on Board: Introducing Lunar Distances to Life at Sea’, British Journal 
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26 Dickinson, ‘The Portsmouth Naval Academy’, p. 21 
27 A. Macdermott, ‘Dr Burney’s Royal Academy at Gosport’, Mariners Mirror, 51, (1965), p.57-59  
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appointed by Parry to command the Hecla during the second Arctic expedition, attended 
Burney’s academy. 
Both the Royal Mathematical School and the Royal Naval Academy faced somewhat 
similar problems. The curriculum was seen as too theoretical and too advanced for the young 
students. Many officers also believed that effective training could only take place on board 
ship. For officers ‘it was immersive, experiential, and practical; it was delivered on an 
informal, ad hoc basis on board ships in commission’.28 Although this approach may have 
produced good seamen, the Admiralty’s problem was that it ‘did not ensure that they were 
gentlemen’.29 The curriculum at the RNA thus included subjects aimed at a balance between 
these two aspects; the ultimate goal was to establish a training scheme for gentlemen 
officers.  
What the Royal Mathematical School, the Royal Naval Academy and private academies 
had in common was that the curriculum for navigation was based on the manuals that were 
so prolific at the time. Burney is significant here because in 1815 he revised William 
Falconer’s Universal Dictionary of the Marine, a reference work for navigators and 
shipbuilders.30 Within the section on navigation, Burney elaborated on navigational manuals, 
and listed which he thought were the best for pursuing navigation. Examining all the manuals 
in circulation during the late eighteenth century is beyond the scope of this thesis and only a 
small selection of manuals has been studied here. Given his position as a naval instructor and 
his knowledge of maritime affairs, Burney’s recommendations offers a good way of selecting 
those manuals that, according to Burney at least, were most relevant. Burney thought 
 
28 Evan Wilson, Jakob Seerup and AnnaSara Hammer, ‘The Education and Careers of Naval Officers in 
the Long Eighteenth Century: An International Perspective’, Journal for Maritime Research, 17:1, 
(2015), p. 27 
29 Ibid, p. 30 
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Robertson’s Elements of Navigation was the manual ‘best adapted for teaching the art of 
navigation in a scientific manner’.31 William Norie, Andrew Mackay, and John Hamilton 
Moore’s general navigation manuals were the most common treatises used at sea as they 
were ‘merely calculated for practical seamen, who have not studied the theory; and on that 
account are published in a small convenient size, and at a low price’.32  
The most striking element of these early manuals is their lack of chronometric 
instruction. The first description to appear was in the 1772 edition of Robertson’s Elements. 
The manual described nine methods for finding the longitude (by a current; by the course 
and distance; by the variation chart; by a perfect time-keeper; by the Sun’s declination; by 
the Moon’s culminating; by eclipses of Jupiter’s Satellites; by eclipses of the Moon; by 
occultation of stars). Time-keepers (i.e. chronometers), the ‘mechanical solution’ to finding 
longitude, were described as too expensive to allow for general supply to naval ships and 
potentially unreliable, as ‘to whatever degree of perfection such a movement may be bought 
… every mechanic instrument must be liable to be injured by various accidents’.33 No rules or 
examples were given on how to determine the error and rate, or the longitude with the 
instrument. The author hoped that astronomical methods might be improved so they could 
also be used from ‘time to time’.34 Robertson’s Elements ran through a further four editions 
(with the last published in 1805) but the chronometric section was never updated.   
Moore described the principle of longitude by chronometer a decade later in The 
Practical Navigator as follows: ‘nothing more is wanted than to find apparent Time at the 
Ship, and to correct it by the Equation of Time; the Difference of this Time so correct, and 
that given by the Watch, turned into Longitude, will be the difference of Longitude between 
 
31 Falconer, A New Universal Dictionary of the Marine, p. 309  
32 Ibid, p. 310.  
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the Ship’s Meridian and that Meridian to which the Watch was set’. Moore thus described 
the principle, but only in the introductory text on longitude. He omitted it as a method of 
determining longitude, ‘as,’ he stated, ‘Watches, though made upon the best Construction, 
are subject to some internal Irregularities, and apt to be otherwise affected by Heat and Cold, 
the Mariner may well be anxious to determine his Longitude at Sea by celestial 
Observations’.35 Other descriptions appeared in the 1790s, noticeably in publications 
specifically related to nautical astronomy for finding latitude and longitude. Mackay was the 
first to do so in his Theory and Practice of Finding the Longitude at Sea or Land, first published 
in 1793. Mackay was Maskelyne’s original choice to replace the astronomer on the 
Vancouver expedition, but he appointed Inman due to Mackay’s ‘stalling’.36 The work was in 
two volumes; the first containing the method of finding longitude, the second containing the 
necessary tables. The main focus of the book, after explaining the principles of longitude and 
angle measuring instruments, was on the lunar distance method. Chronometry instruction 
was placed in Book IV ‘Containing various other methods of determining the Longitude of a 
Place’.37 Just as Wales and Moore before him, Mackay noted the irregularity of timekeepers 
and their high price as the main objection to their use, stating that ‘if a chronometer could 
be constructed, so as to go uniformly when placed in every different position, and under 
different degrees of heat, then would this method of finding longitude be a most valuable 
acquisition to the navigator’; however, due to doubts concerning their accuracy, they were 
 
35 John Hamilton Moore, The Practical Navigator and Seaman’s New Daily Assistant Being an Epitome 
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‘chiefly used for experiment, or to connect observations, for which purpose they certainly 
make a valuable appendage to a set of nautical instruments’.38  
John William Norie, a chart maker and teacher of navigation at a nautical academy on 
Leadenhall Street in London (which also sold charts and nautical instruments), published A 
Complete Epitome of Practical Navigation in 1804.39 Norie expanded on the necessity of 
determining an error and rate, as ‘if its error at the given meridian be known on a certain 
day, and also its rate, or daily gain or loss, we can thence deduce the time at that meridian 
as well as if the hands of the watch actually pointed it out; provided that it goes uniformly, 
which is all that is essential in the motion of a time-keeper’.40 The maker, or whoever cared 
for the instrument, was to supply this rate and error; alternatively, they could be established 
by single or Equal Altitudes of the Sun. The regularity of the watch could be determined by 
regular celestial observations. Norie then explained the method for finding the longitude by 
chronometer supplemented with four examples, as was the tradition in navigational 
manuals. The rules were simple: 
1. Note several altitudes of the Sun and their time by the chronometer.  
2. Determine the Mean Time of these several observations and correct it for rate and 
error.  
3. Use the latitude, true altitude and declination to determine the apparent time and 
Mean Time of the ship. The difference between the time by the chronometer and 
the Mean Time determined by the altitudes of the Sun is the longitude.  
 
 
38 Andrew Mackay, The Theory and practice of Finding the Longitude at Sea or Land, (London: Printed 
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Figure 4.2: Example of a longitude calculation, Norie, A Complete Epitome (1805) p. 240. 
 
In theory, this was indeed a simple method. What is more interesting here is that 
earlier in the manual, under the method for finding the longitude by lunar distances, eight 
and a half pages were dedicated to finding the time at sea and the error and rate of the 
watch. This was also the case in the manuals by Robertson, Moore, and the revised editions 
of Moore’s manual by Bowditch and Kirby. Robertson explained the process as early as 1772 
in Book IX detailing the ‘Day’s Work’. In most of the late-eighteenth-century manuals, these 
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explanations were always included within the description for the lunar distance method. This 
would suggest that if navigators were taught according to these manuals, most of the basic 
steps for determining longitude by chronometer would have been learnt as part of the lunar 
distances. It would also imply that competent users of chronometers had acquired many of 
the basic mathematical and astronomical skills that underpinned the method through the 
instruction of lunar distances. What these manuals thus show is how these methods relied 
on one another to be practical or useful at sea. Of these well-known manuals published in 
the first decade of the nineteenth century (Moore, Robertson, Kirby and Bowditch, Norie, 
Mackay), the consensus would imply that lunars were, in theory, considered the best method 
for finding longitude. The chronometer, found its place amongst the ‘other methods’, such 
as finding the longitude by a variation chart or by eclipses of Jupiter’s Satellites.  
 
Some Notes useful to those who have Chronometers at Sea  
Andrew Cook has examined Dalrymple’s publication in relation to his collaboration with 
chronometer maker John Arnold and his position as Hydrographer to the East India Company 
(1799-1808).41 The motivation for his appointment as Hydrographer was the loss of East 
Indiaman Colebrooke in 1778. Although a known danger since 1745, subsequent wrecks on 
the Anvil Rock in False Bay at the Cape of Good Hope provided the impetus for the company 
to appoint Dalrymple at an annual salary of £500 to improve hydrographical information. 
Dalrymple planned to construct twenty-seven small-scale charts to improve navigation to the 
Indian continent. Connecting these charts could only be done by determining the relative 
longitudes between them and Dalrymple thought that time-keepers and lunar observations 
could be used to achieve this aim. Dalrymple worked closely with Arnold and promoted his 
 
41 Andrew S. Cook, ‘Alexander Dalrymple and John Arnold: Chronometers and the Representation of 
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instruments to be used in these surveys. It was therefore shortly after his appointment in 
1779 or 1780 that Dalrymple’s first instructions relating to chronometers were circulated, 
followed shortly after by an eight-page pamphlet advising on their use at sea. He was 
instrumental in a survey conducted by East Indian Captain John McCluer in 1786 of the west 
coasts of India. In addition to one box and two pocket chronometers sent to Bombay for the 
survey were copies of a four-page manual entitled Instructions concerning the Chronometers, 
or Time-keepers, sent to Bombay, 1786. One year later, Dalrymple added additional 
instructions for observations and the Equation of Time.  
A combination of these earlier instructions formed the twelve-page instructions under 
examination, which appeared in 1788.42 It consisted of three parts. The first part described 
the actual pocket chronometer and included how to open it; how to start it once stopped; 
how to set the hands, and finally warned users not to hold a magnet in the vicinity of the 
instrument. Dalrymple’s advice on winding had less to do with ensuring the good function of 
the instruments, but more to ensuring the behaviour of the user as he cautioned ‘where 
there are more Chronometers than one, it will be proper to wind up one at Noon, the other 
at 8 o’clock at Night … always comparing them before and after winding up, and noting that 
comparison, to prevent the accident of letting them run down, by forgetting to wind them 
up, which is not likely to be forgot twice in one day’.43 Dalrymple included instructions on 
comparing the chronometers before and after taking five observations for the time, 
emphasising that these should be noted, but did not include advice on how the observations 
for time should be taken or calculated. This was explained in the second section of the 
pamphlet, entitled Some Notes useful to those who have Chronometers at Sea. This six-page 
part of the pamphlet started with explanations of some basic concepts in astronomy: the 
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difference between civil, astronomical and nautical time; how apparent solar time and Mean 
Time related to one another; that the chronometer carried Greenwich Mean Time and how 
to determine whether the position was east or west of Greenwich depending on whether the 
chronometer was ahead of or behind GMT; explanation of the Equation of Time and how it 
was calculated (this section takes up almost two pages of the document); clarification of the 
rate and error of chronometers and how these could be calculated to correct the longitude 
by chronometer and a further half page devoted to explaining how to determine the error of 
the chronometer by a known longitude. This section concluded with instruction on 
observations for time, advising users to take five altitudes to detect any observational errors. 
Dalrymple stressed that the altitudes for finding the time were ‘a daily operation, without 
which the Chronometer, however exactly it goes, can give no Information of the Longitude’.44 
The final four-page section instructed how the local time could be determined by 
observations of the Sun’s altitude. This was the basic astronomical and mathematical theory 
behind the calculation of local time and how from this the longitude could be found by 
chronometer. This section emphasised how to apply the declination of the Sun’s altitude in 
the calculation, as the declination given in the tables required correction to the meridian of 
the observer. What this part of the instruction emphasised was that the local time, such a 
crucial component for longitude by chronometer, was entirely dependent on the tables 
based on the Greenwich meridian, thus tying the chronometer method firmly to the Royal 
Observatory via the Nautical Almanac.   
 
A method; plain and simple  
In 1794 Wales published a 155-page manual entitled The Method of Finding the Longitude at 
Sea by Time-keepers. According to Wales the method was, ‘too plain to be misunderstood, 
 
44 Dalrymple, Instructions Concerning Arnold’s Chronometers or Time-keepers, p. 8 
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and too simple an operation to require rules for putting it in practice’, the ‘only difficult part 
of the business’ was finding the rate of the time-keeper.45 Wales published his Method as a 
reaction to the opinions of an authority that had brought ‘time-keepers into disrepute, and 
toward defeating the endeavours of the Board of Longitude’.46 The authority in question was 
Thomas Mudge Jr, who had been involved in a dispute with the Board of Longitude and with 
Nevil Maskelyne concerning his father’s timekeepers. The resulting publication accused 
Maskelyne of not giving their time-keepers a fair trial at Greenwich. This public dispute 
deserves mention as the problems raised remained essential to navigational developments 
until well into the nineteenth century. One point to note is that Mudge and his ally Franz von 
Zach (head of the Gotha Observatory) suggested that the Royal Observatory was biased in its 
chronometer trials because Maskelyne and his assistant, as astronomers, would be 
promoting the lunar distance method. Like Harrison, Mudge and Von Zach saw the methods 
as competing rather than complementary techniques and challenged the Observatory’s 
authority to judge these trials. The Select Committee appointed to investigate the matter 
could only conclude that ‘no judgement can be formed of the exactness of any timekeeper 
by theoretical reasoning upon the principles of its construction, with such certainty as with 
safety to be relied upon, expect it to be confirmed by experiments of the actual performance 
of the machine’.47 
The Method can thus be understood as Wales’ retaliation against Mudge, asserting his 
authority as an astronomer to judge the merits of a chronometer. Officers supplied with 
chronometers should follow Wales’ instructions for rating the instruments and if this was 
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done properly, then it was not the method, but the watch itself that was at fault.48 Wales 
claimed that ‘precisely because timekeepers were so complicated, and because they were 
already in use at sea, the problem of longitude was actually a problem of regulation and 
rating’ and only ‘astronomical surveillance’ orchestrated from the Royal Observatory could 
perform this duty.49 The subsequent decades of chronometer use would prove Wales both 
right and wrong: right to state that a major problem was regulation and rating; wrong to 
think that the method and operation was ‘too plain … and too simple’.  
In his preface, Wales stressed that what he hoped to achieve with this publication was: 
‘[to] remove the stigma which, for private purposes, has been unjustly thrown on these 
valuable machines’.50 The stigma he alluded to was trepidation and difficulty relating to the 
rate and error of timekeepers and thus ultimately their reliability. Wales’ aim was to instruct 
users on how easy this was. ‘It will be shown in the following tract, that there is nothing more 
simple in itself, or more readily performed, than finding the rate, which a time-keeper goes 
at … [for] every one, who is conversant with astronomical observations’, conveniently 
forgetting that most sailors were not. He continued that if ‘irregularities in a watch’s going 
be very great, or the period in which its irregularities return be long, or infinite, I grant that 
this method of deriving a rate is useless; and so will every other method be … but the method 
is only useless because the watch is so’.51 The problem with timekeepers then, was finding 
the rate and error for those who were not conversant with astronomical observations, which 
at the time of writing was in all probability a majority of officers at sea.  
Wales’s method was divided into eighty-three articles. Articles 1 to 26 (16 pages) 
outlined astronomical functions and definitions. These ranged from simple definitions, such 
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as a meridian or the horizon, to explaining the fundamentals of spherical trigonometry that 
formed the basis for astronomical position finding. These articles also explained and 
demonstrated how to determine the Equation of Time, the Sun’s longitude and the 
declination using the Nautical Almanac. Articles 27 to 36 (11 pages) detailed how to find the 
local Mean Time at the ship and Greenwich time by the watch. Wales used this section to 
explain how to rate the watch. This could be done by observations of the Sun’s altitude, using 
Hadley’s quadrant. Wales included this method ‘because it may be put into practice by every 
seaman, without introducing the use of any instrument, or observation, which he is not 
already necessarily acquainted with’ and that it could be performed ‘if care and skill be 
exerted, with tolerable exactness’.52 Despite this, Wales did not recommend it for long 
voyages, even if used with the ‘utmost skill’.53 Articles 36 to 75 (42 pages) described the more 
precise method of determining the rate of the watch, with a transit instrument as 
astronomers did in fixed observatories: thirty pages were dedicated to the description and 
use of the transit instrument. The method of rating by Equal Altitudes was described in 
articles 76-82 (8 pages). Finally, article 83 explained how to ‘find the longitude at sea by a 
Time-keeper’, covering only four pages, of which two included worked examples. The point 
that must be made here is that although finding longitude was in theory relatively simple, it 
still required astronomical and mathematical skill.  
The majority of the method was thus dedicated to the astronomical procedures that 
were required to establish the rate of the chronometer. Each method was directed at a 
particular user or voyage, depending on the ability or duration. Wales recommended 
observations of the Sun’s altitude for the use of general seamen where ‘tolerable exactness’ 
sufficed’.54 If greater exactness was required, Wales advised using a transit instrument, but 
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added that this required some experience of practical astronomy and additional time to set 
up the transit instrument. Meridional transits of stars could be used for greater accuracy 
when there was less time or experience to set up the transit instrument. Finally, for those 
not equipped or familiar in the use of the transit instrument, Equal Altitudes would also give 
fairly accurate results.  
Phillips has argued that Wales’ Method of Finding the Longitude at Sea by Time-keepers 
must be seen in the context of his post-voyage career, where the ‘range of activities that 
these astronomers became involved in were united by the aim of the longitude astronomers 
to situate themselves as mathematical experts and define distinct roles in which they could 
act for the state’.55 Whatever the reason Wales had for publishing, and even if this was not 
(solely) as an instruction manual for users, it still remains one of the few in circulation at the 
time that detailed any kind of instruction in depth. What should also be noted, is that despite 
Wales’ familiarity with the instruments and considering the publication of his Method, he 
chose not to update the section on chronometers in his revised editions of Robertson’s 
Elements in 1780 and 1796. We may assume that these were written with different users in 
mind, and that those learning from Elements were not expected, by Wales at least, to be in 
charge of chronometers when they later went to sea.  
What both Dalrymple’s and Wales’ publications show is that although the 
chronometer may be seen as the mechanical solution to longitude and lunar distance the 
astronomical, the distinction is moot as the chronometer method was still profoundly 
astronomical. Wales had been dismayed by the lack of astronomical knowledge on the 
Resolution, and the astronomical basics formed a large part of his method.56 The amount of 
astronomical explanation and instruction included together both show that these were 
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considerable problems to be overcome if the chronometer was to be put to use. Rate, error, 
the Equation of Time, Solar time and Mean Time were all new concepts for many of these 
early users. This, alongside the cost of the instruments, may have been a big hurdle for users 
to overcome. These two publications also show how the interdependence of the 
chronometer on astronomical instruments and nautical tables. Although in essence the 
‘longitude by chronometer’ rule was simple, it was underpinned by complex and advanced 
mathematical and astronomical ability. 
What is clear from these manuals in the context of these educational institutions is 
that they formed an important basis for the education of potential future naval officers. 
Lessons were dictated from textbooks, transcribed and memorised, supplemented by hands-
on learning with instruments. In addition, mock exams were often included within these 
manuals.57 Authors of these manuals were generally not experienced seamen, although 
some had spent some time at sea. They were generally skilled mathematicians or 
astronomers with close ties to the Royal Society and the Royal Observatory. The users they 
wrote for were not yet officers or captains of Royal Navy ships, but young boys who did not 
always pursue a career at sea.  
In the late eighteenth century, this lack of instruction may not have been problematic 
for Royal Navy voyages, as the use of both methods was limited to exploration and surveying 
voyages. Unlike routine voyages of navigation, these voyages were often commanded by 
captains already skilled in navigation and surveying and who were often accompanied by an 
astronomer whose duties included determining the longitude on land.58 With the skills these 
astronomers brought to the voyage, they were able, and expected, to instruct officers in the 
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astronomical techniques necessary for lunar observations and chronometers.59 Higgitt has 
pointed out that ‘these men were . . . the means by which the practices valued by Maskelyne 
were embedded in Royal Navy survey voyages. His alignments of instruments, projects, 
observers and the interests of the Royal Society and Navy helped shape the nineteenth-
century role of the scientific servicemen’.60  
Early adoption of the chronometer at sea was thus promoted and supported by the 
Board of Longitude, the Royal Society and the Royal Observatory. As was seen in the 
publications by Wales and Dalrymple, for the chronometric method to succeed, users were 
required to learn astronomical and mathematical skills to which navigators were in general 
not accustomed. Astronomers were thus vital to introducing these methods into Royal Navy 
practices.61  
It remains important to state that this formed only the basis of an officer’s education, 
and that their training continued on board ship. For many, this took place under different 
captains on board a variety of vessels. Others would serve the same captain for a number of 
years, often alongside the same young gentlemen they first came on board with. After 
serving six years at sea they would sit their lieutenant’s exam. Moore’s Practical Navigator 
formed the basic standard to pass this examination but was later replaced by Mackay’s 
Complete Navigator. Mackay was examiner for Trinity House, the East India Company and 
the Royal Mathematical School at Christ’s Hospital.62 Miller touched upon the officer training 
for the East India Company’s training of officers, noting that ‘the degree to which these 
officers were educated in navigation at institutions designed for the purpose, including the 
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Royal Mathematical School at Christ’s Hospital, is an important question. For most, the 
Company’s elaborate system of qualification for officers ensured a fairly rigorous training, 
that was provided through a complex network of teachers and examiners and through 
training aboard ship, rather than by a single institution’.63 To understand how an officer 
became a skilled mathematical and astronomical navigator, competent in the use of 
instruments, the next section of the chapter examines practices on board ship.  
 
At sea: experimental practices ‘in the wild’  
The education and training of aspirant officers was inconsistent and unregulated during the 
late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth centuries. The majority of officers entered the Navy 
through a captain’s patronage. Aspiring officers were entered in the muster book as a 
captain’s servant, and after serving six years at sea, of which at least two were at the rating 
of a midshipman or master’s mate, could sit the lieutenant’s examination from the age of 
nineteen.64 This was the general course of entry for young gentleman of a certain social rank. 
For those not destined for the quarterdeck, a career path would typically start in boyhood, 
with aspirations for a warrant rank. From here, individuals of exceptional professional ability, 
or those who distinguished themselves in battle, could obtain a commissioned officer’s 
position, as the lieutenant’s examination was open to any sailor with the qualifying sea time. 
Individuals entering as a ‘College Volunteer’, those who passed through Admiralty control via 
the Royal Naval Academy, accounted for as little as two percent of entrants.65 Within this 
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system, the other ninety-eight percent of young gentlemen entered the Navy through 
patronage, outside Admiralty awareness. The lieutenant’s exam was either overseen by the 
Navy Board in London, before a board of three captains; or arranged by a Commander-in-
Chief overseas before a similar board. As a result, the Admiralty had no control or even 
knowledge of the number of entrants until they applied for the lieutenant’s exam, and this 
knowledge only applied to those sitting the exam at home.66 This lack of oversight caused 
problems that the Admiralty wanted to address: they had no idea how many young men 
entered the Navy; they had no control over the social make-up within the rankings; and they 
were unable to control and regulate individual training and education.  
The end of the Napoleonic Wars signalled a change. For the Royal Navy, peacetime 
was a time of improvement, not only in navigation, but also in shipbuilding, design and 
gunnery. Trade was vital for Britain’s prosperity, and the Royal Navy protected Britain’s 
commercial interests and trade expansion through naval dominance.67 This was to have an 
effect on the education of officers. Within the eighteenth-century training system, tensions 
existed between professional (naval) rank and social rank. Skilled seamen may have been fit 
for command professionally but not socially: this caused conflicts and complicated on-board 
hierarchies, which challenged authority and discipline. The mass influx of recruitments during 
the war had allowed individuals from other social backgrounds to penetrate the officer ranks. 
Towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the Admiralty pushed through regulations and 
reforms in an attempt to centralise and control the selection and appointment of officers. 
Cavell identified the period between 1801 and 1831 as a period ‘that signalled the beginning 
 
66 Samantha A. Cavell, Midshipmen and Quarterdeck Boys in the British Navy, 1771-1831, 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2012); Michael Lewis, The Navy in Transition: A Social History 1814-
1864, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965); Nicolas A. M. Rodger, ‘Commissioned Officers’ Careers 
in the Royal Navy, 1690-1815’, Journal for Maritime Research, 3:1, (2001), pp. 85-129 
67 Andrew D. Lambert, The Last Sailing Battlefleet: Maintaining Naval Mastery 1815-1850, (London: 
Conway Maritime Press Ltd. 1991), p. 1 
126 
 
of a slow but inexorable march towards a nineteenth-century navy officered in large part by 
the social elite’.68  
After 1815, the high demand for appointments and the shortage of opportunities led 
to ‘social exclusivity in the midshipman’s berth’.69 Aristocratic and peer influence once again 
became the determining factor to penetrate the ranks. Well-born sons were required to learn 
hands-on skills in seamanship and to receive an education befitting a gentleman.70 Cock 
points out that ‘partly because of its traditionally amateur standing, science was largely a 
gentlemanly pursuit, and therefore a fitting “occupation” for a gentleman-officer’.71 This 
aided the development of what Miller terms the scientific serviceman: ‘naval officers who 
took part in voyages launched by the Admiralty on which they did scientific work’.72 Scientific 
work during the early nineteenth century increasingly turned away from natural history 
towards the physical sciences, in what some authors term Humboldtian Science: ‘the 
collection of large amounts of data, often using precision instruments, from global or regional 
surveys’.73 A gentlemen’s character guaranteed the correctness of his data: ‘[the] ability to 
perform precise and accurate measurement ensured that the experimenter was of good 
moral standing, while the genteel character and reputation of the man ensured others that 
his observations and data were reliable’.74 Thus, for young gentlemen seeking rewards, 
scientific achievement could lead to medals, honours and a fellowship of the Royal Society. 
By 1848, ‘good scientific work’ received ‘pecuniary reward of promotion’ from the 
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Admiralty.75 Maskelyne’s legacy thereby ensured that ‘the best instruments would be used 
by trained, mathematically capable observers, asked to take repeated observations 
whenever opportunity was presented, to achieve the highest possible levels of accuracy’.76 It 
is critical to understand these expectations, and thus how chronometers were used at sea in 
terms of this expected accuracy within certain user groups at sea.  
 
The navy in transition 
Lewis described the Navy that emerged from the Napoleonic Was as ‘a force, at any rate, as 
forward-looking as its predecessor had been backward-looking’.77 The latter part of this 
description could easily apply to William Fitzwilliam Owen, who stood firmly in the old world. 
Robert Brown remarked that with his ‘stubborn individualism, his eccentricities, his 
tyrannical use of authority on board ship, and his willingness to act without authorization, 
Owen was not unlike most other British naval officers of the eighteenth century’; what made 
him unusual ‘was that with the end of the Napoleonic wars naval practices slowly changed 
and he did not’.78 Owen’s biographer Burrow treats him more favourably, however, both 
biographies suggest he was a complicated figure.79  
Born in 1774, William Fitzwilliam Owen was the illegitimate son of a well-connected 
family descended from respectable Welsh ancestors. His father died when he was four years 
old, leaving him at a military barrack in Madras. Owen was taken under the wing of his 
father’s friend, Captain Sir Thomas Rich, who took him to sea, aged four, as a captain’s 
servant. Owen returned to his father’s birthplace in North Wales where he spent several 
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years at various boarding schools, before excelling at a mathematical academy in London. He 
returned to sea in 1778, again serving under Rich, now as a midshipman.80 He was thirteen 
years old and prospects were good. It was a time when an officer’s social background 
mattered less.81 He would be eligible to sit the lieutenant’s exam in 1793, on the outbreak of 
the French Revolutionary War. Chances of promotion were high. Unfortunately for Owen, 
these prospects did not materialise. His first set-back was a transfer and a demotion, to a 
captain’s servant on board the Zebra, patrolling the Irish coast. Thanks to the friendship of 
Rich, Owen returned to the Culloden as a midshipman, but the experience left him bitter and 
he complained that success ‘depended too much on prejudice, corrupt favoritism, family or 
party favor’.82 Owen saw service throughout the Napoleonic Wars under the command of 
many reputable commanders, and was temporarily promoted to lieutenant.83 But his 
‘arrogance’ and belief that ‘he was chosen by God’ led him to challenge the authority of the 
captain he was serving under on the Ruby, Captain Henry Stanhope, so much so as to initiate 
a court-martial against Stanhope at the Cape of Good Hope.84 The charges Owen laid against 
Stanhope were dismissed as ‘frivolous, malicious, ill grounded and not supported’.85 
Stanhope then proceeded to court-martial Owen, who was found guilty of provocation and 
negligence of duty, which led to his discharge. Owen had managed to establish himself as ‘a 
rigid disciplinarian, and one who was jealous of his newly-gained authority’, rejecting ‘all 
authority other than his own’.86 
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The subsequent ups and downs of Owen’s career are too numerous to record here, 
although it is important to understand how his background informed his character and 
opinions. Owen had to wait until 1797 for promotion to lieutenant, and not until 1811 did he 
make captain, after 23 years at sea. Unfortunately for Owen, rather than distinction in battle, 
the Mayflower, under his command between 1803 and 1808 in the East Indies, was one of 
few ships lost to the French during the wars. This left him imprisoned on Mauritius for 
twenty-two months, alongside Matthew Flinders, under whose guidance he studied 
astronomy, navigation and hydrography. Here, he also developed a theory of the use of 
rocket signals and timekeepers for determining differences of longitude. 87 
On return, Owen, like many other officers, faced unemployment. He found temporary 
employment with Hurd at the Hydrographic Office, translating descriptions of the Portuguese 
Coast.  In 1815, Owen joined his brother Edward Owen in North America, where he was 
ordered by Croker to survey the Great Canadian lakes. Here he established himself as a 
competent, but not exceptional, surveyor. During the survey, Owen trialled the 
measurement of distance using rocket signals and chronometers, and submitted a paper on 
his idea to the Board of Longitude on his return but received no reply, possibly because the 
method had already been employed by Wales and Bayly during Vancouver’s expedition.88 His 
short-lived period at the Canadian Lakes was not without controversy (for which he appeared 
to have a knack), but he excelled when it came to training future hydrographers. Serving 
under Owen on the Canadian Lakes were Alexander Becher, Henry Bayfield and Alexander 
Vidal, all of whom proceeded to have respected careers within the surveying service. He put 
his method of rocket signals and chronometers into practice whilst surveying Lake Ontario 
and wrote about this method in an appendix that was published in Murdoch Mackenzie’s 
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Treatise on Maritime Surveying. Owen remained unemployed until he was given command 
of HMS Leven, blaming his years of unemployment on his lack of ‘influential friends in the 
Admiralty’, whilst this did provide him the opportunity to work under Hurd at the 
Hydrographic Office again.89 
The survey of the East African Coast, undertaken by Owen and his officers between 
1821 and 1826, would result in the loss of over half of the original crew to malaria Despite 
this, they surveyed 20,000 miles of coastline.90 The survey ran from the Cape of Good Hope, 
through Mozambique to Cape Guardafui, the coast of Arabia, to Bombay and included 
Madagascar, and en route back to England, Owen was ordered to include the West Coast of 
Africa.  
During his time at sea, Owen worked with many junior officers: some had studied 
under Inman at the Royal Naval College (Vidal and Becher), others had entered through more 
traditional pathways. Owen commented on their abilities during the first months of the 
voyage of the Leven: ‘Although we had a great many young officers, yet in astronomical 
science most of them were mere novices, and almost all were destitute of that elementary 
knowledge by which it can be acquired’, leading Owen to ‘keep up a continued course of 
observations, both by day and night, during our stay, principally with a view to acquire the 
use of different instruments’.91 Accompanying them was the schoolmaster, Charles Gepp 
Robinson, and an instrument maker Johan Baker to supervise the chronometers: no further 
information on the latter has been found.92 Richard Owen, a lieutenant on board HMS Leven, 
wrote an ‘Essay on the Management of Chronometers’ which served as both an account of 
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their practices and as a guide for further use. The ‘Essay’ also underlined what Dalrymple and 
Wales had shown; namely that a considerable knowledge and skill of astronomical 
observation was necessary, but what Richard Owen additionally argued, was that the 
instruments themselves required careful management.  
Initially, Owen claimed that ‘it was impossible . . . not to have confidence in the results 
of eight chronometers going so well as those of both the Leven and Barracouta did at that 
time’.93 After arriving at the Cape of Good Hope from Rio de Janeiro, the difference of 
longitude ‘entitled them still to full faith’, due to the ‘accuracy with which our chronometer 
had gone so far’.94 Owen knew that chronometers could benefit the surveying work that the 
Leven and the Barracouta were engaged in, but as the journey wore on, he became wary ‘to 
place implicit confidence in it’, being concerned that to do so ‘might probably be fatal to the 
correctness and utility of our work’.95 His caution was justified as ‘not one of our nine 
chronometers kept its rate without fluctuation, produced either by change of weather, 
climate, or position’.96 Actual practice thus required ‘a great deal of care and attention’ to 
prevent error.97 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Owen was not issued with many 
‘good’ chronometers.  
William Owen may be recognised for his training of younger officers, but the credit for 
the hydrographical work should not lie solely with him. Owen, a fervent abolitionist, spent 
much of his time involving himself in local politics, attacking the slave trade and setting up 
protectorates.98 Such activity took him away from the survey and much of the work was left 
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to the Barracouta and the tenders with Vidal, Boteler and Richard Owen. On his return to 
Britain, Owen’s bills were turned down and he was charged for the missing and damaged 
equipment. Writing to Croker, he claimed ‘his career had been damaged because “political 
change, and other circumstances . . . condemned me to see myself passed . . . by numerous 
inferior Officers”’.99 He blamed ‘the Hydrographic Department for “incompetence”, and the 
Admiralty for being “a prey to pretenders of scientific ability” who were interested in “special 
schemes”’.100   
 
Gentlemen of Science  
As the Royal Navy was in transition, so also British institutions of science were undergoing 
change by the early nineteenth century. During the final two decades of Banks’ presidency 
of the Royal Society, his input into others’ exploration voyages increased. Under Banks, the 
Royal Society pursued the causes of the landed gentry and aristocracy; namely natural 
history, antiquities and agricultural improvement.101 Against these interests, a group of 
reformers emerged, with interests in and a commitment to knowledge as a vocation. These 
gentlemen, members of the self-proclaimed ‘Cambridge Network’ – George Airy, Charles 
Babbage, John Herschel, George Peacock, William Whewell – moved away from natural 
history to pursue the physical sciences. Edward Sabine and Francis Beaufort ‘formed alliances 
with members of the Network’.102 Parry, Sabine, Fisher and Foster all functioned within this 
network.  
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The early nineteenth century saw the birth of new societies: The Geological Society 
(1807), the Astronomical Society (1820), the Geographical Society (1830) and the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science (1831). There were strong links between these 
societies and the Navy which provided good opportunities for individuals pursuing a career 
in science. Where in the late eighteenth century, astronomers, mathematicians and natural 
philosophers accompanied exploration or surveying voyages, in the early nineteenth century, 
naval officers themselves were taking over these duties, transforming themselves into 
scientific naval officers as they did so. Areas in which to work and perhaps excel included 
exploration of the Arctic, Africa or the Pacific, geodesy, terrestrial magnetism, tides, 
meteorology, astronomy and surveying. Appointments were often secured ‘because of their 
scientific activities … [and] on the strength of their scientific records and skill in using 
precision instruments’.103 Thanks to the efforts of the Hydrographic Office under Hurd, Parry 
and Beaufort, collection of data and growing specialisation was particularly evident in the 
surveying service. Since there were no specific qualifications for naval officers pursuing 
science at sea, the training was practical and took place on board ship.104  
Henry Browne’s basement, mentioned in the previous chapter, served as an ‘informal 
and extremely elite private space’ in which Admiralty officers were trained.105 Many of the 
Arctic pioneers of the early nineteenth century were either trained, or connected to those 
trained there by Kater: William Edward Parry, Edward Sabine, George Fisher, Basil Hall, 
Frederick William Beechey, James Clark Ross, and Henry Foster. Commissioned to serve as 
lieutenants on the initial Arctic voyages in 1818, Kater considered that Parry and Beechey 
were ‘fully competent to prosecute the required Observations and Experiments’.106 Their 
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training continued in the challenging conditions of the Arctic. During the John Ross expedition 
of 1818, Parry wrote to Kater that he would be glad ‘to hear that I shall certainly have a share 
in all the observations on shore, as both Captain Ross and Sabine are very desirous that I 
should do so’, adding that ‘I cannot express the obligation I feel to you for the instruction you 
have given me respecting the instruments, of which I now feel the full practical value’.107 
Parry and Sabine established a deep respect and friendship during the six months of the 
expedition, described by Sabine in his journal: ‘I cannot quit the subject of Hare Island 
without expressing how much I feel Parry’s kindness in remaining with me – how greatly I am 
indebted for the effectual assistance he rendered me; and how much his agreeable society 
and conversation conduced to render these few days most happy in their course and pleasing 
in their recollection’.108 Parry had already established himself in both science and teaching, 
during his appointment at the North American station in 1813. Here, he had studied nautical 
astronomy which resulted in the privately printed Nautical Astronomy at Night, written to 
instruct junior officers.109  
For Michael Bravo, one result of John Ross’s failed expedition of 1818 was a change in 
the social organisation of science on British voyages of discovery with increased cooperation 
between naval navigators and Royal Society observers.110 The elements of these expeditions 
(geographical and scientific) were governed by two different bodies working in collaboration. 
Joseph Banks and John Barrow issued the instructions for geographical discovery whilst the 
Pendulum Committee oversaw the issuing and instruction for science. Bravo pointed out that 
on these polar expeditions, the work between the naval officer and the Royal Society 
observers was intrinsically related through the use of the same instruments. However, one 
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crucial difference between these two groups was how these instruments were used. The 
scientific observer paid ‘great attention to calibration, consistency, accuracy in habits in the 
observer, and above all, repetition’, while for the naval officer, ‘expedience and speed’ 
mattered due to ‘limited resources and time’.111 For the scientific observer, discipline and 
repetition were important for recognition and credibility of themselves and their readings. 
Strict hierarchal structures were embedded in naval tradition, and so the naval commander 
assumed absolute authority. Sabine may have been appointed and instructed by the 
Pendulum Committee and thus operated in accordance with the goals of the Royal Society, 
but on board ship, he remained under the direct authority of the commander, John Ross. 
Rather than subjecting Ross to Sabine’s authority, Parry was allocated the duty of assisting 
Sabine in the work assigned to him.112 Although Parry and Sabine disagreed with Ross’ 
decision to return to England after naming the non-existent Croker Mountains, they could 
not undermine his authority. By appointing Parry as commander of the following expedition, 
and Sabine as the Royal Society observer, potential tensions were eased. Parry, therefore, 
can be seen as a model ‘scientific naval officer’.  
Under Parry’s command, training of junior officers continued in subsequent 
expeditions in search of the North-West Passage. In addition to instructions received from 
the Admiralty, Parry specified what he expected from his officers: ‘No opportunity must be 
lost of making the various observations connected with Astronomy and navigation, and any 
officer will of course be desirous to obtain all the practice in this way he can. The sights and 
Calculations of each observer will be kept in different books, and every result reported to me 
that I may compare them with my own. I trust that we shall thus be enabled to produce on 
our return, such a collection of observations as may promote the interest of science, and 
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justify the high expectations formed of us’.113 Practical experience of observing and using 
instruments in the field was a crucial part of training if any attempts at accuracy were 
expected. As one officer of the expedition wrote to his brother, ‘all this is most easy in theory 
or on paper, but it is most difficult in practice. This earth is not a perfect sphere; the 
atmosphere changes the appearances and places of objects, without our being able precisely 
to value the changes produced; there is always some uncertainty in fixing the point where 
the phenomenon in question actually does take place; nor is it possible to determine with 
absolute precision the instant of time of its appearance’.114 Practical guidelines and 
instructions were easier to write than to follow, and those isolated in the field dealt with 
these issues with what Miller termed ‘wetware’: ‘embodied skills, abilities, judgements and 
goals’.115 Parry, a gentleman, naval officer and part of an elite group of men of science had 
precisely the requirements to assume these responsibilities.  
Foster was also firmly embedded in this circle of gentlemen of science, although he 
has been described as an anomaly in terms of how rapidly he rose through the ranks due to 
his exceptional scientific ability.116 In all probability trained at Browne’s place alongside Basil 
Hall, Foster accompanied Hall on HMS Conway to assist in pendulum experiments in South 
America. William Webster, surgeon on the Chanticleer, wrote that ‘it was not until serving in 
the Conway, under Captain Basil Hall, that his [Foster’s] scientific qualities were fully evinced. 
In addition to the employment of surveying, he was then entrusted with the use of a 
collection of astronomical instruments, which had been supplied to Captain Hall by the Board 
of Longitude. With these he made some excellent observations, which, with pendulum 
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experiments, the first he ever undertook, obtained him admission into the Royal Society’.117 
Foster subsequently assisted Sabine in the Arctic on HMS Griper in 1823.118 As astronomer 
(although nominally appointed as assistant surveyor) on Parry’s third voyage, Foster 
‘employed the leisure afforded by an arctic winter in making some exceedingly interesting 
experiments on magnetism, refraction, and the velocity of sound, besides those connected 
with determining latitude and longitude’.119 Foster’s results were published in 1826 in the 
Philosophical Transactions and, after again escorting Parry on his attempt to reach the North 
Pole, Foster received the Copley Medal from the Royal Society in addition to his commander’s 
rank. His appointment to the Chanticleer followed shortly thereafter. This expedition was 
designed ‘expressly for the employment of Foster’, following Hall’s earlier call for an 
expedition devoted solely to science.120  
Parry and Foster may well have been those Owen had in mind when he claimed that 
the Admiralty was ‘prey to pretenders of scientific ability’ interested in ‘special schemes’.121 
Certainly, it is with this sentiment in mind that his comments on Foster’s shipboard practices 
should be interpreted. In a letter to Beaufort written from HMS Eden in 1831, Owen reflected 
on a period of three weeks spent with Foster during the Chanticleer expedition. Foster, he 
wrote, ‘alone does all, he observes, he compares, he notes’, adding that ‘those around him 
are in the clouds as to his work and really, altho’ with him near 3 weeks, I could never get my 
time compared with his’.122 His own practice, Owen continued, was  
different, I give practical lessons to those I mean to employ, I make them teach others, 
I never or very rarely work myself but I direct all, examine all, encourage, scold, and 
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above all teach that where there is mystery, suspicion necessarily follows: My work is 
always open, every /gentlemen/ boy in the ship is obliged to know something of it and 
my results are generally those of many observers whose works I have merely analysed, 
criticised, and adjusted and are open to every body; merchant ships, ships of war, or 
shore people. When I have taught others to walk I have let go of the leading strings 
and by encouraging and leading them to continued exercise, they soon learn to run. I 
have never depended on my own individual strength at all in these pursuits and they 
have always been mixed with so many other cases and duties that it would have been 
almost impossible to have given myself up to them that it was impossible must be 
evident since I have never with the strongest predilection for it been able to do so.123 
 
Owen was certainly blowing his own trumpet here, as view this must be tempered with what 
some of the officers he trained thought of the process:  
Becher and Bayfield looked back on this period of their lives with mixed feelings. Owen 
was a hard taskmaster, and Bayfield recalled ‘working after the Owen style’ as an 
example not to be followed: ‘I do not think anything is gained by exhausting the mind 
and body by incessant application like that, which arose from keeping everybody at 
work all day and nearly all night as our old friend Owen did’. Becher remembered that 
‘Captain Owen used to keep me up till about 2 in the morning writing long letters, 
which I thought very hard’.124  
 
Bayfield would later write of Owen that ‘he should not like to serve under him at sea’ due to 
his ‘disciplinary nature’.125 Although this does give us insight into the training conditions on 
board Owen’s expedition, this can also be seen as a statement concerning the credibility of 
practice. Owen also wanted to ‘remove any impression that I am desirous to attach an 
immaculate character to our longitudes I must in justice to the gentlemen who served under 
me say that I am quite sure our measures were made with more care and that more care and 
attention was paid to the preservation of the chronometers, which were never suffered to 
be removed from their places, than I have ever seen anywhere else’.126  
 
123 Ibid  
124 Burrow, Captain Owen of the African Survey, p. 62 
125 Henry Bayfield to John Harris, 20 January ,1823, Harris Letters quoted in Brown William Fitzwilliam 
Owen: Hydrographer of the African Coast, p. 75 
126 Letter from William Fitzwilliam Owen to Francis Beaufort, ‘On the longitudes of certain points in 
South America and in the West Coast of Africa’, HMS Eden, May, 1831. UKHO, MP 58  
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Owen was arguing that his method of practice lent credibility to his results, rather than 
his social status. In contrast, Foster could rely on his status as a scientific naval officer and a 
gentleman: 
There were but few officers in the service, whose minds could have been more highly 
cultivated than Foster’s, and although he had a mild blue eye with a corresponding 
complexion, almost delicately fair, his features were not the less manly or intellectual. 
His smile and tone bespoke him every inch the gentleman; and the anxious expression 
of his yet more anxious mind, evinced that searching after knowledge which had so 
successfully identified itself with his short career. Foster, had he lived would have been 
a distinguished navigator; he was an excellent officer, the best nautical scholar I ever 
knew, and a good astronomer.127  
 
It is hard not to read Owen’s comments as a thinly veiled attack upon those ‘pretenders of 
scientific ability’ that he so disdained. Comparing his slow and difficult career, his continuous 
brushes with the Admiralty, it must have been particularly hard to meet with Foster, an 
officer twenty-three years his junior, whose rapid rise through the ranks led him to captain 
the voyage of the Chanticleer with fifteen of the best chronometers that the Observatory had 
to offer.  
 
Inman and the Royal Naval College  
Two years after the closure of the Royal Naval Academy in 1806, the Royal Naval College 
(RNC) opened to new students in 1808, refurbished and expanded. The governor of the 
College was the First Lord of the Admiralty. Successive naval captains were appointed as 
immediate supervisors, under the title Lieutenant Governor, and as its first and only 
headmaster was Professor James Inman. Inman was a skilled mathematician, having 
graduated at Cambridge in 1800 as Senior Wrangler. He subsequently served as astronomer 
on board HMS Investigator, where he served alongside Matthew Flinders. At the College, he 
 
127 ‘Polar scenes’, published in The Times, (Halifax Nova Scotia) circa. 1835. Probably written by 
Berkeley Westropp, midshipman on board HMS Fury. SPRI, GB 15: MS 1562:D 
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produced Navigation and Nautical Astronomy for the Use of British Seamen, published in 
1821. New mathematical methods were introduced by Inman: the haversine and its 
logarithms, which simplified the calculations of spherical trigonometry, was one that he 
applied to the observations required for local time. Robert Fitzroy was one of several officers 
educated under James Inman at the Royal Naval College, often termed collegians. 
Bartholomew James Sulivan (1810-1890), who was also educated there and went on to 
become a hydrographic surveyor, wrote about his experience at the College: 
The head of studies was the Reverend Professor James Inman, D. D., author of the 
work on navigation, under whom were three assistant-masters for mathematics: first, 
Peter Mason, M. A.; second, Charles Blackburn, M. A.; and third, Mr. Livesay. The 
preceptor, the Rev. W. Tate, M.A., took the classical classes, history, geography, and 
English. French was taught by M. Creuze, a French émigré. We were also taught fencing 
and dancing. The forenoons were given to mathematics, the afternoons to French and 
drawing. . . there were also classes for naval architecture. . . We began geometry with 
Mr. Livesay; but no boy could get on unless he studied in his own cabin and at the 
dining-room tables in the evenings.128  
 
The curriculum attempted not only to combine the theoretical with the practical, but also to 
provide an education befitting a gentleman. The Royal Naval College was another attempt by 
the Admiralty to centralise authority and control recruitment and appointments. But it also 
drew upon the networks established by the Royal Society and the Board of Longitude. 
Without an astronomer on board, Inman’s manual implied ‘a system whereby Royal Navy 
officers were tasked with regulating instruments through a system of recording which at the 
same time served so as to regulate them’.129 This served as a mechanism by which one could 
trust observations made by naval officers using unreliable instruments. Phillips has argued 
that the aim of the RNC, with Inman as its master, was to ‘draw upon the networks of 
timekeeper circulation that they, and the Greenwich system had helped put into motion 
 
128 Henry Norton Sulivan, Life and Letters of the Late Admiral Sir Bartholomew James Sulivan, (London: 
John Murray, 1896), p. 9 
129 Phillips, Making Time Fit, p. 208 
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since the early 1770s, and to impose their own kind of disciplined, principled 
management’.130 If this were so, then Fitzroy would be a prime example of the naval officer 
that Inman produced.  
Fitzroy served one of his earliest appointments, aged fourteen, on board HMS 
Glendower under Robert Cavendish Spencer, whose reputation and connections ensured 
that ‘his ships were always crowded with young aristocrats and the sons of senior naval 
officers’.131 He had joined this vessel two years after joining the Royal Naval College and was 
rapidly promoted to midshipman. On passing his examination with full distinction Fitzroy was 
promoted to lieutenant in 1824, aged nineteen. His next appointment was on board HMS 
Thetis, where Sulivan served as a midshipman. As we have seen from the above section on 
shore-based learning and textual instruction, we have a sense of the knowledge Fitzroy 
would have attained before proceeding to sea. Sulivan again provides us with insights into 
the continued training on board ship. 
Sulivan attested how they had ‘regular use of the table in the captain’s fore-cabin for 
our working observations. We, the collegians had to take sights in the morning for the 
longitude, and at noon for the latitude, with occasional lunars, which we worked in the fore-
cabin’.132 Speaking of Fitzroy in particular, Sulivan wrote that he ‘was one of the best officers 
in the service. . . [he] was one of the best practical seamen in the service, and possessed 
besides a fondness for every kind of observation useful in navigating a ship. He was very kind 
to me, offered me the use of his cabin and of his books. He advised me what to read, and 
 
130 Phillips, Making Time Fit, p. 209 
131 John Knox Laughton, revised by Andrew Lambert, ‘Sir Robert Cavendish Spencer’, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography, (online ed.), Oxford University Press. Last accessed 16 September 2020: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/26136 
132 Sulivan, Life and Letters, p. 22 
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encouraged me to turn to advantage what I had learned at the college by taking every kind 
of observation that was useful in navigation’.133  
Fitzroy assumed command of HMS Beagle in 1828 when he was appointed by Admiral 
Sir Robert Otway, then Commander-in-Chief of the South American Station. Although 
following the suicide of the Beagle’s Commander, Pringle Stokes, effective command had 
passed to the First Lieutenant, George Skyring, this was overruled by Otway’s patronage of 
Fitzroy, itself underwritten by Fitzroy’s aristocratic family connections.134 Fitzroy was satisfied 
with the appointment, writing to his sister that it was ‘not only a promotion, but employment 
and that of the most desirable kind, for it opens a road to credit and character, and farther 
advancement in the Service. Providing I do not fail in my exertions’.135 As I showed in the 
previous chapter, Fitzroy’s family connections and friendship with Beaufort facilitated his 
appointment to command the second surveying expedition of HMS Beagle. 
The collection of papers belonging to John Lort Stokes now retained in the National 
Maritime Museum allow further insight into the ongoing training under Fitzroy. The papers, 
a collection of rough notes and fair copies of rules and examples of navigational matters, 
covers not only the second voyage of the Beagle, but also the vessel’s third voyage to 
Australia. Stokes had joined the Royal Navy aged twelve and served as a midshipman on the 
first voyage of the Beagle where he was appointed mate. During the Beagle’s second voyage 
he served as assistant surveyor. His notes indicate that he read Owen’s ‘Essay on 
Chronometers’, and commented on the method of interpolation, adding his view on what 
the best practice might be. As he was placed in charge of the chronometers, alongside 
Stebbing, it is possible he was using this directly as an instruction manual. Part of this 
 
133 Sulivan, Life and Letters, pp. 15-16 
134 Harold L. Burstyn, ‘If Darwin Wasn’t the “Beagle’s” Naturalist, Why Was He on Board?’ British 
Journal for the History of Science, 8, (1975), pp. 62-69 
135 Fitzroy quoted in James Taylor, The Voyage of the Beagle, (London: Conway, 2008), p. 48 
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collection also contains Stokes handwritten copy of a paper Fitzroy had written on the 
manner of surveying that they adopted on the Beagle. Stokes also copied out navigational 
calculations, including triangulation, dead reckoning and longitudes by chronometer. One 
section references Inman, where Stokes had copied out a rule that would appear to come 
from Inman’s updated manual of 1826 (see figures 4.3 and 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.3: ‘To Find what Fixed Star will pass any Meridian the first after any given time’, Navigational 
notebooks, John Lort Stokes. NMM, STK/26/1 
 
Figure 4.4: James Inman, A Treatise on Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, (Portsea, 1821), p. 107 
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The notebook also included a page entitled ‘answers’ which bears a striking resemblance to 
the mock exam Inman included in his 1826 manual (see figures 4.5 and 4.6). Although from 
the answers, it is clearly not based on this particular example.  
 





Figure 4.6: Answers to the Questions set at the Royal Naval College in the Examination of Midshipmen, 






Stokes was promoted to lieutenant on return to England in 1837, so it is possible that 
these notes relate to his training for the lieutenant’s examination whilst on board the Beagle. 
Stokes also copied out new rules such as ‘To find the Longitude by Lunar Observations taking 
into the Account the Spheroidal figure of the Earth’, contrasting it to Inman’s old method. 
Further on, we find ‘Raper’s Double Altitude’ and ‘Equation for Reducing the Errors of 
Observations when Single Altitudes are observed for the purpose of Rating Chronometers’, 
and notes ‘On the Employment of the signs + and – in multiplications’. Whether these notes 
pertain to the second or third Beagle voyage, they show the continued study of new methods 
and rules by a variety of authors.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: ‘Life on the ocean, representing the usual occupations of the young officers in the steerage 






Serving under Fitzroy provided good references for later employment. Fitzroy wrote 
to Beaufort that Sulivan was ‘up to the business completely. He is as thorough a seaman, for 
his age, as I know, and he has been used to the smallest craft as well as to the largest ships. 
He is an excellent observer, calculator, and surveyor, and I may truly say that his abilities are 
better than those of any man who has served with me’.136 Stokes had to wait longer for a 
promotion, not obtaining this until he had served eleven years as a mate, despite Fitzroy’s 
attempts to promote him. Fitzroy testified to his qualities, as Stokes had been ‘my assistant, 
by my own choice, during eight long years of rough and trying work. I know not the man I 
should prefer to him in a professional way, as surveyor or in a private capacity as a staunch 




Basil Hall’s remark with which I began this chapter was to the effect that theoretical 
knowledge of chronometers had a limited effect on practice and that how this knowledge 
was put to use was entirely dependent on the ship on which they found themselves, whether 
as a midshipman, a lieutenant, or even as captain. Textual learning was a small part of 
becoming a skilled navigator, chiefly amongst those who emerged in the late eighteenth 
century. Textual instruction acquainted officers with the theories and rules behind longitude 
by chronometer; experience at sea taught them how to implement them.  
  Scientific voyages not only provided the means for experimental testing of methods, 
but also served to train young officers according to the aims of the voyage. This chapter has 
examined only a small selection of manuals, academies and voyages. The unregulated 
 
136 Sulivan, Life and Letters, p. 49, original emphasis 
137 Certificates of service in BEAGLE, 1831-36, signed by Fitzroy, 17 Nov 1836, with addition in Fitzroy's 
hand testifying to Stokes’ qualities. NMM, STK/29, original emphasis 
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pathway of the general naval officers reveals that shipboard practice still remained the 
dominant element in the construction of a naval officer. The end of the Napoleonic Wars saw 
a change in direction of the Royal Navy, where scientific ability would more likely lead to a 
distinguished career. This had a profound effect on how officers were trained. Owen was 
moulded too firmly in the tradition of the ‘old navy’ of the eighteenth century to adapt to 
this new reality. Bravo’s distinction between the naval officer for whom expedience and 
speed mattered more than accuracy and consistency would apply to Owen, while Parry, 
Foster and Fitzroy embodied those officers who paid ‘great attention to calibration, 
consistency, accuracy in habits in the observer, and above all, repetition’.138     
An essential, and often overlooked point in the history of the chronometer, is how 
intrinsically linked the chronometer and its use were to astronomical methods. As I have 
shown, early chronometric instruction focused predominantly on explaining the 
astronomical terms which formed the basis for longitude determinations, whether these 
were made chronometrically or astronomically. This is clearly evident in the lunar 
instructions, which in the late eighteenth century included the basic knowledge required for 
longitude by chronometer. Those equipped with the best chronometers were not only well-
connected gentlemen, but also those who excelled in astronomical navigation. As 
contemporary commentators remarked, officers were often lacking in these basic 
astronomical and mathematical skills.  
The chapters following examine a broader range of archival sources to examine how 
the social context of these officers was reflected in their navigational practices on board ship. 
Wynne has examined ‘technologies as rule-following behaviour, arguing that emerging 
practices define “rules”, rather than rules controlling practices’.139 The rules that emerged 
 
138 Bravo, Science and Discovery in the Admiralty Voyages, pp. 114-115 
139 Brian Wynne, ‘Unruly Technology: Practical Rules, Impractical Discourses and Public 
Understanding’, Social Studies of Science, 18, (1988), p. 147 
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from the experimental practices on board these voyages are a theme examined in the 
remainder of this thesis. What is relevant to note here is the impact of textual instruction, 
early education and subsequent training on board ship.  
Navigational manuals were numerous and increasingly detailed in their content 
throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Whether a young boy studied 
on board ship or at a naval college, they formed the basis for their initial introduction to 
navigation. Textual instruction in chronometry was limited before it gradually became more 
common from about 1810. This therefore does not tell us much about how practices were 
established on different vessels. What is clear, however, is that those officers issued with 
chronometers used them for different purposes. The ‘scientifically’ minded officer paid 
attention to repeated observations, accuracy, recordkeeping and precision. As a surveyor, 
Owen was equipped with ‘lesser’ chronometers (see chapter 3) to survey the East African 
Coast, and had less time and resources to pursue astronomical practices as were performed 
during the Arctic expeditions. What was required of the chronometer therefore informed 
how it was used. This relationship would define how the chronometer interacted with, and 
was situated within other practices, whether navigational, geographical or scientific in 
nature. With this evidence in mind, the following chapter examines what officers did with 





The Care and Management of Chronometers at Sea 
 
This arises almost entirely from the peculiar nature of the instrument in question, & 
this argument therefore applies exclusively to chronometers, & not at all to sextants 
or other nautical instruments. These peculiarities are, - that the merits of no 
chronometer can be judged of at sight, but require a considerable period of patient 
& careful trial before any safe opinion can be pronounced upon them.1  
 
Introduction 
Captain Basil Hall’s comment above was made in relation to the purchase of chronometers, 
yet the same sentiment applied equally to the use of instruments on board ship: that only 
with their use could instruments be pronounced effective and reliable, or otherwise. In May 
1819, William Edward Parry set off on his Arctic explorations on his first command with ten 
of the best chronometers then available. Edward Sabine was familiar with some of the 
chronometers supplied by instrument makers Arnold and Earnshaw as they had been 
previously employed on board the Isabella. London clockmakers, Parkinson and Frodsham, 
also lent three of their chronometers for this voyage, each of which had their temperature 
compensation specifically adapted for the Arctic climate. Sabine trialled and rated the 
chronometers in the stable temperature of Henry Browne’s basement. By the time of 
departure Parry had the chronometers ‘an excellent & superior assortment … nicely arranged 
in my cabin, and everything perfectly to rights’.2  
It is misleading, however, to assume that these specially selected chronometers in the 
hands of these experienced observers automatically produced reliable data. The proliferation 
 
1 Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956 
2 William Parry to his parents, HMS Hecla at the Nore, 9 May, 1819. SPRI, GB 15: MS438/26/46  
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of ‘instructions’ supplied to officers and travellers in the nineteenth century demonstrate 
that naval authorities and scientific societies increasingly required the disciplining and 
regulating of those using instruments.3 This is why, in 1827, Richard Owen published his 
‘Essay on Chronometers’, given that in his view, ‘no sufficient rules for the management and 
use of them at present exist by which the best and surest results may be obtained’ which 
were required ‘to detect and guard against their wanderings’ to which they were liable.4 
Owen recognised that the problem also had to do with experience, as his publication was 
intended ‘to instruct seamen … not to inform the Astronomer’.5  
Numerous studies have shown the problems that occurred with instruments used in 
the field.6 It was through dealing with these issues that ideas about the instruments were 
formed and from these ideas that experienced users would offer their views on best, or at 
least adequate, practice. Instruction in chronometry gradually expanded to include these 
experiences following the voyages of the early nineteenth century.  
This chapter examines the particular issues that users faced, whether general or 
unique to specific circumstances, and how these informed the practices that evolved. The 
first section of the chapter examines how the instruments themselves were physically 
 
3 For example: Felix Driver, ‘Distance and Disturbance: Travel, Exploration and Knowledge in the 
Nineteenth Century’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 14, (2004), pp. 73-92; Jane Amanda 
Wess, The Role of Instruments in Exploration: A Study of the Royal Geographical Society 1830-1930, 
Unpublished PhD, University of Edinburgh, (2017); Simon Naylor, ‘Weather Instruments all at Sea: 
Meteorology and the Royal Navy in the Nineteenth Century’, in Geography, Technology and 
Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, eds. (Routledge, 2016), pp. 
77-96 
4 Richard Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, in: Tables of Latitude, and 
Longitudes by Chronometer, William Fitzwilliam Owen, (London; Duckworth and Ireland, 1827), p. 3  
5 Ibid, p.3  
6 Charles W. J. Withers, ‘Geography and “Thing-Knowledge”: Instrument Epistemology, Failure, and 
Narratives of 19th-Century Exploration’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 44, 
(2019), pp. 676-691; Matthew Goodman, ‘Proving Instruments Credible in the Early Nineteenth 
Century: The British Magnetic Survey and Site‐Specific Experimentation’, Notes and Records of the 
Royal Society, 70, (2016), pp. 1–18; Simon Schaffer, ‘Easily Cracked: Scientific Instruments in States of 
Disrepair’, Isis, 102, (2011), pp. 706–717; Alexi Baker, ‘“Precision”, “Perfection” and the Reality of 
British Scientific Instruments on the Move During the 18th Century’, Material Culture Review, 74-75, 
(2012), pp. 14-29 
152 
 
managed to withstand the difficulties of travel. This involved protecting them from variation 
in temperature, shocks, movement and the effects of magnetism. Despite these precautions, 
users still experienced a variety of problems with their instruments as I shall show. These 
practices were therefore constantly evaluated and adapted from the problems experienced, 
as despite the best of care, many instruments ceased to work properly. The second section 
examines what went wrong at sea and how users dealt with instrumental failure. As I show, 
instruments slipped between varying states of disrepair, ranging from suspect to unreliable 
to totally useless. Nevertheless, users adapted and adopted their working practices 
accordingly.  
For instruments to function adequately, more than just careful management of the 
instrument itself was required. Their human operatives required regulating too. The final 
section examines how users were trained and regulated.  It is important to understand, even 
to emphasise, the need to prevent human error whilst handling, winding and comparing 
instruments of navigation at sea. Authors writing instructions on chronometry in navigation 
manuals entirely overlooked these specific parts of practice, until and unless they were 
addressed by those with experience in the field. The issues were, as I shall show, problematic 
enough to warrant attention and guidance.  
Recent research has studied the problems of explorers and surveyors replicating 
knowledge making activities across the globe using astronomical, mathematical and natural 
philosophical instruments. Compasses, dip needles, sextants, artificial horizons, astronomical 
clocks, transit instruments and chronometers all faced limitations even as they were essential 
devices for the undertaking. As Goodman has noted, ‘travel was both essential for, and 
detrimental to, the science of terrestrial magnetism’ and the same applied to the 
chronometer.7  
 
7 Goodman, ‘Proving Instruments Credible’, p. 255 
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Portability or the ability of these instruments to work at a distance, away from sites of 
authority and expertise, ‘in the hands of others’, was a key problem.8 Portability was more 
than just transportation from one location to another, as some of these instruments had to 
perform in transit. Conditions varied and could be stringent; the pitching and rolling of ships, 
extreme climates, high humidity and constant temperature fluctuations. Initially movement 
was condemned as it was considered to have a negative impact on chronometers, although 
later in the century increasing number of users felt that temperature variations, not 
movement, were the more significant cause of irregularities. These beliefs underwrote how 
proper management was defined. Correct management of chronometers was still in its 
experimental stages in the early nineteenth century, hence the lack of textual instructions. 
Instrument makers, astronomers and users were all aware that internal and external factors 
affected the regular going of the instrument but not all agreed to what extent this was the 
case and, in some cases, how much it even mattered.  
Depending on the social circles they inhabited and the journals they accessed (or the 
astronomers they worked with), officers supplied with chronometers may have been aware 
of the ongoing debates concerning magnetism and its potential effects on chronometers. 
Depending on whose authority they relied on for information, they may have believed it was 
proper to transport a chronometer on shore to rate it, or they may have been of the view 
that once settled on board the less the chronometer was handled the better. Some vessels 
may have been fitted with a specially-made contraption for holding chronometers; others 
were housed in an empty drawer or convenient space on a shelf. Officers who bought their 
chronometers directly from the maker may have fastened it directly in place, on a shelf in a 
 
8 Eugene Rae, Catherine Souch and Charles W. J. Withers, ‘‘Instruments in the Hands of Others’: The 
Life and Liveliness of Instruments of British Geographical Exploration, c.1860-.1930’, in: Geography, 
Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, eds. 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 139-159 
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cabin. Some may have been aware that there were debates over whether or not vibrations 
of the deck would influence their timekeeping abilities, or that in certain parts of the ship 
chronometers may be less affected by the ship’s motion. Most would have been aware that 
the chronometers should be wound at the same time each day, as was the case for 
determining error and rate, unless one did not mind the additional steps involving 
interpolation. What is clear is that there was no agreement on how the chronometers should 
be cared for at sea. With no specific set of instructions, how the instruments were managed 
varied from ship to ship and person to person. Issues in the management of chronometers 
at sea emerged from the practical experience of those using them and, crucially, depended 
upon what the users expected of them. Early-nineteenth-century chronometry was as I shall 
show characterised by experimental use where officers were testing the capabilities of the 
instruments and what they could achieve with them, and, at the same time, testing their own 
capabilities and expertise.   
 
Managing chronometers  
One consensus in the navigational manuals in circulation was that chronometers were fragile 
and unreliable. As I showed in the previous chapter, all authors noted the irregularity of 
chronometers as a key issue preventing their widespread use. Additional concerns were their 
susceptibility to temperature variations and their liability to accidental damage. Other issues 
arose from their use at sea. Five decades of chronometer use had proved that chronometers 
were a valuable navigational aid, while at the same time, users were increasingly aware of 
internal and external factors influencing their rate of going. Temperature, magnetism, 
movement, careless handling, the atmosphere of the Gulf Stream, and even the Harmattan 
winds, were all aspects that different users perceived to some degree affected the 
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mechanisms of these instruments.9 Careful management could to some degree mitigate a 
number of these external factors. This was a two-fold operation: careful management of the 
instruments themselves, but also extending to the careful management and interpretation 
of the data which chronometers produced (the subject of the chapters following).  
 
Suspension 
It was important to know the details of the management of the chronometers if users were 
to prove the credibility of the results obtained. Detailed records made during a voyage 
proved that chronometer users understood the unreliable nature of their instruments and 
were capable of managing this uncertainty. Sabine gave an account of the management of 
his chronometers in the appendix to Parry’s Narrative of a Voyage. Five weeks prior to Parry’s 
first voyage, Sabine received six box chronometers supplied by the government and three 
supplied by individuals in order to ascertain their reliability and determine their rates. A 
steam vessel then transported Sabine and the chronometers from Somerset House on 7 May 
1819, which arrived at the Nore on 8 May: ‘immediately after we anchored, the Bee Tender 
came alongside with the chronometers, and the different nautical, astronomical, and 
meteorological instruments, &c. supplied for the expedition. […] Besides the instruments 
provided by government, most of the officers have some of their own’.10 After receiving the 
chronometers on board, they were placed in the same manner as the chronometers from 
the previous expedition under Captain Ross, with the overall intention of minimizing shocks 
from the ice: 
 
9 James Rennell to Edward Sabine, 17 June, 1822. Correspondence of Sir Edward Sabine, PRS. RS, 
MS/259 
10 Alexander Fisher, A Journal of a Voyage of Discovery to the Arctic Regions in His Majesty’s Ships 
Hecla and Griper in the Years 1819 & 1820, (London: Printed for Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and 
Brown, 1821), p. 5; William Edward Parry, Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West 
Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Performed in the Years 1819-20, in His Majesty’s Ships Hecla 
and Griper, (London: John Murray, 1821), Appendix, p. v 
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The box chronometers (with the exception of 286, for the first five weeks) were 
suspended from the beams of the deck in the after-cabin, in canvass cots lined with 
green baize. Steel springs had been furnished by Messrs. Parkinson and Frodsham, to 
be attached, instead of beckets, to the eyes of the cot-clews, with a view to take off 
the effect of jars which the ship might receive when navigating amongst ice; but the 
springs giving way in one or two instances, (fortunately, however, without injurious 
consequences) and the suspension by the eyes of the clews, or by very short beckets, 
appearing in other respects preferable, the springs were removed. The motion of some 
of the larger chronometers was checked by pulleys attached to the sides of their cots.11 
This related to the box chronometers; pocket chronometer P&F 253 was worn constantly in 
a pocket and Arnold 2109 occasionally.  
Henry Constantine Jennings, inventor of an insulating compass trialled on Ross’s 
previous Arctic voyage, had supplied F&N 286 with a special mounting system for holding the 
instrument. The suspended contraption was formed of ‘a copper cylinder upwards of a foot 
in length, and an inch and a half diameter, closed at the bottom, and surmounted by a basin 
of sufficient capacity to receive the chronometer box. The basin was suspended in gimbals 
by lanyards from the deck, and a small quantity of mercury poured into the copper cylinder. 
To the bottom of the chronometer box was affixed a cylindrical wooden leg of rather less 
diameter than the copper tube, into which it entered, resting on the mercury, and bearing 
the weight of the chronometer’.12 Despite such elaborate attempts to minimise the effect of 
motion and shocks at sea, the motion was ‘more lively than by the cots’ with the result that 
the chronometer collided against the framework: although the chronometer continued to 
perform steadily, it stopped during ‘considerable motion’ of the ship.13 It was then placed in 
a cot like the other chronometers but it stopped on two additional occasions. Eventually, this 
chronometer was set in motion but it did not manage to maintain its earlier regularity. On 
return, after examination by its makers, it transpired the reason for its stoppage may not 
have been entirely due to Jennings’ suspension: rust was found on the element intended to 
 
11 Parry, Journal of a Voyage, Appendix, p. iv 
12 Ibid, p. iv 
13 Ibid, p. iv 
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indicate how many days had passed since winding the chronometer.14 Parkinson and 
Frodsham experimented with steel springs as a suspension method, but these gave way early 
in the voyage and, following this failure, the same suspension as the others was adopted.  
Throughout the summer months the ships found themselves navigating through ice 
floes, adding additional shocks to the pitching and rolling movement of the vessel. Parry 
described how the ship had ‘received many severe blows from the ice’, with the result that 
‘the concussions which the chronometers experienced were, perhaps, such as few of this 
kind had ever before been exposed to’.15  
 
Figure 5.1: Situation of HMS Hecla & Griper, July 4th, 1819. Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, p. 17 
  
 
14 Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, Appendix, p. xii 
15 Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, p. 22  
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Parry continued the practice of suspending chronometers in slings on the subsequent 
voyages of 1821-23 and 1824-25, although omitting the steel springs that Parkinson and 
Frodsham had devised. Pocket chronometer Arnold 14 was kept in the pocket constantly for 
observations whilst P&F 2109 ‘was placed in a vertical position against the ship's side, for the 
sake of convenient comparison to the officers in making their observations, and to prevent 
the necessity of taking down any of the watches except for the noon-comparison, an account 
of which was daily hung up for reference’.16 To avoid further movement of the device, Parry 
issued additional orders during the second and third voyages: ‘It being desirable to avoid as 
much as possible the moving the chronometers from the place where they hang, it is my 
direction, that whenever the officers wish to take sights for them, they compare their 
watches with the pocket chronometer which is fixed in a conspicuous part of my cabin. The 
daily comparison of this chronometer with the rest will be found hanging up by the pocket 
watch’.17  
This evidence suggests that the practice of suspending chronometers in slings was 
particular, but not exclusive, to the Arctic expeditions. Following his service with Parry, 
George Francis Lyon commanded his own Arctic expedition, in HMS Griper, in 1824. Lyon 
wrote that the shocks the ship received from the ice were particularly heavy and that the 
chronometers ‘were badly shaken, and in any rough weather their cots would frequently 
strike the beams’, indicating that these, too, were slung from the upper deck.18 Another 
report specified the use of suspension: in 1827 Master of HMS Druid (employed in the West 
 
16 William Edward Parry, Appendix to Captain Parry’s Second Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West 
Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific, performed in His Majesty’s Ships Fury and Hecla 1821-22-23, 
(London: John Murray, 1825), p. 4 
17 William Edward Parry’s Orders and Regulations His Majesty’s Ship Fury, 8 May, 1821, SPRI, GB 15: 
MS 438/8  
18 Captain G. F. Lyon, A Brief Narrative of an Unsuccessful Attempt to Reach Repulse Bay: Through Sir 
Thomas Rowe's ‘Welcome’, in His Majesty's ship Griper, in the Year MDCCCXXIV, (London: John 
Murray, 1824), p. 143 
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Indies) reported that the chronometer had stopped after it dropped when its suspension 
gave way.19 It had fallen down ‘about the height of 18 inches, in consequence of the stock 
that it was suspended to, having given way within the wood … the chronometer has hung in 
the Captain’s Cabin under the Centinels [sic] eye, & to the same hook upwards of one year’.20 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find the following description of the chronometers 
in Foster’s account of them on the Chanticleer: ‘They were put on board the Chanticleer in 
Portsmouth Harbour on the 21st of April 1828, and being placed in small canvas cots, lined 
with baize, were suspended from the deck in my own cabin’.21 Owen described this 
arrangement following his encounter with Foster in 1831: ‘Captain Foster has been equipped 
most nobly and he is a Hercules in astronomical and mechanical labor, but I fancy I see 
objections in his practice; his science is beyond my praise, so also are his zeal and 
perseverance, but his chronometers are suspended from the working deck, each in a 
separate cot into which they fit quite tight; the process of winding and comparing daily 
subjects them to much irregular movement’.22 Following Foster’s death, Tiarks was 
appointed to go over the observations. Just like Owen, Tiarks found fault with the way the 
chronometers were kept: 
the chronometers do not seem to have retained their rates for any length of time, but 
some of them have repeatedly altered to a considerable amount in very short intervals. 
As these chronometers were all considered to be very excellent ones, I am inclined to 
believe that Captain Owen is right in finding fault with the manner in which the 
chronometers were suspended from the deck of the Chanticleer. My own experience, 
as far as it goes, likewise proves that a suspension from the upper deck of a vessel is 
not favourable to the regular going of timepieces.23  
 
19 Letter concerning an accident which happened to a chronometer issued to HMS Druid, 25 
September, 1827. CUL, RGO 5/230, f. 45r 
20 Copy of a report from James Henderson, Master of HMS Druid, concerning an accident to the ship’s 
chronometer, 12 May, 1827. CUL, RGO 5/230, f. 46r  
21 Henry Foster, ‘Memoir of the meridian distances measured in his majesty’s sloop Chanticleer in the 
course of her voyage to the Brazils: 1828’, Astronomical Observations, HMS Chanticleer, 1828-31. 
UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7  
22 William Fitzwilliam Owen to Francis Beaufort, HMS Eden, May, 1831. UKHO, MP58 
23 John Lewis Tiarks, ‘Dr. Tiarks’s Report on Captain Foster’s Chronometrical Observations’, in: 
Narrative of a Voyage to the Southern Atlantic Ocean, in the Years 1828, 29, 30, performed in H. M. 




Chronometer tables and sawdust 
The question of how best to install the instruments on board ship was evidently a matter of 
concern and ongoing debate. Richard Owen was clear that he thought suspension was 
detrimental to the going of chronometers. He opposed any construction for ‘slinging’ the 
chronometers, as they were ‘liable to receive a vibratory motion that may affect their 
balance-wheel’ and rather than limiting the effects, the slings actually exposed them to 
shocks.24 Another objection lay in the additional motion caused by taking them down for 
winding and comparison. What was also ‘very objectionable’, according to Richard Owen, 
was the practice of keeping chronometers in drawers, as the opening and closing would 
‘derange’ them.25  
The most unobjectionable method appears to be, that of having a table hung on 
gimbols (sic), with a weight of from 20 to 50 lbs. suspended underneath, in the manner 
of an Azimuth compass, so that the centre of gravity be as near the centre of its motion 
as possible, to permit it to keep its level permanently without being subject to vibrate, 
and the axes of the gimbols working in smooth stuffed leather sockets, bearing against 
springs in every direction, these springs being neither too stiff, nor too sensible for the 
weight they are to support. The pillars, or stand for the sockets, to be a fixture in the 
deck. Such a contrivance would go far to prevent the ill effects of the ship's motion, or 
concussion from firing guns, &c. The Chronometers to be placed in small partitions on 
the table, and to be wedged securely in their places by soft cushions.26 
 
If this was not practical, the next best solution was a table fixed to the deck, through 
‘unconnected with the adjacent bulk-heads’, with similar partitions in which to place the 
chronometers.27 The best location for the chronometer depended on the type of ship. In all 
cases, the optimal position was as near to the centre of motion as possible but not on the 
same deck as the guns and cables. Richard Owen recommended the best location for 
 
24 Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 6  
25 Ibid, p. 6 
26 Ibid, p. 6 
27 Ibid, p. 6 
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chronometers for certain types of ship. His advice related to battleships (‘the cockpit, with 
the table secured to the orlop deck’); frigates (‘the lower deck, rather than the master’s cabin 
where they are often kept’); deep-waisted vessels (in the ‘fore part of the captain’s cabin’) 
and merchant vessels (where the chronometer was to be housed in the master’s cabin, ‘a 
midships, and as far forward as possible’).28 It is important to note that his Essay was written 
as a guide to best practice, and it does not necessarily reflect how the instruments were 
actually installed on board the Leven and Barracouta, as no evidence remains of their actual 
practice. 
Special contraptions designed for chronometers such as Richard Owen described and 
Jennings provided were in all probability more common than the scant evidence suggests. 
Although none of these devices has survived, occasional descriptions, a drawing and an 
Admiralty order have. Lieutenant Thomas Phipps, late acting commander of HMS Fly, wrote 
to the Admiralty regarding the lack of regulations concerning chronometers at sea in 1824:  
there is no regular uniform system for the care and preservation at sea, of that most 
useful and valuable instrument the chronometer; but that almost every captain, or 
master, has a peculiar plan of his own, each differing from the other, and rather 
adapted with a consideration to the convenience of stowage, than towards the 
preservation of the instrument; some keeping it screwed fast down to the lockers, 
which is the plan recommended by chronometer-makers, having great faith in the 
efficacy of their padding, which, although good, in addition to other precautions, 
cannot alone, (however elastic) effectually counteract the violent shocks and 
concussions received by a ship, in a gale of wind, firing of salutes, &c. as well as other 
causalities and accidents to which it must be liable, fastened down in an exposed 
situation: others keep them locked up in a drawer, the opening and shutting of which, 
every time the chronometer is wanted to be looked at, must, in addition to all the 
above inconveniences, tend to its injury: some keep them on swinging tables, 
suspended from the beams, which, however preferable to the other modes, is still 
liable to receive continual concussions from the deck above.29 
 
Phipps proposed an ‘apparatus for the preservation of chronometers’ in a printed pamphlet 
sent with his letter. According to his plan, the chronometers should be placed in a canvas cot, 
 
28 Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 5 
29 Thomas Phipps to John Barrow, 11 June, 1824. TNA, ADM1/3083 
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upon a platform of steel springs, and surrounded by a tin-reservoir filled with three gallons 
of hot or cold water. The whole would be placed inside a cradle, in turn attached by gimbals 
to an outer frame. This outer frame would in turn be set in gimbals within an outside stand 
composed of wood, cast iron or brass and fastened to the deck. The latter set of gimbals 
would counteract the ‘fore and aft motion’ of the ship, the former the ‘athwart-ship motion’. 
The point of the apparatus was clear: to minimise the effects of the motion of the ship and 
to minimise or eliminate the effects of temperature. For Phipps, it was evident that the 
effects of motion and temperature variations were detrimental to chronometers and could 
be counteracted by this apparatus. Barrow referred the plan to Pond for his opinion, but 
what Pond thought and whether the plan was adopted remains unknown.   
A similar plan, although lacking a temperature compensation reservoir, was proposed 
by Commander Edward Belcher in 1830. His plan was designed to minimise the influence 
from the motion of the vessel. Rather than a description, Belcher provided a detailed sketch 






Figure 5.2: Belcher’s ‘Plan for suspending chronometers on the clasp of a Pendulum which admits of any motion oblique to the pitch and Roll and movable 




Figure 5.3: Details of Belcher’s plan. Left: front view; right: side view. TNA, ADM1/1578.   
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Barrow subsequently ordered the Navy Board to have ‘chronometer stands ... fitted in 
all surveying vessels according to this plan, & to be made of metal not iron’.301This brings into 
focus the debate surrounding magnetism and its effect on chronometers. Using iron for his 
design indicates that Belcher did not consider this to be an issue, but Barrow clearly did.  
In a letter to Beaufort, Richard Owen commented on the chronometer table that had 
been fitted on HMS Blossom. Although originally an 18-gun sloop-of-war, HMS Blossom was 
fitted as a survey ship in Woolwich in 1829, before proceeding to the Jamaica Station under 
the command of Richard Owen. He found that ‘the Chronometer House and Table answers 
to admiration we had some rather heavy weather between the Nore and the Downs, with 
the wind strong from NNE and I put a wine glass full of water on the edge of the table, which 
remained perfectly horizontal’.312  
To conclude with a final example as described in the Nautical Magazine of 1836: ‘This 
table was in use on board the Jackdaw, commanded by Lieut. Barnett, from the time of her 
sailing from England till she was wrecked on Old Providence; and has since been fitted in the 
Lark, which vessel replaced the Jackdaw. It has answered fully the purpose intended’.323The 
Jackdaw’s chronometer table even took the chronometers out of their boxes, using their 
gimbals to secure them in the table (figure 5.4). Lieutenant Edward Barnett had spent three 
years at the Hydrographic Office between 1830 and 1833, at the time Barrow ordered all 
surveying vessels to be fitted with the device.   
 
30 Edward Belcher to the Admiralty, 2 July, 1830. TNA, ADM1/1578 
31 Richard Owen to Beaufort, Spithead, 2 September, 1829. UKHO, LP31  
32 ‘Description of the Chronometer-Table on board of H. M. Schooner Jackdaw’, The Nautical Magazine 




Figure 5.4: Description of the Chronometer-Table on board of H. M. Schooner Jackdaw. The Nautical 
Magazine, vol. 5, (1836), p. 340 
Fitzroy had the benefit of assessing multiple solutions to this particular aspect of 
chronometer management and tables were evidently in use when he departed on the 
Beagle’s second voyage in 1831. Previously, during his command of the first voyage of the 
Beagle he was able to evaluate the arrangements on the Adventure, and also those on the 
Chanticleer, having met with Foster at Martin’s Cove at Cape Horn in April 1829. Fitzroy found 
that ‘suspending chronometers, as on board the Chanticleer, not only alters their rate, but 
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makes them go less regularly; and when fixed to a solid substance, as on board the 
Adventure, they feel vibrations caused by people running on the decks, by shocks, or by a 
chain cable running out’.334As is evident from the Stokes’ archival material, the Beagle also 
carried a copy of Owen’s recommendations. Based on these experiences, Fitzroy adopted the 
following approach: 
Suspended in gimbals, as usual, within a wooden box, each was placed in sawdust, 
divided and retained by partitions, upon one of two wide shelves. The sawdust was 
about three inches thick below, as well as at the sides of each box, and formed a bed 
for it which rose rather above the centre of gravity of the box and watch; so that they 
could not be displaced unless the ship were upset. The shelves, on which the sawdust 
and boxes were thus secured, were between decks, low down, and as near the vessel's 
centre of motion as could be contrived. Placed in this manner, neither the running of 
men upon deck, nor firing guns, nor the running out of chain-cables, caused the 
slightest vibration in the chronometers, as I often proved by scattering powder upon 
their glasses and watching it with a magnifying glass, while the vessel herself was 
vibrating to some jar or shock. All the watches were in one small cabin, into which no 
person entered, except to compare or wind them, and in which nothing else was kept. 
The greater number were never moved from their first places, after being secured 
there in 1831, until finally landed at Greenwich in 1836.345  
 
Carrying up to twenty-two chronometers was exceptional and it would have been challenging 
to build a chronometer table to support that many instruments, particularly in a vessel the 
size of the Beagle. This was not an option for Fitzroy. Although plans made for the Beagle’s 
conversion to a survey ship do not survive, research carried out to enable a reconstruction 
of the Beagle has indicated the layout and so specified where the ‘chronometer room’ was 
located (figure 5.5). It is clear that the instruments did not take up too much space in the 
manner that they were fitted.  
 
33 Robert Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty’s Ships Adventure and Beagle, 
between the years 1826 and 1836, Appendix to Volume II, (London: Henry Colburn, 1839), pp. 326-327 




 a = Captain’s store room m = Dispensary 
 b = Captain’s cabin n = Messroom kitchen  
 c = Chronometer room o = Mess Steward’s pantry 
 d = Captain’s washroom p = Second Lieutenant’s cabin 
 e = Passage and companion way q = Surgeon’s cabin 
 f = Messroom or Gunroom r = Purser’s cabin 
 g = First Lieutenant’s cabin s = Midshipmen’s berth 
 h = Master’s cabin t = Carpenter’s cabin 
 j = Assistant surgeon’s cabin u = Gunner’s cabin 
 k = Slop’s store room v = Boatswain’s cabin 
 l = Captain’s steward’s pantry  
Figure 5.5: Layout of the lower deck of HMS Beagle based on reconstruction plans in: Karl Heinz 
Marquardt, HMS Beagle: Survey Ship Extraordinary (Anatomy of the Ship), (London: Conway 
Maritime Press, 1998), pp. 80-81 
On the Beagle, chronometry was evidently an officer’s pursuit, as access to the chronometers 
was limited to those who walked the quarterdeck. The same has been shown on Parry’s 
voyages, where Parry suspended the chronometers in his own cabin and Foster likewise put 
them in his cabin on board the Chanticleer.  
The Beagle’s officers performed much of the surveying work on smaller boats where 
the chronometers were treated with as much care as on the main vessel. Fitzroy provided a 
description of the five chronometers placed on board the cock-boat Paz: ‘the rates of those 
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useful machines were not injured even by the continual as well as sudden motions of so small 
a vessel. They were bedded in sawdust, wool, and sand, within a large tub, which was secured 
to the deck under the cabin table of the Paz, not far from the centre of least motion’.356 
Suspension, chronometer tables, beds of wool, hair or sawdust were all designed and 
applied to minimise the irregular going of the chronometers caused by the motion of the 
vessel. In this period there was no agreement on the best way to prevent or to minimise this 
and the method adopted relied on the captain’s discretion. Arctic explorers considered 
suspension a suitable method for the specific conditions they faced. The limited evidence 
presented here suggests that chronometer tables became more common in surveying 
vessels. Fitzroy deemed the chronometers’ gimballed boxes sufficient and fixed them on 
shelves embedded in sawdust. This choice was also a direct result of Fitzroy’s belief that 
chronometers were not affected by the motion of the vessel: ‘Though so deep in the water, 
our little vessel's movements were uncommonly easy, and all our best timekeepers being 
hung in particularly good jimbals, I had no fear of their rates being altered, except by the 
effect of a change of temperature’.367During extreme movement caused by ‘strong southerly 
gales’ that ‘raised a high sea … such motion did not affect them materially, and that 
alterations of their rates were caused chiefly, if not entirely, by changes of 
temperature’.378Temperature, according to Fitzroy, caused irregularity. We can see how 
officers were keen to prove they understood how external factors affected chronometers, as 
they could then prove that they had taken the correct steps to remedy any interference. 
 
 
356Robert Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty's Ships Adventure and Beagle, 
Proceedings of the Second Expedition 1831-36, (London: Henry Colburn, 1839), p. 295 
367Fitzroy, Proceedings of the Second Expedition 1831-36, p. 45 
378Ibid, p. 83 
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Instrument epistemology  
I have shown how epistemological authority was transferred from the Royal Observatory to 
the ship’s captain at sea. Initially, in the late-eighteenth century, astronomers accompanied 
and trained captains to ensure the credibility of their practices. By the 1820s, this 
epistemological authority was transferred by the Royal Observatory, by issuing chronometers 
that had been tested and validated through a testing regime determined by astronomers and 
mathematicians. By these means, practices at sea were assured a certain amount of 
credibility. Increasingly, however, officers without specific astronomical training were issued 
with chronometers from the Royal Observatory. This meant that, over time, considerations 
regarding the proper instruction and management of instructions also gained in importance. 
That is to say, instrumental authority and the related authority bestowed on users and 
managers was something that was crafted over time. Credibility could not yet be 
straightforwardly assured, however, as this rested on the premise that the instruments 
behaved correctly. By ‘correct’ behaviour, I mean the ability of an instrument to function 
adequately, as determined by ‘the reliable, regular predictable performance of the 
artifact’.389Even when users were supplied with the best instruments (i.e., the premium prize 
winners from the Greenwich Trials), equipped with knowledge of the theory underpinning 
their use with appropriate training to use them, and had them slung in gimbals or placed on 
a chronometer table, an instrument in a ‘state of disrepair’ could still undermine its function 
and the credibility of the knowledge it was supposed to create.3910Even with the best of care, 
chronometers could easily slip into states of disrepair. As a result, the status of the 
instrument could become suspect, and its reliability called into question.  
 
389Davis Baird, Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments, (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2004), p. 122 
3910Schaffer, ‘Easily Cracked’, pp. 706-717 
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Schaffer detailed accounts of instrumental disturbance ranging from microscopes, a 
Bird quadrant, a Ramsden sextant and a Troughton equatorial telescope. With these 
examples, Schaffer points out that ‘states of disrepair became the norm, yet adequate 
performance was hard to define’.4011In this sense, the chronometer faced the same problems 
as others have identified with the compass and the dip needle. Dunn has demonstrated the 
‘ambiguous status of instruments’, where compasses switched ‘status’, from tools to 
investigate magnetic phenomena to being the ‘subjects of investigation’ 
themselves.4112Goodman too has shown how magnetic instruments suffered from travel and 
geographical interference, as well as an inherent degradation of their magnetism. During 
travel, subjected to a variety of factors, the magnetic needle (of the dip sector) became 
‘unsteady & unsettled’.4213It was particularly important in the study of terrestrial magnetism 
that the status of an instrument, or needle in this case, was known for the later reduction 
and comparison of the observations.4314Withers pointed out that ‘Error … was tolerated in 
reporting what the instrument did: that is, accuracy was always relative, measurement a 
moral judgement of the degree to which, and how often, devices did not function as they 
should’.4415  
As was emphasised by contemporary authors and commentators, chronometers were 
considered inherently unreliable, due to their irregular going. Chronometers accordingly 
required officers constantly to judge which instrument was functioning as it should and the 
degree of trust that could be placed in it. The reason could be clear-cut; instruments broke 
down due to internal mechanical failure or human error, such as their being dropped. The 
 
4011Schaffer, ‘Easily Cracked, p. 711 
4112Richard Dunn, ‘North by Northwest? Experimental Instruments and Instruments of Experiment’, in: 
Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, 
eds. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 57-75  
4213Goodman, ‘Proving Instruments Credible’, p. 255 
4314Ibid, p. 252 
4415Withers, ‘Geography and “Thing Knowledge”’, p. 685 
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ability to ‘troubleshoot’ was a fundamental aspect of chronometer use, and to demonstrate 
one’s ability to do so helped validate claims to accuracy – in both the device and the user. 
 
States of disrepair  
Despite the best care, instruments failed. Of the eleven chronometers on board the Hecla’s 
first voyage under Parry, three stopped working completely. The first to stop was Finer and 
Nowland’s chronometer. As noted, this was eventually attributed to internal rust. Arnold 404 
was ‘laid aside’ after stopping from an ‘unknown cause’ in May 1820. Arnold 369 was found 
to have stopped when it was taken down to be wound in June 1820. Attempts to set it going 
again failed and this chronometer was then ‘reserved for the examination of the 
maker’.4516Inspection by the makers on return found that both chronometers had broken 
mainsprings, either due to flaws in the steel or as a result of the low temperatures, where 
mainspring breakages were more common. Another failure occurred at Winter Island in 
1822, when Arnold 369 had stopped, but was set going again after Mr. Fisher ‘removed a 
long hair from the balance’. It stopped again four weeks later and ‘as it was considered 
advisable not to open it, and as it could not be set agoing, it remained down from that 
day’.4617  
Although material faults and the effects of the weather may have been out of users’ 
control, there were also many occurrences where users were at fault. An unnamed officer 
dropped chronometer P&F 423 after ‘which its rate was so much increased as to render it 
unserviceable for the remainder’.4718On another occasion, an observer removed a pocket 
chronometer too quickly when noting the time of an observation, a fact which caused it to 
 
4516Parry, Journal of a Voyage, 1819-1820, Appendix, p. ix 
4617Parry, Appendix to Captain Parry’s Second Voyage, p. 15 
4718William Edward Parry, Journal of a Third Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific performed in the years 1824-25 in His Majesty’s Ships Hecla and Fury, 
(London: John Murray, 1826), Appendix p. 36 
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stop. P&F 2109 stopped when it was taken down for comparison.4819Its rate was subsequently 
deemed too irregular, even for taking observations, and Parry selected a pocket chronometer 
from the Fury to replace it: P&F 49 which was also supplied by the government. To list thus 
all the instances where chronometers failed is not the point. It is more interesting to explore 
how users dealt with these issues and what they meant in terms of trust and credibility. A 
chronometer with a broken mainspring was in an obvious state of disrepair and, unable to 
tell the time, a useless object until it could be repaired. Even if repair was possible, for some 
users it would still remain suspect.  
In the Arctic, users were restricted in terms of what they could do when an instrument 
failed. They could not rely on global maritime networks which allowed communication at 
foreign stations, ports and with other vessels, and through these avenues, the Admiralty in 
London. These trade routes provided options for chronometer users: they could request a 
new instrument from the Admiralty (via ships sailing to and from London), have it repaired 
or purchase a replacement overseas, and in some cases, even exchange it with a 
chronometer supplied to another Royal Navy ship. Owen, Foster and Fitzroy had access to 
and used these networks during their expeditions. This brings into focus another issue: how 
did this affect the trust that officers placed in individual chronometers?   
Instrument makers established themselves at trade ports, providing that vital 
condition of all technology: repair and maintenance.4920Both Foster and Fitzroy made use of 
these services. Foster wrote to Croker concerning this: ‘about a fortnight ago, the main spring 
of one of the chronometers (Dent 2) broke; and although it has since been refitted, and 
replaced, yet I fear from its irregular going hitherto, it will not hereafter answer the 
 
4819Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, p. xvi  
4920Stephen Graham and Nigel Thrift, ‘Out of Order: Understanding Repair and Maintenance’, Theory, 
Culture & Society, 24, (2007), pp. 1-25 
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conditions of a chronometer for this voyage’.5021Earlier that year Foster had some trouble with 
the standard chronometer: McCabe 167. On route between St Martin’s Cove (Cape Horn) 
and the Cape of Good Hope, McCabe 167 had stopped.5122Foster had the chronometer 
repaired but also requested to be supplied with one of the government chronometers in 
charge of Mr Fallows at the Cape Observatory to ‘add to the accuracy of longitude of the 
places yet to be visited’.5223Mr Fallows agreed to loan Wedenham 929 on condition that it 
would be returned as soon as Foster returned to England. Foster noted fluctuations in the 
rate of McCabe 167 since its repair at Cape Town and that it did not perform ‘so well as could 
be desired’.5324Foster saw a chance of sending it to England in the Albatross tender to be 
examined. He was informed that lieutenant Arundell’s Earnshaw 1024, went ‘remarkably 
well’ and wished to have it in lieu of McCabe 167, which went ‘sufficiently uniform for the 
mere purposes of navigation’.5425This is an issue that occurs in the orders to Fitzroy, as it was 
specified by ‘their lordships' direction that no senior officer who may fall in with Commander 
Fitz-Roy, while he is employed in the above important duties, do divert him therefrom, or in 
any way interfere with him, or take from him, on any account, any of his instruments or 
chronometers’.5526It clearly indicates that not all chronometers were equal and although 
many were deemed sufficient for the mere purpose of navigation, others were not, 
specifically those issued to these expeditions. Foster also returned P&F 799 with the 
Albatross as it had stopped ‘yesterday from some unknown cause’.5627Foster requested one 
 
5021Henry Foster to John Wilson Croker, HMS Chanticleer, Ascension Island, 23 May, 1830. TNA, 
ADM1/1817 
5122Astronomical observations, HMS Chanticleer, 1828. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/9  
5223Henry Foster to John Wilson Croker, HMS Chanticleer, Table Bay, Cape of Good Hope, 10 December, 
1829. TNA, ADM 1/1817 
5324Henry Foster to John Wilson Croker, HMS Chanticleer, Ascension Island, 24 February, 1830. TNA, 
ADM1/1817 
5425Ibid 
5526Fitzroy, Proceedings of the Second Expedition 1831-36, p. 24 
5627Astronomical observations, HMS Chanticleer, 23 April, 1830. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/9  
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in lieu to be sent to Maranham, as he required ‘the aid of a pocket chronometer in the 
execution of the service required of me at Porto Bello’.5728In Port Spain, Trinidad, Foster 
attempted to have Murray 555 repaired after the mainspring detached but the ‘local artists’ 
could not reattach it.5829  
As was briefly described in chapter 3, William Owen purchased three chronometers 
overseas to replace those that broke down. These were intended to replace those used as 
deck watches; Owen believed the chronometer used as the standard could only be supplied 
by the Admiralty.5930This confirms the status of the Royal Observatory as an authority on 
chronometers. Owen experienced many problems with his instruments. He reported of 
Arnold 503 that it ‘was good for about eleven months but for three years has been worth 
nothing’.6031This chronometer, considered ‘useless’ by Owen, was nevertheless supplied from 
the Leven to Captain Penchas of HM sloop Esk in February 1825, although for what purpose 
is unfortunately not mentioned.6132The Hydrographic Office received Arnold 1970 in 
November 1822 after its mainspring had broken during the survey.6233Rather than go to the 
trouble of requesting an alternative instrument from the Admiralty, Owen instead purchased 
a replacement (Arnold 1891) at the Cape of Good Hope.6334At the same time he purchased a 
pocket chronometer (French 1809), not as a replacement but to complement the 
chronometers.6435Owen may have had good reason to purchase a replacement chronometer 
 
5728Henry Foster to John Wilson Croker, HMS Chanticleer, Ascension Island, 24 February, 1830. TNA, 
ADM1/1817 
5829Henry Foster to John Wilson Croker, HMS Chanticleer, Port Spain, Trinidad, 7 December, 1830. TNA, 
ADM1/1818  
5930Stuart Jennings, ‘Chronometers on the 1821-26 Royal Navy African Survey’, Antiquarian Horology, 
40, (2019), pp. 208-209 
6031List of Instruments on Board HMS Leven, enclosure in John Barrow to John Pond, 20 November, 
1826. CUL, RGO 5/229, ff. 360r–361r 
6132William Fitzwilliam Owen to John Wilson Croker, Lambeth Place, 2 December, 1826. TNA, 
ADM1/2271 
6233Thomas Hurd to John Pond, Hydrographic Office, Admiralty, 20 November, 1822. CUL, RGO 5/229, 
f. 75r  
6334John Barrow to John Pond, Admiralty Office, 7 January, 1823. CUL, RGO 5/229, f. 84r  
6435John Barrow to John Pond, Admiralty Office, 1 September, 1823. CUL, RGO 5/229, f. 121r  
176 
 
directly, as he spent almost a year waiting for Arnold 323 to be sent from the Royal 
Observatory.6536By 1825, Owen wrote to the Admiralty that ‘our timekeepers have become 
very faulty, requiring much loss of time and great pains to find the necessary corrections for 
them’.6637But when Owen described Arnold 498 as ‘an excellent watch but now appears to 
want cleaning’, he did not consider using an overseas repair service.6738 
Trust in a repaired device varied. In Valparaiso, Mr Roskell, an agent for the 
chronometer makers Robert Roskell in Liverpool, undertook servicing of instruments.6839Here 
officers could have their chronometers cleaned and repaired, and Captain King (on the 
Beagle’s first voyage) wrote of his satisfaction of the work of the agent, describing him as 
‘quite competent’.6940Owen thought otherwise: ‘Captain Kings chronometers I have 
understood were very frequently in watch makers hands at Rio de Janeiro and at Valparaiso 
this fact does not increase my faith as to very precise results’.7041On the previous voyage with 
Captain King, Fitzroy had purchased instruments and chronometers for the Beagle at 
Valparaiso.7142Fitzroy used these overseas services again during the Beagle’s second voyage. 
On 9 May 1833, chronometers B, O and P were ‘sent on Shore to Mr Bennetts to be 
cleaned’.7243It is unclear who ‘Mr Bennett’ was, only that he was in all likelihood located in 
Montevideo.  
 
6536Jennings, ‘Chronometers on the 1821-26 Royal Navy African Survey’, p. 209 
6637William Fitzwilliam Owen to John Wilson Croker, HMS Leven at sea, 16 May, 1825. TNA, ADM1/2270  
6738List of Instruments on board HMS Leven belonging to His Majesty, enclosure in John Barrow to John 
Pond, 20 November, 1826. CUL, RGO 5/229, f. 360r 
6839Phillip Parker King, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty’s Ships Adventure and Beagle, 
between the Years 1826 and 1836 Vol 1. Proceedings of the First Expedition 1826-1830, (London; Henry 
Colburn, 1839)  
6940Phillip Parker King to John Wilson Croker, HMS Adventure, Valparaiso, 29 July, 1829. TNA, 
ADM1/2031 
7041William Fitzwilliam Owen to Francis Beaufort, HMS Eden, May, 1831. UKHO, MP58 
7142Admiralty digest, tab 98.4, Mathematical instruments. TNA, ADM12/272  




Figure 5.6: Left: Eight-day box chronometer by George Margetts, no. 163 (NMM ZBA0672); Right: One day box chronometer by Barraud and Lund, no. 10 (NMM 
ZBA0676). These box chronometers were both used during the East African Survey as hack watches, as their performance was considered poor. Betts, Marine 
Chronometers at Greenwich, p. 243-248. © National Maritime Museum. 
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What is more relevant to this study is how the instruments were assessed on their 
return. Little evidence remains relating to this and we must therefore rely on Fitzroy’s 
‘principal results of the Beagle’s chronometrical measurements’.731In these results Fitzroy 
listed the meridian distance measured by the chronometers in use during that particular run 
and subsequently selected the ten chronometers he considered to most accurately reflect 
the difference in longitude. Chronometers B, O and P disappeared from the list in the 
meridian distance between Montevideo and Port Desire (figure 5.7).  
 
Figure 5.7: Meridian distance between Montevideo and Port Desire, HMS Beagle. Fitzroy, Appendix, 
p. 334 
Chronometer B reappeared on the next distance between Port Desire (South East coast of 
Argentina) and Port Famine (Chile, in the Strait of Magellan), where it was included in the 
selection of ten chronometers by which the distance was measured (figure 5.8).  
 




Figure 5.8: Meridian distance between Port Desire and Port Famine, HMS Beagle. Fitzroy, Appendix, 
p. 335 
Chronometer P reappeared in the next run, between Port Famine and San Carlos (West Coast 
of Chile) and chronometer O even later between Valparaiso to Callao (figure 5.9). Two other 
chronometers (H and K) were serviced in Valparaiso by a Mr Croft. Both were subsequently 
used in Fitzroy’s meridian distances. It is important to point out that a chronometer that was 
on board ship and which was running, would always be included in the first column listing 
the meridian distance by all the chronometers. It is the second column that is important here: 
these were the instruments Fitzroy selected. If a chronometer is missing from both columns 
in the summary, it was either broken, employed in one of the surveying sloops (the 
Adventure, the Paz or the Liebre), or it was ashore for repair.742  
 
742Simon C. Davidson and Peter Linstead-Smith, ‘W. E. Frodsham No.1. Another Chronometer 




Figure 5.9: Meridian distance between Valparaiso and Callao, HMS Beagle. Fitzroy, Appendix, p. 336 
We can see from these examples that Fitzroy, like King, had enough faith in the abilities 
of the instrument makers overseas to repair the chronometers to use them for his meridian 
distances. They judged the chronometers involved by the data they produced, not where 
they had been repaired. Foster and Fitzroy both used the data they had collected and 
recorded to analyse and select the best instruments for each meridian distance. The repaired 
devices were included or excluded solely on that basis. There are a few reasons why Owen 
may have questioned the results of Captain King’s chronometers: he may have indeed 
doubted the abilities of the overseas instrument makers; he may have thought them to have 
been repaired too frequently (and concluded they were thus inherently faulty), or he may 
have disapproved because the longitudes measured by King did not match his own.  
Questions of trust in repaired devices did not end at sea. When Owen delivered four 
hack watches to the Admiralty on his return to England, Pond advised that new escapements 
should be fitted in the instruments after examination by the makers. Barrow asked Pond to 
clarify ‘whether by being “equal to new ones” new hack watches is meant, or chronometers 
fit for any service, if the latter, their lordships desire that the proposed repairs may be 
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done’.753Pond considered them after repair to be ‘fit for any service’ indicating his trust in 
the abilities of the London instrument makers. The same caution can be found at Parramatta 
Observatory, where the local government clockmaker was trusted to clean a Breguet 
timekeeper, but was not allowed near the sidereal clock.764 
 
Trouble-shooting 
Not all cases of malfunction were as obvious as the examples given above, and in most cases, 
it was not necessarily obvious that an instrument might not be working adequately. This 
section examines the problems Parry faced in the Arctic due to the extreme temperatures 
they experienced. Parry’s experiences have been selected as an example as he not only 
detailed the problems they faced, but also the solutions that they applied.   
As Fitzroy stated, temperature variations caused significant problems. But even stable 
temperatures could cause difficulties, as users in the Arctic were well aware. Extremely low 
temperatures caused numerous issues on Parry’s first voyage. Many of the instruments 
initially began losing rate in the intense cold and stopped if they were not transported back 
to the warm cabin in time. This effect was attributed generally to the congealing of the oil at 
low temperatures. But in one particular case, the problem was the inadequate temperature 
compensation of the instrument itself. Parry testified that the chronometers supplied by 
Parkinson and Frodsham (which had their temperature compensation specifically calibrated 
for the Arctic region), fared better than the other instruments. Although they were affected 
by the cold, none stopped or altered their rates as much as the others did. Each chronometer 
seemed to have a limit at which it would slow down considerably before stopping. Parry 
 
753John Barrow to John Pond, Admiralty Office, 19 September, 1826. CUL, RGO 5/229, f. 353r 
764Simon Schaffer, ‘Keeping the Books at Paramatta Observatory’, in: The Heavens on Earth: 
Observatories and Astronomy in Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg 
and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 131 
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found that box chronometers would stop between and 15° Fahrenheit (-10°C) and 6° 
Fahrenheit (-15°C). Observers using pocket chronometers outdoors had severer conditions 
to compete with, with temperatures ranging between -20° Fahrenheit (-29°C) and -40° 
Fahrenheit (-40°C) during the three- or four-hour periods of lunar observations. Despite 
these extreme conditions, Parry testified that the chronometers continued to work with little 
effect on their rates, if the duration of exposure was not too long or the temperature too 
low. But what was too long or too low could only be determined by exposure. Having found 
that many pocket chronometers stopped whilst being used at temperatures around and 
below -35°C, observers adopted the use of tin cans filled with heated sand. Placing the 
chronometers on these tins during observations prevented them from stopping. 
During each voyage that Parry commanded in search of a North-West Passage, the 
crew spent many months overwintering with the ships beset by ice. This situation only added 
to the challenges of maintaining the instruments. On the first voyage, Parry had kept the 
chronometers ‘suspended within five feet of the cabin fire’.775This was a direct result of 
Sabine’s previous experience whilst he served on the 1818 expedition under Captain John 
Ross. Sabine had observed that the rates of the chronometers altered when Ross 
discontinued the fire in his cabin.786A limited fuel supply unfortunately led to severe changes 
in temperature, despite leaving the chronometers in proximity to the cabin fire. Parry learned 
from this experience, and during the winter of the second voyage, he placed the 
chronometers on bookcases on either side of the cabin fire, indicating a process of trial and 
error in using these instruments in Arctic conditions.  
 
 
775Parry, Journal of a Voyage, 1819-1820, Appendix, p. vii 




The management of chronometers did not end with their receipt and installation on board 
ship. The consensus was that the less chronometers were interacted with the better they 
functioned, but they still required regular winding and comparison. Whilst winding a 
chronometer may not require much skill, officers still required some guidance on how this 
should be done, as it could and did go wrong. This was another point of instruction in Richard 
Owen’s Essay, where he detailed not only how, but also when chronometers should be 
wound. This was an important point as it appears in almost all of the early instructions to 
astronomers and chronometer users of the late eighteenth century, and was one that writers 
of the nineteenth century continued to reiterate. It also became increasingly common for 
ships to carry more than one chronometer, leading to a greater focus on comparing one with 
another. This was another area of chronometry which emerged in other areas of 
instrumental practice and was incorporated into chronometry at sea as it developed.  
Comparing chronometers was not as straightforward as it may sound. Richard Owen 
described several methods of comparison, including details of how and when to record it. 
For all of these case studies, comparison was vital to help officers determine which 
chronometers could be relied upon. Inherent to this practice became the selection of a 
standard chronometer. Here, judgement mattered, as users adhered to hierarchies of 
instruments, where some were trusted to provide adequate data and others not. When 
comparing the chronometers, it mattered which instruments were selected as ‘reliable’ and 
which as ‘unreliable’.   
Although it would seem that daily winding would fit into the regulated rhythm of 
shipboard life, forgetting to wind them was nonetheless a regular occurrence. It was certainly 
common enough to warrant commentary. Parry noted that ‘those who have been 
accustomed to the charge of chronometers for any length of time, and who know the weight 
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and importance of that charge, it will be considered as deserving no small credit on the part 
of these gentlemen, that, for a period of nearly twenty months, during which, eleven 
chronometers were on board the Hecla, only two instances occurred of a single chronometer 
being suffered to go down by neglect’.797The duty of winding chronometers required a 
certain amount of authority. Parry mainly assigned this duty to his astronomer and one of his 
officers. On this first voyage, these were Sabine and William Harvey Hooper, Parry’s purser 
on the Hecla, of whom he later wrote to his brother ‘Hooper is with me, and, as usual, my 
right hand’.808Hooper assisted both Fisher and Foster on the second and third voyages, 
winding and comparing the chronometers daily at noon. Parry’s accounts of all three voyages 
recorded multiple occasions of the chronometers not being wound. Numerous instances 
where a single chronometer had not been wound were dutifully recorded in the appendix, 
evidence that keeping track of which one had been wound and rated could cause confusion. 
It was generally assumed that letting a chronometer run down would result in a change of 
rate, and was thus best avoided. Jennings’ up-and-down indicator was intended to prevent 
this from happening, although in practice it caused the chronometer to stop. Despite this, 
although up-and-down indicators were rare on early nineteenth-century chronometers, they 
became prevalent in most instruments by the 1840s.819This indicates that the duty of winding 
chronometers continued to be somewhat problematic, at least enough to warrant this 
technological addition to the instrument.  
Richard Owen specifically pointed out that winding and comparison should occur at 
the same time. This was intended to minimize interaction with and therefore movement of 
the instruments. This was another point where William Owen found fault with Foster’s 
 
797Parry, Journal of a Voyage, 1819-1820, p. xii 
808William Parry to his brother Charles Parry, 16 January, 1824. SPRI, GB 15: MS 438/26/164 




method. By suspending the chronometers tightly within separate cots, ‘the process of 
winding and comparing daily subjects them to much irregular movement’; movement that 
both Richard and William Owen were keen to avoid.8210Winding and comparing should thus 
occur daily at noon. Regularity was key. Eight-day watches were wound only on Sunday, as 
that would ‘always be remembered better than any other day in the week’.8311The winding 
and comparison of the chronometers had to be reported before being allowed to ‘pipe to 
dinner’.8412If discipline and good habits did not work, withholding dinner certainly should 
ensure the duty was not forgotten. For merchant vessels, Richard Owen warned against 
relying on only one man’s memory: chronometry should not be a solitary practice. Regularity 
in winding was one thing, careful handling was another. The actual physical manner of 
winding a pocket chronometer was described, as the practice of turning the watch on the 
key was ‘very common, and very bad’.8513Instead, the hand holding the chronometer should 
rest against the body to prevent rotation, and the turns of the key should be counted so that 
the last turns could be ‘made gently and carefully, until it is felt to butt’.8614 
Practices were different on the Beagle. Fitzroy ordered that the ‘chronometers are to 
be wound daily between ½ past 8 and 9 in the forenoon & they are to be compared at noon. 
The eight-day watches are to be wound every Sunday morning. The daily winding & the 
comparison of the chronometers is to be reported to me or in my absence to the 
commanding officer by one of the following officers. 2nd lieutenant, assistant surveyor, 
master. Masters assistant’.8715Stebbing (‘under the inspection of Mr. Stokes and myself’) was 
in charge of winding and comparing the chronometers in addition to his duties of repairing 
 
8210William Fitzwilliam Owen to Francis Beaufort, May, 1831. HMS Eden, UKHO, MP58 
8311Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 7 
8412Ibid, p. 6 
8513Ibid, p. 7 
8614Ibid, p. 7 
8715Captain’s orders relating to the voyage of the Beagle, 1831-36, copied by Stokes from the original, 
signed by Fitzroy. NMM, STK/15 
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instruments, assisting in observations, writing for Fitzroy and taking care of the book 
collection.8816With a total of twenty-two chronometers, we might imagine that this may have 
taken up at least half an hour, and in rough conditions possibly considerably more, although 
nobody commented on this. Initially, it may have been prudent to separate the winding from 
the comparison, as it would be easy to forget if one had been wound or not. Yet practices 
were not set in stone and users altered them if necessary. Initially, winding and comparison 
took place at the same time each morning, as advised by Richard Owen. But within the 
Beagle’s comparison book, we can see that the practice was changed. Inserted between the 
comparisons on 9 and 10 February 1831 was an additional noon comparison. On the final 
page of that month Stebbing wrote the following remark in pencil: ‘altered the time of 
comparison to noon’.8917It can be reasonably assumed that Stebbing initially compared the 
chronometers during the morning winding, but after two months a decision was made to 
change this to noon. Potentially, winding and comparing twenty-two chronometers at the 
same time was too much for Stebbing. Another reason for this adaption could be related to 
the method of rating the chronometers. Apparent noon was determined by Equal Altitudes 
which would make noon comparison with the other chronometers more convenient. Practice 
was thus not always as straightforward as the regulations imply. On winding, Foster’s 
comments were limited to the fact that ‘they were wound up every day at noon, and 
compared by lieutenant Kendall and myself, with one considered as the standard’. The 
standard was ‘no. 167, of McCabe’s construction, selected for that purpose in consequence 
of its having obtained the highest prize from the excellence of its performance during a year’s 
trial at the Royal Observatory at Greenwich’.9018  
 
8816Fitzroy, Appendix to Volume II, p. 327 
8917Chronometer Rate Book of HMS Beagle, 1834-36. UKHO, OD/821   
90
 Astronomical Observations, HMS Chanticleer, 1828-31. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7 
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Winding became intrinsically linked to comparison, and comparison to selecting a 
standard chronometer. Both these aspects required certain amounts of skill and reflection.  
 
Comparison is a skill 
Comparing chronometers was a significant part of chronometry practice at sea on ships 
carrying multiple instruments. We can again turn to the 1818 expeditions to understand how 
the practices emerged that were adopted and adapted on the Arctic expeditions under 
Parry’s command. Ross sailed with instructions provided by the Admiralty and the Royal 
Society, although neither included any instructions on the use of chronometers. Kater wrote 
the instructions issued by the Royal Society for the scientific research.9119These instructions 
related to the scientific experiments that the officers were to perform, for which Sabine 
accompanied the voyage. Prior to departure, the chronometers supplied to Ross’s expedition 
were sent to Henry Browne’s basement for rating. Despite the effort that had been put into 
rating the chronometers and the care and preservation of the instruments on board ship, no 
formal instruction over how to account for their performance had been issued. Sabine 
described this in a letter to Browne written on board the Isabella:  
what value would an hour or two’s conversation with you be of use now. However it 
will come altho’ not in time to benefit me for this voyage. I have followed your 
direction in working everything at full length in a book, & find the advantage of it; 
everything is referred to there in consequence. How much more will it be necessary 
[since?] our chronometers commence irregularities. How any true longitude from day 
to day is to be deduced from … books kept in the Isabella except my own chronometer 
book I cannot see. There is no mention kept of what each chronometer shews at mean 
noon. Therefore altho’ our observations may give our daily longitude sufficiently near 
for purposes of navigation, it will be … an impossibility hereafter to deduce the true 
longitude from them, when we may be able to form a judgement of their deviation 
from the rates allowed.9220 
 
 
9119Henry Kater, Instructions for the Adjustments and Use of the Instruments Intended for the Northern 
Expeditions, (London: Printed by W. Bulmer, 1818)  
9220Edward Sabine, Journal and letters during Ross’s expedition, 1818. PWDRO, 581/81 
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From this passage, it is clear that by 1818 there were no guidelines on how to keep an 
account of the chronometers beyond what was necessary navigation. Sabine was not the 
only one who commented on this lack of regulation. In a letter to Barrow in 1820, Hall also 
advised keeping ‘an account of the performance of every chronometer’ which would ‘enable 
the officer in charge of the establishment to form a better estimate of the merits of each 
watch than he could do by merely examining it on shore’.9321 
Sabine would have been instrumental in the practices that emerged on these voyages. 
He followed procedures that were similar to observatory practices and his pendulum 
experiments, as the chronometers supplied were not only used for navigation but also to aid 
in the pendulum experiments. Kater described the process of comparing the chronometers 
to the astronomical clock in his Instructions for the Adjustments and Use of the Instruments 
Intended for the Northern Expeditions. To compare the chronometers with the clock, one 
should ‘place the ear close to the clock, and begin counting the seconds, looking at the same 
time at the chronometer No. 1, and on counting 60 seconds, which will complete the minute 
of the clock registered, mark carefully the second, and fraction of a second shewn by the 
chronometer, and set this down together with the minute and hour’.9422A total of twelve 
chronometers was supplied to the Northern expeditions of 1818 under command of Captain 
John Ross (HMS Isabella) and Captain David Buchan (HMS Dorothea), but it remains unclear 
which instruments were issued to which ship or officer. Captain’s Ross and Buchan received 
two Arnold pocket chronometers each, but the eight remaining box chronometers were first 
sent to Henry Browne’s house at 2 Harley Street, according to Hurd’s report.9523They were 
sent there to have their rates compared against a clock ‘whose rate was known’ and as a 
 
9321Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956 
9422Kater, Instructions for the Adjustments and Use of the Instruments Intended for the Northern 
Expeditions, p. 6 
9523Thomas Hurd, ‘List of chronometers issued between the 1st August 1817 and 1st August 1818’. 
UKHO, MLP82  
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result, Sabine determined ‘their rates, therefore, as deduced from so long a period of trial 
might be expected to be steady’.9624We can see how these practices emerged through the 
experience users had with other instruments within their scientific and navigational 
practices; from the pendulum experiments to the compass. 
Once comparison was completed, users would then produce a table of comparison. 
With these daily comparisons, users could judge the going of the chronometers in the 
absence of astronomical means. Irregularities were detected by tabulating the differences at 
noon each day between the standard and the other chronometers. Richard Owen found the 
comparisons useful as it allowed ‘us to detect the vacillations of any of the Chronometers, 
and to get their corresponding results at any required time’.9725Through comparison, 
operators could decide which chronometers were to be used for computing longitude. This 
would, however, make for a considerable amount of work, depending on the number of 
chronometers being carried on the voyage. When multiple chronometers were used, only 
the standard would be rated, and the rates for all the others were subsequently obtained 
through comparison. For Parry, Sabine, Fisher and Foster, comparing multiple chronometers 
may not have given rise to any difficulties since they were all well trained in their use. Fitzroy, 
having completed his education at the Royal Naval College under James Inman, who oversaw 
the care and rating of chronometers there, must also have been accustomed to the practice 
and, if not there, then certainly aboard the Adventure with Captain King. Stebbing, the 
instrument maker employed by Fitzroy, may have been familiar with the practice of rating 
chronometers through his father’s business in Portsmouth, although there is no evidence 
that they repaired or rated chronometers within their business as ‘working Optician and 
 
9624‘Abstract of Observations for determining the Isabella’s latitude and longitude by Edward Sabine’. 
TNA, BJ3 62/1  
9725Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 8 
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Manufacturer of Optical and Mathematical Instruments’.9826For others less well trained, 
however, comparing eight, fifteen or twenty-two chronometers a day may not have been 
easy work.  
The question of skill more readily springs to mind when you consider an officer 
attempting to take lunar observations with a sextant on a windy day at sea, on the deck of a 
rolling ship, particularly in Arctic conditions where the atmosphere often distorted the 
appearance of the surroundings and the cold instruments caused burning sensations on the 
hands if used for too long. But it also applied to chronometry, although again this aspect was 
not discussed in manuals of instruction. Richard Owen’s essay described various methods of 
comparison, depending on whether the instruments were in the same location, one above 
and one below decks, or on different ships altogether. For most users, the chronometers 
were kept in one place below decks and could be compared by ‘one person, in following the 
beats of the standard by his ear, and counting them to an even ten seconds, whilst his eye 
marks the corresponding time on the other watch; two of these comparisons should be made 
with each, to detect and prevent mistakes’.9927   
In 1861, Charles Shadwell described how the process ‘requires much practice and self-
confidence, and demands also a more delicate organisation of ear and eye than is possessed 
by all persons’.10028Shadwell continued that ‘for the facility of comparison with the other 
chronometers it will be found convenient to arrange the chronometers in their box in such a 
manner that the standard shall occupy a central position among them. The XII and VI hour 
marks should all be parallel to one another, and to the “fore and aft” line of the ship’.10129He 
 
9826Julian Holland, ‘George James Stebbing: Captain Fitzroy’s Instrument Maker: Part One’, Bulletin of 
the Scientific Instrument Society No. 116, (2013), pp. 22-29, quote on p. 22 
9927Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, pp. 7-8 
10028Charles F. A. Shadwell, Notes on the Management of Chronometers and the Measurement of 
Meridian Distances, (London: J. D. Potter, 1861), p. 28 
10129Shadwell, Notes on the Management of Chronometers, p. 26 
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also recommended the use of letters as identifiers rather than the maker’s name and number 
since ‘the highest authorities’ followed this practice (Shadwell unfortunately did not specify 
who the highest authorities were).10230Although written two decades after the Beagle 
departed on her second voyage, Shadwell’s instructions (which continued over three pages) 
described how Stebbing was likely to have performed his comparison in the 1830s.10331  
The observer, with a book in hand, containing a ruled form for the entry of the time 
shown by the several chronometers takes a beat from the standard five seconds before 
the arrival of the second hand at any five or ten seconds mark, and then quickly casting 
his eye on the chronometer to be compared, counts with his ear the ten beats which 
elapse before the second-hand arrives at the mark selected; at the completion of the 
interval he reads the other chronometer, and the comparison is effected. The 
operation being repeated a second time to correct the first judgement, the final 
observation is recorded. It will be found convenient to make the first comparison at 
50s, or at 20s, and again at the minute or half minute for the final result.  
 
This eye-and-ear method was a well-established precision routine in the observatory, and 
those who mastered the process had done so after a long apprenticeship.10432 
 
Setting standards 
Chronometers were not regarded equally by their users. Rather, users such as Parry 
designated hierarchies of reliability. During the 1818 expedition of the Isabella and the 
Alexander, Ross, Sabine and Parry used compasses to investigate magnetic phenomena in 
the Arctic. But the effects of the phenomena they were investigating also rendered the device 
unreliable. On each ship, one compass was selected as ‘a standard’, to which the other 
instruments were compared. It was placed in a position which would reduce external 
 
10230Shadwell, Notes on the Management of Chronometers, p. 26 
10331Ibid, p. 27 
10432David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg and H. Otto Sibum, ‘Introduction: Observatory Techniques in 
Nineteenth-Century Science and Society’, in: The Heavens on Earth: Observatories and Astronomy in 
Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 10 
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interference, and thereby increase the credibility of the observations.10533A similar process 
was seen with the chronometer, where a reference chronometer was selected to simplify 
the procedure of calculating longitude. It also served as a mediator between the 
chronometers that were kept securely in a cabin and the pocket chronometer or hack watch 
used on deck or on shore to time the observations. Parry’s demarcations were clear. He 
employed a standard chronometer, or as it was described on the first voyage, ‘the watch by 
which the time of all observations should be noted, its rate being small and very 
uniform’.10634Then followed those chronometers that were used ‘in the determination of 
longitudes’, those that ‘had best preserved a mean rate’.10735Finally, the rates of the 
chronometers not included in the longitude determinations were listed in a table. Excluded 
from either group were the pocket chronometers used for taking observations on shore.  
The reason and justification for choosing a specific instrument as the standard varied 
depending on particular circumstances. Sabine selected P&F 228 for Parry’s first voyage, on 
the basis of its good performance on the previous expedition under Captain Ross on HMS 
Isabella in 1818. On this voyage, Parry and Sabine worked on the basis of intervals. An interval 
was the period between two ratings of the chronometers. For example, on departure, Sabine 
used the rates as determined in Browne’s basement. Later, the party took a total of 1,209 
lunar distances in June and August, on route to Davis Strait. Sabine thereby retrospectively 
calculated what the Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) was at the instance of Local Mean noon 
22 July, 1819 (the middle day of the observations). By then comparing the time of GMT as 
determined by the chronometers to that determined by the lunars, Sabine was able to rate 
the chronometer again. As Sabine determined the first rates at midnight on May 6 of that 
year, this meant that the interval to which the newly calculated rates were (retrospectively) 
 
10533Dunn, ‘North by Northwest’, p. 68 
10634Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, Appendix, p. vi 
10735Ibid, p. vi 
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applied was a period of seventy-six and a half days. During the course of the voyage the rates 
were again determined at Winter Harbour (by lunar observations) and finally on return to 
England. Following the observations and subsequent rating of the instruments during the 
stay at Winter Harbour, P&F 259 was appointed the standard chronometer as it was believed 
‘to have preserved the most steady and uniform rate throughout the season’.10836Fisher again 
selected P&F 259 on Parry’s second voyage, based on its previous good performance under 
Sabine.  
From 1822, the Premium Trials at Greenwich also served as a criterion for selection. 
During the third voyage under Parry’s command, Foster used Murray 816 as the standard, as 
it had gained the premium reward during the twelfth months trial at the Royal Observatory. 
Again, in 1828, having been equipped with the best chronometers following the Greenwich 
Trials, Foster used McCabe 167 as the standard on HMS Chanticleer, due to it having 
performed best that year. Owen did not specify in his essay which chronometer was selected 
as a standard as it was written as an instructive guide, not an account of the actual practice 
observed. It is evident from the examples given, however, that Arnold 498 was used as the 
standard for the majority of the voyage but was replaced with Arnold 323 after being 
supplied from Greenwich via the Owen Glendower in 1825. In his essay, Richard Owen 
recommended that users should select a chronometer ‘that beats distinctly, and to half 
seconds, as it will be found to give great facility in comparing, and in most cases render the 
assistance of a second person unnecessary’.10937He made no mention of selecting a 
chronometer with the smallest or steadiest rate: practical advantage was accorded greater 
significance. Fitzroy mentioned no justification for selecting his standard, only that ‘the two 
supposed to be the best’ were used.11038These were Molyneux 1415 (an eight-day 
 
10836Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, Appendix, p. vii 
10937Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 7 
11038Fitzroy, Appendix to Volume II, p. 329 
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chronometer owned by Fitzroy) and French 4214 (an eight-day chronometer supplied by the 
Admiralty, see figure 5.10). French 4214 had previously performed well on the Chanticleer, 
and this would certainly have been taken into account. The chronometers had been 
‘embarked, and permanently fixed’ on board for rating a month before the ship departed 
and the results of this would also have formed the basis for their selection.11139  
 
Figure 5.10: 8-day box chronometer by James Moore French 4214. This box is all that remains of 
chronometer French 4214 after it was lost in HMS Erebus during John Franklin’s fatal expedition in 
search of a North-West Passage. The box was found during an expedition led by an American explorer, 
Charles Francis Hall, 1864-1869. (NMM AAA2233). Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, pp. 317-
318. © National Maritime Museum. 
 
 
11139Fitzroy, Appendix to Volume II, p. 325 
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Comparison tables were a crucial health check for the chronometers. Officers used 
them to categorise their instruments into hierarchies of trust, with the standard chronometer 
at the top. As mentioned earlier, this was generally the chronometer that after a period of 
rating had the smallest and steadiest rate. Chronometer P&F 228, had performed so well on 
Parry’s first expedition that it was selected as the standard for the second voyage. But after 
a considerable period of rating during the winter of 1821-22, the officers found that P&F 259 
kept a better rate and this instrument was selected instead as the standard. An earlier 
interval of rating the chronometers also led to changes in the chronometers used for the 
determination of longitude.  
Within Owen’s practices the distinctions between chronometers were also clearly 
defined. Owen requested hack or deck watches, which were chronometers he considered 
good enough for measuring small intervals of time but not for the determination of 
longitude. Owen believed that moving chronometers was detrimental to their going and 
preferred to limit this where possible. By thus acquiring deck watches, Owen hoped to prove 
his measurements were reliable, due to not moving the superior instruments that he used 
for his longitude determinations; those instruments he kept secured below the deck. 
Chronometers were not the only timekeepers Owen employed during the survey; he 
mentioned a ‘small watch by Mr. Massey, of Prescot, in Lancashire, which beat twelve times 
in a second, this we found useful for measuring distance by sound, and to no other purpose 
did we ever apply it’.11240Owen considered a common watch accurate enough for short 
measurements of time.  
The two voyages tasked with measuring meridian distances by chronometers (the 
Chanticleer in 1828 and the Beagle in 1831) adopted similar practices despite applying 
different criteria. Meridian distances had two important aspects: they required large 
 
11240Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 10 
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numbers of chronometers to generate data and they were required to sail between the two 
points of measurement as quickly as possible. This latter was intended to minimise the 
detrimental effects that officers experienced when chronometers were used over longer 
periods. Both used pocket chronometers to take observations on deck or on shore. These 
were then compared to the chronometer selected as the standard. All other chronometers 
were subsequently compared to the standard, and, based on this comparison, each captain 
selected which instruments should be included within the mean results for the longitude 
determination. The criteria for these decisions are explored in more detail in the chapters 
following. Foster used two pocket chronometers (P&F 699 and P&F 799) for taking 
observations on shore and a box chronometer by McCabe (167) as the standard against 
which the times of the observations were noted.  
What becomes increasingly clear from these examples is that the period of time being 
measured played a critical role in how instruments were used. Hack watches and pocket 
chronometers, and sometimes even ordinary watches, were considered accurate enough to 
assist in lunar observations, for the determination of local time and, in Owen’s case, to 
measure distance by sound. Measurements of relative longitudes required longer time 
intervals, which in turn required more consideration from officers and their instruments. For 
these measurements, officers reserved those chronometers they considered their best. This 
was because it was harder to calibrate the chronometers over time. This could only be done 
via extensive astronomical observation or by comparing the chronometers to known 
longitudes. As both these requirements took time and were not always available, 
chronometers could not always be rated and thus calibrated regularly or when required. The 
longer the period of time between ratings, the less reliable the officers considered the 
measurements. Thus, the period between rating chronometers gained importance and was 





Without considering the great improvements which have taken place in this 
instrument, and its supposed perfection, Captain Owen felt that, to place implicit 
confidence in it, might probably be fatal to the correctness and utility of our work : and 
the result proved the justice of this supposition, for, not one of our nine chronometers 
kept its rate without fluctuations, produced either by change of weather, climate, or 
position. In some this variation was very trifling, but in all sufficient to produce much 
error, unless corrected by a great deal of care and attention.11341  
 
From this quote we learn two things. Firstly, Owen confirmed what navigational authors had 
written in the late eighteenth century: chronometers were inherently unreliable due to 
variations in their rate. Secondly, Owen reveals why it was so important to officers to 
demonstrate adequate management of the instruments. No two measurements of longitude 
were the same, even those determined by the same instruments and methods. It was vitally 
important to prove the credibility of one’s results, especially if they differed from those of 
others. Owen countered the unreliability of his chronometers with the reliability of his 
method. When results obtained by other voyages differed from his, he put this down to bad 
management on their part (disagreeing with Foster’s suspended chronometers), or as in 
King’s case, to the repair of his chronometers abroad.  
As chronometers were deemed inherently unreliable, officers sought to use the proper 
management of them to demonstrate expertise and therefore trust in the methods applied. 
Consequently, the printed guidelines on chronometry practice were just as much a bid to 
secure credibility as they were an instruction of best practice. Equally important, they were 
based on users’ own experiences of chronometry practice, which were shaped by a multitude 
of factors. As is evident from the experience of Arctic explorers, where the chronometers 
 
11341William F. W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar; 
Performed in H.M. Ships Leven and Barracouta, Vol. I, (New York: J & J Harper, 1833), p. 16 
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were used mattered, and the specific arrangements that were made evolved through trial 
and error. Instrument makers adjusted the temperature compensation to cold conditions; 
the chronometers were suspended in slings to prevent shocks from the ice, and officers 
learnt to use cabin fires and heated tin cans to prevent them from stopping.  
The purpose of the voyage also mattered. Owen’s survey was shared between the two 
ships, the Leven and the Barracouta, and the additional sloops Owen purchased during his 
five years on the East Coast of Africa. This work required continued movement between the 
shore and the ships, a fact Owen considered detrimental to the going of the chronometers. 
Combined, the requirement of movement and the detrimental effect of movement led Owen 
to use a high number of deck and pocket chronometers. In this way, Owen mitigated the 
specific problems he faced.  
Previous experience also guided practice, as we saw with Foster’s approach on the 
Chanticleer. Despite the majority of the voyage not taking place in the Arctic regions, he still 
proceeded with the suspension of chronometers in slings. Although the approach of the 
chronometric measurements was based on the meridian distances made earlier by John 
Lewis Tiarks, the management was based on Foster’s experience after serving on two polar 
expeditions under Parry. In addition, those officers who had gained experience in 
astronomical practices or through pendulum experiments were able to apply these skills to 
chronometry at sea. They had learned the skill of comparison, astronomical observation, and 
record-keeping. A growing number of officers not only had access to the best instruments, 
but also developed habits which led to a certain method of procedure. If these methods were 
to extend to all officers operating with chronometers at sea, then these practices needed to 
be communicated and taught to officers and seamen. Richard Owen’s ‘Essay’ sought to 
address this issue by attempting to explain the process of and need for comparison to those 
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seamen who were predominantly trained at sea, without the benefit of an astronomer. As 
Richard Owen wrote, his essay was not ‘intended to inform the Astronomer’.11442  
As chronometers were easily disturbed, their management and regulation became 
increasingly common to prevent inaccuracy. The experiences and accounts of these 
expeditions contributed to the instructions that were gradually appearing in print. But these 
instructions still remained a point of debate. Owen ceased firing cannons from the deck of 
the Leven in order to prevent the vibrations from affecting the timekeepers. Later, in 1835, 
four surveying voyages sent out were forbidden from firing guns on account of the 
chronometers.11543Not all agreed with this intervention, as Belcher complained whilst on the 
Blossom (1825-1828) that the guns of a Russian Service ship were not fired in salute ‘on the 
plea of disturbing the chronometers, especially when one may add several guns were fired 
in their presence to measure base by sound’.11644As we have seen, Fitzroy likewise did not 
believe that firing the guns on the Beagle had any effect on them, which he proved by ‘by 
scattering powder upon their glasses and watching it with a magnifying glass’.11745   
The suspicion that magnetism affected chronometers led the Hydrographic Office to 
issue specific instructions to surveying officers in 1835. They were to align their 
chronometers with the length of the vessel with the XII-hour mark on the dial facing the head 
of the ship. The chronometers were to remain in this position for a month, after which their 
position was to be rotated by 90o each month. Officers were to record the results in the 
chronometer journal so that the effect of this could be investigated. In 1836, Fisher was 
 
11442Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 3 
11543Admiralty Minutes, 14 December, 1835. TNA, ADM3/232 
11644Edward Belcher, Belcher’s Journal on Board HMS Blossom, 26 May, 1826 to 12 December, 1827. 
SPRI, GB 15: MS1044/1 
11745Fitzroy, Appendix to Volume II, p. 326 
200 
 
granted the use of ‘as many chronometers as can conveniently be spared’ to perform 
experiments on the subject. Six chronometers were issued.11846  
Owen’s and Tiarks’ opposition to the practice of suspension should not be seen as the 
end of the debate. Between 1837 and 1838, George Fisher conducted experiments to test 
the effect of suspension on the rates of chronometers. Fisher compared the rates of 
chronometers ‘suspended in cots’ with chronometers ‘not suspended’ and concluded that 
suspension caused an increase in their rates. He extended his experiments to determine the 
effect on the rates by clamping or unclamping the gimbals and placing them on ‘cushions of 
hair’, ‘firm on the table’ and on ‘pads of wool’.11947Fisher sent an abstract of the results to 
George Airy entitled ‘Some experiments shewing the effect upon the rates of chronometers 
when placed in cots, as is usual on ship-board’.12048The 1820s and 1830s were a period of 
trialling, testing, experimenting and evaluating how, in very particular circumstances, 
chronometers could be made to behave according to the expectations of those employing 
them. These examples show that although investigations were becoming common place at 
sea, and individual advice was forthcoming, consensus had not yet been reached. 
These expeditions are also indicative of how, through careful management and 
scrutiny, these expeditions helped expand the uses to which chronometers could be put. On 
shore, through trials at the Royal Observatory, instrument makers were attempting to 
improve the mechanism. At sea, users were experimenting with methods and procedures 
that would help prevent variations of rate that were so hard to detect. Many of the 
instruments that were not trusted on these particular voyages were often considered good 
 
11846George Fisher to Francis Beaufort, Greenwich Hospital, 7 March, 1836. TNA, ADM1/4614 
11947George Fisher, Navigational Workbook: Workings of Chronometers, Greenwich(?) and New York. 
NMM, FIS/22 
12048Papers on clock and chronometer improvements, 1836-1844. CUL, RGO 6/585 
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enough for navigation in general. It was their specific use in the pursuit of knowledge that 
led to these procedures of improvement.  
This chapter has detailed the procedures that officers put in place to prevent 
chronometers from behaving poorly or breaking down at sea. It also showed how they 
learned to deal with them in different circumstances. But more often than not, error was not 
evident through examining the instruments alone, only through constant monitoring and 
examination of the data produced. All chronometers deviated, some more than others. At 
some point, trust in the instrument would fail, but it was up to users to decide when this 
moment arrived. Decisions made on the basis of the comparison tables were directly related 
to the rating of the chronometers, which always involved astronomical methods. It was when 
rating chronometers that they interacted with other instruments and methods, and this 







[S]hips tracks would then be laid down with far greater accuracy & current would in 
consequence be estimated; a degree of precision hitherto unknown would belong to 
those occasional surveys which officers have it so often in their power to undertake; a 
taste for nautical research would soon follow, & it might reasonably be expected that, 
in a few years a much more scientific habit of navigating ships would become general, 
than can ever obtain under the present state of things.1 
 
Introduction 
Basil Hall wrote the above at a time in which chronometers use at sea was increasing.2 He 
urged the Admiralty to supply at least ‘one good chronometer’ to each Royal Navy vessel, 
believing that this would ‘considerably’ increase their security and result in financial benefits. 
But Hall’s argument went further. Hall thought the chronometers should be supplied by the 
Admiralty, as they could judge the merits of each individual instrument, through trials at the 
Royal Observatory (see Chapter 3). He continued to point out that captains not supplied with 
chronometers were limited to a record based only on the log board (as used for keeping 
account of the ship by dead reckoning) in their navigational accounts. Another problem was 
due to the difficulty in rating chronometers; that was already apparent on shore:   
It is well known that the rates furnished by the makers cannot de depended on. And 
those given at the naval college, or by any of those persons who undertake this task at 
the sea ports, are liable to a similar criticism. The reason of this is perfectly clear to 
every person conversant with the subject; because it is certain that to rate even one 
chronometer with the proper degree of precision, a great deal of pains & exclusive 
attention are indispensable: when a number are to be rated it is absolutely impossible 
that it can be done by any man, let his talents or industry be what they may.3  
 
 
1 Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956 
2 Yuto Ishibashi, ‘A Place for Managing Government Chronometers: Early Chronometer Service at the 
Royal Observatory Greenwich’, The Mariner's Mirror, 99, (2013), pp. 52-66 
3 Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956 
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Without attending to the particulars of rating chronometers, Hall ‘considered half the 
advantage of the instrument [was] lost’. In addition to the navigational benefits he 
envisioned not only that an officer would be enabled ‘to do his duty much better’, but also 
that it would ‘furnish the admiralty with the means of ascertaining exactly how far the proper 
degree of attention had been paid to the navigation of the ship’.4 This could be achieved by 
each captain sending an account of the performance of each chronometer alongside ‘a chart 
& such other notices as might be deemed necessary’ to a central depot. For Hall, this report 
would achieve three goals that went beyond just judging the merits of a single instrument. 
Judging the performance of the instruments was Hall’s first aim. He also believed this practice 
would lead to better habits among officers, to ‘stimulate the zealous & well informed to fresh 
exertions, & new attainments, & it would to a certain extent compel the indolent & ignorant 
to attend to subjects which, however useful, would otherwise have occupied very little of 
their thoughts’. Finally, Hall claimed it would give ‘the admiralty a very fair & ready means 
for getting at the character of officers, in a most essential particular’.5   
To understand what Basil Hall had in mind when he wrote thus to the Admiralty, we 
need to understand a number of elements of early nineteenth-century navigation involving 
chronometry. The title of this chapter, ‘Keeping Track’, refers to three aspects of 
chronometry which are critical to understanding the chronometer and how its use evolved 
in the context of these scientific expeditions and which are examined in what follows. 
Keeping track refers to the ship’s track on the ocean, in the general sense of its navigation: 
officers had to keep track of where they were and where they were heading. It relates also 
to keeping track of the rate and error of the chronometers, to determine which instruments 
were reliable and which corrections were required to the data they produced. Keeping track 
 




finally and additionally relates directly to the data produced: the process of selecting, sorting, 
documenting and imposing order on chronometric data, or, ‘keeping the books’.6 The latter 
two aspects reveal how observatory techniques became embedded within Royal Navy 
practice. These techniques included the ‘calibration, manipulation, and coordination of 
precision instruments for making observations and taking measurements’.7 Like astronomers 
and their assistants in the observatory, naval officers had to learn the methods of ‘data 
acquisition, reduction, tabulation, and conservation, along with complex mathematical 
analyses’.8  
In his work on images in the sciences, Hentschel stresses that, ‘it would be a mistake 
to analyze any scientific or technological image in artificial isolation from its context of 
foregoing images and from the cultural tradition in which that image arose’.9 The same 
sentiment applies to the marine chronometer and its use at sea. Chronometers functioned 
within cultural and social traditions that we cannot ignore. The chronometer was situated 
within traditional practices of maritime navigation, and it complemented methods and 
procedures already in use. Bennett has shown how the ‘navigational competence’ of East 
India Company officers affected the development of lunar distances.10 But the emergent 
group of scientific naval officers (detailed in Chapter 4), engaged in scientific expeditions on 
board Royal Navy voyages, were moulding these practices to fit their needs. Hall’s aim was 
 
6 Simon Schaffer, ‘Keeping the Books at Paramatta Observatory’, in: The Heavens on Earth: 
Observatories and Astronomy in Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg 
and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 118-47 
7 David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg, H. Otto Sibum, ‘Introduction: Observatory Techniques in Nineteenth-
Century Science and Society’, in: The Heavens on Earth: Observatories and Astronomy in Nineteenth-
Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010), p. 6 
8 Ibid, p. 7 
9 Klaus Hentschel, Visual Cultures in Science and Technology: A Comparative History, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p. 133 
10 Jim Bennett, ‘Mathematicians on board: introducing lunar distances to life at sea’, British Journal for 
the History of Science, 52, (2019), p. 65 
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to extrapolate the practices on board these voyages to surveyors and then into generalised 
navigational practice.  
What Hall wished to achieve was a regulated and standardised practice so that all 
navigators could contribute data. Whilst scientific naval officers were seen as authorities with 
the social standing and moral judgement to determine the reliability of their own practices, 
others were not. It was in the hands of these others that standardisation was thought 
necessary. This could only be achieved through discipline, as ‘disciplines give meanings to 
values, and often resist attempts by others to redefine these meanings or to gain authority 
over measurement’.11 It is perhaps impossible to discuss these developments without 
mentioning Alexander von Humboldt, the Prussian geographer and explorer who ‘helped to 
establish international networks of observers to collect similar data from around the world’.12 
As an admirer of Humboldt, Hall attempted to achieve the same in navigation. For Hall, this 
would improve navigation to a degree that would have both economic and safety benefits, 
but more importantly, it would also aid other explorers in their endeavours to create 
authoritative knowledge about the world. Humboldt’s approach to observation and 
measurement is relevant here if we follow Tresch’s observation that to produce objective 
knowledge, rather than eliminate observers, Humboldt sought to multiply them and thus 
achieve objectivity through ‘interdependence, mediation and community’.13 Humboldt 
aimed to ‘enhance interdisciplinary analysis through the use of mathematics and statistics’.14  
 
11 Simon Schaffer, ‘Astronomers Mark Time: Discipline and the Personal Equation’, Science in Context, 
2, (1988), p. 115 
12 John Tresch, ‘Even the Tools will be Free: Humboldt’s Romantic Technologies’, in: The Heavens on 
Earth: Observatories and Astronomy in Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte 
Bigg and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 255 
13 Tresch, ‘Even the Tools will be Free’, p. 257 
14 Anne Marie Claire Godlewska, ‘From Enlightenment Vision to Modern Science? Humboldt’s Visual 
Thinking’, Geography and Enlightenment, David N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers, eds. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 237 
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This chapter, and that following, will focus in particular on the chronometric data 
produced by these voyages. This numerical data, although at first glance seemingly 
indecipherable, reveals in depth what day-to-day chronometry was all about. Here, I will 
show how, by focusing on calculations of a particular longitude, we can understand exactly 
how longitude determinations were made ‘in the wild’ and tied up with other instruments 
and methods. In addition, by cross-examining and comparing the various numerical 
documents produced, I shed more light on the importance of data management and I 
examine how most of the chronometric determinations were a result of this process, rather 
than on-the-spot readings of these instruments.  
The first section examines the ship’s track and how this was constructed, or kept, by 
officers based on their determinations of latitude and longitude. To assume that a ship’s track 
was merely a record of its latitudes and longitudes, brought together on a chart, however, 
misses a vital point: these coordinates were dependent on many actors, involving the ship, 
officers, multiple instruments, and observations taking place in time and space. They were 
never really ‘on-the-spot’ determinations, but were themselves constructed through a 
continuous process of multiple observation, measurement, plotting, and backtracking. Not 
until 1843, when American merchant Captain Thomas Hubbard Sumner published a method 
that became known as position line navigation, could latitude and longitude be calculated 
simultaneously.15 The chronometer was only one part of this navigational network that was 
shaped, tracked and connected through the ship’s constant interaction with the coastline. 
The ship, as Sorrenson proposed, not only transported observers and instruments, but also 
 
15 Guy Boistel, ‘Training Seafarers in Astronomy: Methods, Naval Schools, and Naval Observatories in 
Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France’, translated by David Aubin and Charlotte Bigg, in: The 
Heavens on Earth: Observatories and Astronomy in Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David 
Aubin, Charlotte Bigg and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 148-173 
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‘shaped the kinds of information observers collected’.16 Chronometry did not stop when an 
officer read and noted the time off the dial. This ‘raw data’ required considerable processing 
to transform it into useful knowledge.  
The second section examines how officers kept track of the performance of each 
chronometer and how they dealt with, mitigated and managed error. Building on what we 
have seen in the previous chapter, I examine how the chronometers were monitored using 
comparison tables and what steps were involved in ascribing a rate to each chronometer. On 
these expeditions this work was rather more complex than it may have been on voyages 
where chronometers were used for more general navigational purposes, where officers 
would use the rate as determined by the makers, an astronomer or through their own 
observations pre-departure until their destination was reached.  
Chronometry involved the production of lots of data. This was often produced on loose 
sheets, computed in observation books and collected in navigational notebooks by various 
officers. Order had to be imposed on this data. When we examine the final processed data 
produced by these voyages, it is often in the form of a list of longitudes according to place, a 
noon longitude in a logbook or the longitude and latitude of a pendulum station. Officers 
would keep the processed data to serve as evidence for their determinations, often in 
tabulated numerical form, discarding the process of selection that led to these outcomes. 
These techniques used at sea, of generating, tabulating and manipulating data, were later 
used by statisticians ‘with the goal of making them universally comparable [and] bear close 
resemblance to those designed by observatory scientists’.17 By applying the same methods 
and procedures that were used in observatories, this ensured that ‘measurement, numbers, 
 
16 Richard Sorrenson, ‘The Ship as a Scientific Instrument in the Eighteenth Century’, Osiris, 11, (1996), 
p. 227 
17 Aubin, Bigg, and Sibum, ‘Introduction: Observatory Techniques in Nineteenth-Century Science and 
Society’, p. 13 
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and statistics [allowed] a certain transferability of data and analysis across fields’.18 This data, 
collected centrally at the Hydrographic Office, aided the Hydrographer in compiling lists of 
the latitude and longitude of distant places. These coordinates in turn assisted those mapping 
other geographical knowledge such as terrestrial magnetism, geodesic measurements, tides 
and currents.19  
 
Chronometers not used in isolation  
Chronometer use was shaped not only by the limitations of the instrument, the training and 
aims of the captain and officers, but also by existing practices of navigation. Scientific naval 
officers experimenting with chronometers and astronomical observations worked in 
collaboration with the master and mate charged with the traditional tasks of dead reckoning. 
Over time, the practices of these different groups merged, so shaping new practices. For 
Miller, ‘neither technological determinism identifying an instrument as the solution, nor 
singular method determinism, captures how longitude was established in practice’.20 
Longitude was determined in a multitude of ways, often a singular point of longitude was 
never an ‘on-the-spot’ determination by an instrument or method alone, but a collaboration 
of officers, procedures, instruments and measurements.  
Yet it was common within navigational literature to find the various methods for 
finding longitude to be listed chronologically or by technology. In such descriptions, latitude 
and longitude are identified as two different entities. The divide goes even further: longitude 
can be found by observations of Jupiter’s Satellites, the Moon’s occultations, eclipse 
 
18 Godlewska, ‘From Enlightenment Vision to Modern Science? Humboldt’s Visual Thinking’, p. 245 
19 John Cawood, ‘The Magnetic Crusade: Science and Politics in Early Victorian Britain’, Isis, 70, (1979), 
pp. 492-518 
20 David Phillip Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea’, Navigational Enterprises in Europe and 
its Empires, 1730-1850, Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), p. 224 
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observations, dead reckoning, lunar distances, or by chronometer. Of these, only the last 
three could be adopted at sea. The first three could only be performed onshore, and often 
required the instruments and expertise of astronomers, the setting-up of a temporary 
observatory, and extensive tables to correct the observations. The methods also differed in 
another way: astronomical observations ‘find’, or determine longitude, while the 
chronometer and dead reckoning ‘kept’ longitude. Hipparchus long ago suggested the use of 
astronomical observations such as lunar eclipses to find longitude but not until the theory of 
the motion of the Moon was further developed during the seventeenth century were lunar 
eclipses reliably used. Galileo’s insight that Jupiter’s Satellites could prove useful had to wait 
for seventeenth-century developments to be practically applicable. John Flamsteed made 
significant contributions to astronomical methods during his forty-four years as Astronomer 
Royal, as did his successor Nevil Maskelyne.21 Navigators using the Nautical Almanac by the 
late eighteenth- and early nineteenth century drew on this data and calculated predictions 
for most of their observational calculations. As such, observatory work was never far from 
the sea and the practices carried out on board ships.  
Whilst the chronometer was in development, methods and instruments for dead 
reckoning, lunar distances and latitude were also progressing. Tables of refraction, parallax, 
sines, secants and logarithms improved. Errors in the tables were addressed and corrected.22 
Each year, new data for the Moon’s position for the years ahead were being published. 
Massey’s patent log was developed and the sextant refined.23 All these developments took 
place on land and substantial amounts of observational data were gathered at Greenwich 
 
21 Albert Van Helden, ‘Longitude and the Satellites of Jupiter’, in: The Quest for Longitude, William J. 
H. Andrewes, ed. (Harvard University: Collection of Historical Scientific Instruments, 1996), pp. 85-100 
22 Anonymous, "XII. On errors in the nautical almanac, &c.", The Philosophical Magazine, 48, (1816), 
pp. 34–35.  
23 Jim Bennett, Navigation: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 98-
99; W. E. May, A History of Marine Navigation, (Henley-on-Thames: G T Foulis & Co, 1973), p.115; 
Charles H. Cotter, A History of Nautical Astronomy, (London: Hollis & Carter, 1968), pp. 87-92 
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and at observatories overseas. Explorers and surveyors collected and published data 
measured ‘in the field in various parts of the globe. This data included positions of latitude 
and longitude, and information concerning refraction, parallax and the speed of sound in 
different latitudes. All these instruments, tables, accounts, calculations and publications 
were taken on board the next voyage setting out. In practice, determining longitude was a 
rich, varied and multi-layered process.  
What follows examines a particular determination of longitude made by Parry and 
Sabine in 1819, based on extant sources that document practice on board the Hecla. This 
example has been chosen as the astronomical work book in which Sabine recorded the 
calculations, Sabine’s chronometer journal, and the detailed published appendix have all 
survived. Examining the data sheds light on the methods and procedures pursued. This gives 
us unique insight into how the chronometric longitude of 24o10’14” determined at noon on 
27 May 1819 was actually established in practice.  
Sabine kept an observation book to determine the latitude and the chronometric 
longitude for 1819 and 1820.24 It contained the tabulated data that Parry printed in the 
appendix to his Journal. In the Journal, two longitude determinations are shown, the first by 
the standard (P&F 228), the second the ‘longitude corrected’, the mean of six chronometers 
selected for these determinations. In the manuscript book, Sabine explained that ‘The 
latitudes in common ink were observed; those in red ink were deduced from the (transit) 
observed; so also the longitudes in common ink are the results of the elements which 
accompany them, and those in red ink are the observations of the day carried to noon by the 
reckoning’.25 By highlighting the determinations noted in red ink found in the manuscript 
 
24 Abstract of observations to determine the latitude, and the longitude by chronometers, 1819 and 
1820; TNA BJ 3/61  
25 Chronometers: Determination of latitude and longitude. TNA, BJ 3/61 
211 
 
material onto the published table in the appendix, the relationship between the latitude and 
longitude becomes apparent (figure 6.1).26 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Parry’s Appendix to his Journal. I have used Sabine’s Journal (TNA, BJ3/61) to identify the 
latitudes and longitude deduced from the reckoning. These are highlighted in red.  
 
26 The red ink has deteriorated faster than the common ink used, and is becoming illegible; but 
comparison with the published appendix show the results are the same. 
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This demonstrates how latitude determined astronomically by the noon observation 
of the Sun always required dead reckoning to connect it to a particular determination of 
longitude. Similarly, the longitude, as determined by the altitude of the Sun in the evening or 
morning, required dead reckoning to connect it to the latitude determined at noon. This is 
corroborated by Sabine’s astronomical notebook, which contains the calculations for the 
determinations which were made by Sabine.27 Figure 6.2 shows Sabine’s observation for 27 
May 1819. It contains calculations for the determination of longitude by chronometer; 
observations and calculations to determine the variation of the compass; comparisons 
between chronometers to determine a mean longitude and an explanation of some 
soundings taken on that day.   
The sections relating to the longitude on the page can be summarised as follows (the 
boxes drawn around the original material correspond to the descriptions below):  
1. Noon observations for latitude.  
2. Correction for longitude by dead reckoning.  
3. Astronomical observations and calculations to determine local Mean Time and 
Greenwich Mean Time by chronometer P&F 228. 
4. Noon longitude calculated by each chronometer.  
5. Noon longitude by the mean of six chronometers on May 27th 1819. 
6. Recalculation of the longitude by chronometer P&F 228, based on the new rates 
determined by the lunar observations taken in June and August 1819.  
7. Noon longitude in time by P&F 228 based on the mean of four observers.  
8. Noon longitude recalculated for each chronometer based on the new rates 
determined by the lunar distances.  
9. Longitude by P&F 259 based on the new rates.  
10. Corrected noon longitude by the mean of six chronometers. Corrected by dead 
reckoning to noon and by lunars for the rates.  
 




Figure 6.2: Sabine’s astronomical observations, 27 May, 1819. TNA, BJ3/58 
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The steps indicated in red were those determined on 27 May 1819, those indicated in purple 
are recalculations from a later date.  
1. Noon observations for latitude.  
 
 
This is the observed meridian altitude of the Sun with corrections to determine the latitude 
at noon. Sabine corrected the observed altitude for dip (4’), refraction, semi-diameter and 
parallax (11.13). A correction for index error was not necessary, as Sabine had set the index 
error of his instrument to zero. Using the principles of spherical trigonometry and the tables 
containing the values for the Sun’s declination, Sabine observed, corrected and calculated 
their latitude at noon.  
2. Correction for longitude by dead reckoning.  
The latitude was corrected by the course and distance as determined by the log account. 
What Sabine needed was the meridian altitude of the sun at the place where the 
observations for time had been made. This correction enabled Sabine to establish what the 
meridian altitude of the Sun would have been at the ship’s position during the altitudes taken 
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for local time and thus the difference in longitude between the two observations. Had the 
Hecla been stationary, this step would not have been necessary. 
 
 
3. Astronomical observations and calculations to determine local Mean Time and 
Greenwich Mean Time by chronometer P&F 228. 
21.04.38,8 Mean Time of observation by 523  
-          4.29 Difference between 228 and 523 
21.00.09,8 Time of observation by 228 
+      2.11,5 Correction for rate and error 
21.02.21,3 Corrected time of observation 
19.28.29,6 Established local Mean Time 
  1.33.51,7 Difference of longitude in time 
23.27.56 Difference of longitude at observation 
+     30.11 Correction longitude to noon 
23.58.07 Longitude at noon by 228 
 1.35.52,5 Longitude at noon in time 
-      2.11,5 Correction for rate and error 
   1.33.41 Time shown by 228 at noon for 
observation  
 
In step 3, the calculation for longitude is given in the left-hand column. The calculation for 
the ship’s local time is in the right-hand column. For the ship’s local time, Sabine noted the 
mean of his three meridian observations and corrected this for dip, refraction and parallax 
to determine the true altitude. As with latitude, Sabine relied on the principles of spherical 
trigonometry and extracted relevant data from the tables. The established local Mean Time 
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can be found at the bottom of the right-hand column: 19h28m29.6s. The left-hand column 
shows how Sabine determined the Greenwich Mean Time based on the chronometer (Arnold 
523) that recorded the time of the observations. By comparing Arnold 523 with the standard, 
namely P&F 228, Sabine calculated the time of observation by the standard. The standard 
was then corrected for rate and error, which were extracted from the comparison tables. The 
difference between this corrected time and the local Mean Time, as established in the right-
hand column, was the difference in longitude at the place of the observations. Using the 
difference in longitude between the place of the noon observations and the morning 
observations, Sabine then corrected the longitude to noon, by adding the distance sailed 
according to the dead reckoning (30’11”). The result was the longitude at noon, according to 
the standard chronometer P&F 228 (23o58’07”). Sabine then needed to compare the 
standard chronometer to the other chronometers and thus required the time shown by the 
standard at the time of the noon observation (which was taken by Arnold 523) to compare it 
to the other chronometers. Sabine thus established the noon longitude by P&F 228 in time 
rather than degrees (23o58’07” is 1h35m52.5s in time). By subtracting the rate and error, 
Sabine determined what chronometer P&F 228 would have shown at the time of the noon 
observations for latitude: 1h33m41s. Having this data allowed Sabine to use the noon 
comparison table to determine the time of the noon observation by each chronometer.  
4. Noon longitude calculated by each chronometer.  
Sabine also required the longitude at noon for each of the other chronometers which 
warranted the following steps. He compared the time calculated for P&F 228 (1h33m41s) to 




For each chronometer, the calculation was as follows: 
 
 
Chronometer P&F 253 
 
1.33.41 Time at noon by P&F 228 
- 0.45,75 Difference between P&F 228 and P&F 
253 
1.32.55,25 Time of noon observations by P&F 253 
+    2.44 Correction for rate and error for P&F 
253 based on the Greenwich rates.  
1.35.39,5 Longitude in time by P&F 253 at noon, 
May 27th 1819 
23.54.50 Longitude in degrees by P&F 253 at 
noon, May 27th 1819 
  
 
Sabine used the noon comparison table to determine the time shown by each chronometer 
at noon. He did this by adding or subtracting the difference between P&F 228 and each 
chronometer as noted by the noon comparison. By doing so, Sabine calculated what each 
chronometer would have shown at the time of the noon observations, in relation to 
chronometer P&F 228. This was then corrected for the rate and error of each chronometer. 
As the correction for the rates and errors was dependent on those established upon 
departure, P&F 259 was not included in these initial determinations as it had been delivered 




5. Noon longitude by the mean of seven chronometers on 27 May 1819. 
Having calculated the noon longitude for each chronometer, Sabine then determined the 
mean longitude by six chronometers. 
 
 
In this calculation, the longitude was 23o57’50”5 west by chronometer numbers 228, 253, 
254, 369, 404, 25 and 523.  
6. Recalculation of the longitude by chronometer P&F 228, based on the new rates 
determined by the lunar observations taken in June and in August 1819 
Sabine based these calculations on the temporary rates assigned to each chronometer on 
departure. During June and August, Parry, Beechey, Hooper, Ross and Sabine observed a total 
of 1209 lunar distances, 640 in June, 569 in August. Sabine recalculated the rates for each 
chronometer twice based on these observations. Initially, interim rates were given to each 
chronometer in August, when Sabine received observations from each observer. Sabine 
corrected these in the following winter, as ‘in their computation the mean refraction of the 
tables had not been in all instances corrected for variations in temperature and 
atmospherical pressure’.28 These rates were again confirmed by 6862 lunar distances taken 
on land on the coast of Melville Island. 
  
 
28 William Edward Parry, Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific Performed in the Years 1819-20, in His Majesty’s Ships Hecla and Griper, (London: 






21.00.09,8 Time of meridian observation by 228 
2.38,7 Corrected rate by Lunars  
21.02.48,5 Corrected time for observation by 228 
19.28.29,6 Local Mean Time  
1.34.18,9 Difference in time 
23.34.44 Difference in longitude 
  
A new longitude of 23o34’44” at the place of observations was the result of this calculation.  
7. Noon longitude in time by P&F 228 based on the mean of four observers.  
This is the same calculation that Sabine performed in step 3, where he calculated what the 
standard chronometer would have shown at noon. Sabine translated the longitude in 
degrees into a longitude in time (24o06’41” in time is 1h36m26.75s) and removed the 
correction for rate and error to get the time of P&F 228 at the noon observation. As Sabine 
had done earlier, he could compare this data with the noon comparison to get times from 
the other chronometers.    
 
One detail of these calculations not included on this page is how Sabine determined the 
longitude to be 24o06’41”, rather than the 23o34’44” he calculated in step 6.  
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To understand the corrections made to these initial determinations we need to look at 
another document produced by Sabine on this voyage. This small bound volume contains 
pre-printed forms for the calculation of longitude.  
 
Figure 6.3: Front cover of Sabine’s Chronometer Book. TNA, MS/831  
On these pages, Sabine filled out the altitudes and times by which they were observed; the 
corrections for dip, refraction, parallax and semi-diameter; the computations for calculating 
the local time and the resulting longitude based on the difference with the time by 
chronometer. On the blank pages, Sabine sometimes added additional information, often, 
but not always, relating to the longitude. This is not a document that recounts every 
determination of longitude made during the voyage. Most of the entries are for August and 
September; there are five entries for May, four for June and July. It is not clear why these 




Figure 6.4: Longitude calculation 27 May, 1819. RS, MS/831 
This shows the abstract of Sabine’s own observations to determine the time and the latitude. 
The opposite page contains the abstract from the other observers and chronometers (figure 
6.5).  
 
Figure 6.5: Computation of longitude by four observers, 27 May, 1819. RS, MS/831 
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The calculations for longitude in Sabine’s astronomical observation book (figure 6.1) were 
based solely on the altitudes measured by Sabine on the morning of 27 May. But, at Winter 
Station, Sabine re-determined the rates and collected the longitudes as established by Parry, 
Beechey and Hooper (Figure 6.5 section a). Here, we see Sabine’s longitude calculation of 
23o34’44”. Based on the mean of the observations by four observers (and again, adding the 
distance as determined by dead reckoning), Sabine calculated a new noon longitude by P&F 
228 as 24o06’41” (figure 6.5 section b). Based on this, Sabine recalculated the longitude for 
each chronometer (figure 6.5 section c). From this calculation we also see that Sabine gave 
equal weight to each observer, indicating that these four were those he trusted most to take 
the observations.  
8. Noon longitude recalculated for each chronometer based on the new rates 
determined by the lunar distances.  
These determinations were copied from Sabine’s astronomical observation book. Based on 
the new rates established at Winter Station, and the new rates as determined by the lunar 
distances, the longitude for each chronometer was calculated. Unlike with Captain Owen, 
the distinction between chronometers used on deck and those kept below decks was not 
clear cut. In this example, pocket chronometer Arnold 523 was used to time the observations 
for both latitude and longitude. Initially, in the first calculations, it was included in the mean 
calculation for longitude. Possibly due to the severe cold to which it was subjected during the 




Figure 6.6: Recalculation of the longitude by each chronometer and the mean of all. TNA, BJ3/58 
9. Longitude by P&F 259 based on the new rates.  
Despite Sabine’s warm praise for P&F 253, it is evident that P&F 259 replaced P&F 253 in all 
the recalculations for longitude that were made at a later date. Based on the stability of its 
rate at sea and at Winter Harbour, Sabine judged its performance as good enough to include 
in the calculation.  
10. Corrected noon longitude by the mean of six chronometers. Corrected by dead 
reckoning to noon and by lunars for the rates.  
Finally, Sabine determined the noon longitude based on the mean of the longitudes by six 
chronometers: 228, 259, 254, 369, 404 and 25. This is the noon longitude (24o10’14”) as 
published in the appendix and that found in the ‘Abstract of Day’s Work’.29 The results of 
each individual chronometer can also be found in the appendix in the table ‘Longitude by 
each Chronometer’.30 The majority of the calculations within this workbook follow the same 
pattern: the initial calculations taken on voyage were later recalculated with the new rates. 
In each case, chronometers P&F 253 and Arnold 523 were excluded, and P&F 259 was 
 
29 Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, Appendix, p. cxlvii 
30 Ibid, pp. lxxx-lxxxiii 
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included in the mean. During the 1820 navigation season, numbers 369 and 404 were 
excluded after they had stopped.  
The noon longitude that Sabine calculated based on the mean of the four observers 
and six chronometers differs from those found in other documents. Beechey’s log book 
records a noon longitude of 22o58’36” which is corrected to 24o05’20” in pencil. This does 
not match the longitude as noted by Sabine in his chronometer book (see figure 6.5 section 
a: longitude 23o34’20”). It can therefore be assumed that Beechey also kept a record of his 
observations and performed his own corrections with the new chronometer rates. Parry’s 
journal also records a different determination; 23o59’50” which was also corrected, to 
24o06’39”.31 These do not match those that Sabine recorded, although Sabine’s 
determination in the appendix remained the official version. In the rough version of the Day’s 
Work the longitude is noted as 24o06’39”.32 Each officer kept his own determinations and 
calculations but Sabine, and only Sabine, collected and organised all the different data into 
the official output.  
In this way, a positional point of latitude and longitude comprised the following: 
latitude, as taken by a meridian observation; dead reckoning, by keeping track of course and 
distant; longitude, as determined by altitudes timed by a chronometer; lunar distances, taken 
whenever possible to assign a correct error and rate to the chronometers. This may be taken 
further to include three or four observers; sextant(s) with or without an artificial horizon; 
notebooks and logarithmic tables; log and line; compass; the Nautical Almanac; Tables 
Requisite and six chronometers. Positional points of latitude and longitude were constructed 
using multiple observers, instruments, tables and calculations, and were subject to revision 
 
31 Hecla: Journal with Appendix Kept by W. E. Parry, 4 May 1819 to 26 September 1819. TNA, 
ADM/55/157-1 
32 HMS Hecla, Account of the Construction of the Charts on board the Hecla, 1819-1820. UKHO, Survey 
Data Books, Miscellaneous Books, 25. 
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and recalculation at a later date. A longitude determination was therefore never ‘on-the-
spot’, as it always required considerable recalculation based on the continuous monitoring 
of the instruments, or, error management. 
 
Keeping the books 
On board the Beagle, officers recorded the details of this daily comparison in the comparison 
book. Initially, ten chronometers were compared with the standard ‘A’ and ten chronometers 
with the standard ‘Z’. As the journey progressed, and chronometers broke down or were 
assigned to surveying ships, there were fewer instruments to compare. Figure 6.7 shows the 
comparison in September 1836, when only fifteen chronometers were functioning on board 
the Beagle.   
 
Figure 6.7: Beagle comparison book, 4 September 1836. UKHO, OD807 
Examination of the data gives an indication of the process. On 4 September 1836, 
chronometers A and Z were compared to the others. First the two standards were compared: 
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A showed 6.53 and B 1.18.17,0. Z was fast of A 6.25.17,0. Two minutes later, at 6.55, A was 
compared to chronometers B, C, D, G, H, K and L. This process took less than ten minutes. 
Chronometer Z was subsequently compared to N, O, S, V, W and X at 1.30 (time by Z). The 
comparison with these six chronometers took less than six minutes as by 1.36 (again 
according to Z) the two standards were again compared and the daily comparison completed. 
The times noted in the comparison columns all give the difference between each 
chronometer and the standard at exactly 6.55. As it would be physically impossible to 
determine and note the time of seven chronometers with the standard at that instant, this 
comparison book is clearly the fair comparison book compiled from the notes that would 
have been made during the comparison. Unfortunately, these do not survive. Assuming, as 
Shadwell and Owen advised, each chronometer was compared at the whole and at the half 
minute, this would make it easy for users to recalculate all the comparison back to a single 
time – subtracting 30 seconds; one minute; one and a half minutes; two minutes etc. from 
each consecutive comparison. The comparison of these 15 chronometers took Stebbing (and 
his assistant) 17 minutes to complete, evidence of their skills of comparison.   
 
Figure 6.8: Detail of Beagle comparison book – comparison of chronometer K. UKHO, OD807 
More comparisons were inserted in the margin, the same day pocket chronometer K (P&F 
1042) was compared with the standards A and Z.33 This particular example is the comparison 
before and after the morning observations. These were not inserted daily, but only when 
necessary for obtaining sights for either general navigational purposes or for obtaining the 
 
33 Interestingly a McCabe chronometer was also compared, being listed as belonging to HMB Rolla. 
This indicates that the Beagle provided a comparison service for this vessel.  
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necessary shore observations for rating the chronometers. By comparing the chronometers’ 
times at ‘going PM’ (A = 8.30.00.0) and ‘returning PM’ (A = 9.51.00.0), the time taken for 
these observations was one hour and twenty-one minutes. Similar comparisons from other 
pages show that these morning or evening observations could take over two hours.  
 
Figure 6.9: Note inserted in the pages of the Beagle’s Comparison Book. UKHO, OD807.  
As can be seen from the above note, the comparison was made in pencil on scraps of paper, 
before being copied in pencil and later ink in the comparison book. The figures that are 
crossed out are those that have been copied into the book. We can assume that the practice 
for the daily comparison was similar. This tiny note can be found folded within the pages of 




Figure 6.10: Depicting the relationship between the comparison and rate books. HMS Beagle 
September, 1836. UKHO, OD807 and OD821. 
From the daily comparison book, the data was copied into the Beagle rate book (figure 6.10). 
It was from this that users determined which chronometers kept their rates steady or when 
fluctuations occurred. The chronometer rate book kept on the Beagle is a hefty folio volume 
containing the daily differences between December 1831 and October 1836. Each page 
contains the monthly comparison of all the chronometers against the standards A or Z. Each 
month thus contains eight pages.34 A remarks column was included every four pages where 
 
34 Page 1: A compared to B, C and D; Page 2: A compared to E, F and G; Page 3: A compared to H, K 
and L; Page 4: A compared to M; Page 5: Z compared to N, O and P; Page 6: Z compared to R, S and T; 
Page 7: Z compared to V, W and X; Page 8: Z compared to Y 
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occasionally interesting details on the instruments were included. A frequent comment 
added was ‘(X, Y or Z) increased or decreased its daily difference’.  
From the comparison book, the difference between the standard and the 
chronometer in question was inserted into the column ‘difference +/- of A’ or ‘difference +/- 
of Z’ (figure 6.10). The next column was for the second difference; this was the daily 
difference between the differences in the previous column, either gaining or losing. The third 
and fourth columns (for the ‘average difference’ and the ‘average rate’) were often left blank. 
The first column, next to the dates, recorded the temperature. Fluctuations could be 
compared against variations in temperature. Figure’s 6.11 and 6.12 are two pages of the rate 
books kept on HMS Beagle. 
Selecting a standard and keeping comparison and rate books enabled users not only 
to check the regularity of the chronometers at sea, but also to correct or appoint new rates 
at any given time. Rates for chronometers could only be determined by astronomical 
observations on shore, provided that the ship remained at that spot for several days. For 
surveying vessels progressing more slowly whilst remaining close to the coast, this presented 
fewer problems than for ships navigating two weeks crossing the Atlantic between two ports, 
especially if the goal was to establish a meridian distance. As we have seen, the accuracy of 
chronometric measurements diminished the longer the period between two ratings. 
Additionally, greater geographical distances increased the likelihood of external factors 
influencing the going of the chronometers (temperature variations, movement, magnetism, 
etc.).  In addition, because the chronometers could not be rated in transit, when a rate was 
affected could not be established. This could be a problem if a ship were to stop at additional 
places included in the meridian measurements, but where the rate was not established 
separately. Assigning a rate was not straightforward but relied on the judgements of the 








Figure 6.12: Table of Rates, HMS Beagle, July 1834. UKHO, OD821 
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The Admiralty trusted Fitzroy to make these judgements as he was ‘so accustomed to 
the management of chronometers, that there is no doubt, with proper precautions and with 
proper formulæ for determining their rates, that he will succeed in obtaining good results in 
reasonably short intervals of time and in gradual changes of temperature’. Even so, the 
Admiralty also cautioned Fitzroy that ‘after long periods, and sudden changes of heat and 
cold, it will be absolutely necessary to check them by astronomical means’.35 In general, 
Fitzroy settled on the ‘method used by Dr. Tiarks’ for determining their rates, with a few 
exceptions when ‘that [method] used by Flinders, Owen, Foster, King, and others, was 
employed’.36 In his notebook, Stokes wrote about the method for correcting the rates of 
chronometers between two stations when the rates had altered on voyage. In this, he quoted 
Richard Owen’s ‘Essay’, which considered that an incorrect ‘and very common method’ of 
accounting for the rate (by arithmetical proportion) had been practised by Flinders (and 
others). After ‘reflecting upon the subject’, Stokes concluded that Flinders’ method was 
accurate and stated multiple approaches to detect a variation in rate.37 The correct method 
was dependent, according to Stokes, on what was considered the cause of the alteration, 
and this was a matter of judgement by the individual who managed the chronometers. These 
variations could occur at any point of the voyage and it was up to the user to divide the 
interval between ratings into periods (Stokes named these periods ‘C’ and ‘D’). A rate would 
be ascribed to each period. Another method was to designate a standard chronometer, as 
‘when there are many chronometers together, and some of them are so invariable in their 
rates, as to become Standards of comparison for the others, which vary; - the periods C and 
D may be found, for the varying watches, most satisfactorily. When there are no such means; 
 
35 Robert Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of His Majesty's Ships Adventure and Beagle 
between the Years 1826 and 1836, Proceedings of the Second Expedition, 1831-36, (London: Henry 
Colburn, 1838), p. 36 
36 Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages… Appendix to Volume II, p. 330 
37 John Lort Stokes, General Notebook, probably begun circa 1830. NMM, STK26/1  
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judgement is the only guide, and no rules can fix those periods exactly in this progression’.38 
In other words, employing a large number of instruments would reduce instrumental error, 
and help determine at which point on the route an actual change in rate had occurred, to 
facilitate the more accurate recalculation of the results.  
Tiarks’ method of interpolation to determine the change of rate of a chronometer 
differed. To avoid applying a rate based on a uniform manner of change, he described his 
mathematical formula to get a more accurate rate that could be applied to shorter periods 
between the intervals of rating. His formula was, he considered, ‘more correct and rather 
more simple’ than those adopted by Flinders, Owen, King and Foster.39 Although a table of 
comparison was helpful, it was also pointed out that if all chronometers were affected in the 
same way, it would not be possible using these tables of comparison to determine when an 
alteration in rates taken place. For example, if temperature variation caused an acceleration 
of rate in all the chronometers, the rate of the standard would increase. When comparing 
chronometers to the standard, this increase could not be detected because the relation to 
the standard would remain the same.  
Shadwell was still debating these considerations as late as 1861. Without going into 
unnecessary mathematical detail, I will follow Shadwell’s example to point out the broad 
differences of each approach. One was an arithmetic series, where ‘the change of rate 
increased or decreased uniformly by a given quantity from day to day … adopted by Flinders, 
King, Owen and others’.40 The second considered the ‘increment or decrement of rate to flow 
on uniformly by the area of a right-angled triangle, whose base represented the time elapsed, 
 
38 John Lort Stokes, General Notebook, probably begun circa 1830. NMM, STK26/1 
39 John Lewis Tiarks, ‘Dr. Tiarks’s Report on Captain Foster’s Chronometrical Observations’, in: 
Narrative of a Voyage to the southern Atlantic Ocean in the Years 1828, 29, 30, Performed in H. M. 
Sloop Chanticleer, Volume II, W. H. B. Webster, (London: Richard Bentley, 1834), p. 228  
40 Charles F. A. Shadwell, Notes on the Management of Chronometers and the Measurement of 
Meridian Distances, (London; J. D. Potter, 1861), p. 151 
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and altitude the observed change of rate’.41 This latter was applied by Fitzroy, Tiarks and 
Bayfield. In the use of meridian distances, astronomical ability, it seems, was replaced by 
mathematical functions. Examples of the formulae discussed by Shadwell for assigning 
correct rates to chronometers go further than those suggested by Tiarks and discussed by 
Stokes. If a run included multiple measurements of meridian distances (without stopping to 





If corrections for temperature were also to be taken into account, then the following would 
apply:43 
 
41 Shadwell, Notes on the Management of Chronometers, p. 151 
42 Ibid, pp. 157-158 






The best chronometers were those that did not alter too much in their rates and the 
rate book helped officers identify those chronometers. Stokes wrote to an unknown 
recipient, whom he had promised to send ‘a short account of the best chronometers’.44 
Although he believed ‘others’ would be better placed to judge, he considered the three best 
chronometers on board to be Molyneux 971, Murray 584 and French 4214. He advised his 
correspondent to look over the rate book in Fitzroy’s possession. During the two and a half 
months stay at Valparaiso in 1834, ‘Molyneux and Murray did not alter their rates more than 
the 1/10 of a second’.45  
 
44 John Lort Stokes, ‘Remarks on chronometers and sailing directions’. NMM, STK/31/4 




Figure 6.13: Column headings in the Beagle’s Rate Book. UKHO, OD821 
The second difference was meant to indicate whether or not the chronometer varied much 
in its going (figure 6.13). This was what Stokes referred to in his letter when he suggested an 
examination of the rate book so the recipient might see for themselves his justification for 
this. Because this data is hard to read, I have produced a visualisation to make it easier to 
examine. Figures 6.14 and 6.15 depict in a graph the data taken from the column ‘second 
difference’ in the Beagle’s rate book between December 1828 and February 1829. The 
chronometers Stokes considered best can be found in figure 6.15. Chronometer ‘R’ was 
Murray 584 and chronometer ‘N’ was Molyneux 971. French 4214 was used as the standard 





Figure 6.14: Chronometer variations between December 1831 and February 1832 on board HMS Beagle, chronometers B – M. UKHO, OD821. The x-axis shows the 




Figure 6.15: Chronometer variations between December 1831 and February 1832 on board HMS Beagle, chronometers N – Y.  UKHO, OD821.The x-axis shows the 
period of comparison, from December 1831 to February 1832. The y-axis shows the rate of the chronometers in seconds fast or slow of the standard.
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These figures show how easily variations could be detected using these tables of 
comparisons and rates. The average temperature and barometric pressure were also 
recorded, but there appears no evidence that this was used to correct for alterations in rate 
(i.e. by knowing how a certain chronometer responded to temperature alterations and 
adjusting the rate accordingly), but rather to determine why a chronometer may have altered 
its rate, and to identify those chronometers that were susceptible to variations in 
temperature and those that were not. 
The only comment concerning the work required to produce these volumes was made 
by Fitzroy: ‘want of room alone prevents my giving the minutest details upon which they 
depend; it would be of little use to give computations without comparison, or comparisons 
without rates, or rates without the calculations and observations on which they depend; or 
any part of these without the whole, which constitutes a mass of figures filling several thick 
folio books. All these, however, will be deposited at the Hydrographic Office’.461What 
happened to all the ‘rough’ manuscript material that would have been produced to fill these 
two hefty volumes of rates and noon comparison is not known. Even the fair comparison 
book kept between 1831 and 1834 has not survived. This comment underlines how 
important those observations, calculations, comparisons and rates (or the ‘mass of figures’) 
were and makes clear that a substantial amount of time was dedicated to this process.  
Early voyages using chronometers for more precise determinations of longitude often 
relied on the appointment of an astronomer to give credibility to the determinations 
produced at sea, and the interaction between the chronometer and the astronomical 
observations was symbiotic and complex. The development of the method of meridian 
distances relying on chronometric measurements between two or more stations relied on a 
complex understanding of mathematics and the various ways in which the alteration of rates 
 
461Fitzroy, Appendix to Volume II, p. 330 
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could be accounted for. Even then, each singular determination of longitude was dependent 
on the manner of interpolation or approximation applied. Although astronomers may not 
have been strictly necessary, advanced astronomical observations on shore were still crucial 
for the method to succeed. This is examined in more detail in Chapter 7.  
 
Data Management  
It was precisely because of the nature of navigation as detailed above that it was important 
for officers to keep track of all observations and measurements. Foster had produced a mass 
of data, and Tiarks had been appointed to examine it after the Chanticleer’s return. During 
the voyage, Foster had already been sorting and organising his data, specifically for later 
examination but also as evidence for his determinations. As is the case for most of the 
voyages covered in this thesis, not all of the documents that were kept at sea have survived. 
Despite this, the Chanticleer’s documents are the most comprehensive and allow us to 
understand the importance of managing all the observational data, comparison and rate 
books, calculations and corrections. Although far from complete, Foster’s reports sent during 
the Chanticleer’s voyage to Beaufort reveal how the data collected in the comparison and 
rate books related to the wider aims of determining meridian distances. A significant part of 
this came down to observing, noting, collating, examining and managing data.  
All observations were taken on land and the results fed back into the chronometer 
data. The method of meridian distances was the same as that used by Tiarks and was 
comparatively simple. The chronometers were kept on board ship and not moved from their 
positions except during winding and the noon comparison. Foster was to sail from station to 
station: upon arrival and at pre-departure, he was to establish the error and rate of the 
standard chronometer by Equal Altitudes. As short a run as possible was made between two 
stations, as the accuracy of the chronometers was believed to decrease over longer 
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intervals.472Pre-departure, the error of the chronometer on the Mean Time at the place was 
determined by either Equal or Absolute Altitudes of the Sun. When the error was determined 
over consecutive days, a rate was calculated and applied to the next run of the journey. 
During the run, the daily noon comparison was kept to check the function of each 
chronometer. Compiled into a table, Foster used this data to select which chronometers he 
thought reliable to use for the meridian distance. The function of this noon table was two-
fold: it allowed Foster to check the function of each chronometer over time, but it also noted 
the exact difference between each chronometer and the standard at noon each day. Because 
of this, the noon tables of comparison were one of the most important parts of this practice. 
Without these, each chronometer would need to be rated separately. From this table the 
relevant information could easily be extracted. The data could also be readily recalculated if 
they found the longitude used to establish one meridian distance changed. 
We return here to the importance of a hierarchy of instruments. Foster defined three 
different uses for his chronometers: one chronometer (assuming a pocket chronometer) for 
timing observations on deck. Another chronometer, one with the steadiest and smallest rate, 
was employed as a standard, being the one instrument that was compared to the 
chronometer used during observations and the chronometer against which all the others 
were compared. All the other chronometers would average out instrumental errors. 
Chronometers that were used on deck or on shore to time observations were often, but not 
always, excluded from this average, as this could depend on the performance of the 
chronometer. The performance was judged by comparing it to the other chronometers 
through examining the table of daily comparison. Reliability, rather than maker or to which 
 
472Basil Hall to the Admiralty, Edinburgh, 7 April, 1820. TNA, ADM1/1956; Jim Bennett, The Divided 




particular use the chronometer was put to, decided whether a chronometer was considered 
good enough. 
Material held by the Hydrographic Office suggests that Foster kept all his initial 
observations on loose papers (figures 6.16 and 6.17).483Foster then undertook to produce a 
written-up record of this data in a substantial volume of folio size.494Although Foster did 
occasionally note some rough calculations within this volume, most of it contains the results, 
rather than the workings. Foster also wrote up reports for each meridian distance. These are 
kept within the Astronomical Data Books collection held by the Hydrographic Office in 
Taunton. This collection contains ten folders primarily relating to the meridian distances and 
contains determinations of latitude of the temporary observatories.505Many of these reports 
are ‘written up’ versions for a particular station, although some folders contain ‘rougher’ 
versions of the same. It becomes clear when viewing these documents that although the 
method of meridian distances was modelled upon Tiarks’ voyage, Foster nevertheless 
experimented when it came to managing the data. This is most apparent in the tables that 
Foster constructed based on the information considered important to the process. In his 
initial drafts, Foster sorted this information into at least seven tables; in others he divided 
five tables into different parts. He later settled on the latter approach. 
 
483Astronomical Observations, HMS Chanticleer, Deception Island, 1829. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/6 
494Astronomical Observation Book, HMS Chanticleer, 1828-1831. UKHO, SFD9/12/2 
505HMS Chanticleer Astronomical observations. UKHO, OD39 and HMS Chanticleer Remarks and 









Figure 6.17: Observations for the latitude at Decepetion Island. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/8  
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The aim here is not to explain exactly how Foster managed his data, but to emphasise 
the fact that managing data, however done, was crucial to the practice of chronometry. 
Figure 6.16 shows the computation for local time taken at Santa Cruz. Foster observed 
altitudes of the Sun timed by McCabe 167 and the subsequent calculation for its error on the 
Mean Time at Santa Cruz. As McCabe 167 was the standard, it is likely that this document 
was compiled from another where the timings were made by one of the pocket 
chronometers (P&F 699 or 799), as these were consistently used for shore observations. 
Whether or not this is the case, this particular calculation shows the work that is not included 
in Foster’s folio book, nor in the tables constructed from that. Figure 6.17 contains the 
computations for determining the latitude at Deception Island. It is easy to forget the 
importance of latitude, but determining the exact latitude for each spot was just as important 
for establishing the meridian distances between two places.  
To keep track of this data, Foster kept a semi-rough book in which he recorded the 
outcome of the observations made for time and the subsequent determinations for the 
meridian distance. Although Foster did occasionally note some rough calculations, the 
majority of this document contains the results, rather than the workings. Based on this 
document, Foster compiled tables in which he organised what he considered necessary for 
determining a meridian distance. The meridian distance between Falmouth and Funchal will 
be taken as an example.  
The first rates used on the journey were determined at Pendennis Castle, Falmouth. 
Foster obtained McCabe 167’s error on the Mean Time at Falmouth through twenty-six 
observations of the sun’s lower limb. These results were compared and adjusted using 
0o20’10”85 West as the longitude of Pendennis Castle, as determined by Tiarks’ meridian 
distances in 1822, to give the error of McCabe 167 on Mean Time Greenwich at midnight on 
1 May. Using the table of comparison, Foster obtained the error for each chronometer. The 
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rate assigned to each chronometer was the difference between the error at Greenwich and 
the error at Falmouth divided by the number of days elapsed between the two stations. 
Comparing the error on Mean Time Greenwich determined in March with that determined 
on 1 May gave the difference during an interval of 36.5 days and subsequently a daily rate 
for that period. Foster used these rates to establish the meridian distance between Falmouth 
and Funchal.  
On arriving at Funchal, Foster took Equal Altitudes on 12, 14 and 17 May 1828 to 
determine new rates. He took those in the Consul’s garden at Funchal, in exactly the same 
spot as Tiarks had done six years earlier, to allow direct comparison between their two 
results. Foster made three calculations for the meridian distance between Falmouth and 
Madeira: the first using the rates determined at Falmouth, the second using the rates 
determined at Madeira, and the third using the mean of the two rates. By comparing the 
results of these three computations, Foster noted that ‘the results of the chronometers 699, 
799, 620 and 838 differ very considerably from each other, as well as from the mean result 
of all the rest’. P&F 699 and 799 were used to time the observations on shore in England and 
Madeira, which may have ‘deranged’ their rates, and, using the noon comparison table, 
Foster determined that the change in rates for the other two had occurred during the voyage 
between England and Madeira. The meridian distance was thus calculated without these 









The data thus selected and recorded for this meridian distance between Falmouth and 
Funchal in Foster’s folio book contained the following:  
• An overview of the errors of the chronometers at Falmouth on, 1 May and a list of 
the chronometers delivered to the Royal Observatory in preparation for the voyage.  
• Observations of the Sun’s altitude to determine the time at Falmouth using 699 to 
time the observations and McCabe 167 as the standard chronometer. 
• Observations of the Sun’s altitude to determine the time at Funchal 12 May using 
799 to time the observations and McCabe 167 as the standard chronometer.   
• Calculations to determine the correction for the Equation of Equal Altitudes. 
• Computations of the errors of the chronometers at Greenwich and Falmouth, by 
comparison to the standard McCabe 167. 
• Determination of the meridian distance between Falmouth and Funchal using the 
rates determined at Falmouth. 
• Abstract of the above. 
• Determination of the meridian distance between Falmouth and Funchal using the 
mean of the rates determined in England and Madeira. 
• Abstract of the above. Additional computations for a meridian distance whereby 
chronometers 699, 799 and 838 were rejected from the mean and another 
computation whereby 838, 799, 699 and 620 were rejected from the mean. Included 
is an overview of similar determinations by other users.  
• Determination of the meridian distance between Falmouth and Funchal using the 
rates determined at Madeira. 
• Abstract of the above and the determination of the meridian distance using an 
average of the rates determined at Falmouth and Madeira.  
• Comparison between the standard McCabe 167 and P&F 799 previous and 
subsequent to the observations on the 12 of May. Comparison between the standard 
McCabe 167 and all the other chronometers. 
• Observations of the Sun’s altitude to determine the time at Funchal May 12, 14 and 
17 using P&F 799 to time the observations and McCabe 167 as the standard 
chronometer.  
• Errors of the chronometers on Mean Time at Madeira based on the observations 
made on the 12, 14 and 17 May (Table IV).  
• Above continued and a table showing the daily rates of the chronometers on Mean 
Time by the observations taken at Funchal.  
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Foster created an abstract of the above which, whenever he had the chance, he sent to 
Beaufort. Each abstract contains the same documents, based on the observation book 
described above, and together they give an overview of the steps taken. The following pages 
contain images of each table and an explanation of their use (figures 6.26 – 6.38). They can 
be summarised as follows: 
1. A list of chronometers and their error on the Mean Time at the place and the rates 
that were established. 
2. The daily noon comparison of each chronometer against the standard. 
3. Observations of Equal Altitudes taken to determine the error of the local Mean Time 
at the next station. 
4. New rates determined at the next station based on the observations taken there, 
calculated for each chronometer using the daily comparison. 
5. The meridian distance between the two stations, computed using the old rates, new 
rates and the mean of the rates. 
A brief description of these tables follows. Table 1 contained a list of the chronometers 
supplied to the Chanticleer (figure 6.18). There are only two examples of these tables; this 
one, drawn up by Foster on departure and a second, drawn up by Lieutenant Austin, acting 




Figure 6.18: List of chronometers delivered to HMS Chanticleer in March 1828. UKHO, AO32: 
SFD7/7/1/7 
Table 2 was kept consistently during the voyage and contained the daily noon comparison of 
each chronometer against the standard (figure 6.19). The documents from which this table 
was constructed do not survive, but there would have been a manuscript noting the daily 




Figure 6.19: ‘Table N. 2 Shewing the Errors of each Chronometer on Standard, every day at noon, from 21st April to the 17th May 1828’. UKHO, AO32:  SFD7/7/1/7   
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Each chronometer is listed in this table, except the standard McCabe 167, against which 
Foster compared these chronometers. Figure 6.20 is a close-up of one section.  
 
Figure 6.20: Detail of the daily errors. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7   
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The first column in figure 6.20, which is headed by the chronometer number, is the amount 
of time fast or slow of the standard. The second column, the daily difference, is the difference 
between two daily comparisons. Fitzroy’s rate book (described in detail in Chapter 7) 
followed the same format.  
Figure 6.21 allows us to have a visual understanding of how Foster used these tables 
of daily differences to select which chronometers to include in determining meridian 
distances. The data was taken from the second column of Table 2, which thus shows the daily 
change in rates for each chronometer. The above example is based on the rates determined 
from 21 April to 8 August 1828. The lines indicated in blue represent the chronometers which 
Foster chose to include in the measurement of the meridian distance; chronometers P&F 699 
(green), 799 (yellow), 838 (red) and Murray 620 (purple) were excluded due to the 
irregularity of their rates. While it is clear why Foster decided these four chronometers were 
not regular enough, Murray 555 and P&F 543 also evidenced alterations in rate but were 






Figure 6.21: Chronometer variations between April and August 1828 on board HMS Chanticleer. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7. The x-axis is the period from 21 April to 8 
August, 1828; the Y-axis shows the error of the chronometer in seconds compared to the standard.    
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In Table 3 (figure 6.22), Foster noted the times of the observed altitudes of the Sun’s lower 
limb (corrected for refraction, parallax and index error) from the morning and evening 
observations by pocket chronometer P&F 799. He then noted in the next column the times 
by the standard McCabe 167 by comparison. The mean of these two times (morning and 
afternoon) was noted in the next column and corrected for the Equation of Equal Altitudes. 
This led to the time of apparent noon by McCabe 167 for each double altitude. Foster 
observed a total of 37 sets of observations on 12 May, spending a total of one hour and 
twenty minutes on taking the observations; then, more time was needed to compute them. 
Table 3 continues on the next page, containing the same observations and calculations for 
14 and 17 May.  As can be seen, it was not always possible to take 37 observations and on 17 
May, Foster had to make do with eight sets. 
Foster determined the Mean Time of apparent noon for each day of observations and 
compared this to the Mean Time of apparent noon by McCabe 167. The resulting difference 
was the error of McCabe 167 on the Mean Time at Madeira (figure 6.23). All this data was 
copied directly from Foster’s observation folio book.511 
 




Figure 6.22: Detail of Table 3. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7  
 





Figure 6.24: Abstracts of the Equal Altitudes taken to establish the error of McCabe 167 at Funchal on 




Figure 6.25: Abstracts of the Equal Altitudes taken to establish the error of McCabe 167 at Funchal on 




Figure 6.26: ‘Table No. 4 Shewing the Daily rates of the Chronometers as deduced from the difference of their errors on Mean Time at Greenwich 26th March 1828 and 








Figure 6.28: ‘Shewing the Chronometrical Difference of Longitude, between Falmouth and Funchal, as ascertained 1st, by the Falmouth Rates for the Chronometers, 
2ndly by the Madeira Rates, and 3rdly by a mean of the Falmouth and Madeira Rates respectively’. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7 
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Table 4 shows the rates based on the calculations made at Greenwich and Falmouth 
(figure 6.26). Table 4 part 2 (figure 6.27) shows the rates based on the astronomical 
observations made at Funchal, as abstracted in Table 3. Table 4 part 2 also continued contains 
the rates based on the determinations at Greenwich, Falmouth and Funchal. These tables 
thus show how Foster determined the rates based on the observations made on shore at 
these three places. Using the table of comparison, Foster was able, by comparison with the 
standard, to determine a rate for each of the chronometers. Finally, in Table 5, Foster 
established a meridian distance, based on the abstracted data detailed above (figure 6.28).   
The data that Foster sorted and organised in this way was important for two reasons. 
It was ‘data in comparable, numerical form’, which followed the growing trend of scientific 
pursuit of the nineteenth century.521This data was useful to others. It could be analysed, 
compared, adjusted and transferred to support other scientific pursuits. It also proved that 
the chronometric measurements had been performed adequately by the officers of the 
voyage. Astronomical observations could not be redone, and so trust in the abilities of the 
officers performing these observations remained essential. By organising and tabulating the 
calculations and corrections resulting from these observations, they could be examined and 
corrected if necessary. It was common for the officer of the voyage to perform this duty 
himself. Captain Owen and Lt. James Badgley spent sixteen days at Owen’s residence 
examining and recalculating the observations made during the voyage.532Following Foster’s 
death, Tiarks examined Foster’s data. Tiarks corrected some errors that Foster had made in 
his calculations, errors that Foster would have detected himself. But Tiarks also modified the 
data by using different rates from Foster. He found fault with the rates Foster had 
determined at Falmouth, and therefore discarded those completely. Instead, rather than 
 
521Godlewska, ‘From Enlightenment Vision to Modern Science? Humboldt’s Visual Thinking’, p. 245 




calculating the meridian distance between Falmouth and Madeira using the mean rates as 
had Foster, Tiarks used only the rates determined at Madeira. This data mattered: it could 
be moulded to support an outcome. As Tiarks illustrated: ‘with a view to examine the 
correctness of Captain Foster’s calculations, and at the same time to see whether more 
accordant results could be adduced, I have tried other rates, generally those nearest to the 
observations on which the longitudes depend’.543Numerical data was not objective 
knowledge. It was, initially, shaped by those who produced it and, later, moulded by those 
who would use it.  
 








For each meridian distance, Foster constructed handwritten reports, although not all 
survive. They all have the same basic information. Figure 6.29 is the title page of a report on 
the meridian distance between Trinidad and La Guayra. The place of observation is detailed 
in a small survey for the benefit of future observations at the same spot. As each report is 
similar, the text from this particular document will serve as an example:  
the observations for rating the chronometer previous to sailing for La Guayra were 
made on the transit of stars on the 28th of November, 2nd and 5th of December near 
to the Protestant Church and observations by equal altitudes of the Sun, in Fort St. 
David’s on the 7th of December, observations for the chronometer were made on the 
Sun in the Fort near the wooden Jetty La Guayra on the 13th & 15th of Dec. The mean 
of rates determined by the above observations places the Fort near to the wooden 
Jetty La Guayra, 21o40’24” west of Fort St. David’s Trinidad, and 4h27m22s6 or 
66o49’1” west of Greenwich by the determined chronometric longitude of Fernando 
de Noronha in 1828.554  
 
 
Figure 6.30: Detailed survey of the place of observation at La Guayra, HMS Chanticleer 1830. UKHO, 
AO32: SFD7/7/1/2  
 
554Astronomical Observations. Foster’s Observations. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/2 
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Many of these reports refer the reader to the tables in which the abstracted data can be 
found, and some reports include the latitude and the variation of the compass, but not all. 
The determination of the above longitude was based on the mean of nine chronometers. 
Foster excluded four instruments that varied too much from the mean.  
What is more apparent in these reports is the importance of place. The place of 
practice was the actual geometrical location, where no ‘two things can be in the same place 
at the same time’, in this case the wooden jetty in La Guayra (figure 6.30).565This was a 
specific place: only here was longitude 66o49’1” west of Greenwich. But it was also a specific 
site of practice, or a ‘practiced place’, where rituals and practices were defined by users of 
that space.576At La Guayra, Foster reconstructed observatory practices, creating ‘a 
knowledge space that transcended the boundaries of the observatory’.587The exact spot of 
observations was given in a detailed survey, since, it was important that other observers 
could locate it for use in their own observations, or at least, refer to this precise spot. This 
would also help those working in the Hydrographic Office coordinate the charts and surveys 
the Office received. Longitude determinations would never yield the same results, but this 
allowed data to be integrated into relative positions of longitude. Sabine pointed this out in 
1825: ‘The revised tables should contain an additional column to those in the tables at 
present esteemed as of the best authority, for the purpose of specifying the spot to which 
the geographical position refers; without such specification, it is quite superfluous to insert 
the data, as is now done; to seconds of space. The spots should also be selected, as far as 
might be possible, with reference to their conveniency [sic] of access, with instruments, from 
 
565Charles W. J. Withers and David N. Livingstone, ‘Introduction: on Geography and Enlightenment’, 
in: Geography and Enlightenment, David N. Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers, eds. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 7 




vessels in the harbour’.598This did not always work as planned. Fitzroy, when arriving at 
Fernando Noronha to take observations for the chronometers, found it ‘difficult to ascertain 
the house in which his pendulum observations were made. Not even the Governor could tell 
me, for he had arrived since Captain Foster’s departure’.609The same difficulties were 
experienced during the ‘Trigonometrical Operations’ which intended to measure the 
difference of longitude between Greenwich and Paris in 1821 where the exact spots used for 
previous measurements could not be determined.6110  
These spots were crucial for calibration. They underpinned the theory on the use of 
time balls and could provide significant benefits for general navigation. This was because a 
fixed point of latitude and longitude determined for these spots meant that navigators could 
directly determine the error of the chronometer on local time by directly comparing the 
longitude as given by the chronometer to that as determined on land. The difference 
between the two was all that was required to calibrate the instrument. Navigators spending 
a week at anchor could also determine their rates with a minimal requirement of 
astronomical observations. All that was needed was a set of Equal Altitudes to determine the 
error of the chronometer at the Mean Time of the place on arrival and at departure. As the 
longitude of the place was known, the error of the chronometer could be readily established. 
Time balls simplified this process by eliminating the need for observing Equal Altitudes. 
Instead, officers would observe the drop of the ball.  
  
 
598Edward Sabine, An Account of Experiments to Determine the Figure of the Earth by means of the 
Pendulum Vibrating Seconds in Different Latitudes, (London: John Murray, 1825), pp. 401-402 
609Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyage, p. 59 
6110Charles W. J. Withers, Zero Degrees, Geographies of the Prime Meridian, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 110 
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As a final report, these documents provided what was considered the key information 
concerning a meridian distance. The place of observation was given particular attention, as 
anybody wishing to use this determination for their own navigation would need to observe 
either in the same spot, or be able to refer, via triangulation, to that particular spot. Equally 
important was how and when rates of the chronometers had been determined at the 
previous station and current station and that the mean of the two had been used for the 
calculation. What was not included is which chronometer timed the observations, which was 
used as the standard, and which had been chosen to determine the mean result.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that chronometer use on Royal Navy vessels did not significantly 
transform navigational practices during the first decades of the nineteenth century. As 
longitude was constructed from a variety of observations, reductions, tables, instruments 
and mathematical functions, it was never made ‘on the spot’, but rather constructed from a 
distance. As such, a position of longitude by chronometer cannot be seen in isolation from 
lunar observations, dead reckoning, surveying and triangulation. The calculation of longitude 
was a time-consuming process, as officers were required to keep track of the data taken from 
chronometers in order that it could be analysed, corrected and formatted at a later date. 
Error analysis was an important part of this practice, and one that varied between users.  
While at sea, the comparison tables, combined with shore-based astronomical 
observations, helped officers select those chronometers they considered the most reliable. 
Data management played an important part in this selection. As Hall pointed out, it also 
played a role in regulating the behaviour of officers: neatly tabulated data revealed the 
character of the officer. In relation to observatory practices, George Airy neatly summarised 
the importance of data management: 
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In England, an observer conceives that he has done everything when he has made an 
observation. He thinks that the merely noting the passage of a star over one wire and 
its bisection by another, is all that can be expected from him; and that the use of a 
Table of logarithms, or anything beyond the very first stage of reduction, ought to be 
left to others. In the foreign observatories, on the contrary, and observation is 
considered as a lump of ore, requiring for its production, when the proper machinery 
is provided, nothing more than the commonest labour, and without value till it has 
been smelted. In them, the exhibition of results and the comparison of results with 
theory, are considered as deserving much more of an astronomer’s attention, and 
demanding greater exercise of his intellect, than the mere observation of a body on 
the wire of a telescope.6211 
 
Observatory practices were never far removed from chronometer use at sea. In this 
case, Airy’s point about reducing and comparing the data is especially relevant, as it was 
critical for chronometers at sea. In terms of observing on distant shores, however, this was a 
crucial and perhaps the most difficult part of establishing what we might think of as a 
‘chronometric regimen of practice’ across the Royal Navy. If the longitude of a place was 
lacking, or incorrect, as was often the case in the early nineteenth century, local observations 
were the only means to establish the rate and error of the chronometers and played a critical 
role in calibrating the instruments. The aims of Fitzroy’s, Foster’s and similar voyages 
measuring meridian distances was to establish the positions of these ports in order to 
improve navigation. To accomplish this, agreement had to be reached between the varying 
results of many observations. The following chapter explores how these agreements were 
negotiated.  
 
6211George Airy, ‘Report on the Progress of Astronomy during the Present Century’, Report of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2, (1832), quoted in: The London and Edinburgh 








It happens in every profession, but probably more in the navy than in any other, that 
intelligent, active, practical men, are perpetually discovering something new, which 
may be rendered useful to the whole profession, if properly diffused.1 
 
Introduction 
For Captain Basil Hall whose work and words I have examined in previous chapters, diffusion 
of knowledge was just as important as regulation and discipline. Hall was of the view that 
useful discoveries at sea were entirely lost to the public. Practical men might meet at sea, 
‘their mutual communications are of the highest service to one another’, but the exchange 
ended there. The ‘numberless Philosophical Journals … are not in the hands of those whom 
it is intended to benefit’. ‘Equally ineffectual’, he continued, ‘is the plan of directing officers 
to send their “Remarks” to the Admiralty’ because ‘[as] long as the nautical reports of officers 
are allowed to lie neglected in the Hydrographical Office, we may be quite sure that nothing 
at all comparable to what might be, ever will be produced’. Hall thought this an evil that 
needed to be remedied because ‘[such] neglect infallibly chills the most zealous enthusiasm’, 
and prevented individuals from sharing their knowledge and others from obtaining it. 
Without proper dissemination, the ‘immense mass of interesting & important knowledge’ 
was ‘wasted’.2 Each chapter of this thesis has opened with an epigraph by Hall, who, as I have 
shown, lobbied for the standardisation of navigational practices at sea in the 1820s. This 
 




chapter shows that Henry Raper (1799-1859) was also pivotal in attempts to standardise 
navigational practices involving chronometers from the late 1830s.  
Raper’s Practice of Navigation and Nautical Astronomy first appeared in 1840 and was 
a standard work on navigation until 1920 when the twenty-first and final edition was 
published. For this work, Raper received the Gold Medal from the Royal Geographical 
Society. The East India Company and the Admiralty issued copies of his Practice to their ships. 
Raper’s authority on navigation resulted from his own naval experience. After serving with 
his father, Admiral Henry Raper, he studied at the Royal Naval College from 1812 to 1814, 
passing with distinction and earning the silver medal for proficiency in mathematics. Raper’s 
determination to improve navigation may have been influenced by his experience on board 
HMS Alceste, which struck a reef during an expedition on which he served as a midshipman. 
During the voyage, Captain Murray Maxwell found that the charts of Western Korea had 
erroneously placed the reef 130 miles farther east. Serving later under surveyor and 
astronomer William Henry Smyth in the Mediterranean, Raper was put in charge of the 
chronometers, where he ‘had exceptional opportunities for the scientific study of navigation, 
nautical astronomy, and surveying’.3 Raper would become an authority on navigation and 
took up Hall’s calls to regulate and discipline the use of chronometers at sea. In Raper’s view, 
the ‘ultimate perfection of hydrography demands very different proceedings from those 
which have sufficed to collect together the first rough materials of the outline, and can 
evidently be effected solely by the chronometric measurement of small distances, finally 
depending upon certain points determined by unimpugnable astronomical observations’.4  
 
3 J. K. Laughton, revised by Derek Howse, ‘Henry Raper (1799-1859)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, (online ed.), Oxford University Press. Last accessed 17 September, 2020: https://doi-
org.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/10.1093/ref:odnb/23144 




 The work of Hall and Raper provides the focus to this chapter. Building upon the 
evidence of chapter 6, the chapter looks at how data collected at sea was analysed and 
processed and subsequently communicated to users. The rate and comparison books 
recorded only the ‘raw’ data produced by chronometers. Useful knowledge followed from 
processing this data, which primarily involved determining the rate and error of each 
chronometer, from which points of longitude were deduced. Officers were familiar with the 
instruction in navigation manuals to ‘find the Errors and Rates of Chronometers’, but a rate 
or error was not easily ‘found’.5 Rather, it was the result of complex judgments about 
something which was never constant: always negotiated, never found.  
This chapter shows that the study of chronometric longitudes needs to be taken 
further than just the determination of rate and error in order to understand how individual 
determinations interacted and to what effect. A focus on the voyage may show how 
determinations were negotiated in the field (see also chapter 6), but misses the interplay 
between the various outcomes of the voyage and how consensus was reached based on data 
that accumulated in the Hydrographic Office. This data was first collected on board ship, 
where an agreement was required between the instruments and methods used. With the 
increase in the number of scientific and surveying voyages came an increase in the number 
of determinations that required evaluation. Each new voyage carried determinations 
produced by previous expeditions. Encounters between servicemen during these expeditions 
led to exchanges of nautical knowledge and to additional data which was incorporated with 
those already in their possession and with that produced on the voyage. Of the two methods 
(astronomical and chronometrical), neither could give the absolute longitude at sea, ‘for no 
astronomical observations taken at sea can be implicitly depended upon within at least one 
 
5 Edward Riddle, Treatise on Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 
1824), p. vii 
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minute, and the chronometer, in consequence of not preserving exactly the same rate, 
ceases, after some days, to afford the true longitude of the ship. Since, therefore, the 
absolute longitude of the ship herself cannot be determined with certainty, the knowledge 
of the precise longitude of any position, as a rock, or a shoal, which she may be near, is but 
of little service’.6 Basically, whether making absolute astronomical observations of longitude 
on shore or measuring relative chronometrical differences of longitude by ship, no two 
measurements would ever agree. This meant, Raper continued, ‘the whole mass of positions 
is kept in a state of perpetual fluctuation, from which it is impossible that universal precision 
can ever be obtained’.7 Every data set that the Hydrographic Office received was slightly 
different from those previously gathered there. Absolute universal precision may not have 
been attainable, but by analysing the accumulated data, agreement could be achieved.  
This chapter looks at how these different data sets were constructed, compared, 
evaluated, and agreed upon. To be of any use, local determinations had to be analysed and 
used to support global navigational science. This could only be done by reaching agreement 
because, as Raper pointed out, no two determinations of longitude were ever the same. 
Accuracy ‘was always a relative achievement’.8  
The first section explores the important relationship between the ship and the shore. 
I show how longitude determinations made by previous expeditions helped officers judge 
the reliability of their own practices. This could be done by evaluating how the information 
gathered by users ‘retain(ed) integrity across time, space, and local contingencies’.9 Trust in 
 
6 Henry Raper, The Practice of Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, (London: J. D. Potter, 1842), sixth 
edition, p. 378 
7 Raper, The Practice of Navigation, sixth edition, p. 379 
8 Charles W. J. Withers, Zero Degrees, Geographies of the Prime Meridian, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 114 
9 Joan H. Fujimura, ‘Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and “Translation”’, in: 
Science as Practice and Culture, Andrew Pickering, ed. (Chicago and London, University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), p. 172 
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the measurements became linked to the user’s ability to protect the instruments against the 
vagaries of the voyage, the method of calculating the rate and error, the ability to detect and 
exclude unreliable instruments, and ultimately, the agreement of their outcomes with those 
of others. In chapter 5 I showed how users adhered to hierarchies of instruments, where 
some were trusted more than others. Here I show how different users’ perception of the 
reliability of their instruments in relation to other methods of determining longitude affected 
their practices. That shore-based astronomical observations provided a check on the 
chronometers is well known, but the extent to which they were considered necessary was a 
matter of personal judgement.  
The second section looks at the shore as a ‘place of knowledge’, a field-site and a truth-
spot. The example taken, Deception Island (an island in the South Shetland Islands, close to 
the Antarctic Peninsula, which was a whaling station in the nineteenth century), where Foster 
spent nearly two months making astronomical observations, was remote and the weather 
unfavourable. Replicating observatory practices in these conditions was challenging and only 
a few individuals had access to the resources required to do so. Being in the field 
demonstrated ‘the inescapability of variation and improvisation, even in those that were 
following instruction’.10 The remoteness of the location led to variation through operational 
variance, as did the ‘independence of those who worked at a distance’.11 Despite this, the 
remoteness of the field-site also led to observers there gaining authority: ‘being there’, as 
Gieryn wrote, ‘becomes an essential part of claiming authority for an observation or 
discovery’.12 It was the immersive nature of the field that allowed this to happen, as field 
scientists developed ‘embodied ways of feeling, seeing, and understanding’, experiences that 
 
10 Sophie Waring, Thomas Young, the Board of Longitude and the Age of Reform, Unpublished PhD, 
University of Cambridge, (2014), p. 121 
11 Ibid, p. 121 
12 Thomas F. Gieryn, ‘City as Truth-Spot: Laboratories and Field-Sites in Urban Studies’, Social Studies 
of Science, 36, (2006), p. 6 
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others elsewhere did not.13 Based on precision instruments and instructions supplied by the 
Board of Longitude and the Royal Society, the knowledge produced here transcended the 
contamination of place by establishing and maintaining credible and repeatable observatory 
practices. Tresch has argued that while instruments could and did respond to their 
environmental circumstances (heat or cold could affect their operation), agreement 
‘between the field instrument and the master instrument, often located in the observatory, 
[fixed] the instrument’s action within a defined range of values, providing the shared and 
stable background needed to make local difference communicable’.14 The field site thus also 
followed the standardised practices and disciplines of the observatory.  
Astronomical observations determined the longitude on shore; chronometrical 
longitudes would connect these to other places. The astronomical observations on shore also 
served to calibrate the chronometers. This seemingly straightforward affair, a distance 
measured chronometrically with a large number of instruments, still did not guarantee a 
definitive and reliable outcome. Instruments were made to agree by their operators including 
and excluding specific results, and by selectively applying rates and errors that would best 
reflect the desired agreement between instruments. How this should be done could and did 
differ between users. By examining two meridian distances measured on the voyage of the 
Chanticleer, I show how measurements depended on different criteria and how individuals 
could interpret the same data differently.  
The final section examines how these determinations were accumulated and 
interpreted after the voyage, and how they fed into new determinations of voyages setting 
out. The trust placed in different methods of measurement is once again important here. 
 
13 Gieryn, ‘City as Truth-Spot’, p. 6 
14 John Tresch, ‘Even the Tools will be Free: Humboldt’s Romantic Technologies’, The Heavens on Earth: 
Observatories and Astronomy in Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg 
and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 271 
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Raper defined absolute positions as those determined astronomically and relative positions 
as those determined chronometrically. Raper believed that these two aspects would lead to 
the ‘ultimate perfection of hydrography’, which would be attained ‘solely by the 
chronometric measurement of small distances, finally depending upon certain points 
determined by unimpugnable astronomical observations’.15 Raper termed these points 
secondary meridians (as only Greenwich or Paris could be considered the zero, or prime 
meridian) which would serve as a ‘regulating meridian of a survey’.16 Raper thus set out to 
establish fixed longitudes for a total of eighteen secondary meridians, based on information 
accumulated at the Hydrographic Office. These were ‘determined nearly enough for present 
purposes’ but would require ‘long series of astronomical observations’ to settle their 
positions.17 In addition to hierarchies of instruments, there was a clear hierarchy in 
technique: only extensive astronomical observations could settle the longitude of Raper’s 
secondary meridians. This section shows how Raper negotiated accuracy from the variety of 
voyages and methods previously employed to determine longitude. Accuracy was not 
achieved solely through precision instruments and standardised practices, but also through 
agreement.  
 
Negotiations between ship and shore 
On 24 May 1819, the crew of the Hecla spotted Rockall, an islet located west of the Outer 
Hebrides. The chronometers had last been rated at Somerset House, on May 7, and Sabine 
used a previous determination of the islet to gauge their accuracy: ‘at 30 minutes past noon 
we saw Rockall, as we expected, but bearing rather further to the Westwd (SW ½ W by comps) 
 
15 Raper, ‘Remarks on the Mode of Determining Longitude’, p. 320 
16 Henry Raper, ‘On the Necessity of Adopting Secondary Meridians’, Nautical Magazine, June, (1839), 
p. 399 
17 Henry Raper, The Practice of Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, (London: R. B. Bate, 1840), p. xi 
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of what our chronrs had given us. Its distance was about 13 miles. As I know from experience 
how excellent an observer Captn Capel is, I consider this as a confirmation of our 
chronometers being a mile or two to the Westwd of the truth’.18 Captain Thomas Bladen 
Capel19 had determined the position of Rockall in 1810, by the mean of sixteen lunar 
observations taken in July and August and by the mean of three chronometers.20 Sabine 
placed more trust in Capel as an observer than the six chronometers they carried (‘an 
excellent & superior assortment’ according to Parry), which had been rated only two weeks 
previously for a duration of five weeks.21  
 
Figure 7.1: Rockall, depicted in John Purdy’s Memoir, 1825.  
 
 
18 HECLA: Journal with Appendix kept by W E Parry TNA ADM55/157/1 24 May 1819  
19 Captain Thomas Bladen Capel of HMS Endymion (1776-1863). Capel had a distinguished naval career 
after serving as an officer during the French Revolutionary War, the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 
1812. Basil Hall accompanied this expedition on board HMS Endymion as a lieutenant.  
20 John Purdy, Memoir, Descriptive and Explanatory, to Accompany the New Chart of the Atlantic 
Ocean, and Comprising Instructions, General and Particular, for the Navigation of that Sea, (London: 
R. H. Laurie, 1825), p. 241 




For the purpose of navigation, however, this close encounter between observations was 
‘striking proof of the infinite value of chronometers at sea, [that] the certainty with which a 
ship may sail directly for a single rock like this, rising like a speck out of the ocean, and at the 
distance of forty-seven leagues from any other land’.22 This enthusiasm must be tempered, 
however, with the fact that ‘single rocks’ required accurate charting before one could sail 
directly towards their destination. While navigating safely with chronometers was one thing, 
accurately charting a ‘rising speck out of the ocean’ was another, and required more than 
just a good chronometer.  
As the journey continued, lunar observations were made to check the reliability of the 
chronometric determinations. These were taken in June and August and Sabine gave each 
chronometer a new rate based on the calculations. Sabine confirmed the validity of these 
rates when the ships reached their winter station. In September that year, at Melville Island, 
the ships were secured for the winter and Sabine compared the chronometrical longitude 
with the ‘true longitude’, this being a point determined by 6862 lunar observations and 
connected by a survey.23 He concluded that ‘the error of the chronometrical longitude … 
proved in distance less than a geographical mile; an amount so trivial’ that it needed no 
‘further consideration’ and that the rates ‘at the expiration of four months, had produced so 
very close an accordance with the result of so great a number of lunar observations, were 
judged to require no further correction’.24 In the period between May and September, from 
departure to the arrival at Melville Island, two checks were thus carried out for the 
chronometers.  
 
22 William Edward Parry, Journal of a Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific; Performed in the years 1819-20, in His Majesty’s Ships Hecla and Griper (London: 
John Murray, 1821) p. 4 
23 Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, Appendix, p. vi 
24 Ibid, pp. vi-vii 
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In the first instance, Captain Capel’s observational skills outweighed the careful rating 
of the instruments at Henry Browne’s house in London. This was because Sabine anticipated 
an alteration in the rates of the chronometers following departure from London. Secondly, 
the chronometrical longitude that Sabine referred to had been established using rates 
determined by lunars taken at sea in June and August. This corrected longitude was 
compared to that determined by 6,862 lunar observations taken on shore at Winter Harbour, 
and so was considered good enough. Here, the volume of data served to confirm the 
observations made.  
Sabine’s faith in the chronometers could only be confirmed by lunar observations, as 
these verified the accuracy of the determined longitudes. This can be seen in the minutes of 
a meeting between the Board of Longitude and officers from the voyage on 27 November 
1820. In September 1819, the Hecla and Griper had sailed beyond 110o west within the Arctic 
Circle and so, according to the 1818 Longitude Act, were entitled to a reward of £5000.25 At 
the meeting were Parry, Sabine, Liddon and Hoppner to ‘prove their claim to the said reward’. 
The Board wanted to know, amongst other details, which longitude was reached and how 
this was established. Liddon specified a longitude of 113° 46’15” ‘by the mean of the 
timepieces’. Sabine stated the longitude as ‘certainly beyond 113o’ based on the accurate 
observations taken at Winter Harbour. The longitude at Winter Harbour was ‘110°48’29” by 
the mean of 6,862 lunar observations taken by myself and other officers. The rates of 5 
chronometers were determined by 3 month’s lunar observations, and after 3 month’s they 
agreed with the true time observed at the Calton Hill within less than 3 seconds of time, or 
 
25 ‘A Bill for more effectually discovering the Longitude at Sea, and encouraging attempts to find a 
Northern Passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and to approach the Northern Pole, 9 
March 1818’. Quoted in: Trevor H. Levere, Science and the Canadian Arctic: A Century of Exploration, 
1818-1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 44 
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35” of longitude’.26 Hoppner and Parry both corroborated the determinations but without 
specifying the observations on which they were based.27 From these testimonies, it is clear 
that although the chronometers were used to determine the longitude, the credibility of the 
chronometric results relied on the celestial observations taken on shore: extensive lunar 
observations at Winter Harbour and further observations taken at Calton Hill.  
For Parry and Sabine, the rates determined at sufficient intervals (a maximum of 
twelve weeks was advised) were considered adequate as ‘the error of the chronometrical 
longitude, using the corrected rates ascertained by means of the lunars of June and August, 
proved in distance to be less than a geographical mile; an amount so trivial, that is was not 
deemed necessary to pursue its further consideration; and rates … were judged to require 
no further consideration’.28 On the second voyage, Fisher was more wary as he believed 
magnetism had a pronounced effect on chronometer rates. He was one of a few writers in 
the early nineteenth century to assert that the iron on board a ship influenced the rates of 
chronometers.29 Opinions varied on this. Sabine insisted in the case of magnetism and 
chronometers that the results from Parry’s first voyage proved that ‘a more decisive result in 
the negative [could not] have been obtained’.30 Sabine believed it had ‘been overlooked by 
many whose ingenuity has been exerted in devising contrivances to remedy an evil which has 
no practical existence’.31 Owen also disagreed with Sabine. Firstly, in Owen’s opinion, 
chronometers could not be rated often enough. Secondly, Owen considered lunar 
 
26 Confirmed minutes of the Board of Longitude, 1802-1823. Minutes 27th November, 1820. CUL, RGO 
14/7, f. 2:324 
27 Confirmed minutes of the Board of Longitude, 1802-1823. Minutes 27th November, 1820. CUL, RGO 
14/7, ff. 2:321-330 
28 Parry, Journal of a Voyage 1819-1820, Appendix, pp. vi-vii  
29 Randell C. Brooks, 'Magnetic influence on chronometers, 1798 - 1834: A case study', Annals of 
Science, 44:3, (2006), pp. 245-264 
30 ‘Marine Chronometers, and the Currents of the Ocean’, The Kaleidoscope: or, Literary and Scientific 
Mirror, 6 September, (1825), p. 78 
31 Ibid, p. 78, original emphasis 
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observations obtained at sea unsatisfactory for determining rates. But Owen also pointed 
out that he was not against the lunar method for determining longitude, and that he 
recognised its utility on longer voyages.32 
On the following voyage to find a North-West Passage, Fisher received instruction from 
the Admiralty to ‘keep an accurate register of all the observations that shall be made, 
precisely in the same forms, and according to the same arrangement, that were followed by 
Captain Sabine on the late voyage’.33 Where Sabine was satisfied with the rates corrected by 
lunars in June and August, which were confirmed at Winter Island, Fisher was less convinced 
of the stability of a chronometer’s rate. Guided by his belief in the effects of magnetism on 
chronometers, Fisher applied more checks on the chronometers than his predecessor. Sabine 
applied a correction for the rates of the chronometers by lunar observations, leading to an 
interval in which the same rate was applied over seventeen weeks, from 6 May to 6 
September 1819. At sea, Fisher used lunar observations to rate the chronometers, in intervals 
‘never exceeding twelve weeks’.34 Even though this was a good way to keep a check on the 
chronometers, Fisher believed that ‘the most favourable opportunities’ to determine the 
chronometric error was provided by ‘fixing the meridian of the ships’ at winter quarters and 
through a great number and variety of observations.35 
 
32 Richard Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, in: Tables of Latitude, and 
Longitudes by Chronometer, William Fitzwilliam Owen, (London; Duckworth and Ireland, 1827), p. 33 
33 William Edward Parry, Journal of a Second Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific Performed in the Years 1821-1822-1823, (London: John Murray, 1824), pp. 
xxvii 
34 William Edward Parry, Appendix to Captain Parry’s Second Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West 
Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific, performed in His Majesty’s Ships Fury and Hecla 1821-22-23, 
(London: John Murray, 1825), p. 6   




Figure 7.2: Longitude on 5 June using the mean of three different rates. NMM, FIS/7. 
Fisher took a different approach to Sabine. We can find evidence of this early on in the 
voyage. On June 5, 1821, one month after departure, Fisher readjusted the rates of the 
chronometers twice. He determined the longitude on that day by the mean of three rates: 
those supplied by the makers, by rates determined in the river (probably the Thames), and 
by rates determined at Orkney (figure 7.2). Each determination was given equal weight in the 
calculation. How Fisher determined the rates in the river is unknown, but the rates at Orkney 
seem to have been determined by altitudes taken on shore, although he did not note the 
method, calculation and rates attributed in his observation book. During the passage to 
Hudson Strait, Fisher, like Sabine, also took lunar observations during the summer months to 
rate the chronometers. Based on these observations, the rates were once again corrected. 
Rather than assign a rate for the whole period, Fisher divided the alteration in rate according 
to the fluctuations as shown in the daily comparisons. Fisher therefore corrected for a 
progressive alteration in rate in this way, rather than just using the mean within an interval. 
Both Sabine and Fisher used the comparison tables to check the going of the chronometers, 
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but only Fisher appeared to use them to determine which rate should be allowed. The 
example of chronometers P&F 228 will serve as an example of Fisher’s approach:  
No. 228 certainly took up a much smaller gaining rate immediately after its being put 
on board: about the 18th of May it began to gain still less, by the mean of the five other 
watches, about 1s.3 per day. From the 29th June, it again gained more, by nearly the 
same quantity. The rates allowed are 
26th April till 18th May  +2s.7 
19th May ,, 29th June  +1s.4 
30th June ,, 18th July  +2s.6236 
For the following season of navigation, Fisher divided the period into two intervals, 
one just under four weeks and one of nine weeks. On this occasion, Fisher applied a single 
mean rate to each chronometer for both intervals. This was because he considered the first 
interval a short one. His justification for the second interval was that as in ‘the weekly Table, 
No. V, there appears to have been no material irregularity in the going of the watches upon 
each other, one rate has been applied to each during the second interval’.37 The results given 
by the mean of the chronometers thus varied according to the users and how they decided 
to divide the rates given to each period, which would result in slight variations in the positions 
of longitude measured.  
This returns us to the importance of place and to the geography of science: where a 
longitude determined on shore was seen as more accurate and was a point against which the 
chronometers were checked. But the determination of place varied. Sabine had great faith 
in both chronometers and lunar distances. Fisher was more cautious. Both took numerous 
lunar observations during the winter stop at the observatories they established. But where 
Sabine used only lunar distances to determine the meridian of their winter stop, Fisher also 
observed twelve eclipses of Jupiter’s Satellites. Not all observations were equal. In the 
publication of the second voyage, Parry gave two potential longitudes for the observatory at 
 
36 Parry, Appendix to Captain Parry’s Second Voyage, p. 9 
37 Ibid, p. 15 
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Winter Island, where the ships were stationed during the winter of 1821-22. The longitude 
published on the chart was calculated by ‘considering each eclipse of the same value as one 
set of Lunar Observations’ and gave the result as 83o09’49.6”. The longitude by 944 Lunar 
Observations was 83o10’02.16”, and by 12 eclipses of Jupiter’s Satellites 82o53’21.5”. By 
counting each set of lunar distances equal to one eclipse, the result is closer to the 
observations based on the lunar distances. But another calculation was possible based on 
the mean between the two methods, by not considering one of more value than the other, 
which would put the observatory of Port Bowen in 83o01’41.83”, a difference of 8’07.8” 
degrees of arc, or 8.2 geographical miles. Parry did not make this judgement himself, but 
decided that ‘should the last method of deducing the Mean be considered more just, the 
Longitudes in the Charts, for this part of the coast will be subject to a correction of -8’07.8”.’38 
In addition to the above mentioned observations, Fisher also observed Right Ascensions of 
the stars and Moon, and of the Sun and Moon and by occultations of fixed stars, but as these 
required comparisons with corresponding observations at Greenwich, they were not taken 
into account by Parry.  
Foster, ‘observer extraordinaire’ as he was, took this even further. During the winter 
of the 1824-25 expedition, he calculated the position of the winter observatory at Port 
Bowen based on the following measurements: 
Mean latitude of the observatory at Port Bowen, [was determined] by 90 observations 
of the stars with the repeating circle: 73°13’39’’39 North.39 
Longitude:  
By 6 occultation’s of fixed stars by the Moon    88.54.52,4 West 
By 23 transits of the Moon      88.57.30,99 
By 21 Eclipses of Jupiter’s satellites     88.52.08,85 
By 620 lunar distances (viz 310 * east, & 310 * west of Moon)  88.54.22,41 
By 9 chronometers       88.55.08,1 
Received longitude being the mean of the above:    88.54.48,55 
 
38 Parry, Appendix to Captain Parry’s Second Voyage, p. 93 
39 HECLA: Journal kept by Captain W E Parry. Arctic exploration: North-West Passage. Full and detailed 
account of the expedition, with several sketches. TNA, ADM55/67/1, p. 76/141 
284 
 
Foster considered all the methods used to have equal merit and so gave each equal weight 
in the mean. The longitude derived from nine chronometers was also included in the mean. 
For Foster, the fact that they lay within agreement of the other celestial observations was 
further testament to the correctness of the result. The detail and extent of these land-based 
observations show the importance of determining an accurate base for the charts. But the 
three above examples also highlight how each observer had his own preferences as to how 
this should be done. Establishing the longitude of an observatory was not just a negotiation 
between observers and their methods: some methods or determinations were given more 
weight than others.  
What we learn from this is, firstly, that the position of the ship was continuously 
evaluated by more than just the methods of dead reckoning, chronometers or lunar 
distances. Longitude points on land, even when that was a tiny rock off the coast of Scotland 
and had been determined a decade earlier by another voyage, helped officers evaluate the 
reliability of their measurements. Officers determined the longitude on land each winter, to 
serve as a base for their surveys and to calibrate the chronometers. Secondly, although 
calibration was an important part of chronometer use, the methods used by officers to 
correct chronometers varied considerably, and were significantly determined by how much 
trust each officer placed in both the instrument being calibrated and the methods of 
calibration. Thirdly, each astronomer used different astronomical techniques on shore, and 
not all astronomical techniques were considered equal. This left room for negotiation, as 
Parry’s deliberation on the longitude for the observatory at Winter Island in 1822 shows: if 
other authorities believed the correct longitude required adjustment, then this could be 
done by giving more weight to the outcome that most suited the required outcome. In sum: 
land-based observations were crucial to establishing longitude; these land-based 
observations were used to calibrate the chronometers but the methods used to do so varied 
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considerably; and agreement could be achieved by giving some instruments or techniques 
more weight than others. The following sections further explore the implications of these 
points. 
 
Deception Island: a truth-spot  
The Chanticleer departed from Staten Island on 21 December 1828 and arrived at Deception 
Island on 29 December, another location selected for Foster’s pendulum experiments. On 
arrival at Deception Island, where the Chanticleer was stationed for nearly two months, 
Foster determined the error of the chronometers on the Mean Time by transits of the Sun. 
This was a laborious procedure. Richard Owen explained the procedure in his ‘Essay’, stating 
that in fixed observatories the method ‘will always be preferred’ for rating chronometers, 
but admits that they did not apply this practice themselves and that portable transits were 
not much in use by navigators.40 The method required ‘very strict attention to preserve it in 
adjustment, but the adjustment itself requires more time than can generally be given to it’ 
as it was ‘a delicate and tedious operation; and not by any means so simple as is generally 
supposed’.41  
 
40 Owen, ‘An Essay on the Management and Use of Chronometers’, p. 13 




Figure 7.3: The Chanticleer at Pendulum Cove, Deception Island, 1828. W. H. B. Webster, Narrative of 
a Voyage to the southern Atlantic Ocean in the Years 1828, 29, 30, Performed in H. M. Sloop 
Chanticleer, Volume I, (London: Richard Bentley, 1834), p. 147 
Richard Owen described three ways to set up the transit instrument: using the transit 
of certain stars; by the passage of the Sun; or by a circumpolar star. The adjustments 
determined in this way could take two to three days to ‘perfect’ or within 24 hours if all three 
were applied. Foster, ‘a Hercules in astronomical and mechanical labor’, as others described 
him, managed this tedious operation.42 He spent several days setting up his transit telescope, 
which he ‘enclosed in a light octagonal observatory designed for [its] use’.43 He used Captain 
Kater’s azimuth compass to set it to the meridian. Unfortunately, the weather did not allow 
Foster to use the transits of stars for adjusting the instrument and he had to depend upon 
transits of the Sun. For this, he had to rely on the chronometers despite the fact that his not 
knowing their exact rates would ‘render the deductions therefore proportionally 
erroneous’.44 The chronometer with the smallest rate of variance was selected by Foster to 
 
42 William Fitzwilliam Owen to Francis Beaufort, 1831, UKHO, MP58 




time transits of the Sun’s eastern and western limbs to determine the deviation. Foster does 
not specify which chronometer this was, but it is likely it was Murray 620, as this was used 
during all the subsequent observations of the Sun’s transit.  
 
Figure 7.4: Foster’s observatory on Deception Island, 1828. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/4.  
The weather at Deception Island was poor, with clouds often obscuring the sky and 
thus also the observations. Foster wrote that ‘indeed I never before in any Climate at any 
time witnessed such an … series of gales of wind & unfavourable W. for every kind of 
observation’.45 Midshipman Henry Joseph Kay wrote in his journal that ‘I really expect to see 
Captain, Mids, instruments and tents and all go flying over the adjacent hills some of these 
days, the squalls are so very strong and sudden’. 46 The weather lived up to his expectations, 
 
45 Astronomical Observations, HMS Chanticleer, Deception Island, 1829. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/6 
46 Joseph Henry Kay, ‘Journal kept by Midshipman Joseph Henry Kay During the Voyage of HMS 
Chanticleer, 1828-1831’, in: Four Travel Journals / The Americas, Antarctica and Africa / 1775-1874, R. 
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as on 19 February ‘a squall took the Intensity Tent and as a Sailor said Dous’d it in a twinkling. 
I ran to save the Chronor and while doing that the same squall took all the others successively 
leaving none but our own and the Captain’s Marquees standing’.47 Despite such difficulties, 
the crew obtained some of the necessary observations, and seven transits of the Sun across 
the meridian were observed, these being then used to determine the rates of the 
chronometers (figure 7.5).  
Setting up and adjusting the transit instrument was only the first step in a long process. 
As with all astronomical determinations, substantial calculation was required. Foster’s first 
step was to compare Murray 620 with the standard McCabe 167. This was done in the 
morning and afternoon of 15 January. Although it was usual to compare the standard to the 
chronometer used for observing directly before and after observations, Foster did not follow 
this convention in this particular case, as the transit observations were taken on 17 January. 
Foster then observed the Sun’s first limb cross five wires of the transit telescope in short 
succession. Subsequently, the times of the Sun’s transit of its second limb across these wires 
were noted. These ten observations took just over four minutes and allowed Foster to 
determine the difference between the Sun’s first and second limb crossing the wires to get 
the time of the Sun’s centre of transit across each wire. The mean result of these transits was 




J. Campbell, Herbert K. Beals, Ann Savours, Anita McConnell, Roy Bridges, eds. (New York: Routledge, 
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Figure 7.6: Foster’s observation for the Sun’s transit on Februray 12th 1829. UKHO, SFD9/12/2 
The process was still far from complete. Although the transit instrument may have 
taken three or four days to set up correctly, it still required correction, as the time of the 
transit had to be corrected for deviation and level. As with all calculations, this involved 
taking the secant, co-secant and sine from the tables depending on the values determined 
by the compass and spirit level. The calculated correction was then subtracted from the 
Mean Time of the transit to give the time of apparent noon by Murray 620. Applying the 
Equation of Time gave the time of mean noon. Again, chronometer Murray 620 was 
compared to McCabe 167, and the difference between the two recalculated to determine 




Figure 7.7: Corrections and calculations required to determine the time by the Sun’s transit. 
UKHO, SFD9/12/2 
 
Figure 7.8: Corrections and calculations required to determine the time by the Sun’s transit. 
UKHO, SFD9/12/2 
Using the error of the standard against the Mean Time at the place of observation, 
Foster then determined the error for each chronometer by comparison. Figures 7.9 and 7.10 
show the error as calculated by Foster on January 14, 17, 18, 26 and on February 1, 8, 15, 22 
and 28. Foster determined the error of the chronometers in the same manner once a week 
for the duration of their stay at Deception Island (figure 7.11). This enabled him to determine 









Figure 7.10: Errors of the chronometers on Mean Time at Deception Island, January and February, 




Figure 7.11 Table of rates as determined by observation at Deception Island 1829. UKHO, SFD9/12/2 
 
This should not be seen as an objective determination of mechanical precision 
corrected by astronomical accuracy: decisions were required when applying rates to the 
corrections for the chronometers. A rate had to be applied to the meridian distance between 
Staten Island and Deception Island. Foster chose to use the mean of the rates determined 
between 14 and 26 January and the mean rate determined on departure at Staten Island to 
correct the measurement of the meridian distance. For the departing rate, which would be 
taken into account for the next meridian distance, Foster chose only to take the rates in 
account determined after 15 February as ‘about the 15th of Feby a decided change in the 
amount of the daily rates of many of them took place … for determining the difference of 
meridians between St. Martins Cove & Deception Island’ (figure 7.12).48  
 




Figure 7.12: Foster’s selection of rates for the meridian distance between Deception island and St. 
Martin’s Cove. UKHO, SFD9/12/2 
At his home in London, Tiarks later re-examined Foster’s data to correct these rates 
through mathematical intervention. A first step in the validation of Foster’s process was to 
compare how the determinations by him ‘agree amongst themselves’, when he had 
performed more than one run.49 Tiarks looked at the two runs between Deception Island and 
St. Martin’s Cove, deciding that ‘the smallness of this difference proves that the results are 
most likely very accurate’, but adopted for the meridian distance the results of only one run, 
as the return voyage ‘was long and unfavourable’.50 Users may not yet have found agreement 
on all matters relating to chronometry, but one aspect was accepted: chronometers were 
considered more reliable over shorter distances. 
Land-based observations played a significant and often overlooked role in maritime 
chronometry, although these observations were often hampered by the local conditions in 
which they were made. Foster, thoroughly instructed in astronomical observations, 
improvised when instructions could not be followed. He was able to do so due to his 
 
49 John Lewis Tiarks, ‘Dr. Tiarks’s Report on Captain Foster’s Chronometrical Observations’, W. H. B. 
Webster, Narrative of a Voyage to the southern Atlantic Ocean in the Years 1828, 29, 30, Performed in 
H. M. Sloop Chanticleer, Volume II, (London: Richard Bentley, 1834), p. 230 
50 Tiarks, ‘Dr. Tiarks’s Report on Captain Foster’s Chronometrical Observations’, p. 230 
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connections and experience with Pond at the Royal Observatory and his naval experience 
under Hall, Sabine and Parry. Foster relied on the transit instrument rather than the 
combination of various astronomical observations such as he had made on Winter Island with 
Parry.  
Sabine, Fisher and Foster all relied on shore observations to determine ‘more 
accurately’ what the error and rate of each chronometer was. The method employed by 
Foster, outlined above, was described by Owen as the best for rating chronometers but also 
very complicated. Foster, an experienced observer, was able to do this: he had the time, 
training and resources available. Even so, it was a complicated and challenging affair. This is 
but one example of the difficulties that individuals faced in establishing the longitude of the 
place on land and it illustrates why the time-ball system for rating chronometers was 
suggested and finally introduced in the 1830s. This would help naval officers rate their 
chronometers more readily. But even if an error and rate was established astronomically, or 
by the known longitude of a place, this did not mean that this value was settled. 
Chronometers were often rated on departure and on arrival. If the rates then varied, officers 
would have to choose which rate to apply: that determined on departure, on arrival, or the 
mean of the two.  As I show in the next section, this left more than enough room for the 
different interpretations of chronometric results.   
 
Getting instruments to agree    
Foster used his tables to select which chronometers to use between each station. This meant 
that whilst a particular chronometer might not be included in an initial calculation, it may 
have been employed in a subsequent one. To understand how Foster negotiated his 
determinations we can look more closely at the tables showing the chronometer rates 
produced on board the Chanticleer. Figure 7.13 is a modern representation of a selection of 
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Foster’s data taken from the chronometer comparisons which Foster termed ‘Table II’. It does 
not show how he would have used his own tables, but it can help us visualise what the data 
shows. The data was taken from the second column of Table 2, which thus shows the daily 
change in rates for each chronometer. 
 
Figure 7.13: Showing the chronometer comparison on board HMS Chanticleer between 21 April and 
17 May 1828. The x-axis shows the period of comparison, from 21 April to 17 May, 1828. The y-axis 
shows the rate of the chronometers in seconds fast or slow of the standard. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7 
The above example is based on the rates determined from 21 April to 17 May 1828. The lines 
in blue represent six of the eleven chronometers which Foster included in the measurement 
of the meridian distance. I have omitted the other five chronometers Foster included in this 
mean to give a clearer picture of the diverging chronometers. Chronometers P&F 699 
(green), 799 (yellow), 838 (red) and Murray 620 (purple) were excluded due to the 
irregularity of their rates: ‘chronometers 699, 799, 620 and 838 differ very considerably from 
each other, as well as from the mean result of all the rest’.51 Foster concluded that employing 
P&F 699 and 799 on shore may have ‘deranged’ their rates.52 For the other two, Foster 
 




determined that ‘a very considerable change in the rates of both 620 and 838 [had] taken 
place during the passage from England to Madeira’.53  
Foster’s rough observation book reveals more of his thinking. In his initial calculations, 
Foster compared the longitudes as determined by each chronometer using the mean of the 
rates determined at Falmouth and at Funchal (figure 7.14). 
 
Figure 7.14: Longitudes for HMS Chanticleer, as calculated by the rates determined at Falmouth and 
Funchal. UKHO, SFD9/12/9 
Foster calculated a mean longitude of these results in four different ways:  
1. The longitude by the mean of all:   0.47.23,063 
2. The longitude rejecting 620:   0.47.21,786 
3. The longitude rejecting 799, 699 and 838:  0.47.26,23 
4. The longitude rejecting 799, 699, 838 and 620: 0.47.26,26 
 




Figure 7.15: ‘Table N. 5: Shewing the Chronometrical Difference of Longitude between Falmouth and Funchal, as ascertained, 1st by the Falmouth Rates for the 
Chronometers, 2ndly by the Madeira Rates, and 3rdly by a mean of the Falmouth and Madeira Rates respectively’. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7  
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It is clear why Foster rejected 799, 699 and 838 from the mean as they clearly differ from the 
mean of the chronometers in the summary (figure 7.14). Removing them from the mean 
resulted in a more westerly determination. Foster’s reason for rejecting Murray 620 was 
different. As mentioned above, Foster calculated three different longitudes for each 
chronometer; one using the Falmouth rates; one using the Funchal rates; and one based on 
the mean of these two rates (figure 7.15). It was the comparison between these three results 
for Murray 620 that led Foster to reject it.   
 
 
Figure 7.16: Values from figure 7.15 presented in graph form. This shows the longitude (x-axis) as 
computed by each of the chronometers depending on how the rates were calculated.  
Figure 7.16 shows this analysis in graphical form. This shows the data taken from ‘Table 
5 part II’ in which Foster abstracted the longitude results using different rates. The y-axis 
shows the resulting longitude. The chronometers which Foster selected for the longitude are 
shown in grey (in order that the rejected chronometers stand out more clearly). Section 1 
shows the longitude using the Falmouth rates; section 2 the Madeira rates; section 3 the 
mean of both. Murray 620 fluctuated significantly in these three calculations, and in section 
1, it is also clear that P&F 699, 838 and 799 would bring the average longitude down, placing 
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Funchal slightly more to the east. As section 3 shows, the mean of Murray 620 sat very closely 
to the results of the mean of the other chronometers.  
We come back to the hierarchies of chronometers here. In this case, as Foster pointed 
out, pocket chronometers P&F 699 and 799 were the watches used to take observations on 
deck. As such, their results were generally somewhat suspect. The chronometer with the 
steadiest and smallest rate, considered the best chronometer, was employed as the standard 
(McCabe 167). This was then compared to the watches P&F 699 and 799 and the rest of the 
chronometers kept in the cabin. All the other chronometers were trusted to average out 
instrumental errors and to provide a check upon one another. Chronometers that were used 
on deck or on shore to time the observations were not necessarily excluded from this 
average, as this decision depended on their performance. In the above example, Foster found 
them inadequate, and attributed this to their use on shore. This was not always the case. In 
other determinations they were included: on-shore use did not necessarily rule out their 
inclusion in the mean, but they would often remain suspect and were excluded by Foster for 
the majority of meridian distances. Each decision was made on the spot and varied for each 
run. Sometimes the negotiation was simple: if a chronometer deviated too far from the mean 
it was excluded. But other considerations were also involved. During the passage between 
Staten Island and Montevideo for example, the chronometers were ‘subjected to a change 
of Temp. amounting to 26o of Faht scale viz between 69o & 43o … [and] to considerable motion 
during the heavy and constant gales of wind’.541Despite this, only two chronometers gave 
results that deviated far from the mean. These were the pocket chronometers P&F 699 and 
799. P&F 699 was included despite having been ‘worn in the Pocket as a common watch by 
Lieut Kendall’, during a survey made prior to departure. Foster’s reasoning was that by only 
applying the rate calculated on arrival at Montevideo, the result could ‘be fairly taken along 
 
541Astronomical Observation Book, Capt. Foster, 1828-31, HMS Chanticleer. UKHO, SFD9/12/2 
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with the other Chros’.552P&F 799 was excluded despite its result being ‘by no means very wide 
from the mean of all the rest’ on the basis that ‘it was always used as a journeyman, both at 
sea & in obtaining the necessary observations on shore at the different places visited’.563In 
this case, Foster relied on its use rather than its performance to determine that it should not 
be included in the mean.  
  It is clear that there was no golden rule for officers to follow when selecting 
chronometers to measure a meridian distance. In another instance, Foster applied a different 
approach. At a later stage of the voyage, Murray 620, previously excluded, started to work 
properly and so was included in the mean of the results. In the determination between Rio 
de Janeiro and Santa Cruz (using the rates determined at Rio de Janeiro), chronometers 
Arnold 578, Murray 555, P&F 699, 799 and 838 differed ‘widely’ from the others, a fact which 
led Foster to ‘question their accuracy’. Rather than reject them entirely, Foster ‘considered 
it right to reject them separately from having an equal value with the rest, and have only 
regarded their mean results as equivalent to one chronometer’.574Although, on average, it 
would be possible to select certain chronometers that in general performed better than 
others, these examples show that the average reliability of a chronometer did not guide its 
selection in all instances. In the runs between Funchal and Tenerife, between Funchal and 
San Antonio and between Funchal and the Panedo de San Pedro, the rates of the 
chronometers fluctuated too much for Foster to use the mean of the rates, or just those 
determined at either station. The rates had been determined at Funchal and thirty-six days 
later at Fernando Noronha. In between which the Chanticleer had stopped at the stations 
above. Foster only took sights to determine the local time at these stations. He did not stop 
to determine new rates. Because the rates determined at Fernando Noronha, differed 
 





considerably from those at Funchal, Foster determined the longitude of these places using a 
selection of the best chronometers which were then ‘corrected for irregularity of rate’.585To 
correct for this irregularity of rate, Foster applied interpolation, using the more complex 
equation shown in chapter 6, page 235. Even when the best instruments were employed in 




585Astronomical Observations, HMS Chanticleer, 1828-31. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7 
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To verify these singular determinations, Foster also turned to other sources. Captain 
King had determined the longitude of Funchal in 1826 as 1h7m35,18s west of the Breakwater 
at Plymouth. This location, by correcting for the difference of longitude with Greenwich, 
could be used in comparison with Foster’s results. Figure 7.17 is a transcription of Foster’s 
deliberation for the longitude of Funchal, Madeira. 
 Longitude of Funchal, Madeira  
1 By rejecting the results of 699, 799 & 838 as being the most Eastern 
of any, the meridian distance will be 
0.47.26,23 
2 & by rejecting 699, 799, 838 & 620 we have 0.47.26,26 
3 The longitude of Funchal determined by Captn King in 1826 from the 
Breakwater at Plymouth 0.16.32,19596is 
1.07.35,18 
4 The Longd of Funchal determined by myself from Falmouth the 
Flagstaff on Pendennis Castle being in 20.10,85607by the mean of 15 
Chros four of which did not go very regularly is 
1.07.33,913 
5 If the four irregular going Chros be rejected, the Longd of Madeira by 
the remaining 11 which agreed very nearly with each other is 
1.07.37,11 
6 The mean of these determinations may, it is presumed be put in 
competition with Dr Tiarks determinations,  
1.07.35,40 
7 the Longd by Dr Tiarks 1.07.39,08 
8 The Mean of all which is considered a nearer approximation to the 
truth then 1.7.39,08 the results of Dr Tiarks mean 
1.07.37,24 
9 From which if we deduct the longd of Falmouth according to Dr Tiarks 0.20.10,85 
10 We have for the Meridian Distance between Falmouth & Funchal  0.47.26.39 
11 Which accords very nearly with the best results of the chronometers 
supplied to the Chanticleer – viz –  
0.47.26,26 
12 I shall therefore consider the longd of Madeira as 1.7.37,24 West of 
Greenwich 
 
Figure 7.17: Foster’s deliberation for the longitude of Funchal, transcribed from Foster’s Astronomical 
Observation Book. UKHO, SFD9/12/2. 
In steps 1 and 2 (indicated in the left-hand column) Foster calculated two possible 
meridian distances between Falmouth and Madeira by excluding the results of three 
 
596Foster added this correction to King’s longitude at Plymouth to get the meridian distance between 
Greenwich and Falmouth.  
607This correction is the longitude of Falmouth as determined by Tiarks. Foster added this to get 
comparative data for all the longitudes from Greenwich.  
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chronometers (in step 1) and four chronometers (in step 2). Foster then proceeded to 
compare these determinations with those made by others in the same spot (the observations 
‘were taken on the very spot selected by  Tiarks’): one by Captain King (in 1826) and the other 
by Tiarks (in 1822).618Foster took the mean of three determinations: firstly, that by King (step 
3); secondly, by his own determination using all fifteen chronometers (step 4); and finally, 
the result by rejecting four chronometers (step 5). This mean result (step 6) was then 
compared to Tiarks’ determination (step 7), which placed Funchal further west. The longitude 
according to Foster should be the mean of his calculated longitude and the determination by 
Tiarks: 1o07’37”24 (step 8). By deducting the longitude of Falmouth (step 9 – the longitude 
according to Tiarks), Foster calculated the meridian distance between Falmouth and Funchal 
(step 10). He concluded that this ‘accords very nearly with the best results of the 
chronometers supplied to the Chanticleer’. This led him to: 
suggest the above alteration in the hitherto received longitude of Madeira. The 
almost exact coincidence of Capt. King’s determination with my own and the 
circumstance of the meridian distance between Falmouth & Funchal measured by 11 
chronometers in an interval of 10.5 days, being all in defect of Dr. Tiarks final result, 
whether deduced from the rates furnished by the Falmouth observations or the rates 
ascertained at Madeira, or from the mean of the rates at both those places, are of 
themselves sufficient, in my opinion to warrant a preference to the mean of these 
results of these observers being considered as the longitude of Madeira.629  
Foster relied on the number of good instruments, the relative shortness of the interval and 
the agreement with King’s determination to verify his account.  
Tiarks again used his personal judgement when selecting which rates to apply to a 
meridian distance. He ‘endeavoured to find the most probable results for the meridian 
distances chronometrically determined during the expedition’.6310According to Tiarks, the 
‘near agreement of Captain Foster’s equal altitudes shows his great skill in observations of 
 
618Astronomical Observations, HMS Chanticleer, 1828-31. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/7 
629Astronomical Observations, HMS Chanticleer, 1828-31. UKHO, AO32: SFD7/7/1/8 
6310Tiarks, ‘Dr. Tiarks’s Report on Captain Foster’s Chronometrical Observations’, p. 225 
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this kind, and the advanced state and correctness of the calculations afford unequivocal 
proof of his indefatigable industry’. Tiarks did not doubt the reliability of the instruments, ‘as 
all were considered very excellent ones’, but rather questioned Foster’s method of storing 
them during the voyage.6411Due to the alteration of their rates over very short intervals, Tiarks 
was ‘inclined to believe that Captain Owen is right in finding fault with the manner in which 
the chronometers were suspended from the deck of the Chanticleer’. He added that his own 
experience confirmed that ‘suspension from the upper deck of a vessel is not favourable to 
the going of timepieces’.6512He corrected Foster’s longitude for Madeira, using the rates 
Foster had determined at Funchal without including the Falmouth ones. Tiarks thought the 
run had been too long and that the rates had altered after the ship’s departure.6613  
During the voyage of the Beagle, Fitzroy, Stokes and Stebbing were in charge of the 
twenty-two chronometers kept in Fitzroy’s cabin. Stebbing, Fitzroy’s personal assistant in 
charge of winding and comparison, was not charged with processing the data from the 
chronometers. This duty was the responsibility of the officers on the voyage: Fitzroy, Stokes, 
Lieutenant Bartholomew Sullivan and Alexander Usborne (the Master’s assistant). Sullivan’s 
and Usborne’s chronometer duties appear to have been confined to the surveys performed 
in the schooner Constitucion on the coast of Peru. Only a few of the ‘backstage’ calculations 
involved in Fitzroy’s chain of meridian distances have survived. All that remains for 
examination are the comparison and rate books, the published appendix and a notebook 
kept by John Lort Stokes, Mate and Assistant Surveyor on the Beagle. This was not a 
navigational notebook such as kept by Sabine, Fisher, and Foster. Rather, it contains general 
notes relating to more than one voyage in which there are a few sections that record Stokes’ 
work on the chronometers. The notes relating to the chronometric procedures of the 
 
6411Tiarks, ‘Dr. Tiarks’s Report on Captain Foster’s Chronometrical Observations’, p. 225 
6512Ibid, p. 226 
6613Ibid, p. 229 
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Beagle’s second voyage are unfortunately scant, but despite this, these documents reveal 
similar negotiations concerning the selection of chronometers, the rates assigned, and, 
subsequently, the longitudes that were determined.   
Fitzroy gave an elaborate explanation of how he rated the chronometers, as I showed 
in chapter 6, by using Equal Altitudes of the Sun. He felt it necessary to point out that the 
time determined by these observations differed less than a tenth of a second compared to 
observations obtained by astronomers at Paramatta Observatory and the Royal Observatory 
at Greenwich.6714This indicates how important these observations were for the accuracy of 
the results of the chronometers; just as important, if not more important, than the internal 
workings of the instruments. The application of rates to the chronometers on the Beagle has 
been discussed above (chapter 6 pages 225-240). Let me briefly discus the selection of the 
chronometers.  
In the Appendix, Fitzroy published only the results of his determinations. From this, it 
is clear that he selected the chronometers whose results lay closer to the mean and rejected 
those that differed too far from the mean. Table 7.1 is based on two sources: the published 
appendix and Stokes’ notebook. The first column lists all the chronometers used for the 
meridian distance and the second column shows the results for each instrument. The third 
column shows the chronometers officially selected to determine the distance and the final 
column shows Stokes’ selection.  
  
 
6714Robert Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages of his Majesty’s Ships Adventure and Beagle 
between the Years 1826 and 1836, Appendix to Volume II, (London: Henry Colburn, 1839), p. 329 
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In the run from Ascension to Bahia the results were as follows:  
 Published Account Stokes’ Journal 
Chronometer All Selected  Selected 
A 1.36.27,18 1.36.27,18 1.36.27,18 
B 1.36.20,25   
C 1.36.25,75 1.36.25,75 1.36.25,75 
D 1.36.28,31 1.36.28,31  
G 1.36.24.47 1.36.24.47  
H 1.36.23,48   
K 1.36.22,36   
L 1.36.28,76 1.36.28,76 1.36.28,76 
N 1.36.29,92 1.36. 29,92  
O 1.36.23,56   
R 1.36.26,65 1.36.26,65 1.36.26,65 
S 1.36.24,71 1.36.24,71 1.36.24,71 
W 1.36.26,28 1.36.26,28 1.36.26,28 
X 1.36.32,50   
Z 1.36.26,12 1.36.26,12 1.36.26,12 
Mean  1.36.26,02 1.36.26,70 1.36.26,49 
Table 7.1: Data from Fitzroy Narrative of the Surveying Voyages – Appendix to Volume II, p. 341, and 
from Stokes’ General Notebook. NMM, STK/26/1 
As can be seen from the table, fifteen chronometers were used (A – Z): Fitzroy selected 
the ten instruments he considered the best while Stokes selected only seven. The scant 
record of meridian distances in Stokes’ notebook follow a similar pattern: he selected a lower 
number of chronometers by which he determined a ‘preferred’ distance. But was such 
precision even necessary? As can be seen from this evidence, the difference between these 
three determinations is extremely small, amounting to merely 0.68 seconds between the 
greatest two differences. It is also unclear what Stokes’ reasoning was for selecting these 
chronometers and omitting others. Although it is clear that in both selections (i.e. the official 
selection of ten chronometers out of fifteen and Stokes’ selection of seven chronometers), 
all the chronometers chosen lay closer to the mean result and outliers were excluded, this 
was not necessarily the only criterion that Stokes applied. The examination of a different 
meridian distance reveals that Stokes noted two results for the difference in time between 
Hobart Town and Van Diemen’s Land. Figure 7.18 shows the page from Stokes’ notebook 
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where he listed the results in two columns. Results in the first column were based on 
calculations using the mean of the rates determined by observations performed at both 
locations. In the second column, ‘the watches have been rated by the watches that have been 
going steadily’. These are the highlighted chronometers in figure 7.6 (chronometers A, O, S 
and Z). As Stokes put it, ‘the preference being given to four watches against eleven may 
appear strange; a strict and careful examination of the comparison book has excused it. The 
better agreement of the watches in the second column must prove the correctness of it, tho 
the mean of the five best of each differs only 4 tenths of a second’.6815  
 
 
Figure 7.18: Chronometer selection by Stokes for the meridian distance between Hobart Town and 
Van Diemen’s Land. NMM, STK/26/1.   
 
6815John Lort Stokes, General Notebook, probably begun circa 1830. NMM, STK26/1 
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Even with a collection of the best chronometers available, selection was neither simple nor 
evident. The variations between these results, however slight, reveal that selection was 
dependent on who was doing the selection and how the rates had been calculated. Despite 
these variations being small, they still mattered to those calculating them. Fitzroy and 
Stebbing came to different conclusions, just as Tiarks altered Foster’s determinations by 
applying a different formula for the interpolation of the rates. Each meridian distance 
therefore varied, as users selected different instruments, applied different rates and adjusted 
calculations to align them with other determinations. 
The task of collecting and analysing all this information from several voyages faced 
similar issues. In 1839, prior to publishing his Practice, Raper published a paper entitled ‘On 
the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’. The paper was published in 
eight parts, between April and November 1839. He had spent ‘considerable time and labor 
… to establish among the several longitudes, that consistency which the number of 
observations, now accumulated, gives us a right to expect, at least in some parts of the 
world’.6916In addition to this, Raper ‘demanded that a list of positions pretending to any claim 
upon the confidence of seamen, should exhibit both the elements that have entered into its 
composition, and the use that the Compiler had made of his evidence’.7017Raper thus called 
for uniformity in the method of referring data to particular stations. In his Practice he 
attempted to discipline the users to collect data in a specific way, through chronometric 
instruction, so that the data collected could be readily processed by the Hydrographic Office. 
His list of maritime positions was compiled from various sources: earlier discussions printed 
in the Connaissance des Temps and the Astronomische Nachrichten; ‘fresh data’ that Raper 
had access to ‘by the kindness of Captain Beaufort, (and often with his assistance)’; and 
 
6916Henry Raper, ‘On the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, Nautical Magazine, 
April, (1839), p. 260 
7017Ibid, p. 260 
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finally, from approximately seventy-five voyages whose hydrographical information had 
been deposited at the Hydrographic Office.7118  
The following section examines this transition from data collected on a voyage in a 
particular way, through the process of consolidation towards a stabilised fact, i.e., a 
geographical position of longitude as published in Raper’s paper. Raper’s list of maritime 
positions included Owen’s, Foster’s and Fitzroy’s expeditions, but omitted ‘the Polar Voyages 
… as lying too far out of the way of ordinary navigation’.7219Despite Raper’s exclusions of these 
expeditions, the navigational practices on board Parry’s polar expeditions provide clear 
examples of how data could be collected and was particularly dependent on the individual, 
the geography of the voyage, and the methods against which the reliability of the 
instruments were tested. 
 
Coordinating accuracy 
Accuracy was found by agreement and place was key to coordinating the efforts to 
standardise longitude. Navigational manuals commonly included lists containing the latitude 
and longitude of places around the globe useful to navigation; these were not only listed as 
a destination, but also for navigators to use as a departure.7320Many of these positions were 
inaccurate. This added to the difficulty in establishing where one was and where one was 
going. It was not until progress in charting had been made that a more accurate 
determination of these positions became beneficial. Both of these factors, the accuracy of 
 
7118Raper, ‘On the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, p. 260. A complete list of 
the voyages can be found from page 261 in this edition.  
7219Ibid, p. 261 
7320John Hamilton Moore, The New Practical Navigator, sixteenth edition, (London: G. and J. Robinson, 
1804); John William Norie, A New and Complete Epitome of Practical Navigation, (London: J. W. Norie 
and William Heather, 1805); Nathanial Bowditch and Thomas Kirby, The Improved Practical Navigator, 
third edition, (London: James and John Hardy, 1809); Edward Riddle, Treatise on Navigation and 
Nautical Astronomy, (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1824).  
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charts and the positions of latitude and longitude, were imperative for chronometric 
methods to succeed. Flamsteed had made this point in 1697: ‘Tis in vain to talk of the Use of 
finding the Longitude at Sea, except you know the true Longitude and Latitude of the Port 
for which you are designed’.7421  
The problem with the chronometer was that alone it was not sufficient for the job at 
hand. It was a good tool in navigation, where it could function as a more accurate method of 
dead-reckoning. Its precision also made it highly beneficial when applied to surveying 
practices: in these situations, the chronometer’s function could be said to be ‘black-boxed’. 
The problem was not in the potential precision of the chronometer (potential because the 
instrument still fluctuated too much in challenging conditions; precise, as it often produced 
similar results). It lay in the difficulty of judging the accuracy of the measurements it 
produced. The chronometer was not in itself an accurate instrument, its accuracy depended 
on what it was intended to measure. In surveying, it was accurate, as it was only relied upon 
for very short instances of time. The longer the period of time it was to measure, the more 
its accuracy could be called into doubt. And as the points that the chronometer was intended 
to measure had not been accurately determined, a back and forth negotiation was taking 
place. This is why the Beagle carried twenty-two chronometers. Had the voyage been limited 
to surveying the South American coast, four or five may have been sufficient. For the purpose 
of determining meridian distances, large numbers were required to generate claims to 
credibility.    
The definition of black-boxing as laid out by Latour ‘refers to the way scientific and 
technical work is made invisible by its own success’.7522This definition applies to these points 
 
7421Flamsteed, writing to Pepys on 21st April 1697, quoted in W. E. May, A History of Marine Navigation, 
(Henley-on-Thames: G T Foulis & Co LTD, 1973), p. 29 
7522Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999), p. 304 
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of longitude. Raper’s lists of maritime positions published in 1839 included descriptions of 
how these determinations were made. These details included whether they were made 
astronomically (lunars, eclipses, occultations) or chronometrically, by whom and how the 
resulting longitude had been calculated. Raper compared the whole to form a determination, 
which although not itself always accurate, was at least a fixed point of reference for all 
navigators and surveyors. Gradually, these lists would become fixed positions of longitude, 
no longer accompanied by a discussion or uncertainty (at least not in the manuals in which 
they appear). The longitudes in that sense had been black-boxed: that is, the knowledge is 
now encapsulated in the result, where the complexity of its determination was hidden from 
view. Longitude became detached ‘from [its] context of creation to serve other technical and 
scientific needs’.7623Black-boxing the points of longitude meant that, in hindsight, 
chronometers could be more easily calibrated and, consequently, could form a check on the 
discipline of users. If the outcome of the chronometric determinations matched that of the 
longitude, both the instrument and the users had performed as desired.7724The chronometer 
thus performed an important role, but not its only one, in hydrography, where points of 
longitude required the ‘progressive stabilization of distinct elements’.7825The chronometer 
could not be trusted until the longitude was known: the longitude, as determined by the 
chronometer, was the only way to judge whether it had been appropriately used.  
Raper’s 1839 paper in the Nautical Magazine is a good place to unpick this constructed 
longitude. I examine this by focusing upon Raper’s discussion of the longitude of Rio de 
Janeiro. The longitude of Rio de Janeiro was a point of contention in British and foreign naval 
circles. The determinations made by Owen, Baron de Roussin and ‘the Portuguese 
 
7623Davis Baird, Thing Knowledge, A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2004), p. 163 
7724Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 141.  
7825Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge, p. 140 
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astronomers’ did not agree with those of Foster, King and Beechey. Beaufort wished to verify 
the matter since ‘all our meridian distances in South America are measured from thence’.7926 
Supplied with the best chronometers, Beaufort hoped the matter could be settled during the 
Beagle’s voyage. His instructions to Fitzroy were to break the run down into parts. There 
were several reasons for this. Dividing the run into parts meant that rates could be obtained 
at each stop and alterations due to temperature variations could be monitored, so allowing 
the difference between the authorities to be reduced to ‘within limits too small to be of much 
import in our future conclusions’.8027The first port of call was Madeira, ‘the exact position of 
which has been admitted by all parties’.8128For this reason, it could serve as one of Raper’s 
secondary meridians, i.e. a point of longitude assumed as ‘a fundamental point’ to which all 
further positions would refer.8229The second port of call was Port Praya (Cape Verde), an 
important station for the longitudes submitted by Captain Owen, and one that Beaufort felt 
required verification. Beaufort selected Fernando Noronha as the next stop, which neatly 
divided the run into three equal parts and formed an important station in Foster’s 
determinations. This part of Fitzroy’s journey involved corroborating various accounts. 
Beaufort recommended astronomical observations (‘eclipses, occultations, lunar distances, 
and Moon-culminating stars, will furnish those means in abundance: of all these, the last can 
be obtained with the greatest regularity and certainty’) as ‘absolutely necessary’ because the 
chronometers would be in use for long periods and subjected to sudden changes of heat and 
cold.8330  
Despite Beaufort’s specific instruction as to the necessity of astronomical observation, 
Fitzroy concentrated on the chronometric differences alone, ‘having so many good 
 
7926Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages Appendix to Volume II, p. 24 
8027Ibid, p. 25 
8128Ibid, p. 25 
8229Raper, ‘On the Necessity of Adopting Secondary Meridians’, p. 400, emphasis in original 
8330Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages Appendix to Volume II, p. 36 
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chronometers on board; being practised in observations such as they require; and placing 
great confidence in their results’ rather than ‘to perplex myself … by attempting series of 
observations which would give occupation to an astronomer, and could not be undertaken 
by me, while actively engaged in coast-survey, without interfering with other duties’.8431Poor 
weather conditions, a transit instrument ‘of inferior construction’ and the time required to 
adjust the instrument and wait for clear skies were additional reasons for Fitzroy to ignore 
these astronomical duties.8532  
Raper continued the discussion of the longitude of Rio de Janeiro by pointing out the 
‘very great anomalies’ between various determinations.8633In discussing the validity of a point 
of longitude, Raper made clear that secondary meridians should be determined by 
astronomical observations which could then be connected chronometrically with other 
places. These astronomically determined positions could then be connected 
chronometrically to surveys across the globe. Corrections in relation to one of the secondary 
meridians could be transferred through these connections to any other places affected. 
Raper also elaborated on the difficulty of judging the results: ‘when two or three successive 
determinations agree nearly together we are apt to assume in general that they are right. 
This is however by no means certain’, he continued, citing the example of the difference of 
longitude between Greenwich and Paris, ‘in which two or three equally bad results will often 
be found following each other. It is therefore open to discussion whether the first 
determinations of a place, even though they agree, are right or wrong’.8734 Raper did believe 
however, that if determinations differed widely from one another, then the truth was likely 
 
8431 Fitzroy, Narrative of the Surveying Voyages Appendix to Volume II, p. 75 
8532Ibid, p. 74 
8633Henry Raper, ‘On the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, Nautical Magazine, 
October, (1839), p. 698 
8734Henry Raper, ‘Discussion of the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, Nautical 
Magazine, July, (1839), p. 476 
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to be found somewhere ‘between them, because such great discrepancy most probably 
arises from the presence of errors of opposite kinds’.8835In some cases, however, Raper 
suggested that ‘the evidence divides itself in support of two distinct determinations …  in 
such cases the probability seems to be that one of the determinations is true and the other 
false’.8936Rio de Janeiro was one such case. The point of observation, was Fort Villgagnon, 
recorded as 43o8’ on English charts and 43o14’ on French charts. Determinations of this place 
varied up to 40’, and ‘even in our own times, the results of large numbers of chronometers’ 
had not managed to settle the debate without a difference of 10’ between them.9037   
The problem with this station, as Beaufort also noted, was that it formed the reference 
meridian for many other places. Raper hoped to solve the problem by supporting Beechey’s 
determinations (by Moon culminating stars) with chronometric differences from other 
places, particularly from where the longitude was ‘well determined’. Raper’s discussion of 
Rio de Janeiro was a lengthy and complicated one. But if we break it down, we can see how 
distinct elements became stabilised, to use Golinski’s term.9138 Raper relied on astronomical 
determinations made in various ports on the South American coast and the difference of 
longitudes between these places determined during the previous fifty years by French, 
German, British and Portuguese astronomers. The majority of the determinations were 
astronomical, involving transits of Mercury, lunars, the solar eclipse of 1784 and occultations 
of fixed stars. In 1830, M. Givry, the French Hydrographer, discussed these results in the 
Connaissance des Temps. Comparison led to agreement, which led Givry to confirm the 
longitude of Rio de Janeiro as 44o32’33”. Raper resumed this discussion, adding the longitude 
of Fort Anhatomirim (48o34’20”) as determined by Beechey in 1836 and connecting this to 
 
8835Raper, ‘Discussion of the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, July, p. 476 
8936Ibid, p. 476 
9037Raper, ‘On the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, October, p. 699 
9138Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge, p. 140 
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Fort Villgagnon by their difference of longitude. For this difference, Raper listed six sources: 
Foster, King, Roussin, Givry, Beechey and Fitzroy from whose six determinations he took the 
mean. In this discussion, each separate determination was given equal weight. The mean 
result of this was 5o25’3” which led to the longitude of 43o9’ (by deducting 5o25’3” from the 
longitude of Fort Anhatomirim: 48o34’20”) for Rio de Janeiro. The goal in view was practicality 
rather than accuracy. Whether the absolute longitude of Rio was really 43o8’ or 43o14’ was 
not the point. The point was to accumulate comparable data from different sets of users, 
select an agreed value and then have all navigators use this value.  
Ascension Island was another point of longitude that demanded Raper’s attention, but, 
as with Rio de Janeiro, it was not discussed in isolation. Raper came to the following view:  
The remarkable agreement of Captain Vidal's chronometric runs during long intervals 
gives great weight to his connection with Sierra Leone, and this last position agrees 
singularly well with Captain Owen's determination made 12 years before. Sierra 
Leone is determined probably to 2 or 3 seconds of time. Again, the meridian 
distances of St. Helena and Ascension agree remarkably well. Now on this run 
Captain FitzRoy's chronometers vary only four seconds, while on the run from the 
Cape to St. Helena they vary sixteen seconds, hence the connection between 
Ascension and St. Helena is more certain than that between St. Helena and the Cape. 
If now we apply 8°41'40" above, to 5°42'47", we obtain 14°24’27", combining this 
with 14°26'9" (the joint result of Owen's and Vidals') and giving double weight to this 
result, we obtain 14°25'35" and hence from St. Helena 5°43'55", which very nearly 
agrees with observation.9239  
The figure of 8°41'40" was the mean of the chronometric determinations of both Fitzroy and 
Foster between St Helena and Ascension. The longitude of the Observatory on St Helena was 
determined as 5°42'47", also by the mean of Fitzroy’s and Fosters chronometric 
determinations. Vidal’s and Owen’s determinations were given more weight than those of 
Fitzroy and Foster due to their ‘remarkable agreement’. The resulting longitude of all the 
observations and calculations placed Ascension at a longitude of 14°25'35". By subtracting 
the difference of longitude between St. Helena and Ascension (8°41'40") from this, the 
 
9239Raper, ‘On the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, Nautical Magazine, 
August, (1839), p. 548 
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longitude of the observatory on St. Helena was corrected to 5°43'55" (rather than 5°42'47" 
as determined by Fitzroy and Foster) which, Raper concluded, ‘very nearly agrees with 
observation’. Observation, in this case, was determined by ‘54 observations of Moon 
culminating stars compared with observations at Greenwich, Cambridge, and Cape of Good 
Hope’.9340In Raper’s Practice of Navigation, this longitude had already been adjusted to 
5°44'00”.9441  
The above examples have been chosen to show how complex longitudinal 
determinations were. Each determination was evaluated in comparison to other 
determinations, either chronometrical or astronomical, whether performed by a surveyor, 
an astronomer, or a naval officer. This brings back into focus Miller’s point: ‘neither 
technological determinism identifying an instrument as the solution, nor singular method 
determinism, captures how longitude was established in practice’.9542This also echoes Phillips’ 
point that the longitude problem was one of ‘regulating and rating’, and an ‘appropriate 
astronomical technique’.9643What is missing from this is the role of the Hydrographic Office 
where the accumulated data was not only stored, but also analysed and disseminated to 
officers in the Royal Navy and merchant marine. Increasingly, the Hydrographic Office 
supported an open exchange of knowledge and the ‘intention to “diffuse” it’.9744That Raper’s 
first call to regulate maritime positions was published in the Nautical Magazine is indicative 
of this. The Nautical Magazine, edited by Alexander Becher at the Hydrographic Office under 
Francis Beaufort’s supervision and with the financial support of the state, was ‘an organ for 
 
9340Raper, ‘On the Longitudes of the Principal Maritime Points of the Globe’, August, p. 548 
9441Raper, The Practice of Navigation, (1840), Tables, p. 86  
9542David Phillip Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea’, Navigational Enterprises in Europe and 
its Empires, 1730-1850, Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), p. 224 
9643Eóin Edward Phillips, Making Time Fit: Astronomers, Artisans and the State, 1770-1820, Unpublished 
Thesis, University of Cambridge, (2014), p. 199 
9744Megan Barford, ‘Fugitive Hydrography: The Nautical Magazine and the Hydrographic Office of the 
Admiralty, c. 1832-1850’, The International Journal of Maritime History, 27, (2015), p. 217 
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the dissemination, but also crucially for the collection, of useful knowledge in its desire to 
improve the Royal and Merchant Navy’.9845 
 
Conclusion 
Officers using chronometers to calculate longitude or differences of longitude would 
constantly evaluate the accuracy of their instruments even as this was dependent on the 
resources to which they had access in the field. This chapter has focused on how these checks 
were applied in the field. Parry’s three northern expeditions form an interesting case study 
as each expedition set out with the same goals, instruments, instructions and a similar crew. 
Nevertheless, the steps taken to calibrate and calculate the chronometric measurements 
varied considerably. In these cases, this was linked to the astronomical abilities of the 
accompanying observer and their views on how steady and reliable they considered the rates 
of the chronometers. Sabine, dedicated as he was to pendulum research, was perhaps less 
experienced in the practice of particular astronomical observations, but he also did not deem 
it necessary as a check on the chronometers: in his words, he was never ‘able to discover any 
systematic variations whatever’ when using chronometers supplied by Parkinson and 
Frodsham, on ship or on shore.9946His views on whether magnetism influenced the going of 
chronometers or not were decisively dismissive of this possibility. Fisher and Foster both 
conducted more varied astronomical observations on shore, and in Fisher’s case there is 
evidence to suggest that he placed less trust in the stability of his chronometer rates and 
spent more time improving the accuracy of his measurements with astronomical and 
mathematical techniques.  
 
9845Barford, ‘Fugitive Hydrography: The Nautical Magazine and the Hydrographic Office of the 
Admiralty, p. 209 
9946‘Marine Chronometers, and Currents of the Ocean’, The Kaleidoscope: or, Literary and Scientific 
Mirror, 6 September 1825, p. 271 
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Astronomical observations on shore played a crucial role in early nineteenth-century 
chronometry. Foster’s voyage has shown how establishing the longitude on land to rate 
chronometers was complicated and challenging. Improvisation was often required and only 
skilled observers could be trusted with this task. Foster used the observations to calibrate his 
instruments, which he did both on arrival and on departure. The influence of observatory 
practices on Royal Navy expeditions went beyond the introduction of astronomical and 
chronometric procedures for longitude as it extended to the methods of observation 
performed by naval officers on distant shores and introduced ‘a standardised system of 
calculation’ in the reduction of the results.10047As Phillips has concluded, ‘[the] work and 
experience of astronomers demonstrated the ways in which establishing forms of trust and 
disciplined reporting from officers came to be more important for the Board of Longitude 
and the Admiralty than reliance on ‘perfect’ instrumentation’.10148However, this still left room 
for interpretation. In the examples shown in this chapter, the officers following instruction 
were trusted to improvise whilst working in the field. This is similarly evident in Raper’s 
discussion of ‘The Principal Maritime Points’. The reliability of the results produced by Foster, 
King, Fitzroy, Owen and others was not questioned since it was expected that their 
determinations would vary. Raper’s task was to find agreement between these varying 
results.  
We have seen how rates and errors were established through astronomical 
observations on shore and by comparison at sea. Rates could vary considerably between two 
stations and it was down to the user to determine how a correction should be applied. As a 
result, two different observers could come to different conclusions on what the correction 
should be. Instruments could be either included or excluded from the mean. Different results 
 
10047William J. Ashworth, ‘The Calculating Eye: Baily, Herschel, Babbage and the Business of Astronomy’, 
British Journal for the History of Science, 27, (1994), p. 411 
10148Phillips, Making Time Fit, p. 18 
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were compared based on calculations using only the rates determined on departure, those 
determined on arrival, and from the mean of the two. Foster, Tiarks, Fitzroy and Stokes all 
came to different conclusions as their reasoning for selecting a method varied. As Withers 
has emphasised, ‘[imprecision] and confusion in geography and in time was, it turned out, an 
almost unavoidable consequence of the numerous methods and metrologies used to 
determine the different points and lines in space’.10249    
Advances in hydrography could not occur until the longitude of specific locations had 
been agreed, against which the chronometers could be checked. The voyage of the Beagle 
was the first to connect a chain of meridian distances around the globe, but this did not mean 
that the positions determined were accepted as fact. As has been shown throughout this 
thesis, calculating longitude by chronometer was both time-consuming and a complicated 
process. This chapter has shown that this process continued long after the expeditions 
returned to England, with the accumulation and comparison of data generated by voyages 
spanning over half a century in time. Nevertheless, through continued collection, 
collaboration and comparison, agreed points of longitudes were slowly worked out from the 
mass of documents deposited at the Hydrographic Office. Continued negotiation – between 
methods, instruments, voyages, shore and sea-based observations – ensured that the data 
collected at sea allowed the globe to be mapped to ever increasing accuracy. To this end, 
Raper considered fixed points of longitude determined by astronomical observations crucial 
to improving hydrography. Agreement on fixed points of longitude formed a check on 
chronometers and provided anchor points for chronometric connections. From the 1830s, 
these fixed points would increasingly be equipped with time-balls, which reduced the 
reliance on astronomical observations.  
 
10249Withers, Zero Degrees, p. 115 
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Raper’s paper was addressed to naval men in general. For those not skilled in various 
branches of astronomy, or equipped with precision instruments, discipline and instruction 
were vital to increase the production of reliable data at sea. Precision navigation helped 
‘make visible and thus control’ the performance of officers.10350Raper’s list of ‘Maritime 
Positions’ would allow more individuals to contribute to the collection of data that could then 
be evaluated by others at the Hydrographic Office. This shows parallels with the management 
regime of the Royal Observatory under George Biddell Airy where ‘moral discipline went 
hand in hand with quantitative discipline’.10451In summary, this chapter has shown how 
through negotiation, longitude could be agreed. These agreed reference points made 
calibrating chronometers easier for officers. They led to a more systematised method of data 
collection and a means to check and control the performance of both instruments, and their 
human operators. 
 
10350Phillips, Making Time Fit, p. 17/18 
10451Simon Schaffer, ‘Astronomers Mark Time: Discipline and the Personal Equation’, Science in Context, 







Whatever value may be attached to Chronometric results, the objection cannot be 
removed, at least at present, that any cause which affects the rate of one watch, may 
with equal probability affect any number however great in like manner; thus 
rendering the consistency of several watches no argument for the truth of the time 
they show. But whatever results the continual efforts to perfect the machinery may 
tend finally to produce, the very imperfection of watches at present contributes to 
the security of navigation; for since one watch often loses, while another under 
exactly the same circumstances gains, the discrepancies prevent the danger of 
trusting too confidently to any one result.1   
 
Introduction 
Henry Raper’s remarks above were made over a century after the first sea trial of John 
Harrison’s marine timekeeper, known now as ‘H1’. In the decades between, much had 
changed in the practice of chronometry and the calculation of longitude.  In 1762, the sea 
trial of John Harrison’s fourth marine timekeeper, ‘H4’, proved that a single piece of marine 
timekeeping technology could aid navigators in determining longitude at sea. By 1836, a 
single naval voyage carried twenty-two marine chronometers that were used to determine a 
global chain of meridian distances. In the intervening years, the design and principles upon 
which marine chronometers were built had changed and improved. The cost of individual 
instruments had been reduced, and the supply of these devices to the Royal Navy had 
increased. However, one crucial element remained the same: chronometers were still 
susceptible to variations in the shipboard environment and users could not always be sure 
that the rate and thus error of a chronometer could be predicted with absolute certainty. As 
 




a result, even towards the later 1830s and 1840s, chronometers still remained ‘suspect’, at 
least that is, as Raper’s quote suggests, when only one was used or when chronometry was 
used in isolation. Raper’s remarks thus point to a number of the main findings of this thesis: 
that the chronometer was successful when it was used in association with other means of 
calculating longitude, when more than one chronometer was employed on board ship and 
when chronometry was the result of networks which supported its use. Raper’s remarks must 
also be read in relation to his own published list of longitudes, which he encouraged others 
to adopt in his efforts to standardise the collection of hydrographic data and thereby improve 
navigation.2 Here, too, we can see a connection with the findings of this thesis, namely, the 
link between chronometry at sea, navigation manuals and the production and dissemination 
of chronometric data.  
This thesis set out to investigate the use of chronometers on board Royal Navy 
expeditions in the early decades of the nineteenth century. To gain a comprehensive 
understanding of chronometry at sea, I have examined the chronometer in context, or rather, 
in action.3 This meant examining chronometry as a process: from its start, with the issuing of 
the chronometers at the commencement of a voyage, to its journey’s end, when the 
chronometer was returned and the data accumulated during its journey was analysed and, 
potentially, recast into navigational data. The voyages examined were specifically selected 
because of the ‘thickness’ of the archival resources relating to their use. I have examined 
archival sources that are often overlooked within chronometric research: the navigational 
notebooks containing the observations, calculations, corrections, and outcomes of 
chronometric practices at sea. In addition to these I consulted journals, the published 
narratives of expeditions, correspondence, newspapers and literary journals, navigation 
 
2 Henry Raper, The Practice of Navigation and Nautical Astronomy, (London: R. B. Bate, 1840) 
3 Bruno Latour, Science in Action, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987) 
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manuals, printed chronometric instructions, and additional material. These sources provide 
a more complex and detailed account of chronometry at sea.   
The aim of the thesis was to extend and deepen our understanding of how the 
chronometer was used at sea, and to illuminate its use within established and expanding 
practices of navigation with a particular emphasis upon how users learnt to operate it and 
how they dealt with the vagaries of its use. A second aim was to understand how the 
chronometer went from being an innovative and to some degree experimental instrument 
used on pioneering voyages of exploration, to one that was used, by the 1840s, as a standard 
navigational tool. This thesis argues that certain voyages of exploration were instrumental in 
aiding the up-take of chronometers at sea and that they did so in a number of ways.  
This final chapter is divided into five sections with the collective purpose of identifying 
the context to the work and to present the principal findings and to address their 
implications. In the first section, I reiterate the complex and interwoven nature of 
chronometry and astronomy. These voyages either employed astronomers to assist in 
astronomical observations and chronometric measurements, or they were commanded by 
naval officers who had been specifically instructed in these techniques, often, but not always, 
by those same astronomers. The social status of these officers allowed them to set standards, 
and to make judgements concerning the use and maintenance of chronometers that others 
would later follow. In the second, I reiterate the importance of the care and management of 
instruments, as chronometry in the field was, still, at an experimental stage. This section 
examines the chosen voyages as sites of experimental practice where officers were testing 
the pitfalls and difficulties of chronometer use in a shipboard environment and coming up 
with experimental solutions to perceived problems. Ultimately, as I have shown, this led to 
the formulation and implementation of increasingly standardised rules that regulated 
officers in the use of chronometers and which guided their processes of collecting and 
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analysing data. Each of these points is elaborated upon in what follows. In the third section, 
I reflect on the importance of chronometric data, on how it was collected and managed at 
sea, and how it was transformed into navigational knowledge that, in time and once ratified, 
found its way back to sea. The fourth section describes the limitations of the research and 
suggests areas for future research. In the fifth and final section, I reflect on the key 
contributions this thesis has made to the history of navigation and the history of chronometry 
and to the understanding and content of a perhaps more expansive historical geography and 
history of science and technology.   
 
Astronomical chronometry  
This thesis has contributed to a broader understanding of the relationship between 
astronomical techniques and the implementation of chronometric practices at sea. It has 
done so by examining this relationship from various perspectives. It includes the connections 
between astronomical training and its application to chronometer use; the unreliability of 
the instrument and thus the necessity of astronomical observations to evaluate its 
performance; and the hierarchies that were perceived between astronomical and 
chronometric determinations and how this guided and shaped chronometer use. In this 
sense, the thesis builds upon and extends recent research into the British Board of Longitude 
and Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt’s Navigational Enterprises in Europe and its Empires, 
1730-1850.4 
Those officers using chronometers at sea to determine their longitude at sea, or the 
longitude of distant shores, were required to understand and apply astronomical methods 
and procedures. Many of these techniques related to other methods of determining 
 
4 Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds. Navigational Enterprises in Europe and its Empires, 1730-
1850, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 
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longitude, including lunar observations. Even as this was true, lunar observations and 
chronometers are still often represented as two competing methods which were developed 
in the eighteenth century to find longitude at sea. This thesis has offered a contrary view. By 
examining the methods of instruction and training that were available to chronometer users 
in the early nineteenth century, it has shown how chronometer users were likely to benefit 
from training and instructions relating to the lunar distance method. While there is clear 
evidence that chronometers were used more commonly on routine voyages of navigation 
from the 1780s, it is also clear that within general navigation manuals instructions concerning 
their use remained limited until the 1810s and 1820s. Most early manuals described 
chronometers as being both too expensive and too unreliable for use at sea. Nevertheless, 
detailed instructions relating to timekeeping at sea can be found within the sections given 
over to calculating the longitude by lunar observations, as is apparent, for example, in 
Andrew Mackay’s of 1793.5 The presence of these sections within navigational works points 
to the importance of lunar observations, not only as a complementary method for finding 
longitude at sea, but also as fundamental for training and instruction and in the acquisition 
of skills required for the proper and best use of chronometers. Training of officers in lunar 
distances did not rely solely on navigation manuals: practical instruction would have been 
equally important. Yet, the skills learnt in the process of taking and recording lunar 
observations were also drawn upon by chronometer users. The instructions issued to 
astronomers and captains of ships also point to the importance of astronomical 
understanding and to the observational skills required in using chronometers. Alexander 
Dalrymple and William Wales, for example, both emphasised the terms and procedures that 
would have been familiar to astronomers, if less so to naval officers. These instructions were 
 
5 Andrew Mackay, The Theory and Practice of Finding the Longitude at Sea or Land, Volume I, (London: 
Printed for J. Sewell, 1793), pp. 64-156 
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issued to those voyages that were specifically equipped to trial these methods in the late 
eighteenth century, voyages on which an astronomer was often present. While it was the 
officers who set the rules and procedures for chronometric use at sea, they were increasingly 
guided by means of word of mouth, practical example, and in text books, by astronomers 
and mathematicians.  
These reflections on the nature of the training of officers and their use of instruments 
also points to the social standing of the Royal Naval officer and his access to training and 
resources. The period of peace following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 and 
Britain’s naval dominance thereafter also signalled a change in the nature and direction of 
the Royal Navy. Scientific pursuits at sea afforded good career opportunities for officers 
skilled in navigation, astronomy and hydrography. The majority of those naval officers who 
operated within state- and Admiralty-sponsored networks were afforded access to various 
resources, including scientific instruments and the training and instructions to use them. At 
sea, the role of the naval officer itself was changing, and this reflected the change that 
occurred within the scientific communities of London. Early nineteenth-century scientific 
pursuits, specifically for officers in the Royal Navy, increasingly involved collecting large 
amounts of data, by taking multiple observations and measurements using precision 
instruments. This speaks to Shapin’s argument that access to the spaces where technology 
and science were practised is key to understanding how and why certain practices were 
adopted.6 In these select spaces such as the captain’s cabin, the quarter deck, even the shore-
based observatory tent, Royal Society observers could train naval officers to become 
observers themselves, as Michael Bravo has shown.7 In the context of this thesis, I have 
 
6 Steven Shapin, Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was Produced by People with Bodies, 
Situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority, (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 2010), p. 57 
7 Michael Trevor Bravo, Science and Discovery in the Admiralty Voyages to the Arctic Regions in Search 
of a North-West Passage (1818-25), Unpublished PhD, University of Cambridge, (1992), p. iii 
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shown how this was also the case in chronometry and navigational science. This collaborative 
element of training and instruction in specific sites between people with the appropriate 
social status lent authority and credibility to the resulting practices. William Edward Parry, 
Edward Sabine, George Fisher and Henry Foster were, for example, all associated in one way 
or another with the training and experimental space that was Henry Browne’s basement, an 
‘informal and extremely elite private space’ in which Admiralty officers were trained by Henry 
Kater of the Royal Society.8 There, they became fully acquainted with scientific instruments 
and with the training required in their use. Under Parry’s command in the Arctic, junior 
officers were similarly instructed in, and assisted with, their astronomical observations. This 
was a crucial part of their training in nautical astronomy.  
This thesis has shown that this increased competence amongst some officers in 
astronomy, navigation and chronometry was not always and everywhere extended to all on 
board ship. As William Fitzwilliam Owen testified in his journal, few of his junior officers had 
any knowledge or experience of astronomical science. In modern scholar ship, Betts cites a 
captain who, in 1836, stated that he regularly encountered fellow captains who had been 
issued with chronometers but who had no idea how to use them and did not understand that 
it would take time to do so.9 Although Betts concludes that this view was not commonplace 
became increasingly rare overtime, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that this 
may have been quite common, more so than hitherto assumed perhaps, in the 1830s. But a 
note of caution is necessary here. This study has focused on particular expeditions and upon 
particular source material. Further research into the general adoption of these methods of 
 
8 Sophie Waring, ‘The Board of Longitude and the Funding of Scientific Work: Negotiating Authority 
and Expertise in the Early Nineteenth Century’, Journal for Maritime Research, 16, (2014), p. 109 
9 Jonathan Betts, Marine Chronometers at Greenwich, A Catalogue of Marine Chronometers at the 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 59 
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calculating longitude as sea is necessary before we can make solid judgements about the 
degree of their take-up across the Navy as a whole.   
Astronomical observations remained a fundamental aspect of chronometry because 
although chronometers were issued more widely by the early nineteenth century, they were 
still considered unreliable. This thesis has shown that chronometric procedures and 
determinations were dependent upon lunar and other astronomical observations to a 
considerable degree. First and foremost, astronomical observations were still necessary to 
establish onshore determinations of longitude, against which chronometers could be 
calibrated. In some parts of the world, overseas observatories could provide this service to 
naval officers, but for most expeditions, these services were not available. These links to 
observatories, in particular to the Royal Observatory, were secured and made stronger by 
reference to publications such as the Nautical Almanac and the Tables Requisite. These 
publications are commonly seen as important to the method of calculating longitude by lunar 
distances, as indeed they were, but they were also essential for those officers using 
chronometers at sea as the texts contained the necessary corrections for refraction, dip, 
parallax, semi-diameter and the Equation of Time. The findings of this thesis in this respect 
thus complement and extend recent work in the history of navigation.  
 
Instruments of precision or unruly technology? 
This thesis has shown that uncertainties surrounded the use of chronometers at sea. Why 
chronometers varied in their rates or even stopped working at sea was not fully understood. 
It was because of these uncertainties that officers experimented in different ways in order to 
manage and to care for the instruments under their charge. As a result, how instruments 
were managed at sea depended on what was thought to be the root cause of the problem, 
whether this was magnetic interference, the result of temperature variations or a 
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consequence of chronometers being improperly moved or mishandled. The evidence 
presented here demonstrates that considerable efforts were made to ensure that they 
worked optimally and to prevent either human or instrumental failure that was common in 
chronometers’ use at sea. The four case studies make clear that how chronometers were 
cared for and managed was contingent on a variety of factors.  
The Royal Observatory at Greenwich became an important authority in terms of 
ensuring the working status of chronometers used at sea. The chronometers issued to these 
voyages had been tested by methods and procedures formulated by astronomers and 
mathematicians, in the Premium Trials conducted at the Royal Observatory in Greenwich. 
These trials encouraged chronometer makers to improve the mechanisms of the 
chronometers and as a result the quality of government owned chronometers improved. This 
also put the Royal Observatory and the Astronomer Royal at the centre of the testing and 
issue of chronometers. Those chronometers that performed best in these Premium Trials 
were reserved for officers on the most prestigious scientific expeditions. Makers would also 
use this opportunity to have their own instruments tested on these prestigious voyages. 
Whether their methods of testing were approved by all did not matter (consider James 
South’s critique in chapter 3 pages 71-72). What mattered was that the captains who were 
issued with these instruments considered them superior to other instruments. As a result, 
the determinations of longitude derived from these instruments and from these ships were 
granted a certain authority, epistemic and social, that others were not. Here, we again see 
the role of authority and trust: the authority of the Royal Observatory to test and issue these 
instruments, and the trust placed in the officers they were issued to, and the techniques that 
these officers applied.10 Eóin Phillips demonstrated how initially, lunar observations and 
 
10 Steven Shapin, ‘Placing the View from Nowhere: Historical and Geographical Problems in the 
Location of Science’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 23, (1998), pp. 7-8 
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chronometers were entrusted to astronomers appointed by the Board of Longitude, as they 
were trusted to perform, and to train others to perform, these duties.11 This thesis has shown 
how through education, training and discipline, naval officers were eventually trusted to 
perform and instruct others in these duties themselves.  
Observations in the field were considerably more difficult in practice than on paper. 
Poor weather hindered observations; bad weather prevented them altogether. In the Arctic, 
observers experienced burning sensations when using cold instruments, which often froze 
and broke down in the extremely low temperatures. Here, the atmosphere distorted the 
appearance of the surroundings, further adding to the difficulty of observing in the field. Even 
in milder conditions, instruments failed and broke down. Officers in the field learnt to deal 
with, and mitigate these problems, as, for example, Parry’s use of heated tin cans for 
observing with pocket chronometers has shown.  
This thesis has shown that different practices were adapted to respond to the specific 
environment of a particular ship, the particular geography or area visited and the perceived 
problems which officers felt had to be mitigated. This meant different things in practice. 
Some officers on some expeditions believed it sensible to suspend the chronometers from 
slings. Others thought that this was detrimental to their going and considered a gimballed 
table structure the only way to prevent instrumental error. Even if this was considered best 
practice, it was not always practical: working with twenty-two chronometers on board, 
Fitzroy made do with fixing the chronometers to shelves. This reflected Fitzroy’s beliefs on 
how chronometers were affected by their environment. His view was that movement had no 
effect on their going, and that the main cause of irregularities of rate was variation in 
temperature. William Fitzwilliam Owen established practices that mitigated the effects of 
 
11 Eóin Phillips, ‘Instrumenting Order: Longitude, Seamen and Astronomers’, in: Geography, 
Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. F. Withers, eds, 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 162-163 
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movement, which he considered the most detrimental to the functional operability of 
chronometers, by requesting and using a range of hack or deck watches, which allowed him 
to keep what he considered his superior instruments below decks. This reflected the nature 
of the survey: much work was done in boats away from the main vessels. In summary, officers 
applied different measures to protect their instruments from disturbance, whether the 
source of this was temperature, magnetism, movement, or even the Harmattan winds. These 
issues were still being debated and tested in the late 1830s, on land and at sea, often 
instigated by the Astronomer Royal or the Hydrographer, Francis Beaufort, in attempts to 
improve the accuracy of chronometric measurements.   
Trust in an instrument’s reliability was also a contingent factor. Trust in the device 
varied and depended on where and by whom it was issued, whether it had been tested 
(either on land or at sea) and whether it had been rated on shipboard or on shore. Owen had 
a clear hierarchy of use in his practice of chronometry, and only considered chronometers 
issued by the Admiralty and supplied from London to be used as the standard to which all 
measurements were compared and adjusted. In other cases, the officers were supplied with 
larger numbers of government trialled and tested instruments, and as a consequence 
perhaps saw a less rigid hierarchy of status in their chronometers. Trust in a device also varied 
if the instrument had been repaired, especially if it had been overseas. Owen did not consider 
such instruments reliable. Fitzroy and Foster saw no problem in having their chronometers 
repaired on shore: it was a necessary running repair. As always, a daily account of their rates 
was kept and if these did not vary overmuch, the device was trusted enough to provide 
dependable measurements. These findings resonate with current research that discusses the 
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difficult nature of instrumental practices at sea and how users struggled to maintain and 
demonstrate the credibility of their findings despite instrumental failures.12  
In addition, and in order to prevent or at least reduce instrumental failure, Richard 
Owen offered guidelines on where chronometers should preferably be kept depending on 
the type of ship, and advised that they be kept as near to the centre of motion as possible 
and to avoid having them connected to decks on which guns or chains might cause vibrations. 
Despite these guidelines, neither William nor Richard Owen specified where they kept their 
chronometers on board the Leven or the Barracouta. Of the other expeditions examined, the 
chronometers were kept in the captain’s cabin. This in all probability had more to do with 
questions of access and authority than with where might be the best place on the ship in 
terms of instrumental stability, although the captain’s cabin was perhaps also that part of the 
vessel least disturbed by vibrations and movement. The care and management of 
chronometers can therefore be linked to questions of access, authority, trust and credibility. 
As the chronometers were kept in the captain’s cabin, this meant access was restricted to 
those officers who walked the quarter deck. This not only limited physical access to the 
chronometers, but embraced other resources that were required to use them, for example, 
the use of additional instruments, and access to books, notebooks and paper for recording 
measurements. Limiting this physical access meant that the practice of chronometry at sea 
could only be conducted by officers. In a sense, therefore, this meant that this ‘knowledge 
 
12 Richard Dunn, ‘North by Northwest? Experimental Instruments and Instruments of Experiment’, in: 
Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, 
eds. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016) pp. 57-75; Stuart Jennings, ‘Chronometers on the 1821-26 Royal 
Navy African Survey’, Antiquarian Horology, 40, (2019), pp. 200-214; Mathew Goodman, ‘Proving 
Instruments Credible in the Early Nineteenth Century: The British Magnetic Survey and Site-Specific 
Experimentation’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society, 70, (2016), pp. 251-268; Sarah Louise Millar 
‘Science at Sea: Soundings and Instrumental Knowledge in British Polar Expedition Narratives, c.1818-
1848’, Journal of Historical Geography, 42, (2013), pp.77-87; Charles W. J. Withers, ‘Geography and 
“Thing-Knowledge”: Instrument Epistemology, Failure, and Narratives of 19th-Century Exploration’, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 44, (2019), pp. 676-691  
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was constructed at a distance’, as these officers worked with and received their instructions 
and training from institutions such as the Royal Society and Board of Longitude, or individuals 
linked to these institutions, and in close quarters within quite confined spaces on the ship.13  
As I have shown, connections to institutions and societies lent authority to the officers 
appointed on these expeditions: they had the authority to judge the merits of their 
instruments, to implement their own standards of management, and the authority to record 
and organise the results of chronometric measurements. But adopting strict practices of 
management also afforded credibility and authority to the voyage itself. It demonstrated that 
the users understood the instruments; that they understood the limitations of chronometers 
and applied what they considered appropriate measures to minimise or mitigate these 
limitations. These issues reflect similar findings in current research and contribute to 
understanding the complex nature of instrument epistemology, that is, the ‘intimate 
associations between embodied procedure, authority, accuracy, and disciplinary practice’.14 
In this light, Richard Owen’s instructions to navigators achieved two goals: first, they 
validated William Owen’s claims to accuracy, as these instructions were printed as a preface 
of his tables of latitude and longitude. William Owen wanted navigators to use his tables as 
a reference, alongside Richard Owen’s instructions as a method of use. Second, the 
instructions provided a disciplinary model which would ensure ‘modes of commensurability 
between distant places’, whether these were made by officers with the best quality 
instruments available or by officers commanding routine voyages of navigation.15 William 
 
13 Simon Naylor, ‘The Field, the Museum and the Lecture Hall: The Spaces of Natural History in 
Victorian Cornwall’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 27, (2002), p. 495 
14 Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, ‘Introduction: Geography, Technology and Instruments 
of Exploration’, in: Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and 
Charles W. J. Withers, eds, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 6 
15 Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, Christian Licoppe and H. Otto Sibum, ‘Introduction’, in: Instruments, Travel 
and Science: Itineraries of Precision from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century, Marie-Noëlle 
Bourguet, Christian Licoppe and H. Otto Sibum, eds, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 9 
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and Richard Owen relied on textual means to demonstrate and persuade others of the 
validity of their claims.16 These instructions meant that anybody with a chronometer could 
collect chronometric data, and that this data could then be compared and analysed with that 
collected by a different navigator, provided they too had followed the self-same instructions. 
We can see here one expression of Jan Golinski’s point that disciplining as a form of scientific 
conduct rather than simply a route to subject definition not only provided instruction, but 
also controlled participants’ behaviour.17 It was not the chronometer on its own that thus 
achieved the accumulation of accurate data to improve hydrography. Rather it was, a 
consequence of what Porter termed ‘mechanical objectivity’: individuals were shaped and 
guided by the standardised rules.18 Owen’s instruction meant that navigators could bypass 
‘disciplinary objectivity’, what in the early case of chronometer use was limited to 
astronomers and scientific servicemen.19 
 
Data collection and astronomical accountancy 
Practical chronometry involved more than just the daily winding of the chronometers and 
the recording of the results following the chronometer’s application. The examination of 
navigational notebooks has shown that the process of navigation with chronometers was not 
as straightforward as is often assumed. Officers kept track of their position using dead 
reckoning, chronometers and astronomical observations. Although a logbook might present 
a longitude ‘by chronometer’ or by ‘lunars’, these navigational notebooks show how 
 
16 Stevin Shapin, ‘Here and Everywhere: Sociology of Scientific Knowledge’, Annual Review of 
Sociology, 21, (1995), pp. 289-321; Innes M. Keighren, Charles W. J. Withers, Bill Bell, ‘Writing the 
Truth, Claims to Credibility in Exploration and Narrative’, in: Travels into Print: Exploration, Writing, 
and Publishing with John Murray, 1773-1859, (London: University of Chicago Press, 2015), p. 99 
17 Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 69  
18 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers, The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, 
(Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995) 
19 Ibid, p. 3-4 
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interwoven and interdependent these outcomes could be. This was because a chronometric 
longitude was often brought to noon by dead reckoning and the rates that were applied had 
been calculated using lunar observations. To do this, officers kept written records which 
could be recalculated and corrected at a later date. Astronomical observations were crucial 
therefore for longitude determinations and record keeping was fundamental in keeping track 
of this.  
William Parry’s Arctic commands provided a valuable case study to show how these 
methods varied between each expedition and how the methods used were tied to the beliefs 
and capabilities of the accompanying astronomer. Observations made by previous observers 
were constantly referred to if possible. Simon Werrett has demonstrated, for instance, how 
Russian navigators referred to Captain Cook’s measurements of latitude and longitude as a 
standard, against which their own measurements could be validated.20 This research has also 
confirmed this practice amongst British naval officers, who not only referred to Cook, but to 
any other determinations which could help verify their results. Edward Sabine used Captain 
Capel’s determination of the longitude of Rockall, as he considered this to be more reliable 
than that measured by the chronometers of the Hecla, using the rates ascribed to them. In 
this manner, navigation was not a ‘one-off’ measurement but a constant negotiation, 
between the methods applied on board ship (dead reckoning, chronometers and lunar 
observations, as George Fisher’s navigational notebooks have shown) and through 
comparison to astronomical and chronometric determinations made by other officers. 
Comparisons with other determinations reveal reflections on why one measurement was 
considered more accurate than another and could vary as a result of the competence of the 
officer, the perceived quality of the instruments, or the astronomical methods applied. 
 
20 Simon Werrett, ‘’Perfectly Correct’: Russian Navigators and the Royal Navy’, in: Navigational 
Enterprises in Europe and its Empires, 1730-1850, Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds, (Basingstoke 
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 111-133 
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Uncertainty remained a constant factor in navigation, even after the adoption of 
chronometers. 
This thesis has shown that officers carrying and using several instruments spent 
considerable time comparing the times between the instruments and noting the differences 
recorded. This provided a check on the chronometers when astronomical observations were 
not available. Officers used these tables alongside shore-based astronomical observations, 
for the selection of chronometers that would determine a chronometric measurement, and 
as a basis for calculating the corrections that were required. This was a substantial part of 
chronometric practice and one that required additional skills, notably the ‘eye and ear’ 
method applied by astronomers in observatories. In addition to this practical method of 
observation and comparison, the methods of data collection known as ‘keeping the books’ 
reflected those practised in observatories.21 This is evident in the attempts to standardise the 
calculations, and in the reductions of the results. Using many different chronometers where 
that was possible, several officers took multiple observations and applied their average. 
Officers who demonstrated that they could perform, record and analyse their data could 
claim credibility with respect both to the practices themselves and to the results. The 
astronomical accountancy that William Ashworth identified in the Royal Astronomical 
Society can also be found in these developing practices at sea.22  
If one conclusion can be drawn from chronometric longitudes it is that no two 
determinations were ever simply the same. Agreement had to be reached. It was not until 
this agreement was reached that hydrography and, by extension, navigation, could benefit 
from the introduction of chronometers. Initially, this agreement was reached at sea, as 
 
21 21Simon Schaffer, ‘Keeping the Books at Paramatta Observatory’, in: The Heavens on Earth: 
Observatories and Astronomy in Nineteenth-Century Science and Culture, David Aubin, Charlotte Bigg 
and H. Otto Sibum, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 118-147 
22 William J. Ashworth, ‘The Calculating Eye: Baily, Herschel, Babbage and the Business of Astronomy’, 
British Journal for the History of Science, 27, (1994), p. 411 
339 
 
officers collated, organised and analysed the data they produced. This speaks to Theodore 
Porter’s concept of quantitative objectivity and the idea of a ‘social basis of authority’ 
embodied in these officers.23 Operating as fellows of the Royal Society and, closely connected 
as they were with the Board of Longitude, the Pendulum Committee and with other learned 
bodies, these officers had the authority to use these instruments in order to make 
judgements concerning their accuracy. In time, these would become stabilised values, or 
facts of longitude. Raper’s list of longitudes that he urged navigators to adopt and adhere to 
were based on these singular voyages, together with similar expeditions conducted by 
French, Spanish and Russian authorities. This data, analysed and interpreted by officers at 
sea, reveals the invisible work involved in these naval officers’ contribution towards a global 
system of reference points used in hydrography.   
Withers has revealed the complex historical geographies of the prime meridian as a 
global point of reference, this thesis has examined the importance of reference meridians 
and how these were adopted in publications and on charts and therefore played a role in 
practice.24 This also points to clear hierarchies in methods, where only astronomical 
observations could provide absolute longitudes and chronometers could contribute to 
relative longitudes. This is again to return to the dependence on astronomy, as instead of 
observatories, officers could now use these reference meridians to calibrate their 
chronometers. These meridians were points across the globe that had been determined by 
‘unimpugnable astronomical observations’, as Henry Raper termed ‘secondary meridians’.25 
These absolute positions were determined astronomically and served as reference meridians 
for surveys and chronometric determinations. Meridian voyages, hardly mentioned within 
 
23 Porter, Trust in Numbers, p. 6 
24 Charles W. J. Withers, Zero Degrees, Geographies of the Prime Meridian, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2017) 




histories of the chronometer or even in navigation, became an important tool in the 
measurements of relative longitudes, and would result in Charles F. Shadwell’s manual on 
the management of chronometers and the measurement of meridian distances. Shadwell’s 
manual reflected the practices of the voyages studied in this thesis and drew heavily on 
publications by Richard Owen and by Henry Raper.  
Place was important here, as the observer was required to describe the spot where 
the observations were made so that the exact location could be revisited for use by other 
officers. Raper himself had negotiated these points of longitude, by examining, processing, 
and seeking agreement between the data collected by the Hydrographic Office. Whether the 
position was correct or not in terms of any absolute precision was not the point: rather, by 
agreeing these points, consistency led to uniformity of practice in hydrography. In addition 
to these secondary reference points, Raper called on navigators to adopt his list of 
longitudinal positions of principal maritime points. These proved important for simplifying 
the method of determining the rate and error of chronometers and would lead to the 
establishment of time signals. Longitude was thus constructed through processes of 
agreement. These established reference points across the globe enabled officers to calibrate 
their instruments by agreed standards which also led to uniformity in the collection and 
comparison of data. As such, uniformity and accuracy were an administrative achievement.26  
 
The future of chronometry  
There is more scope yet to broaden our understanding of how navigational manuals did or 
did not assist in the practical training in the use of these methods. Here, I have examined 
how they may have been used by Royal Naval officers whose education took part mainly on 
 
26 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers, The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, 
(Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 14 
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board ship. This research is thus limited to a small group who had access to instruments and 
training that others did not. Additional research, where the sources permit, might reveal 
similar or different patterns in general naval voyages, within the merchant marine, or at a 
later period. There is some evidence to suggest that ordinary watches may have been used 
more widely at sea than chronometers, as late eighteenth-century navigation manuals often 
described how to rate a watch and determine the time in various sections relating to 
astronomical observations. Not until the early nineteenth century were these included under 
the heading ‘longitude by timekeeper’. Additional research should extend to the mid-
nineteenth century, to further our understanding of how chronometry became embedded in 
routine navigational practice, which continued to evolve. Position line navigation, for 
instance, which allowed the simultaneous calculation of latitude and longitude, was first 
published in 1843 by Captain Thomas Hubbard and was gradually adopted in the decades 
that followed. The influence of this new method on chronometric instruction and practice 
deserves more attention.  
The focus of this thesis has been on a small number of case studies, yet the scope of 
my argument has a broader reach. It is possible that further insights might come from 
narrowing the focus. For example, a focus on one or two naval officers’ educational 
background and practical training could tell us more about how one individual came to use 
these instruments in their particular ways. At the same time, and where it would be possible 
to do so, an instrument biography, that is, examining one chronometer through its use on 
different voyages, its repair, maintenance, the data it produced and its life post-retirement, 
would greatly enhance our understanding of different practices and their implications.27 Such 
 
27 See for example the following chapter: Eugene Rae, Catherine Souch and Charles W. J. Withers, 
‘‘Instruments in the Hands of Others’: The Life and Liveliness of Instruments of British Geographical 
Exploration, c.1860-.1930’, in: Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser 
MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, eds. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 139-159 
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a biography would be critically dependent upon the survival of the necessary sources. The 
examination of the data produced would benefit from a more detailed account of how each 
trace of practice relates to another, how logbooks were constructed from a multitude of 
observers, observations and calculations, and what we can learn from the results there 
recorded.  
In this thesis, I have explored the method of meridian distances that was employed by 
John Lewis Tiarks, Henry Foster and Robert Fitzroy. This principally national focus could be 
extended towards an international perspective to examine these determinations in relation 
to those made, for example, by the Russian General Schubert who established longitudes in 
the Baltic using 56 chronometers in 1833, and by Admiral Adam Johann von Krusenstern, 
who applied the method between 1803 and 1806, or by the French Captain Guattier du Parc, 
who measured chronometric distances in the Mediterranean and Black Sea. The advent of 
steam allowed the process to be applied more specifically to this aim, though no research up 
to date has examined how this influenced practice.  
The final chapter of this thesis began with an examination of Henry Raper’s call in 1839 
to agree the reference meridians to which naval officers should refer their measurements. A 
decade earlier, the first time-signal had been trialled in Portsmouth. Our understanding of 
naval chronometry, technology, and science at sea would be enhanced through more in-
depth research into how these were established in relation to the continuing role of the 
observatory. There is still more to be gained by examining how this influenced the practice 
of chronometry at sea, the trust that was placed in instruments, method and the production 
of data, and in the application in chronometry for routine navigation.  
This thesis has also touched upon, but not explored in detail, the collaborative nature 
of research into chronometers, both at sea and on land. In his position as Astronomer Royal 
between 1835 and 1881, George Airy oversaw land and sea-based trials to understand how 
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external factors influenced chronometers. Hydrographer Francis Beaufort oversaw sea-
based trials by ordering specific guidelines to be followed by surveyors and requested the 
results to be reported back to him. Here, again further research might be possible to see how 
their work extended or differed from the Premium Trials of the 1820s. Finally, a growing 
overseas market for chronometers was appearing, where businesses would sell, repair and 
service instruments. It is clear from this research that these services were engaged with, and 
that it affected the status of the instruments. If chronometry was a ‘thrifty science’ in the 
sense of instruments’ repair and the contingencies of practice, that too would merit greater 
attention.28   
 
A historical geography of the chronometer 
This thesis has made contributions to the historical geographies of science, the histories of 
navigation and to the histories of chronometry by emphasising the chronometer in action. It 
has done so through a focus on the places in which chronometry was practised, the 
individuals who used the chronometers, and the regulations, instructions and institutions 
that guided the behaviour of the chronometers and their users.  
By examining the use of chronometers in the period following the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars from 1815, I have built on and contributed to research that has examined 
the changing role of naval officers and the emphasis of scientific practice at sea. Others have 
shown how this led to standardised methods of measurement, the use of precision 
instruments, the collection of data and the presentation of data in numerical, tabulated 
forms.29 Drawing on research within the historical geographies of science, I have contributed 
 
28 Simon Werrett, Thrifty Science: Making the Most of Materials in the History of Experiment, (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2019);  
29 Randolph Cock, ‘Scientific Servicemen in the Royal Navy and the Professionalisation of Science 1816-
1855’, in: Science and Beliefs: From Natural Philosophy to Natural Science 1700-1900, David M. Knight, 
and Matthew D. Eddy, eds, (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), p. 96 
344 
 
to our understanding of the ‘relationships between science, technology, and method in terms 
of individual disciplinary formation’.30 This thesis has shown how in relation to chronometry, 
this was still work in process, since, by the 1840s, there was yet more work to be done to 
ensure standard practices were adopted and to establish the necessary networks to allow 
this disciplinary formation to take shape.  
This thesis has also contributed to the geography of the chronometer, and examined 
the places where longitude was constructed. These places, whether evident in Foster’s 
Deception Island, or the Consul’s garden in Funchal, were vital to constructions of longitude: 
they allowed users to check, calibrate, and correct their instruments. Chronometers are often 
seen as placeless, a device or mechanism that simply provided the time, regardless of where 
they were used. I have shown that this was not the case, and that the practice of chronometry 
was in reality rooted in a series of locations; on board ship, on bumboats, on shore and in 
observatories. The methods of their use bore the marks of these locations.31 These findings 
confirm the research of Miller and Werrett, who also argue that instruments and methods 
were used together and in specific places depending on circumstances.32 This thesis has 
shown exactly how this was the case and what mechanisms were employed to construct 
knowledge from these contingent practices. Following Simon Naylor’s argument in relation 
to meteorology at sea, naval chronometry, like meteorology, transformed from an ‘informal 
even idiosyncratic, culture of inquiry’ to the uniform use of instruments with ‘prescribed 
 
30 Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. Withers, ‘Introduction: Geography, Technology and Instruments 
of Exploration’, in: Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and 
Charles W. J. Withers, eds, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 7 
31 Heike Jöns, David N. Livingstone, and Peter Meusburger, ‘Interdisciplinary Geographies of Science’, 
in: Geographies of Science, Knowledge and Space, Volume 3, Peter Meusburger, David N. Livingstone, 
Heike Jöns, eds, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), pp. ix-xvii 
32 David Phillip Miller, ‘Longitude Networks on Land and Sea’, pp. 223-247 and Werrett, ‘’Perfectly 
Correct’: Russian Navigators and the Royal Navy’, pp. 111-133, in: Navigational Enterprises in Europe 
and its Empires, 1730-1850, Richard Dunn and Rebekah Higgitt, eds, (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016)  
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observations and practices’.33 This thesis has also contributed to scholarship which examines 
the ship as site of scientific enquiry and has shown how these experimental sites contributed 
to practices of standardised regimes of practice.  
A further contribution of this research demonstrates the importance of data collection 
and its management. With these findings, the thesis contributes to the history of science and 
technology, the history of navigation and the history of the chronometer as no other study 
to date has examined the role, nor the implications of this aspect of chronometry. These 
practices developed alongside, and were shaped by, the expanding role of the state, the 
Admiralty and the scientific societies of the nineteenth century. These data practices at sea 
reveal how officers dealt with uncertainty, established authority and trust in their methods 
and helped navigational knowledge circulate on a larger scale. One further contribution of 
this work is that of methodology. I have demonstrated the value of close reading of 
navigational notebooks, scribbled calculations, calculated data and tabulated numerical 
outcomes for revealing daily practices at sea. While it is not uncommon to see these 
documents described as topic, I have shown how valuable they are as resource for 
understanding otherwise undescribed aspects of chronometry.   
I have contributed to the history of science and technology by drawing on current 
research and approaches which have shown how chronometers were used in the pursuit of 
longitude. The evidence presented has shown how chronometers, alongside astronomical 
observations, constructed and constituted longitude. Informed by Porter’s work concerning 
trust in numbers, I have shown how quantitative authority was achieved in the pursuit of 
longitude.34 The pursuit of chronometry at sea became linked to the ‘right moral habits’ that 
 
33 Simon Naylor, ‘Weather Instruments all at Sea: Meteorology and the Royal Navy in the Nineteenth 
Century’, Geography, Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. J. 
Withers, eds, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), p. 78 
34 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers, The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, 
(Chichester: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 3-8 
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Schaffer has described in nineteenth-century observatories.35 Drawing on Simon Schaffer’s 
analyses of the division of labour in observatories and the disciplining of the recorder, I have 
shown how ‘disciplinary regulation’ in chronometry was transferred from the observatory to 
the ship.36 As Eóin Phillips has demonstrated, this process was underway in the late 
eighteenth century, and continued on nineteenth-century voyages.37 This thesis has shown 
how Royal Navy officers were increasingly disciplined through observatory practices. This 
was achieved through standardised processes of observing, of numerical reduction and 
record keeping, and through instructions on the management of chronometers themselves. 
Observatory practices guided the process of observing, calculating and reducing the data: the 
Hydrographic Office collected, sorted and negotiated the outcomes. Henry Raper himself 
commented on the similarities between astronomy and hydrography: ‘In fact hydrography 
has now arrived at a phase corresponding to that of Astronomy, at which the positions of the 
smaller stars, instead of being made the object of direct observations, are inferred with more 
convenience and precision from comparison with a few fundamental stars’.38 Gradually, 
points of longitude became stabilised values represented in tables, sailing directions, charts 
and on maps. Ultimately, this instruction and standardisation helped to control the 
performance of the devices and the officers. The making of chronometric longitude was the 
result of processes of disciplinary formation, social negotiations and administrative practices 
at sea and on land.
 
35 Simon Schaffer, ‘Astronomers Mark Time: Discipline and the Personal Equation’, Science in Context, 
2, (1988), p. 119 
36 Simon Schaffer, ‘Astronomers Mark Time: Discipline and the Personal Equation’, Science in Context, 
2, (1988), p. 119 
37 Eóin Phillips, ‘Instrumenting Order: Longitude, Seamen and Astronomers’, in: Geography, 
Technology and Instruments of Exploration, Fraser MacDonald and Charles W. F. Withers, eds, 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 37-55 
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